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I. Introduction
Advances in medicine are reported almost daily in the media.
Medical researchers have developed and are continuing to develop
new methods of creating, saving, and prolonging life. This Special
Project examines the impact that rapidly advancing medical tech-
nology has on the law governing conception, pregnancy, and birth.
Although medical techniques have advanced rapidly during
the past decades, state and federal legislatures have responded in-
adequately to the legal consequences of these new birth technolo-
gies. The resulting lag between technology and the law has forced
courts to confront new situations that do not fit neatly into the
statutory framework created to deal with past fact situations. For
example, courts have applied statutes prohibiting "child bartering"
to surrogate parenting cases1 and statutes prohibiting fetal experi-
1. See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text in the Surrogate Parenting section.
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mentation to artificial insemination cases2 although it is clear that
the legislators never considered such fact patterns when passing
the statutes. A lag is inevitable because the law can only respond
to, rather than predict, emerging medical developments. Nonethe-
less, legislators must respond promptly by confronting the new le-
gal issues that result from new medical technologies.
One impediment to prompt legislative response to the lag be-
tween medical technology and the law is the controversial nature
of the legal problems posed. Abortion continues to be an extremely
controversial issue thirteen years after the Supreme Court legal-
ized it in the landmark decision Roe v. Wade.3 The "Baby Doe"
issue of whether to force hospitals and parents of severely de-
formed newborns to provide medical care is another extremely
controversial issue. "Baby Doe" has become highly politicized as
the Reagan administration, Congress, right-to-life groups, disabil-
ity groups, medical professionals, and other groups have taken
stances.4 Surrogate parenting also has produced controversial situ-
ations. In one incident, a New York couple contracted with a Cali-
fornia surrogate mother. When the surrogate mother breached the
agreement, the couple brought suit. The court discovered that the
couple consisted of a man and a transsexual, thus raising the issue
of whether transsexuals or homosexuals should be allowed to adopt
children by contracting with surrogate mothers.5
A second impediment to prompt legislative response to the lag
between medical technology and the law is the need to understand
thoroughly the new medical procedures. Obviously, legislators can-
2. See infra notes and accompanying text in the Surrogate Parenting section.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The abortion controversy is particularly emotional and po-
larized. Thirteen years after the Supreme Court legalized abortion, the controversy still
swirls at full tide. Antiabortion demonstrators marked the anniversary of the Roe decision
on January 22 with a mass march through the nation's capital and smaller protests else-
where across the country. The National Organization for Women and other abortion-rights
groups held vigils and counterdemonstrations in more than 100 cities. Those who seek to
again outlaw abortions vowed to keep fighting. Declared one marcher: "We aren't going to
quit-ever." U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 3, 1986, at 5.
The abortion controversy has become so emotional that it has resulted in violence. For
examples of bombings at abortion clinics, see Ohio Abortion Clinic Damaged in Blast, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 11, 1985, at A-22, col. 6; Abortion Clinic Blasts Bring 10-Year Sentence, N.Y.
Times, July 31, 1985, at A-19, col. 6; Man Sentenced in Bombings, N.Y. Times, July 13,
1985, at A-42, col. 6.
4. See infra notes 1112-1138 and accompanying text in the Baby Doe section for a
discussion of the Baby Doe controversy.
5. The "Malahoff incident" was discussed by legal commentator Lori Andrews in NEw
CONcEPTiONs 239-41 (1984) and in The Stork Market: Legal Regulation of the New Repro-
ductive Technologies, 6 WHrrrmR L. Rav. 789, 791 (1984).
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not regulate a medical technique until they understand not only its
mechanics but also its legal implications. Legislators have a re-
sponsibility to educate themselves by studying the new technology
and by utilizing the expertise of the medical profession.
The courts also have a duty to confront the impact of medical
technology on the law. Judges have applied old common law rules
to modern prenatal tort cases even though the modern fact situa-
tions could not have been contemplated when the rules were devel-
oped decades or centuries earlier.' Judicial failure to examine thor-
oughly the new causes of action arising as medical technologies
expand has led to confusion of the issues and mislabeling of causes
of action,7 most notably in wrongful pregnancy and wrongful con-
ception suits.
This Special Project focuses on several areas of the law that
are directly related to the medical technology regarding concep-
tion, pregnancy and birth. Part II lays the foundation for the anal-
ysis by explaining the medical procedures themselves. An under-
standing of the various medical advances is crucial to developing a
legal analysis. Part III examines the legal consequences of the sur-
rogate parenting process. Part IV discusses the inheritance conse-
quences when a child is conceived by artificial insemination. Part
V focuses on the role of the physician in the judicial and statutory
framework regulating the decision whether to abort a fetus. Parts
VI, VII, VIII and IX examine the birth torts, including wrongful
pregnancy and conception, wrongful birth, wrongful life, and
wrongful death. Part X describes the Baby Doe controversy and
the legislative attempts to regulate the decision whether to deny
medical treatment to a severely defective newborn. Part XI dis-
cusses the broader implications that medical technology poses for
the tension between maternal and fetal rights.
II. Medical Technology
A. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 605
B. INITIATION OF PREGNANCY ........................... 606
1. Fertilization .............................. 607
2. Implantation .............................. 609
6. See infra notes 7-10 and accompanying text in the Wrongful Death Section.
7. See infra notes 1-5 and accompanying text in the Wrongful Pregnancy and Concep-
tion Section.
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A. INTRODUCTION
Rapid advances in many scientific disciplines have led to the
application of new methods and technologies in every aspect of
medicine. Often these new capabilities require fundamental
changes in legal analysis or raise legal questions that never before
have required consideration. This Part explains new technologies
that potentially influence fetal and neonatal' rights; it lays the
technical foundation for the discussions that follow. Although
countless new technologies have developed, this Part will empha-
8. For a definition of fetus, see infra note 15. The fetal period extends to birth. When
born alive the fetus becomes a neonate. The neonatal period extends for the first four weeks
(28 days) oflife. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 931 (24th ed. 1982).
The term infant refers to a child from either birth or the end of the neonatal period
until one year of age. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 663 (26th ed. 1985). For
a general discussion of the relationship between period of development and mortality statis-
tics, see M. AVERY & H. TAEUSCH, SCHAFFER'S DISEASES OF THE NEWBORN 2-5 (1984).
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size three areas in which the impact of modern medical technology
on legal analysis is particularly acute. Section B discusses noncoital
or "artificial" initiation of pregnancy. This Section first examines
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization and then turns to
an explanation of embryo transfer and of preservation of embryos
for future use. Section C focuses on the medical problems of the
fetus during pregnancy. This Section explores the technology for
detection and therapy of genetic diseases, chromosomal abnormali-
ties, and physicial malformations. This Section also examines fetal-
maternal interactions, including maternal blood group antibodies;
infections; and the use of drugs, alcohol, and tobacco. Section D
analyzes the medical aspects of pregnancy termination-either by
abortion or by delivery-with a focus on fetal "viability," a term
central to legal analysis in this area.
B. INITIATION OF PREGNANCY
Reproduction is either natural or artificial.9 Natural, or coital,
reproduction has been the exclusive form of reproduction available
to mankind for many centuries.10 Artificial, or noncoital, reproduc-
tion includes all other forms of reproduction-artificial insemina-
tion, in vitro fertilization, and embryo transfer.11 A brief review of
the biological facts surrounding natural reproduction 12 will lay a
foundation for subsequent analysis of the problems raised by artifi-
cial reproduction.
A normal female of child-bearing age ovulates approximately
every twenty-eight days. At ovulation, one of her two ovaries re-
leases an ovum, or egg."3 The fallopian tube, a tube-like structure
9. This section discusses human reproduction, but many of the technologies are appli-
cable to other mammals. Animal studies are the source of much of the understanding of
human reproduction.
10. See infra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 17-37. For an overview of the social policy con-
siderations related to artificial reproduction, see Elias & Annas, Social Policy Considera-
tions in Noncoital Reproduction, 255 JA.MA 13 (1986). For a summary of the historical
aspects of artificial reproduction, see Alfredsson, Gudmundsson & Snaedal, Artificial In-
semination by Donor with Frozen Semen, 38 OBSTEmICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURVEY 305,
305-06 (1983) and references cited therein.
12. See generally BEST AND TAYLOR'S PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 934
(J. West ed. 1985); A. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 983 (1986); Kaiser, Fertil-
ization and the Physiology and Development of Fetus and Placenta, in OBSTrRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY 294 (D. Danforth ed. 1982).
13. Occasionally two ova, or eggs, are released. If each is fertilized by different sperm,
fraternal, or dizygotic, twins that are not genetically identical will develop. If one ovum is
fertilized and then divides into two embryos, both embryos will be genetically identical and
develop into identical, or monozygotic twins. K. MOORE, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN 130-33 (3d
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that connects to the inside of the uterus, or uterine cavity, draws
the released ovum into its opening, or lumen, and propels the egg
toward the uterine cavity. The egg's trip through the fallopian tube
takes three to five days. Meanwhile, if a male has deposited sperm
in the upper vagina by sexual intercourse, the mobility of the
sperm will cause them to enter the uterine cavity and migrate up
the fallopian tube. If a viable sperm"4 reaches a viable ovum during
its transit through the fallopian tube, fertilization will occur and
the fertilized ovum will divide to begin formation of the embryo, or
early fetus.15 If fertilization does not occur, then the ovum will die
and no pregnancy will occur. Upon fertilization, the early embryo
continues down the fallopian tube until it reaches the uterine cav-
ity, where the embryo implants on the surface and grows to form a
fetus and placenta. Three trimesters of approximately three
months each comprise the stages of fetal development.16
1. Fertilization
In vivo fertilization is fertilization that occurs within the body
of a woman. Natural reproduction, of course, invovles in vivo fertil-
ization. Artificial insemination, another form of in vivo fertiliza-
tion, is similar to natural reproduction except that no sexual inter-
ed. 1982). For a glossary of terms used in human reproduction, see id. at 1-6.
14. Although the terms sperm and semen are sometimes used interchangeably this use
is not technically correct. The sperm, or spermatoza, are the male sex cells that contain the
male's genetic information to be transmitted to his offspring when they fertilize ova from
the female. When the sperm are viable they move with a swimming-like motion. Semen, a
fluid produced by the male, contains sperm and the secretions from various glands along the
male reproductive tract including the seminal vesicles and the prostate.
15. The technical terms used to designate the various stages of development are as
follows: The fertilized ovum is a zygote. After repeated divisions during the first three days
after fertilization the zygote becomes a small ball of cells called amorula. After entering the
uterine cavity the morula continues to divide and becomes a blastocyst, which them im-
plants in the uterine lining. At about two weeks the cells of the blastocyst become organized
into layers; at this point the developing human is referred to as an embryo. The embryo
stage continues until about the end of the eighth week after fertilization. During this stage
the body organs, such as heart, lungs, and liver, are formed. At the end of the embryo stage
the developing human is called a fetus. See K. MOORE, supra note 12, at 1-6.
Although not technically correct, the term embryo is widely used to include the stages
from zygote through embryo. This Special Project will use the term early embryo to refer to
the stages from zygote until the beginning of the embryo stage, i.e. approximately the first
two weeks after fertilization.
16. The medical literature defines a full term pregnancy as forty weeks. This forty
week interval is measured from the beginning of the last menstrual period, not from ovula-
tion. Consequently, approximately two of the forty weeks are before fertilization. OBSTET-
RICS AND GYNECOLOGY 295-96 (D. Danforth ed. 1982).
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course takes place. 17
During artificial insemination, sperm is collected from a male
and deposited by a plastic syringe into the opening of the woman's
uterus shortly after she has ovulated. Processing the sperm be-
tween collection and deposition in the uterine cavity may include
freezing and storing the sperm for future use, concentrating the
sperm to increase the chance of fertilization, or selectively concen-
trating the sperm to increase the probability of a genetic trait such
as the sex of the child. The source of sperm may be either the
husband of the woman inseminated or another male. When the
husband is the source of the sperm, the insemination process is
called homologous artificial insemination.18 When another male is
the source of the sperm, the term is heterologous artificial insemi-
nation.19 The usual reasons to use homologous artificial insemina-
tion are related to processing of the sperm between collection and
insemination. These reasons include: infertility0 in the male from
medical problems that cause a low sperm count or that prevent
effective sexual intercourse; storage of sperm for future use; and
selection of the sex of the offspring. A woman typically may elect
to use heterologous artificial insemination to overcome the steril-
ity 21 of her husband, to reproduce without sexual contact with the
father,22 or to select the genetic traits of her offspring.
In vitro fertilization is fertilization that takes place outside the
body.25 One or more ova removed from the woman by a surgical
17. See generally Batzer & Corzon, AIH: New Approaches to Therapeutic Insemina-
tion, 13 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY ANN. 289 (1984); Alfredsson, Gudmundsson, & Snaedal,
supra note 11, at 305.
18. Batzer & Corson, supra note 17.
19. See generally Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial In-
semination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 585 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Curie-Cohen].
20. Infertility is the failure to achieve conception by natural reproduction despite re-
peated attempts. Among infertile individuals a subset of individuals have an "absolute fac-
tor," such as complete failure to produce sperm or ova, preventing natural reproduction.
These individuals have sterility or absolute infertility. Coulam, The Diagnosis and MAnage-
ment of Infertility in 5 GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS (Sciarra ed. 1983).
21. See supra note 20.
22. Of course, a woman also may use homologous artificial insemination to reproduce
without sexual contract with her husband. As a pratical matter, however, this practice rarely
occurs.
23. See generally Garcia, In Vitro Fertilization, 14 BOSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY ANN.
45 (1985); Grobstein, Flower & Mendeloff, External Human Fertilization: An Evaluation of
Policy, 222 SCIENCE 127 (1983). For a discussion of the legal issues raised by in vitro fertili-
zation, see Fanta, Legal Issues Raised by In vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in the
United States, 2 J. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION & EMBRYO TRANSFER 65 (1985).
[Vol. 39:597608
1986] CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND BIRTH
technique 24 are placed in a dish in the laboratory under conditions
designed to maintain viability. Processed sperm25 are mixed with
the ova. If fertilization occurs, the ovum undergoes division. After
several divisions, typically within two or three days,26 the early em-
bryo is ready for implantation in the uterine cavity. The source of
the ovum may be either the woman into whose uterus the embryo
is implanted or another woman. Likewise, sperm may come from
the husband of the implantee or from another male. In vitro fertil-
ization most often is used to overcome infertility due to obstruc-
tion of the fallopian tubes,27 but also may be used to store embryos
for future use 28 or to control the genetics of the offspring.29
2. Implantation
After fertilization, the next step in reproduction is implanta-
tion of the early embryo in the uterine cavity. Following in vivo
fertilization, the early embryo will progress down the fallopian
tube and implant in the uterine cavity. Immediately before, or
more likely, shortly after implantation, the early embryo may be
flushed out of the uterine cavity and collected. This embryo then
may be implanted in another uterus or in the uterus of the same
woman"0 after storage of the embryo for some period of time.31 The
24. See Ayers, In Vitro Fertilization: A Perinatal Perspective, 10 CLINICS IN PER-
INATOLOGY 285, 287 (1983); Belaisch-Allart, Hazout, Guillet-Rosso, Glissant, Testart &
Frydman, Various Techniques for Oocyte Recovery in an in Vitro Fertilization and Em-
bryo Transfer Program, 2 J. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION & EMBRYO TRANSFER 99 (19850).
25. McDowell, Preparation of Semen for in Vitro Fertilization, 6 INFERTILITY 149
(1983).
26. Purdy, Methods for Fertilization and Embryo Culture in Vitro, in HUMAN CON-
CEPTION IN VITRO 147 (R. Edwards & J. Purdy eds. 1982) 147.
27. Previous pelvic infection may cause blockage of the fallopian tubes. In addition, a
woman who has had her fallopian tubes surgically interrupted as a means of contraception
may now want to have a child. See Edwards, Fishel, Cohen, Fehilly, Purdy, Slated, Steptoe
& Webster, Factors Influencing the Success of in Vitro Fertilization for Alleviating Human
Infertility, 1 J. VITRO FERTILIZATION & EMBRYO TRANSFER 3 (1984).
28. See infra notes 35 & 36 and accompanying text; Grobstein, Flower & Mendeloff,
supra note 15, at 1585. Embryo storage may occur if a doctor anticipates that a spouse will
be infertile because of surgery or chemotherapy.
29. See infra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
30. Implantation in the same uterus would follow storage of the previously removed
early embryo. This practice might be used if a doctor anticipates that the woman would
become infertile as a result of ovarian surgery or chemotherapy or if the woman desires to
store the embryo until a more "convenient" time for childbirth. As a practical matter, im-
plantation of the embryo into the same uterus from which the embryo was removed rarely
occurs.
31. For a discussion of the technique of storing embryos, see infra notes 35 and 36 and
accompanying text.
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technique consists of inserting a small tube through the uterine
opening, or cervix, into the uterine cavity, then washing the cavity
and separating the embryo(s) from the washings.2
Whether the early embryo is harvested in this way following in
vivo fertilization or is produced by in vitro fertilization, it then
must be placed into a uterine cavity. The uterus may be that of the
wife of the sperm donor, the same woman who supplied the ovum,
or a third woman.3 3 This process of transporting the early embryo
to its site of implantation following either in vivo or in vitro fertili-
zation is known as embryo transfer.3"
After fertilization either in vivo or in vitro, but before implan-
tation, the early embryo also may be frozen and stored by a pro-
cess known as cryopreservation- 5 The early embryo is placed in a
protective medium that allows the embryo to be frozen and then to
be thawed and implanted at a later time. In practice, to avoid sub-
jecting the woman to the risk of repeated surgery and time delays,
it is common to remove several ova from the woman and fertilize
each in vitro. One embryo then is implanted while the others are
frozen. If the first implantation fails, one of the other frozen em-
bryos then is emplanted.3 6
32. Unlike in vitro fertilization, the in vivo method does not require surgical removal
of ova from the woman, but she must have a normal reproductive tract, including unblocked
fallopian tubes. Bustillo, Buster, Cohen, Thorneycroft, Simon, Boyers, Marshall, Seed, Lauw
& Seed, Nonsurgical Ovum Transfer as a Treatment in Infertile Women, 251 J.A.JA. 1171
(1984). For a discussion of the legal issues raised by this method, see Blumberg, Legal Is-
sues in Nonsurgical Human Ovum Transfer, 251 JA.MA. 1178 (1984). As a practical mat-
ter, the requirement of a normal reproductive tract, the limitation on the number of em-
bryos available, and the technical difficulty involved in collecting the early embryo mean
that this in vivo method of embryo flushing is seldom used.
33. See Utian, Sheean, Goldfarb & Kiwi, Successful Pregnancy After In Vitro Fertili-
zation and Embryo Transfer from an Infertile Woman to a Surrogate, 313 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1351 (1985). This article reports that an ovum from a woman who previously had her
uterus removed was fertilized in vitro. The resulting embryo was implanted in another wo-
man. The source of the sperm was the ovum donor's husband. The technology would be the
same, however, if no marital relationship existed between the ovum donor and the sperm
donor.
34. Edwards S. Steptoe, Current Status of In Vitro Fertilization and Implantation of
Human Embryos, 2 LANCET 1265 (19830; Bustillo, Buster, Cohen, Thorneycroft, Simon,
Boyers, Marshall, Seed, Louw & Seed, supra note 32.
35. Mohr, Trounson & Freeman, Deep-Freezing and Transfer of Human Embryos, 2
J. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION & EMBRYO TRANSFER 1 (1985); Cohen, Simons, Edwards, Fehilly &
Fishel, Pregnancies Following the Frozen Storage of Expanding Human Blastocysts, 2 J. IN
VITRO FERTILIZLATION & EMBRYO TRANSFER 59 (1985). For a discussion of policy issues re-
lated to frozen embryos, see Grobstein, Flower & Mendeloff, supra note 15, and the letters
written in response, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1541-41 (1985).
36. Mohr, Trounson, & Freeman, supra note 35; Cohen, Simons, Edwards, Fehilly &
Fishel, supra note 35.
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C. MEDICAL PROBLEMS DURING PREGNANCY
This section addresses the problems during pregnancy that
may adversely affect the fetus and result in a defective or un-
healthy child. These problems fall into two broad catergories: (1)
those determinable at conception-genetic disease and chromo-
somal abnormalities-and (2) those related to the intrauterine en-
vironment of the developing fetus-nongenetic physcial anomalies
and fetal-maternal interactions.
1. Medical Problems Determined at Conception
The genetic and chromosomal makeup of the fetus is deter-
mined at conception, when the maternal genetic information in the
ovum is joined with the paternal genetic information contained in
the sperm. If this information is sufficiently defective, the fetus
will have a genetic disease or a chromosomal abnormality.
(a) Genetic Disease
(i) Patterns of Inheritance and Detection
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in every cell carries the informa-
tion for all the inherited characteristics of human beings. The
chemically encoded information tells the cell how to produce every
substance the body can make, and how and when to start and stop
the production.3 7 Normally, one-half of the DNA information
comes from each parent. The information related to any one sub-
stance coming from any one parent is referred to as a gene.38 Thus,
each individual has two genes for each substance, one from each
parent. For some genes, one gene from one parent will cause the
individual to have that trait regardless of the gene from the other
parent; these are called dominant characteristics. For example, in
some populations, the gene for brown eyes is dominant. Thus, an
individual inheriting a gene for brown eyes from one parent will
have brown eyes regardless of the eye color gene from the other
parent. Other characteristics are recessive-meaning that they will
not be expressed unless both genes for the characteristic, one from
37. The term substance, as used here, means any chemical product that the body
makes. Most of these are proteins. Examples of proteins include: hemoglobin and albumin
in the blood, enzymes throughout the body, and collagen in the skin and connective tissue.
J. STANBURY, J. WYNGAARDEN, D. FREDRICKSON, J. GOLDSTEIN & M. BROWN, THE METABOLIC
BASIS OF INHERITED DISEASE 61-63 (1983) [hereinafter cited as J. STANBURY]. See generally
id. at 2-32 and references cited therein.
38. Id. at 7.
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each parent, are present. Some characteristics show variation from
these patterns.3 9
Genetic disease results when sufficient error exists in the DNA
information.4 Just as in the case of normal traits, genetic disease
traits may be dominant or recessive.41 For recessive diseases, both
parents must be carriers of the defective gene.42 For a dominant
disease, the presence of the defective gene in only one parent may
result in a child with the disease.43 However, because the trait is
dominant, the parent also will have the disease."
Three basic methods exist to establish the diagnosis of a ge-
netic disease using laboratory tests45 : (1) quantification of the gene
product, (2) study of the DNA itself, and (3) linkage studies. Simi-
lar methods may be used to detect the carriers of recessive dis-
eases. The first method, quantification of the gene product, is an
indirect way to determine if the DNA contains an error.46 The lab-
oratory measures the presence or absence of the substance coded
for by the defective gene. From this data doctors may infer the
presence of the defective gene. A second method is to study the
39. These variations include variable expressivity anvd reduced penetrance. With varia-
ble expressivity variation occurs in the effects produced by the same gene in different indi-
viduals. An example of variable expressivity is the dominant gene for multiple exostoses.
Some individuals with this gene have many large disfiguring bone tumors while other indi-
viduals with the same gene have a few small tumors only detectable by x-ray.
Reduced penetrance results in a failure to produce any clinically detectable effect in
some individuals who inherit the gene. An example of reduced penetrance is the gene for
hypophosphatemic rickets. One individual with this gene may have the characteristic bone
changes of rickets while others with the gene have normal bones. J. NORA & F. FRASER,
MEDICAL GENETICS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 103-05 (1981). In addition, theoretically mito-
chondrial DNA may transmit some of the traits from the mother. V. McKuSICK, MENDELIAN
INHERITANCE IN MAN xxi-xxii (1983) (a catalog of human genetic traits).
40. J. STANBURY, supra note 37, at 12-20.
41. See id. at 39-59; see generally, V. McKusicK supra note 39.
42. J. STANBURY, supra note 37, at 17-18. A carrier for a recessive genetic disease is an
individual who has only one gene for the disease, and, therefore is not afflicted with the
genetic disease but can pass the gene onto his or her offspring. See infra note 53 and accom-
panying text.
43. The disease will result if the defective gene is the one passed on to the child.
There is a 50% chance of that occurring because the parent has two genes for the character-
stic, one of which is defective, and only one gene will be passed to the child. See infra note
53.
44. J. STANBURY, supra note 37, at 14-17. This general statement has two exceptions:
the case of characteristics carried on the sex chromosomes and the rare case of a new error
of mutation. In either of these cases, the parent could pass on the defective gene without
having the disease himself. Id. at 19-20 and 72-74.
45. Id. at 27-29; Antonarakis, Phillips & Kazazian, Genetic Diseases: Diagnosis by Re-
striction Endonuclease Analysis 100 J. PEDIATRICS 845 (1982).
46. White, DNA in Medicine: Human Genetics, 3 LANCET 1257 (1984).
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DNA itself and identify errors using restriction endonucleases4 7 ei-
ther alone or in combination with recombinant DNA.48 The third
method, linkage studies, uses one of the first two methods to deter-
mine the presence or absence of another gene that is physically
linked to the defective gene site.49
An important feature of these tests is that each of these three
methods looks for a specific gene defect. In other words, each
method asks: Is genetic disease X present? Thus, a separate test
must be performed for each suspected gene defect.50 All three
methods are available for some genetic diseases; for other diseases
current technology makes only one or two of the methods availa-
ble; for still other genetic diseases no definitive laboratory test is
available-especially for carriers.5 1
(ii) Genetic Counseling
Available laboratory tests allow doctors to diagnose genetic
diseases shortly after birth by studying cells from the child. Even
more helpful is the ability of these tests to identify individuals or
couples at risk of having an affected child.
If the genetic disease under scrutiny is recessive and is present
in an identifiable population, then that population can be tested
for the defective gene.2 Individuals found not to carry the gene
may be reassured. Those individuals found to be carriers are in-
formed of the likelihood that they may have an affected child. De-
pending on their preferences and on the seriousness of the genetic
disease in question, these persons may decide to ignore the infor-
47. A restriction endonuclease is an enzyme-a special function protein-that cuts
DNA into small pieces. The size of the pieces depends on the genetic information carried on
that piece of DNA. See Antonarakis, Phillips & Kazazian, supra note 45.
48. Antonarakis, Waber, Kittur, Patel, Kazazian, Mellis, Counts, Stamatoyannopoulos,
Bowie, Fass, Pittman, Wozney & Toole, Detection of Molecular Defects and of Carriers by
DNA Analysis, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 842 (1985); Caskey, Recombinant DNA Methods for
Prenatal Diagnosis, 99 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 718 (1983); Tsipouras, Myers, Ramirez &
Prockop, Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism Associated with the Pro-a-2(I) Gene
of Human Type I Procollagen, 72 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1262 (1983).
49. Bakker, Hofker, Goor, Mandel, Wrogemann, Davies, Kunkel, Willard, Fenton,
Sandikuyl, Majoor-Krakauer, Essen, Jahoda, Sachs, VanOmmen & Pearson, Prenatal Diag-
nosis and Carries Detection of Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy with Closely Linked RFLPs,
5 LANCET 655 (1985).
50. See infra text accompanying note 71.
51. J. STANBURY, supra note 37, at 1896-98 (no definitive laboratory test for carriers of
cystic fibrosis). Id. at 32 (no definitive laboratory test for carriers of Huntington's chorea).
The situation is quickly changing, however. See Merz, Markers for Disease Genes Open
New Era in Diagnostic Screening, 254 JA.MA 3153 (1985).
52. J. STANBURY, supra note 37, at 31-33.
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mation, to have no children, to use some form of artificial repro-
duction that eliminates the risk, to have further testing of their
spouse (or other reproductive partner), or to test the fetus while it
is still in the uterus. Screening a large population for a genetic dis-
ease carrier state, however, creates major problems. They include
the cost in both dollars and manpower, the low incidence of posi-
tive results, and the ethical dilemma presented by a positive test.
An alternative strategy is to screen a narrower popula-
tion-couples who are concerned about a particular genetic disease
either because the disease is present in a family member or be-
cause the couple's racial or ethnic origin increases their risk. When
testing a specific couple, unlike screening the general population,
the physician can state the exact probability that the offspring of
that couple will have the specific genetic disease. The probability
typically is either zero or twenty-five per cent (or in some cases
fifty per cent)."3 If the probability is zero, with this information the
couple can dismiss their concern. If the probability is twenty-five
per cent or higher, the couple has several alternatives: have no
children, have children using one of the artificial reproductive
methods that employs sperm or ova from a noncarrier donor,"4 or
have chidren by natural reproduction. The couples following this
last counsel may simply take the risk that their offspring will not
have the genetic disease, or they may test the fetus in the uterus
and have an abortion if the fetus has the genetic disease.
(iii) Detection In Utero
Detection of genetic disease while the fetus is in the uterus
requires fetal cells. Amniocentesis is the oldest method for ob-
taining fetal cells.5 5 A hollow needle is inserted through the
mother's abdominal wall, through the uterine wall, and into the
amniotic fluid that surrounds the developing fetus. A small portion
of this fluid is removed. The cells floating in the fluid can be stud-
53. If both parents are carriers for a recessive genetic disease, then there is a one in
four (25%) chance that a child of the couple will inherit both recessive genes and, therefore,
have the gentic disease. There is a one in two (50%) chance the child will be a carrier for
the genetic disease and a one in four chance the child will neither have the disease nor be a
carrier.
If only one parent is a carrier for a recessive genetic disease, no offspring will have the
disease, but one in two (50%) will be a carrier. If one parent has a dominant genetic disease,
one of two (50%) offspring will have the disease.
54. See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
55. J. PRITCHARD, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, WILLIAMS OBSTETRIcs 268-278 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as J. PRITCHARD]; J. STANBURY, supra note 37, at 30-31.
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ied directly, but usually they are allowed to multiply in the labora-
tory until enough cells are available for detailed studies. Amni-
ocentesis cannot be performed until the end of the first trimester
or early in the second trimester. Culturing and testing the cells in-
troduces additional delays. Consequently, if the fetus is defective
and abortion is desired, a second trimester method ok abortion56
must be used. Second trimester abortions are accompanied by risks
and costs that include the psychological cost of a late abortion.
The recent development of two new techniques-chorionic vil-
lus biopsy and the fetoscope-allow sampling of fetal cells. The
first technique, chorionic villus biopsy,5 7 allows safer sampling at
an earlier stage of pregnancy and consists of removing a minute
piece of the placenta. The fetal cells in this piece of placenta then
can be tested for fetal genetic traits. The second technique re-
quires the use of a fetoscope.55 The fetoscope is a small diameter
fiberoptic device that has a light source and lens.59 When intro-
duced into the uterine cavity through the mother's abdominal wall,
the fetoscope allows the physician to see the fetus directly and to
remove samples of fetal blood cells ° or fetal skin61 by using instru-
ments inserted through the fetoscope. The fetoscope cannot be
used until the second trimester and has risks associated with its
use.
62
Once a fetus is found to have a genetic disease, the only
choices currently existing are to allow the pregnancy to continue to
term or to abort the fetus. In utero therapy for genetic disease is
not available, but as treatments for affected newborns are devel-
oped they may have the potential for use in utero. Once a child is
born with a genetic disease, effective therapy is very limited. For a
few diseases, a restrictive diet," protective environment, 64 or re-
56. See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
57. Gosden, Mitchell, Gosden, Rodeck & Morsman, Direct Vision Chorion Biopsy and
Chromosome-specific DNA Probes for Determination of Fetal Sex in First-Trimester Pre-
natal Diagnosis, 2 LANCEr 1416 (1982).
58. J. PRITCHARD, supra note 55, at 280; Rodeck and Nicolaides, 39 BRIT. MED. BULL.
332 (1983); Elias, Fetoscopy in Prenatal Diagnosis, 10 CLINICS IN PERINATOLOGY 357 (1983).
59. The fetoscope, thus, is similar to the brochoscope, used to visualize a patient's
lungs, and the gastroscope, inserted to visualize a patient's stomach.
60. Modell & Ward, Antenatal Diagnosis of the Haemoglobinopathies in FEroscoPY
87, 104 (I. Rocker & K. M. Laurence eds. 1981).
61. Elias & Esterly, Prenatal Diagnosis of Hereditary Skin Disorders, 24 CLINICAL
OBSTETRICS GYNECOLOGY 1069 (1981).
62. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
63. J. STANBURY, supra note 37, at 33.
64. Id. at 21 & 29.
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placement therapy65 may help, but these measures do not "cure"
the genetic disease. For a few diseases, organ transplantation has
had limited success."' So far, no human genetic disease has been
"corrected" after birth by altering the DNA of the cells, but the
ability to do this is close at hand.6
(b) Chromosomal Abnormalities
Normally each cell has twenty-three pairs of chromosomes (46
total) that carry the cell's DNA. 8 When an individual's cells have
too many or too few chromosomes, he usually has multiple physical
deformities, and possibily mental retardation."9 A well-known ex-
ample of chromosomal abnormality is trisomy 21, commonly
known as Down's Syndrome.7 0 In patients with Down's Syndrome,
instead of having two of the number twenty-one chromosomes, the
individual has three.
Two distinctions between chromosomal abnormalities and ge-
netic diseases influence the application of medical technology in
their detection. First, chromosomal abnormalities are a quantita-
tive, not qualitative, problem. In contrast to genetic diseases, the
DNA is normal in chromosomal abnormalities; it is just present in
the wrong amount. A test, therefore, that determines whether a
normal complement of chromosomes are present will also test for
all known chromosomal abnormalities. 1 Second, because the par-
ents have a normal number of chromosomes, laboratory tests on
the parents will not predict who will have children with chromo-
somal abnormalities. 7 2 Thus, both these distinctions indicate the
importance of intrauterine detection.
65. Id. at 33.
66. Id. at 35.
67. Id. at 74-76; see also Anderson, Human Gene Therapy: Scientific and Ethical
Considerations, 8 RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNICAL BULL. 55 (1985); Culliton, Gene Therapy:
Research in Public, 227 SCIENCE 493 (1985); Ledley, Grenett, DiLella, Kwok & Woo, Gene
Transfer and Expression of Human Phenylalanine Hyroxylase, 228 SCIENCE 77 (1985). For
a congressional report on the background of genetic therapy up until 1984, see Human Gene
Therapy-A Background Paper, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress (1984).
68. J. STANBURY, supra note 37, at 54.
69. Id. at 13; J. STANBURY, J. WYNGAARDEN & D. FREDRICKSON, THE METABOLIC BASIS OF
INHERITED DISEASE 51 (1978); see generally F. VOGEL & A. MOTULSKY, HUMAN GENETICS:
PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES (1979) (an examination of physical, mental and social problems).
70. D. SMITH, RECOGNIZABLE PATTERNS OF HUMAN MALFORMATION 10 (1982).
71. But cf. supra text accompanying note 50 (noting that specific testing is required to
screen for each genetic defect).
72. There is one exception to this general rule. In rare instances, chromosomal abnor-
malities in the offspring result from one parent having a translocation of his chromosomes.
This parent is called a translocation carrier. J. STANBURY, supra note 37, at 13.
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As a practical matter, chromosomal abnormalities are much
more common than genetic disease. 73 The abnormal chromosome
number results from an error during cell division, either during the
formation of an ovum or sperm or shortly after fertilization. These
errors are much more common in older women; therefore, the inci-
dence of chromosomal abnormalities increases with maternal age.74
If the mother is thirty-five years old or older, and would want an
abortion if the offspring had a chromosomal abnormality, then the
risk of abnormality is sufficiently great to warrant testing the fetus
in utero.75 Fetal cells are obtained, usually by amniocentesis,76 and
the chromosomes are studied by visual analysis."7 Chromosomal
analysis also will reveal the sex of the fetus. This information may
lead some parents to want an abortion.
No present "cure" for chromosomal abnormalities exists. Sur-
gery after delivery may correct some, but usually not all, of the
physical defects. Measures to prevent the birth of a child with
chromosomal abnormalities include: contraception, abortion, and
artificial reproduction, possibily using ova from a younger female.7a
2. Medical Problems Related to the Intrauterine Environment
The intrauterine environment influences the fetus as it devel-
ops. If the environment is altered sufficiently to interfere with nor-
mal development, physical malformations of the fetus may result.
Other fetal-maternal interactions that do not cause malformations
also may adversely affect the health of the fetus.
(a) Physical Malformations
(i) Causes
Physical malformations result from improper development of
an organ or tissue during early pregnancy. 79 Most malformations
73. Compare J. STANBURY, supra note 37, at 13 Table 1-3 (indicating prevalence of
chromosomal disorders among live-born infants) with J. STANnURY, supra note 37, at 14
Table 1-4 (indicating prevalence of some common monogenic disorders among live-born
infants).
74. J. PRITCHARD, supra note 55, at 801.
75. Additional reasons to perform the test are (1) to reassure the parent(s) if the result
is negative, and (2) to fulfill the physician's duty to provide the patient with information
sufficient to make an abortion decision and thereby to avoid liability in a wrongful-birth
lawsuit. See generally infra section V of this Special Project.
76. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
77. Yunis, High Resolution of Human Chromosomes, 191 ScIENcE 1268 (1976).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 17-36.
79. D. SMITH, supra note 70, at 540; see generally D. SMITH, RECOGNIZABLE PATTERNS
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occur in otherwise normal children. 0 During the first trimester the
fertilized ovum develops from one cell into a complete fetus with
formation of all of its organs. These organs, including the heart,
lungs, brain, and liver, grow and mature during the second and
third trimester.8" Anything that interferes with cell movement and
differentiation during this critical early period may lead to malfor-
mations. The cause of most malformations is not understood.
Known causes, however, include some maternal viral infections, 2
alcohol, 3 some drugs, " and some environmental agents 8 such as
radiation.
(ii) Detection and Treatment
Because malformations occur during pregnancy, it is impossi-
ble to predict before pregnancy who will have a malformed child.86
Once a woman is pregnant her physician relies on clinical findings,
such as an unusually rapid or slow increase in the size of the
uterus, to decide if further studies for malformations are needed.
For one of the most common and severe malformations, meningo-
myelocele, 7 a laboratory test on maternal blood is now available
that can predict the need for further diagnostic tests.88 If the
OF HUMAN DEFORMATION (1981) (a compendium of physical deformities).
80. Of course, some physical malformations result from chromosomal abnormalities,
but these are only a small minority of all malformations. See supra notes 68-78 and accom-
panying text.
81. K. MOORE, supra note 13 at 262; D. SMITH, supra note 70, at 540.
82. See infra notes 105-114 and accompanying text.
83. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
85. Brent, The Effects of Ionizing Radiation, Microwaves, and Ultrasound on the De-
veloping Embryo: Clinical Interpretations and Applications of the Data, 14 CURRENT
PROBLEMS IN PEDIATRICS 1 (1984); Harvey, Boice, Honeyman & Flannery, Prenatal X-Ray
Exposure and Childhood Cancer in Twins, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 541 (1985). See infra text
accompanying notes 90-93.
86. D. SMITH, supra note 70, at 552. If a couple has one child with a malformation, the
chance of a recurrence in a second child is slightly higher than in the normal population. Id.
This is in contrast to genetic diseases in which the probability of disease in the offspring can
be predicted from the parents' genetic makeup. See supra text accompanying notes 37-54.
87. Meningomyelocele is a failure of the spinal cord and its coverings to form properly,
which can result in extensive paralysis, other nervous malfunctions, and frequent severe
infections. It is one of a family of malformations called neural tube defects. The tests for
meningomyelocele also detect other neural tube defects. See D. SMITH, supra note 70, at
462.
88. The use of maternal serum alpha fetoprotein as a screening test in the United
States has been the subject of controversy. The Food and Drug Administration at first pro-
posed restricting its use but later withdrew consideration of the restrictions. See 45 Fed.
Rep. 74158 (1980) (withdrawn) and 48 FR 2778 (1983) (withdrawn). The test is currently
available and recommended for screening. A positive result dictates the need for more spe-
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screening test is positive, the doctor then uses more specific tests
to confirm the diagnosis."'
Detection of specific fetal malformations usually depends on
the availability of methods to "visualize" the fetus. Several indi-
rect methods are available. The most commonly used method is
ultrasonography or ultrasound imaging.90 In ultrasound imaging, a
high frequency sound source is aimed at the fetus and the echos
produced are recorded. This method produces a picture of the fe-
tus in utero. The risk of injury to the fetus from exposure to high
frequency sound waves appears to be minimal. Doctors rarely use
x-rays to examine the fetus in utero because of the risk to the fetus
and mother from radiation, l and because of the availability of
safer alternatives, such as ultrasound. Magnetic resonance imaging
is a new method of visualizing internal tissues.92 This method uses
magnetic fields to create a visual image. The quality and resolution
of the pictures are superior to those pictures produced by either x-
ray or ultrasound. The risk to the fetus or mother from exposure to
magnetic fields, however, is unknown. Because magnetic resonance
imaging has been used only recently to visualize fetuses in utero,
experience in detecting malformations is limited, but use of mag-
netic resonance imaging is likely to expand in the future.93 The
physician also can observe the fetus directly by using a fetoscope.9 4
In addition to the visualization methods, a laboratory test is
available to confirm the diagnosis of a specific malformation. This
test determines the alpha fetoprotein levels in the amniotic fluid to
detect the presence of a malformation called meningomyelcele.9 5
cific testing. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. Some obstetricians have opposed
use of the screening test for fear it might be misused as more than a screening test. See G.
Annas, Is a Genetic Screening Test Ready When the Lawyers Say It Is? 15 Hasting Center
Rept. 16 (Dec. 1985); see also Ferguson-Smith, Maternal Serum Alpha-Fetoprotein Screen-
ing For Neural Tube Defects, 39 BRIT. MED. BULL. 365 (1983).
89. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
90. J. PRITCHARD, supra note 55, at 278; Campbell & Pearce, Ultrasound Visualization
of Congenital Malformations, 39 BRIT. MED. BULL, 322 (1983).
91. See supra note 85.
92. Lowe, Weinreb, Santos-Ramos & Cunningham, Magnetic Resonance Imaging in
Human Pregnancy, 66 OBsTErIcs & GYNECOLOGY 629 (1985). In the medical literature,
magnetic resonance imaging sometimes is referred to by the abbreviation MR or MRI. For-
merly, it was called NMR, for Nuclear Magnetic Resonance, but this terminology has fallen
into disfavor.
93. Id. at 632.
94. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
95. J. PRITCHARD, supra note 55, at 277-78; Brock, Amniotic Fluid Tests for Fetal
Neural Tube Defects, 39 BRrr. MED. BULL. 373 (1983); see supra notes 87-88 and accompa-
nying text (discussing maternal blood test as screening test for this malformation).
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An amniocentesis 6 must be done and the levels in the fluid must
be compared with normal values that vary depending on the stage
of pregnancy.
Until recently there was no reason to diagnose malformations
in utero except to determine the desirability of abortion. Once a
malformation is detected in utero the parents may elect to have an
abortion. Now, at least two conditions exist in which in utero diag-
nosis has led to successful in utero surgery.9 7 If the parents do not
elect abortion, or if in utero surgery is either not available or not
successful, or if the malformations are not detected before delivery,
the diagnosis and management of malformations after delivery de-
pends on clinical signs and symptoms, numerous laboratory tests,
and ultrasound and x-ray procedures. For some malformations,
surgical repair or perhaps transplantation is possible. 8
(b) Fetal-Maternal Interactions
The fetus may have medical problems as a result of its inter-
action with the mother. Among these interactions are maternal an-
tibodies against fetal red blood cells; infections acquired by the
mother and transmitted to her fetus; and drug, alcohol, or tobacco
use by the mother.
(i) Maternal Antibodies
In a sense, a fetus is foreign tissue growing within the mother.
At no other time is there such tolerance of the tissue of another
person and corresponding lack of tissue rejection.29 The mother
may, nonetheless, develop antibodies against fetal cells. An Rh
negative mother will make antibodies against Rh positive cells if
she is exposed to them by a transfusion or previous pregnancy.100
96. See supra notes 55-76 and accompanying text.
97. The two conditions are obstructive hydocephelus and obstructive urinary tract
malformations, for which openings are made to relieve the pressure of built-up fluid caused
by the obstruction.
98. See, e.g., M. AVERY & H. TAusCH, supra note 8, at 248, 351 (discussion surgical
correction of malformations); Najarian, Mayer & Howard Kidney Transplantation in 2 PE-
DIATRIC SURGERY 1293-94 (M. Ravitch, R. Welch, C. Benson, E. Aberdeen & J. Randolph
eds. 1979) (discussing transplantation to treat malformations).
99. Scott & Jenkins, Immunology of Human Reproduction, in 2 CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY
982, 982-83 (C. Parker ed. 1980).
100. J. PRTICHARD, supra note 55, at 772. The woman's first exposure to Rh positive
red blood cells, whether by blood transfusion or pregnancy with a Rh positive fetus, rarely
leads to problems. She does make antibodies during this first exposure, but the levels are
low. If, however, she has a Rh positive fetus in a later pregnancy, there is a booster effect
and she rapidly makes antibodies to fetal blood cells. This higher level of antibodies results
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Once this sensitization has occurred, these maternal antibodies can
cross the placenta and, if the fetus is Rh positive, 0 1 destroy the
red blood cells of the fetus. The level of maternal antibodies can be
measured. If the antibody levels are high it may be necessary to
give the fetus a blood transfusion. 102 To transfuse the fetus in
utero, ultrasound or x-ray is used to guide the placement of a
hollow needle through the mother's abdominal wall into the uterus,
and then into the fetus within the uterus. Red blood cells are then
transfused into the fetus to replace the cells that were destroyed
by the maternal antibody. In less severe cases, the fetus is not
treated in utero. Instead, after delivery the blood of the newborn is
replaced in a procedure called exchange transfusion. 03 To prevent
Rh antibody problems, doctors avoid giving positive blood transfu-
sions to Rh negative women and doctors give Rh immune globulin
to any Rh negative woman who had a previous pregnancy that en-
ded either in abortion or in an Rh positive child. 04
(ii) Maternal Infections
Maternal infections may be transmitted to the fetus either in-
directly, through the mother's blood stream, or directly when the
baby passes through the mother's vagina during delivery. Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is an example of an often fa-
tal infection acquired from the mother. 105 Some infections acquired
through the mother's blood stream during pregnancy may result in
malformations. Examples include rubella (German measles), 0
cytomegalic virus,' °7 syphilis, 08 and toxoplasmosis. 09 Other infec-
in fetal problems. P. MOLLISON, BLOOD TRANSFUSION IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 344-82, 678-80
(1983). Other blood group antibodies can also cause fetal problems. Id. at 677.
101. A similar course of events may occur with other blood group members in addition
to the RH factor. J. PRITCHARD, supra note 55, at 779.
102. Id. at 776; Bowman, The Management of Rh-isoimmunization, 52 J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNECOLOGY 1 (1978).
103. J. PRITCHARD, supra note 55, at 778.
104. See Freda, Gorman, Pollack & Bowe, Prevention of Rh Hemolytic Disease-Ten
Years' Clinical Experience with Rh Immune Globulin, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1014 (1975).
105. The fetus may acquire AIDS through the mother's blood stream or by direct in-
fection during vaginal delivery. See Leads from the MMWR: Recommendations for Assist-
ing in the Prevention of Perinatal Transmission of HTL V-III/LA V and Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome, 255 JAMA 25 (1986).
106. D. SMITH, supra note 70, at 424; J. PRITCHARD, supra note 55, at 786; Cooper,
Congenital Rubella in the U.S. in INFECTIONS OF THE FETUS AND THE NEWBORN INFANT 1 (S.
Krugman & A. Gerhson eds. 1975). (Also cited as 3 PROGRESS IN CLINICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH 1 (1975)).
107. McCracken, Shinefield, Cobb, Rausen, Dische & Eichenwald, Congenital Cytome-
galic Inclusion Disease, 117 Am. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 522 (1969); Stagno & Whitley,
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tions, including Group B streptococcus10 and herpes simplex vi-
rus,1 11 may be acquired from the mother's vagina at the time of
delivery and result in severe neonatal disease. Treatment of fetal
or neonatal infections depends on the type of disease acquired.
Bacterial diseases, such as syphilis and Group B streptococcus in-
fection, can be treated with antibiotics either before or after deliv-
ery. Viral diseases, such as rubella, cytomegalic virus, and herpes,
generally cannot be treated by antibiotics or analogous means.1" 2
Neonatal infections acquired during vaginal delivery may be pre-
vented by caesarean section'" delivery." 4
(iii) Maternal Drug, Alcohol, and Tobacco Use
Drug, tobacco, or alcohol use during pregnancy may adversely
affect the fetus by causing malformations, poor development, or
drug dependence. Most prescription drugs carry a warning indicat-
ing that the safety of their use during pregnancy is unknown."15
Some prescription drugs are known to be detrimental to the fe-
tus. ' " In prescribing these and similar drugs to pregnant women, a
physician weighs the benefit to the mother against the risk to the
Herpesvirus Infections of Pregnancy Part I: Cytomegalovirus and Epstein-Barr Virus In-
fections, 313 NEw. ENG. J. MED. 1270 (1985).
108. Oppenheimer & Dahms, Congenital Syphilis in the Fetus and Neonate, 6 PER-
SPECTIVES IN PEDIATRIC PATHOLOGY 115 (1981).
109. Eichenwald, A Study of Congenital Toxoplasmosis, in HUMAN TOXOPLASMosIs 41
(J. Siim ed. 1960).
110. Barton, Feigin, & Lins, Group B beta Hemolytic Streptococcal Meningitis in In-
fants, 82 J. PEDIATRICS 719 (1973).
111. Stagno & Whitley, Herpesvirus Infections of Pregnancy Part II: Herpes Simplex
Virus and Varicella-Zoster Virus Infections, 313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1327 (1985).
112. There have, however, been recent advances in the treatment of herpes simplex
infections. Id. at 1328.
113. This Special Project will refer to delivery by "caesarean" section. Readers should
note, however, that medical and legal literature also refer to "cesarean" section. Legal re-
searchers using computers should type in both spellings.
114. The ability to avoid this infection is especially important in herpes simplex virus
infections because this disease is often fatal in the neonatal. Stagno & Whitley, supra note
111, at 1328.
115. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMA DRUG EVALUATIONS 31 (5th ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as AMA DRUG EVALUATIONS]. For individual drugs see PHYSICIANS' DESK
REFERENCE (40th ed. 1986).
116. D. SMITH, supra note 70, at 414 (fetal hydantoinor Dilantin syndrome), 418 (fetal
trimethadione or Tridione syndrome), 420 (fetal warfarin or Coumrin syndrome) & 422
(fetal aminopterin effects). See also AMA DRUG EVALUATIONS, supra note 115, at 31-40; R.
BEHRMAN & V. VAUGHAN, NELSON TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS, 325 (12th ed. 1983) (table link-
ing drugs to fetal malformations).
This Special Project will signify use of a drug's trade name by capitalizing the name of
the drug.
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fetus. When the well-being of the mother and that of the fetus are
opposed, this judgment raises difficult medical, ethical, and legal
problems. 117 In addition to prescription drugs, common over-the-
counter drugs, such as those drugs containing aspirin, caffeine, or
antihistamines, also may adversely affect the fetus.1" 8
Drug abuse also may cause fetal problems. Illicit drugs may
contribute to a mother's general poor health and thereby increase
her risk of an infection. Even more harmful, narcotic addiction in
the mother causes a similar addiction of the fetus in utero. " After
delivery, the newborn will exhibit narcotics withdrawal and the ac-
companying medical problems.
Maternal smoking also may adversely affect the fetus. Babies
born to mothers who smoke tobacco are smaller than normal. 120 In
addition, long-term developmental problems are associated with
maternal tobacco use.12' Recently, the term fetal tobacco syn-
drome12 2 has been used to describe the group of problems observed
in the offspring of smoking mothers. A group of physical and
mental development problems known as fetal alcohol syndrome'23
may occur in the offspring of mothers who abuse alcohol.
D. TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY
All pregnancies terminate in either abortion or delivery. 24 In
both abortion and delivery the interests and well-being of the
mother may be directly adverse to those of the fetus. This section
examines the medical technology involved in abortion and delivery
and explores the meaning of the term "viability."
117. See generally infra section XI of this Special Project.
118. AMA DRUG EVALUATIONS, supra note 115, at 34-40; R. BEHRMAN & V. VAUGHAN,
supra note 116, at 325.
119. J. PRITCHARD, supra note 55, at 788.
120. Wainright, Change in Observed Birth Weight Associated with Change in Mater-
nal Cigarette Smoking, 117 Am. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 668 (1983).
121. Nieburg, Marks McLaren & Remington, The Fetal Tobacco Syndrome, 253 J.
A.M.A 2998 (1985) (see references cited herein).
122. Id. at 2998-99.
123. D. SMITH, supra note 70, at 411; Jones, Smith, Ulleland & Streissguth, Pattern of
Malformation in Offspring of Chronic Alcoholic Mothers, 1 LANCET 1267 (1973).
124. Technically, there is a third alternative. The pregnancy can terminate with the
death of the mother and fetus while the fetus is still in utero. The legal implications of this
occurrence are discussed infra, see generally section III of this Special Project.
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1. Abortion
Abortion is the interruption of pregnancy. In the medical liter-
ature the term abortion does not imply an intentional interruption
of pregnancy. 1 5 Abortions that occur naturally are called sponta-
neous abortions or miscarriages, and those abortions that are in-
tentional are called induced abortions. This subsection will deal
exclusively with induced abortions, but legal scholars need to re-
member this distinction between medical and legal terminology
when they research the medical literature.
The method used to induce abortion depends on the stage of
pregnancy, on the woman's and physician's preferences, on the wo-
man's other medical diagnoses, and perhaps on statutory require-
ments.'26 The stage of pregnancy and the method of abortion pro-
foundly influence the probability that the fetus will be aborted
alive.
(a) Traditional First Trimester
Approximately ninety per cent of the abortions in the United
States127  are performed in the first trimester.'28  The usual
method'29 at this stage in pregnancy is mechanical evacuation of
the uterus by dilating the cervix, the opening to the uterus, in-
serting a hollow tube connected to a vacuum, and scraping or suck-
ing the fetus out of the uterine cavity. This procedure, known as
dilatation and curettage (D & C)"' or dilatation and evacuation (D
& E), requires less than thirty minutes and often is done as an
outpatient procedure. The early stage of the pregnancy and the re-
125. Compare STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICioNARY 3 (24th ed. 1982) with BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 7 (5th ed. 1979).
126. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of statutes regulat-
ing the method of abortion. See generally J. PRITCHARD, supra note 55, at 479-88. (discuss-
ing methods used to induce abortion).
127. In 1983 there were 1.3 million legal abortions in the United States. For the same
year there were 3.6 million live births. J. PRITCHARD, supra note 55, at 477.
128. LaFerla, Midtrimester Abortion: Techniques and Complications, 10 CLINICS IN-
PERINATOLOGY 305 (1983).
The term "traditional" first trimester abortions refers to abortions performed after im-
plantation but before the end of the first trimester. See supra note 16 and accompanying
text. An implantation is technically part of the first trimester but this paper discusses sepa-
rately abortion before implantation. See infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
129. Id.; Grimes & Cates, Gestational Age Limit of Twelve Weeks for Abortion by
Curettage, 132 AM. J. OBsTrIcs & GYNECOLOGY 207 (1978).
130. Dilatation and curettage (D & C) is the dilatation of the cervix and the scraping
of the uterine lining. This procedure is also used for reasons unrelated to abortion such as
biopsy of the uterine lining.
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sultant fragmentation of the fetus assure that the fetus will not be
aborted alive. The relative simplicity of the procedure, low inci-
dence of complications, and avoidance of the psychological trauma
associated with a late abortion are all advantages of first trimester
abortions.
(b) Second and Third Trimester
After the first trimester, the increasing size of the fetus makes
mechanical evacuation of the uterus more difficult. Chemical
agents, therefore, are used to cause expulsion of the fetus. Saline
abortion 13 1 and prostaglandin abortion 2 are typical.
In a saline abortion, a hollow needle is inserted through the
mother's abdominal wall, through the uterine wall, and into the
amniotic fluid surrounding the fetus. A concentrated salt solution,
which is toxic to the fetus, is injected into the amniotic fluid. Fetal
death usually occurs within a few hours.
In a prostaglandin abortion, the mother is given one of a class
of drugs called prostaglandins. The drug causes the uterus to start
contracting, usually within twelve hours, and to expel the fetus.
Notably, prostaglandins do not directly cause fetal death; the fetus
is usually alive up until its separation from the uterus. Compared
to saline abortion, protaglandin abortion is technically easier and
has fewer serious complications. In addition, protoglandin abortion
results in a greater availability of viable fetal tissue for genetic
testing and research.' 3 The Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a legislative attempt to prohibit saline abortions,134 but there have
been renewed efforts to control the methods of abortion.13 5
Hysterectomy and hysterotomy are surgical procedures used
infrequently for abortion."3 " Typically, hysterectomy and hysterot-
omy are attempts to correct some other problem, but, if the woman
is pregnant, these procedures will terminate the pregnancy. Hys-
terectomy is the surgical removal of the uterus. Usually, this
131. LaFerla, supra note 128, at 312.
132. Id. at 313; Robins & Surrago, Early Midtrimester Pregnancy Termination, 27 J.
REPORDUCTIVE MED. 415 (1982).
133. See supra notes 37-78 and accompanying text.
134. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The
Missouri statute prohibited saline abortions after the twelfth week. The Court declared this
unconstitutional as an "unreasonable or arbitrary regulation designed to inhibit, and having
the effect of inhibiting, the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks." Id. at 79.
135. For discussion of recent Supreme Court cases concerning abortion, see infra notes
513-616 and accompanying text.
136. LaFerla, supra note 128, at 316.
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method of abortion is not used unless there is some other medical
reason for removing the uterus, such as a tumor. Hysterectomy can
be used, however, to terminate a pregnancy at any stage. Because
the blood supply to the uterus, and therefore to the fetus, is inter-
rupted before removal, this method causes fetal death even very
late in pregnancy. Hysterectomy subjects the woman to the risks of
a major surgical procedure and leaves her infertile.
A hysterotomy is the surgical opening of the uterus. In this
procedure, similar to a caesarean section delivery, the surgeon
opens the uterus, removes the fetus, and then sews up the opening
in the uterus. Reluctance to subject the woman to an unnecessary
surgical procedure militates against this method unless a separate
medical reason for performing surgery on the uterus exists, such as
congenital malformation of the uterus." 7 Of all the abortion meth-
ods, however, hysterotomy has the greatest probability of produc-
ing a viable fetus.
(c) Abortion Before Implantation
The methods of abortion discussed above are concerned with
removing the fetus once it has implanted in the uterus and started
to grow. The time between fertilization of the ovum and implanta-
tion of the developing embryo"8 presents a more difficult problem
for analysis. Debate has arisen on the issue of defining pregnancy.
If pregnancy begins at the time of fertilization, then prevention of
implantation is a method of terminating the pregnancy. If preg-
nancy begins at implantation, then prevention of implantation is a
method of preventing the pregnancy.
Two methods of preventing implantation are the intrauterine
contraceptive device (IUD) and postcoital contraception ("morning
after pill"). An IUD is a specially designed plastic or metal device,
often containing medications, that is placed in the uterine cav-
ity.13 9 Exactly how the IUD works is not understood. Unlike other
contraceptive methods, however, the IUD does not prevent fertili-
zation of the ovum. Rather, the IUD has a local effect on the uter-
137. Malformations of the uterus may dictate the use of hysterotomy for abortion be-
cause they increase the difficulty and risk of other abortion methods. In addition, the wo-
man often needs surgical correction of the uterine malformation, which may be preformed
at the same time and under the same anesthesia as the hysterotomy.
138. See supra note 15 for precise technical terminoology of early developmental
stages; see generally notes 18-36 and accompanying text (describing fertilization and
implications).
139. J. PRrrCHARD, supra note 55, at 819-20.
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ine lining that prevents implantation and subsequent development
of the embryo. Postcoital contraception likewise prevents implan-
tation and subsequent development. 140 In this technique large
doses of estrogen-like hormones given shortly after coitus make the
uterine lining unreceptive to implantation.
Fertilized ovum transfer is another area in which conception,
implantation, and abortion may be closely related.14 1 These rela-
tionships are best illustrated by considering the nearly identical
stages of biological development achieved when an early embryo
(1) is affected by IUD contraception; (2) is flushed from the uter-
ine cavity following in vivo fertilization; or (3) is readied for stor-
age or implantation following in vitro fertilization. In IUD contra-
ception, the ovum is fertilized and develops to the morula14 2 stage
before entering the uterine cavity. Once the morula enters the
uterine cavity, however, the IUD prevents effective implantation
and halts development. Following in vivo fertilization the fertilized
ovum progresses through the same developmental stages before be-
ing shed from the uterus, except that the flushing process rather
than the IUD prevents effective implantation. If the displaced
early embryo later is discarded rather than being transferred or
frozen, the parallel with IUD contraception becomes complete. In
in vitro fertilization the fertilized ovum develops in the laboratory
to the morula stage, just as occurs in vivo in the two previous ex-
amples of the IUD and "morning after pill." If, instead of being
implanted, the early embryo is destroyed, then development is
halted at the same stage as in IUD contraception or in the flushing
of an early in vivo embryo. Focusing strictly on the developmental
status of the early embryo, there is no biologically signficiant dif-
ference between IUD contraception and destruction of the early
embryo produced by in vitro or in vivo fertilization. This biological
identity leads to three possible divergent approaches in legal anal-
ysis of the rights and duties associated with early embryos created
by in vitro fertilization: (1) regard as controlling the historical ac-
ceptance 1 13 of the legitimacy of IUD contraception,144 which rejects
140. Yuzpe & Lance, Ethinylestradiol and dl-Norgestrel as a Postcoital Contracep-
tive, 28 FERTmrrY & STERmIrry 932 (1977).
141. Postcoital Contraception, 1 LANCET 855 (1983); see also supra notes 18-36 and
accompanying text.
142. See supra note 15 for terminology of early embryonic development.
143. Most states seem simply to accept IUD's as contraception. In Pennsylvania, the
legislature specifically exempted IUD's from its abortion statute. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3203 (Purdon 1983).
144. Because Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) removed first-trimester abortion from
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protection of the early embryo and gives the woman the right to
decide; (2) rethink IUD contraception; or (3) continue to accept
IUD contraception but elaborate a nonbiological distinction be-
tween the status of early embryos created by in vitro fertilization
and those affected by IUD contraception.
2. Delivery
During labor and delivery, the well-being of the fetus may de-
mand subjecting the mother to a number of potentially threatening
procedures. Drugs may be needed to stop premature labor. 45 The
fetal heart rate routinely is monitored during labor. This may re-
quire the attachment of an electrode to the scalp of the fetus1 46 in
utero. In addition, monitoring devices may be attached to the
mother's abdominal wall.147 The anesthesia used during labor and
delivery may be dictated by the condition of the fetus.148 Caesa-
rean section delivery may be required. Often the mother's pelvic
anatomy, and perhaps her history of previous caesarean sections,
will dictate the need for caesarean section delivery. However, in
utero fetal distress, as evidenced by a falling or irregular fetal
heart rate, may require emergency caesarean section delivery to
save the life of the fetus. 49 Maternal vaginal herpes infection is
one example of another reason for caesarean section delivery.150
When the mother refuses to consent to one of these procedures, a
conflict between the rights of the fetus versus the rights of the
mother comes into sharp focus.' 5'
states rejction, the Supreme Court never has had to analyze in legal terms.
The postfertilization actions of the IUD. In discussing the background for its decision
in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court noted that "[s]ubstantial problems for precise definition
[of the beginning of life] are posed. . . by new embryo embryological menstrual extraction,
the 'morning-after' pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial
wombs." Id. at 161 (footnote omitted). The Court's omission of the IUD from this list is
interesting.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari and heard oral arguments of a challenge to
an Illinois informed consent statute that requires physicians who prescribe the IUD or the
"morning after pill" to tell their patients that these devices are "abortifacients" which cause
fetal death by preventing implantation. See infra notes 688-693 and accompanying text.
145. J. PRrrCHARD, supra note 55, at 751-54.
146. Id. at 284-85.
147. Id. at 286.
148. Id. at 353-54.
149. A caesarian section delivery takes less time than a vaginal delivery. Id. at 287,
866-69.
150. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 1447-74; 1524-29 and accompanying text.
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3. Viability
The concept of fetal viability is a central feature in the legal
analysis of the right to abortion. In Roe v. Wade'52 the Supreme
Court held that, for the stage of pregnancy subsequent to the point
of fetal viability, the state can regulate or even proscribe abor-
tion.153 According to the Court, the states' interests in protecting
fetal life become "compelling" at the point of viability because the
fetus then "presumably has the capability of meaningful life
outside the mother's womb. '15 The court, however, did not pro-
vide a definition of "meaningful life.' '1
55
Viability of a fetus-that is, the fetus' ability to live-outside
the uterus is influenced by many interactive factors. As discussed
above, 15  the method of abortion is one factor. Other factors in-
clude fetal age, fetal medical condition, maternal health, and appli-
cation of medical technology to sustain the fetus after removal
from the uterus.
Nowhere has medical technology had a more profound influ-
ence on the concept of viability than in techniques utilized in the
perinatal and neonatal intensive care unit 157 of a modern hospital.
Drugs given the mother can promote maturation of the fetus.158
Hysterotomy or caesarean section delivery assures removal of the
fetus from the uterus with a minimum of fetal trauma. A respirator
supports breathing if needed. Intravascular fluids and, later, spe-
cial formulas for oral feeding provide for nutritional needs.5 9 Mod-
ern electronic and computer technology enable constant monitor-
ing of vital functions and control of life support equipment.
152. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
153. Id. at 163.
154. Id.
155. At another place in the opinion, however, the Court noted that "physicians and
their scientific colleagues historically have regarded a "viable" fetus as one "potentially able
to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id. at 160.
156. See supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
157. Perinatal refers to the time before, during, and after birth. The usual definition is
from the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy through the first seven days after birth.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DITIONARY 1055 (24th ed. 1982). A perinatal intensive care unit is a
hospital unit for treating and monitoring the mother and fetus during late pregnancy, labor,
delivery, and immediately thereafter. The neonatal intensive care unit cares for the baby
from delivery until about one month of age. See supra note 8.
158. J. PRITCHARD, supra note 55, at 869; Korenbrot, Aalto & Laros, The Cost Effec-
tivenss of Stopping Preterm Labor with Beta-adrenergic Treatment, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED.
691 (1984).
159. See generally M. AVERY & H. TAZUsCH, supra note 8, at 791-97; COMMITTEE ON
NUTRITION, AM. ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, PEDIATRIC NUTRITION HANDBOOK 66 (2d ed. 1985).
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Numerous laboratory tests, radiographic ("x-ray") procedures, and
ultrasound techniques allow rapid detection of complications and
changing conditions.
A major threat to life once the fetus leaves the uterus is the
immaturity of its lungs.16 0 In utero the fetus does not need to have
functioning lungs because it gets oxygen from the maternal blood
circulation. At the moment of separation from the mother, how-
ever, life depends on the functioning of the lungs. Recent clinical
trials have indicated that membrane oxygenators may temporarily
bypass the need for lung function.1 61 The net effect of this technol-
ogy on the definition of fetal viability can be seen in the changes in
the rate of newborn survival since 1973, the year of the Roe v.
Wade 62 decision. Since 1973, the age at which the majority of fe-
tuses survive outside the woman's womb has become significantly
earlier in pregnancy.16 3
Thus, when determining fetal viability, it may not be enough
simply to establish the point at which the fetus has "the capability
of meaningful life outside the mother's womb.' 6 4 One must go on
to ask: (1) viable in what setting and with what technology?; and
(2) viable at what cost to the mother's well-being and at what ex-
penditure of dollars and resources? There also looms a related
160. M. AVERY & H. TAEUSCH, supra note 8, at 133-45. Researchers continue to investi-
gate the development of fetal lungs and other tissues. Stahman, Kasselberg, Orth & Gray,
Ontogeny of Neuroendocrine Cells in Human Fetal Lung IL An Immunohistochemical
Study, 52 LABORATORY INVESTIGATION 52 (1985); Kasselberg, Orth, Gray & Stahlman, Immu-
nocytochemical Localization of Human Epidermal Growth Factor/Urogastrone in Several
Human Tissues, 33 J. HISTOCHEMISTRY & CYTOCHEMISTRY 315 (1985).
161. Roloff, Cornell, Andrews, Dillon & Zwischenberger, Extracorporeal Circulation in
Neonatal Respiratory Failure: A Prospective Randomized Study, 76 PEDIATRICS 479 (1985).
162. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
163. Numerous centers have documented the remarkable change in survival of
preterm infants. MK AVERY &H. TAEuSCH, supra note 98, at 86-88; Schechner, For the 1980s
How Small is Too Small? 7 CLINCIS IN PERINATOLOGY 135 (1980); Stahlman, Newborn Inten-
sive Care: Success on Failure?, 105 J. PEDIATRICS 162 (1984). Although individual infants
born after only twenty-five weeks of gestation have been known to survive, the real change
in the limits of viability is illustrated by the shift in the gestational age at which there is
fifty percent survival in the best medical centers. In the early 1970's fifty percent survival
was associated with a gestational age of twenty-nine weeks. By the late 1970's the age had
moved to twenty-six weeks of gestation. Compare R. BEHRMAN & V. VAUGHAN, supra note
116, at 339 with M. AVERY & H. TARUSH, supra note 98, at 87. Some believe that the current
limits of viability will not change significiantly until there are major technological changes
in the care of newborns. M. AVERY & H. TAEuscH, supra note 98, at 87. It is important to
note that the survival data cited was compiled in neonatal intensive care units in major
university hospitals and may not correlate with the figures in other facilities.
164. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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question: Who will pay for it?16 5
III. Surrogate Parenting: A Quagmire of
Legal Issues
A. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 632
B. TYPICAL PROVISIONS IN A SURROGATE PARENTING
CONTRACT ......................................... 634
C. APPLICABILITY OF STATE STATUTES AND PUBLIC POLI-
CIES TO SURROGATE PARENTING ..................... 638
1. State Statutes ............................. 638
2. Public Policies ............................ 644
D. ENFORCEABILITY OF THE SURROGATE PARENTING CON-
TRACT ............................................. 645
1. Contract Viewed as an Adoption Agreement. 645
2. Contract Viewed as a Custody Agreement ... 648
E. CRIMINAL LIABILITY ................................ 650
1. Surrogate M other .......................... 650
2. Adopting Couple ........................ 651
3. Placement Agencies and Attorneys .......... 651
F. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES AND PUBLIC
POLICIES RENDERING SURROGATE PARENTING CON-
TRACTS UNENFORCEABLE ............................ 652
1. Substantive Due Process ................... 652
(a) Compelling State Interest ................ 653
(b) Narrowly Drawn Regulation ............ 655
2. Equal Protection .......................... 655
G. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF A SURROGATE PARENTING
CONTRACT IF THE CONTRACT IS ENFORCEABLE ....... 657
1. Specific Performance ...................... 658
2. Compensatory Damages .................... 659
H. ACQUIRING RELIEF EXCLUSIVE OF THE SURROGATE
PARENTING AGREEMENT IF THE CONTRACT IS UNEN-
FORCEABLE ......................................... 660
1. Surrogate Mother's Recovery ............... 660
2. Biological Father's Recovery ................ 662
I. LEGISLATIVE REFORM ............................... 664
J. CONCLUSION ........................................ 664
165. See generally infra section III of this Special Project.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
A "surrogate" is "a person appointed to act in the place of
another." 166 "Mother," when used as a verb, includes the meaning
"to give birth to.11 67 Thus, a "surrogate mother" 16 8 is a woman ap-
pointed to give birth to a child in the place of another. 6 '
Although defining a "surrogate mother" is not difficult, surro-
gate parenting involves complex and uncertain legal conse-
quences.17 0 The parties to the surrogate parenting process usually
enter into a contract. State statutes and public policies appear to
regulate and often prohibit surrogate parenting, but their applica-
bility to these contracts is unclear. And even if applicable, the stat-
utes and policies that render the contract unenforceable may be
unconstitional. Furthermore, ultimate enforceability of the surro-
gate parenting contract may depend on whether the court views
the contract as one for adoption or for custody. Consequently, it is
not clear whether a party to a surrogate parenting contract has
contract rights upon a possible breach, or whether the party must
seek redress exclusive of the contract. Surrogate parenting is a via-
ble and popular method of birth even though it is subject to great
unpredictability and legislation is necessary.
Three main methods of surrogate parenting exist.'7 ' The first
method, the artificial insemination method, is the traditional one
and includes three steps. First, the surrogate mother is artifically
inseminated 72 with the biological father's sperm.13 Second, the
surrogate mother carries the fetus in her uterus for nine months
166. WEBsTER's TmRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2302 (1981).
167. Id. at 1474.
168. Commentators have argued that the term "surrogate mother" is a misnomer be-
cause the woman is in fact the biological mother in most instances. S. GREEN & J. LONG,
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW AGREEMENTS 246 n.128 (1984) [hereinafter cited as GREEN &
LONG].
169. "Surrogate mother describes a woman's conceiving a child [usually] by artificial
insemination by donor, carrying it to term, and relinquishing it to the sperm donor after
birth in accordance with a preconception agreement. Usually the sperm donor's wife will
adopt the child after the surrogate mother relinquishes it." Pierce, Survey of State Activity
Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001, 3002 (Jan. 29, 1985) (quot-
ing the National Committee For Adoption, Inc.'s policy statement).
170. Because this section analyzes the relationship between all parties rather than fo-
cusing solely on the surrogate mother carrying the fetus, the Author has chosen to use the
term "surrogate parenting" rather than "surrogate mothering."
171. For a discussion of the inheritance problems resulting from surrogate parenting,
see infra notes 486-91 and accompanying text.
172. Artificial insemination is accomplished by inserting a syringe into the vagina and
injecting semen toward the uterine opening. GREEN & LONG, supra note 168, at 235. See also
supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
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and gives birth to the child. Last, the surrogate mother terminates
all parental rights to the child and gives it to the biological or
adopting father for his custody or adoption. This method normally
is used when the wife is infertile and the husband is fertile.
The second method of surrogate parenting, in vitro fertiliza-
tion 4, involves five steps. First, a fertile couple desiring a child
gives an egg and semen to a doctor.175 Second, the doctor fertilizes
the egg through in vitro fertilization. Third, the fertilized egg is
implanted in the surrogate mother's uterus. Fourth, the surrogate
mother carries the fetus in her uterus for nine months and gives
birth. Last, the surrogate mother terminates all parental rights to
the child and gives it to the couple who donated the egg and se-
man. This method is used when the wife has an abnormality in her
reproductive organs that prevents her egg from being fertiilized by
her husband's sperm or when the wife is unable to carry a child to
term because she has an abnormality in her uterus. If the wife is
able to conceive, but unable to then carry the gestating fetus, em-
bryo transfer methods allow transfer of the naturally fertilized egg
from the biological mother's womb to the surrogate mother's
womb.
The third method of surrogate parenting is a modification of
the in vitro fertilization method and involves five steps. The first
four steps are identical to those of the in vitro fertilization method.
The fifth step, however, differs. Instead of giving the child to the
couple who donated the seman and egg, the surrogate mother gives
the child to adoptive parents who are not biologically related to
the child.176 There have been no reported incidents of the use of
this method, but the method could be utilized in a situation in
173. A variation of this method is sometimes used. This variation is known as "con-
fused, combined, or comingled artificial insemination" because it is accomplished by taking
the semen of the adopting father and combining it with donor semen and then artificially
inseminating the surrogate mother with the mixture. This variation is used when the adopt-
ing father's sperm count is low; by using this method, there is a possibility that the child is
biologically related to the adopting father. See GREEN & LONG, supra note 168, at 235-36.
174. The in vitro fertilization method of surrogate parenting is a new approach. The
first reported incident in which this method of surrogate parenting was utilized occured in
august 1985 at Cleveland's Mount Sinai Medical Center. Wellborn, Birth: To Couples that
Could Never be Parents, a Thousand Children are Born, US. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov.
11, 1985, at 48. See also supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
175. If only one member of the couple is fertile, this step of the in vitro method may
be varied by using either donor sperm or a donor egg.
176. In this situation, one commentator maintains that the child would have "five par-
ents: an egg donor, sperm donor, surrogate mother who gestates the fetus and the couple
who raise the child." Andrews, The Stork Market: Legal Regulation of the New Reproduc-
tive Technologies, 6 WHrrrER L. REV. 789, 791 (1984).
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which both the husband and wife are infertile.
Although the three above-mentioned methods of surrogate
parenting involve very different medical techniques, and although
the biological relationship of the couple receiving custody to the
child may vary depending upon the method used, the legal conse-
quences of contracting to perform each method are surprisingly
similar. 177 The methods are treated very much the same because
most states presume that the woman who gives birth to a child is
the natural, biological mother of the child.'7
This Part discusses the legal aspects of surrogate parenting
from the perspective of an attorney faced with the problem for the
first time. Section B presents the typical provisions of a surrogate
parenting contract. Section C introduces the question of the appli-
cability of state statutes and public policies to the surrogate
parenting situation. Section D examines the enforceability of sur-
rogate parenting contracts, focusing on whether the court charac-
terizes the contract as an adoption agreement or a custody agree-
ment. Section E discusses possible criminal liability resulting from
the surrogate parenting process. Section F examines the constitu-
tionality of state statutes and public policies that make a surrogate
contract illegal and, hence, unenforceable. Section G considers the
remedies available for breach of an enforceable surrogate contract.
Section H explains the methods of acquiring child support and
child custody exclusive of the surrogate contract. Section I calls for
legislation to deal with the legal aspects of surrogate parenting
that remain unresolved.
B. TYPICAL PROVISIONS IN A SURROGATE PARENTING CONTRACT
In all three methods of surrogate parenting, the surrogate
mother agrees to provide a womb for the fetus for nine months, to
relinquish all parental rights to the child, and to give the child to a
specified couple at birth.I7 9 The couple receiving the child typically
177. Throughout this section the Author will note the instances in which different
methods of surrogate parenting result in different legal consequences.
178. See sources cited infra notes 184 and 323 (creating a presumption that the child
is that of the woman giving birth and her husband).
179. There are many possible surrogate parenting scenarios, but for purposes of clar-
ity, this section will use as a model the situation in which a married couple proposes to
adopt a child carried by a surrogate mother who is also married. In fact, many doctors and
lawyers refuse to handle a surrogate parenting case for single parents or unwed couples.
For a review of commentary discussing ethical issues posed by the surroage parenting
process, see Brahams, The Legal and Social Problems of In Vitro Fertilisation: Why Parlia-
ment must Legislate-II, 133 NEw L.J. 881 (1983); Sherwyn, Attorney Duties in the Area of
[Vol. 39:597
1986] CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND BIRTH 635
agrees to pay for the surrogate mother's medical, hospital, and le-
gal expenses related to conception of the child, pregnancy, and ter-
mination of the surrogate mother's parental rights to the child. In
most instances the couple also agrees to pay the surrogate mother
a specified fee for her services.180 The parties usually execute a sur-
rogate parenting contract. 81 Simply specifying rights in a contract,
New Reproductive Technologies, 6 WHrrrIER L. REV. 799 (1984); Comment, Love's Labor
Lost: Legal and Ethical Implications in Artificial Human Procreation, 58 U. DF'. J. URB. L.
459 (1981).
180. An estimate of the fee paid to a surrogate mother for carrying the child to term is
$12,000. Handel, Surrogate Parenting, In Vitro Insemination and Embryo Transplanta-
tion, 6 WHiTrIER L. REv. 783, 786 (1984).
181. One commentator has drafted a sample surrogate parenting contract that at-
tempts to solve some of the legal problems asosciated with surrogate parenting.
Surrogate Mother Contract Agreement
THIS AGREEMENT is made this - day -, 198[ ], by and between
(hereinafter referred to as "Surrogate") and her husband, - (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "Husband") and - (hereinafter referred to as "Natural Father").
RECITALS
THIS AGREEMENT is made with reference to the following facts:
(1) The Natural Father is a married individual over the age of eighteen (18) years who
is desirous of entering into the following agreement.
(2) The Natural Father desires to have a child who is biologically related to him.
(3) The Surrogate and her Husband are a married couple each over the age of eighteen
(18) years who are desirous of entering into the following agreements in consideration
of the financial remuneration incident hereto.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutural promises contained herein and
with the intentions of being legally bound, hereby the parties agree as follows:
SECTION I. The Surrogate represents that she is capable of conceiving children, but
agrees that she will not form or attempt to form a parent-child relationship with any
child she may conceive pursuant to the provisions of this contract and shall freely and
readily, in conformance with applicable statutory regulations, terminate all parental
rights to said child pursuant to this agreement.
SECTION II. The Surrogate and her Husband have been married since - and the
Husband is in agreement with the purposes, intents, and provisions of this agreement
and agrees that his wife, the Surrogate, shall be artificially inseminated pursuant to the
provisions of this agreement. The Husband will not form a parent-child relationship
with any child the Surrogate may conceive by artificial insemination as described
herein and agrees to freely and readily terminate all parental rights to said child and
acknowledges he will do all acts necessary to rebut the presumption of paternity (in-
cluding blood testing) . ...
SECTION III. The Natural Father is hereby entering into a written contractual
agreement with the Surrogate and her Husband, whereby the Surrogate shall be artifi-
cially inseminated, with the semen of the Natural Father, by -, M.D. The Surro-
gate, upon her becoming pregnant, shall carry said embryo/fetus(s) (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "child") until delivery. Delivery shall occur in the state of - The
Surrogate and her Husband agree that they will on the fifth day after delivery of the
child, or as soon thereafter as is medically possible, institute proceedings in [.], to
terminate their respective parental rights to said child and sign any and all necessary
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however, may not bind the parties because a court can stike down
affidavit documents, etc., in order to further the intent and purposes of this agreement.
The Surrogate and her Husband agree to sign all necessary affidavits, prior to the birth
of the child in order to have the Natural Father's name placed on said child's birth
certificate as the biological father ....
. . . .SECTION IV. The Natural Father and the Surrogate and her Husband recognize
and acknowledge that the Attorney(s) for the Natural Father shall act as agent for the
Natural Father is all matters pertaining to this agreement in order to maintain com-
plete confidentiality.
SECTION V. The consideration for this agreement, in addition to other provisions
contained herein, shall be as follows: (a) $__ shall be paid to the Surrogate and
her Husband upon entry of the judgment fully terminating the parental rights of the
Surrogate and her Husband as defined by the law in [ ] to the child to be born pursu-
ant to these provisions between the Surrogate and the Natural Father.
ALTERNATE PROVISION,
SECTION V (a) The Natural Father shall not pay the Surrogate a fee of any kind
pursuant to this agreement but shall pay the Surrogate's pregnancy and confinement
expenses beginning on the date her pregnancy is verified and continuing for (1) one
month subsequent to the contemplated birth. Said pregnancy and confinement ex-
penses shall not exceed $ per month in addition to the following:
See (c)(1).
(b) The consideration to be paid said Surrogate and her Husband shall be deposited
with the attorney for the Natural Father at the time of the signing of this agreement
and held in escrow until completion of the duties and obligations of the Surrogate and
her Husband as herein described.
(c) The Natural Father shall pay the expenses incurred by the Surrogate and her Hus-
band pursuant to her pregnancy, more specifically defined as follows:
[(1)-(5) describe the expenses paid in detail. (contents summarized)]SECTION VI. Im-
mediately subsequent to the birth of the child, the Surrogate, the Natural Father, and
the child shall undergo the following tests under the direction of the pathologist desig-
nated by M.D.:
(1) Blood Group
(2) Serum Proteins
(3) Red Cell Enzymes
(4) White Cell/H.L.A.*
In the event that the Natural Father is excluded by one (1) or more of the aforemen-
tioned tests, this contract shall be immediately terminated and all monies and/or all
other consideration paid to the Surrogate and her Husband, or in their behalf, or ex-
pended to screen and/or investigate the Surrogate and/or her Husband in contempla-
tion of this contract by the Natural Father shall be immediately returned by the Surro-
gate and her Husband to the Natural Father. In addition, the Surrogate and her
Husband shall pay interest on said monies at the United States prime rate existing at
the time said sum(s) were expended.
SECTION VII. The Natural Father shall pay the cost of a term life insurance
policy payable to a named beneficiary of the Surrogate with a policy amount of $ .
and said policy shall remain in effect for six (6) weeks subsequent to the birth of the
child. In addition, the Natural Father shall make appropriate arrangements in his will
for the support of the infant child should he die prior to the birth of said child and
shall pay the cost of a term life insurance policy on his life payable in trust to said
unborn child.
. . .SECTION VII. The Surrogate and her Husband understand and agree to as-
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sume all risks, including the risk of death which are incident to conception, pregnancy,
childbirth and postpartum complications.
.... SECTION IX. This section provides for psychiatric and psychological examina-
tions of the Surrogate and her Husband, with the reports given to the Natural Father.
(contents summarized)SECTION X. Defines "Child" (contents summarized)SECTION
XI. In the event that the child is miscarried prior to the fifth (5th) month of preg-
nancy, no compensation as enumerated in Section V(a) shall be paid to the Surrogate.
However, the expenses enumerated in Section V(c) shall be paid or reimbursed to the
Surrogate and her Husband in addition to any and all travel and incidental expenses
incident hereto incurred by the Surrogate and/or her Husband. In the event the child
is miscarried, dies, or is stillborn subsequent to the fourth (4th) month of pregnancy,
and said child does not survive, the Surrogate shall receive $_ in lieu of the com-
pensation in Seciton V(a) only if the paternity testing enumerated in Seciton VI(6) is
completed and satisfactory as to said child. In the event of a miscarriage or stillbirth as
described above, this agreement shall terminate and neither the Surrogate nor the Nat-
ural Father will be under any further obligation under this agreement.
.... SECTION XIL Surrogate and Natural Father must undergo physical and genetic
examination (contents summarized)SECTION XIII. In the event that custody of the
child is awarded to the surrogate and/or her Husband or their family, or any invidual
or organization not related to the Natural Father, by any court decision or otherwise,
the Natural Father shall be indeminified by the Surrogate and/or her Husband, both
jointly and severally ....
.... SECTION XIV & SECTION XV. None of the parties to the contract will at-
tempt to learn the identity of the others. (contents summarized)SECTION XVI. If
pregnancy hasn't occurred within a reasonable time, the inseminating physician will
terminate the contract. (contents summarized)SECTION XVIL All parties agree not
to tell news media (contents summarized)SECTION XVIII. If Surrogate or Husband
violate any provision, Natural Father can terminate contract-Surrogate and Husband
must indemnify Natural Father for any expenses. (contents summarized)SECTION
XIX. Surrogate and Husband agree to provide no interviews without Natural Father's
permission. (contents summarized)SECTION XX. Surrogate agrees not to abort child
unless her health is in danger, or child is physiologically abnormal. In either of these
contingencies, Surrogate agrees to abort child. (contents summarized)SECTION XXI.
The Natural Father assumes the legal responsibility for any child who may possess
congenital abnormalities and he has been previously advised of the risk of such abnor-
malities. (See attachedmedical statement of Natural Father).
. . .SECTION XXII. In the event that the Natural Father predeceases the birth of the
child, said child shall be placed in the custody of _ for placement through a
private adoption to a designated person upon consent of the appropriate social
agency.SECTION XXIII. Surrogate and Husband agree not to try to view child after
birth. (contents summarized)SECTION XXIV. Surrogate agrees to follow physician's
instructions. (contents summarized)
.SECTION XXV. All parties understand and sign voluntarily. (contents summa-
rized)SECTION XXVI. Any provision which is invalid is severable. (content summa-
rized)SECTION XXVIL The contract may be executed in two or more counterparts, if
togehter, constitutes same instrument. (contents summarized)SECTION XXVIII. All
of the agreement is set out in this (contents summarized) document; all prior agree-
ments are viewed, merged, or superseded; This is an integrated agreement. (contents
summarized)SECTION XXIX. This contract can be amended only by a writing signed
by all parties. (contents summarized)SECTION XXX. Governed by law of [_].
(contents summarzied)SECTION XXXI. This agreement is not to be interpreted for
or against the party that drafted provisions. (contents summarized)
Signatures
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any term it deems contrary to public policy. i8 2
C. APPLICABILITY OF STATE STATUTES AND PUBLIC POLICIES TO
SURROGATE PARENTING
1. State Statutes
Arkansas is the only state that has a statute specifically deal-
ing with surrogate parenting. 83 The Arkansas statute provides that
a child born to an unmarried surrogate mother is the child of the
intended parents. 84 Most state legislatures have not passed legisla-
tion specifically intended to regulate surrogate parenting.'8 " As of
1985, no state has passed legislation specifically prohibiting surro-
gate parenting. At least one court has held that a legislature's fail-
ure to authorize surrogate parenting indicates the state's desire to
Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263, 266-84 (1981-82),
reprinted in GREEN & LONG, supra note 168, at 385-401.
182. See Note, Surrogate Mothers: The Legal Issues, 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 323, 326
(1981).
183. See ARK STAT. ANN. § 34-720-21 (Supp. 1985).
Child born as result of artificial insemination shall, be deemed legitimate natural
child of husband.Any child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemina-
tion shall be deemed the legitimate natural child of the woman's husband if the hus-
band consents in writing to the artificial insemination.Child born to married or unmar-
ried woman-Presumptions-Surrogate mothers.(A) A child born by means of
artificial inseminatin to a woman who is married at the time of the birth of such child,
shall be presumed to be the child of the woman's husband.
(B) A child born by means of artificial insemination to a woman who is unmarried at
the time of the birth of the child, shall be for all legal purposes the child of the woman
giving birth, except in the case of a surrogate mother, in which event the child shall be
that of the woman intended to be the mother. For birth registration purposes, in cases
of surrogate mothers, the woman giving birth shall be presumed to be the natural
mother and shall be listed as such on the certificate of birth, but a substituted certifi-
cate of birth can be issued upon orders of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Id.
184. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-721(B) (Supp. 1985). Even the Arkansas statute does
not deal adequately with all of the problems surrounding surrogate parenting because it
addresses only arrangements involving an unmarried surrogate mother.
185. One student commentator has proposed a Uniform Surrogate Parenting Act to fill
the void resulting from the failure of state legislatures to pass statutes regulating this area.
See Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate
Parenthood Act, 73 G.o. L.J. 1283, 1299 (1985).
This proposed Act is subject to criticism. First, it addresses only the artificial insemina-
tion method of surrogate parenting. Because the proposed Act does not contemplate the
legal implications of other methods of surrogate parenting, the Act would have to be re-
drafted as other medical techniques are developed or utilized. Second, the Act requires a
large volume of paperwork that may be justified only in the event that one party attempts
to breach the agreement. In the majority of undisputed cases, the paperwork will only in-
crease the cost of surrogate parenting arrangements rather than aid the parties.
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prohibit these arrangements. 8e
Often states have statutes that on their face appear applicable
to surrogate parenting, but the statutes do not specify whether
state lawmakers intended the statutes to regulate surrogate
parenting arrangements. 18 7 Analysis of the goals and purposes un-
derlying the statute is useful because most states enacted their
statutes before advanced medical technology made surrogate
parenting a viable option.188 If a statute appears to prohibit as-
pects of the surrogate parenting process, courts should undertake
an analysis to determine whether the surrogate parenting process
would frustrate the purposes and goals behind the statute. Specifi-
cally, before a court applies any state statute to the surrogate situ-
ation, the court should examine the legislative history of the stat-
ute to determine what legislative goals the state meant to further
by enacting the statute. If the surrogate parenting situation frus-
trates the goals of the state statute, the legislature probably would
have intended to regulate the activity if it considered surrogate
parenting before passing the act. The court in that instance should
apply the statute to cases concerning surrogate parenting. If, how-
ever, the surrogate parenting situation does not frustrate the state
legislature's goals, the court should not apply the statute to surro-
gate parenting cases because the legislature probably would not
have intended to regulate the surrogate parenting process had it
considered surrogate parenting before passing the act.
At first glance, the group of various state statutes dealing with
adoption and custody of children appears to prohibit various as-
pects of the surrogate parenting arrangement. For example, many
state statutes prohibit a mother from receiving compensation for
allowing another person to adopt her child.18 9 State statutes also
186. Kentucky ex rel Armstrong v. Surrogate Parenting Assoc., Inc., 11 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 1359 (Ky. Ct. App. Ap. 26, 1985).
187. Statutes that appear to regulate surrogate parenting arrangments include: stat-
utes regulating fetal experimentation, statutes prohibiting a mother from receiving compen-
sation for giving her child up for adoption, statutes prohibiting agencies from receiving com-
pensation for placing children, statutes prohibiting a parent from assigning rights to the
care and custody of a child, and statutes prohibiting advertisement of placement matters.
See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
188. Commentators have noted that it is unclear whether legislators intended baby
brokerage statutes to include surrogate motherhood arrangments because such arrange-
ments were not prevalent when the state drafted the legislation. See GREEN & LONG, supra
note 168, at 251.
189. Cf., e.g., Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114 (Supp. 1985) (stating that spouse of natu-
ral parent is exempt from prohibition, and that a mother can receive medical and legal
expenses if they are approved by the court); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-115(1) (1978) (mother
639
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:597
prohibit any unlicensed agency or person from receiving compensa-
tion for placing a child for adoption. 90 Still other state statutes
require that an agency placing a child for adopting have a li-
can receive attorney's fees and other fees approved by the court); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §
928(a) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(d) (West 1985) (indicating that the mother can
receive actual medical, hospital, confinement and living expenses); IDAHO CODE § 18-1511 to
-1512 (1979) (allowing mother to receive payment of medical bills); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-
1-9 (Burns 1985) (allowing payment and receipt of attorney's fees, medical expenses, reason-
able charges by a licensed agency, and other court-approved charges); IowA CODE ANN. §
600.9 (West 1981) (allowing receipt of actual expenses); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199. 590 (2)
(Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1985); MD. FA. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-327(a) (1984) (permitting receipt
of medical and legal expenses); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 11A (West Supp. 1985);
MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(1) (West Supp. 1985) (allowing receipt of court-approved
fees); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1977) (permitting receipt of medical ex-
penses); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1984); OHIO RE V. CODE ANN. § 3107.10 (Page 1980) (noting
that the prohibition does not apply to adoption by a stepparent, and that the mother can
receive payment for medical and legal expenses); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 866 (West Supp.
1985) (allowing receipt of medical and legal expenses); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.2
(1984); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-1-135(a) (1984) (permitting receipt of medical and legal ex-
penses); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (1979) (allowing receipt of actual, reasonable medical,
hospital, and confinement expenses); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.716(1)(a) (West 1982) (permit-
ting hospital, medical, and legal expenses); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 1970)
(prohibiting payments in excess of medical expenses to the mother or agency); GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-418(b) (Harrison Supp. 1984) (prohibiting payments in excess of medical ex-
penses); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1702 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (prohibiting payments to mother
or agency).
190. Cf., e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-4-115 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(b)
(1981) (attorney's fees, court costs, and a service fee can be received); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,
§§ 1526, 1701 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Burns 1985) (allowing receipt
of attorney's fees, medical expenses, reasonable charges by a licensed agency, and other
court-appointed charges); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1985) (al-
lowing licensed placement agencies to charge a fee for placement); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 8204(3) (1980) (allowing receipt of reasonable costs for services); MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 5-327 (1984) (allowing receipt of medical and legal expenses); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 210, § 11A (West Supp. 1985); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(1) (West Supp. 1985)
(allowing receipt of court-approved fees); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 127.285, .290 (1981) (attorneys
and licensed agencies can receive reasonable compensation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West
Supp. 1985) (permitting receipt of medical expenses, birth-related expenses, and fees
charged by a licensed agency); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1977) (permitting
receipt of medical expenses); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.10
(Page 1980) (permitting medical and legal expenses and exempting step-parents from the
prohibition); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 866 (West Supp. 1985) (allowing receipt of medical
and legal expenses); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.2 (1984) (permitting receipt of court-
approved fees & licensed agency's fees); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-135(a) (1984) (permitting
receipt of medical and legal expenses); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-8a-1 (Supp. 1985) (allowing
receipt of medical and legal expenses); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5(e) (Supp. 1985) (limiting fees
to value of services rendered); WIs.STAT. ANN. § 946.716(1)(b) (West 1982) (only licensed
agencies); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.097, 63.212(1)(g) (West 1985) (allowing agencies to
receive a compensation, but requiring court approval for more than $500 over the actual
documented medical and legal expenses); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9 (West 1981) (allowing
receipt o± a reasonable fee).
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cense.' e' Many states also statutorily prohibit advertisement of
child placement matters by anyone other than a licensed agency. 192
Other state statutes prohibit a parent from assigning or transfer-
ring rights to the care and custody of a child, except for adoption
purposes. 93
Generally, the primary purposes and goals underlying the
group of statutes relating to custody and adoption are to promote
the best interests of the child9 4 and the natural family unit by
preventing a process similar to "child bartering.' ' 95 Arguably, the
surrogate parenting process would not frustrate these purposes and
goals because aspects of child bartering, which the legislatures in-
tended to prevent, are not present in surrogate parenting.'96 The
state legislatures probably intended to prevent black market baby
bartering that, in many instances, involves young, frightened, preg-
nant girls who did not choose to become pregnant and are uncer-
tain about what to do with their babies. The typical surrogate
191. Cf., e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 224q (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-108 (1978)
(the guardian of the child is also allowed to place the child); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-49a
(West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904 (Supp. 1984) (no requirement to use li-
censed adoption agency if stepparent or blood relative adopts); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN § 170-
E:3 (Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-7-19, 40-7A-8 (1983) (no requirement to use li-
censed agency if adoption by a stepparent or through a religious organization); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 50-12-02 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-1(a) (Supp. 1985) (no need for licensed
agency if child is place by parent, or with close realtive or stepparent); TENN. CODE ANN. §
35-1-134 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-8a-1(2) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 63.1-220.1 (Supp.
1985) (parent can place child without license). But see ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 8204(2)
(1980) (allowing unlicensed agencies to place children).
192. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1975); CAL. CIV. CODE § 224p (West 1982); GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-418(a) (Harrison Supp. 1984); Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.590(1) (Supp. 1985); ME.
RED. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 8240(1)-(2) (1980) (must have a license to advertise); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 127.310 (1981) (licensed agencies can advertise); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-E:14
(Supp. 1985) (licensed agencies can advertise); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-38 (1984); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 866(5) (West Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-8a-1(3) (Supp. 1985).
193. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 181 (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
63.212(1)(e) (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.02 (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.110
(Vernon 1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-135(3) (1984); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.33.370(1)
(Supp. 1986).
194. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060(a) (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (1981);
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-107(a) (Harrison Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 602, 1525 (Smith-
Hurd 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-11 (Burns Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.025
(West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.110 (Vernon 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05 (Supp.
1983); OHIo RE. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(A) (Page Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 107.137,
109.175 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1002 (Purdon Supp. 1985); TEX. FAh. CODE ANN. §
14.07 (Vernon 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2) (West 1981).
195. "Child bartering' is the selling of children for a fee or for some other item of
value.
196. See GREEN & LONG, supra note 168, at 250-51, for an argument that the child's
best interests are not taken into account.
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parenting fact situation is very dissimilar from the black market
adoptions that the legislatures visualized when they wrote the stat-
utes because most surrogate mothers are women who choose to
carry the child after being made aware of the consequences. 97
Black market adoptions include child bartering elements. In
the typical black market adoption a third-party intermediary ar-
ranges for a married couple to adopt an unwed mother's baby. The
intermediary rarely investigates the mental and physical health of
the couple, the child, or either's suitability for adoption.19 Unlike
the unwed mother in the typical black market adoption, a surro-
gate mother willingly agreed to relinquish parental rights to the
child before she became pregnant. 19 Accordingly, no one is pres-
suring the surrogate mother into making a serious decision in a
small span of time. Surrogate parenting actually may further a
state's goal of promoting the best interests of the child. The adopt-
ing couple or the couple receiving custody have planned carefully
for the child2 0 and intend to treat the child as their own. In fact, a
child carried by a surrogate mother may be biologically related to
one or both adopting parents.20 ' When the state legislatures passed
their respective statutes, they believed that they were promoting
the best interests of the child by having the child stay with its
natural mother.202 Today, however, many state legislatures hold
197. Greenburg & Hirsh, Surrogate Motherhood and Artificial Insemination: Con-
tractual Implications, 1983 MED. TRIAL TECHNIQUE Q. 149, 155 [hereinafter cited as Green-
burg & Hirsh]; see also GREEN & LONG, supra note 168, at 250-51 (stating that surrogate
parenting is distinguishable from black market adoptions because the child is biologically
related to the husband and because surrogate agency investigations lessen the chance of
unsuitable parents).
198. Greenburg & Hirsh, supra note 197, at 155.
199. Id.
200. See supra note 181 for a sample surrogate parenting agreement containing de-
tailed provisions regulating all involved parties' conduct.
201. For a review of the possible sperm and egg combinations in the surrogate parent-
ing process, see supra text accompanying notes 172-76.
202. For custody statutes providing that the state shall not prefer one parent over the
other, see e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-718 (Supp. 1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722(b) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 602 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-11 (Burns Supp. 1985); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-203(c)(2) (1984);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.025 (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.110 (Vernon 1977); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-05 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.03 (Page Supp. 1984); OR.
REv. STAT. § 109.030 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1002 (Purdon Supp. 1985); S.D. CODI-
FrED LAWS ANN. § 25-5-10 (1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon 1975); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 767.24(2) (West 1981). But see CAL. CIv. CODE § 197 (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §
74-203 (Harrison Supp. 1984) (mother is entitled to custody of illegitimate child unless fa-
ther legitimizes him, then custody is based on best interests of child); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
953 (Law. Co-op. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.435 (West Supp. 1985).
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the view that the best interests of the child are promoted just as
much by permitting the child to live with the natural father as by
permitting the child to live with the natural mother. 0 3 Under the
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization methods, the natu-
ral father receives custody of the child. In some cases, the in vitro
method may result in both biological parents getting custody of
the child. Accordingly, the state would accomplish its goal of pro-
moting the family unit by enforcing the surrogate contract because
the surrogate mother is not biologically related to the child. °4
Under the modified in vitro fertilization method, however, no
party to the contract is biologically related to the child and, con-
cededly, neither leaving the child with the surrogate mother nor
giving the child to the intended parents would further the state's
goal of promoting the natural family unit.
A second group of state statutes dealing with fetal experimen-
tation may render surrogate contracts illegal and, hence, unen-
forceable. Virtually all states have fetal experimentation laws in
one form or another.20 5 These statutes may apply to the in vitro
fertilization 26 and modified in vitro fertilization2 0 7 methods of sur-
rogate parenting because conception takes place outside of the
womb. The statutes probably do not apply to the traditional artifi-
cial insemination method 20 8 of surrogate parenting because concep-
tion takes place in the surrogate mother's womb and because the
states do not consider artificial insemination experimental. When
analyzed by examining the underlying purposes and goals, how-
ever, the fetal experimentation statutes should not apply to any of
the surrogate parenting methods because the purpose of the stat-
utes is to prevent cruelty and harm to fetuses. 20 1 The surrogate
203. The surrogate mother could argue that she has a bond with the child that the
natural mother does not have. This argument is more persuasive when the parties used the
modified in vitro fertilization method with donor sperm and a donor egg because the adopt-
ing couple, in this situation, is completely unrelated to the child.
204. See, e.g., ARMz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (Supp. 1978-1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 81-26(7) (Hurd-Smith Supp. 1985); IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-6 (1985); Ky. REv. STAT. §
436.026 (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1974); ME REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593
(1980); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685-.2692 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.-.422
(West Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01
(1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Page 1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3216 (Purdon
1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978);
Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977).
205. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
208. See Note, supra note 182, at 328.
209. Id.; see also Andrews, supra note 176, at 791-94 (1984); Flannery, Weisman, Lip-
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parenting process, rather than harming fetuses, promotes the
health and safety of the fetus.
In conclusion, statutes appearing to regulate or prohibit surro-
gate parenting are of questionable applicability because surrogate
parenting actually furthers the statutes' underlying purposes and
goals. Under the modified in vitro fertilization method, however,
the statutes may apply to prevent frustration of legislative goals.
Because of the confusion surrounding the applicability of statutes
that do not address specifically surrogate parenting, an attorney
also should examine public policy in attempting to predict whether
a state court would enforce or strike down a surrogate parenting
agreement.
2. Public Policies
State public policy may render the surrogate parenting con-
tract unenforceable2 10 even when state statutes do not appear to
regulate surrogate parenting or when state statutes that appear to
regulate surrogate parenting do not apply.21' Public policies of a
state that could preclude surrogate parenting contracts include:
preventing child bartering, promoting the best interests of the
child, and promoting the natural family unit. Because these public
policies are identical to the goals and purposes of statutes that ap-
pear to apply to surrogate parenting, the arguments for not apply-
ing these public policies to the surrogate parenting situation re-
main the same.212
Although considering the underlying purposes and goals of ex-
isting statutes and public policies is an appropriate way to measure
a state's attitude toward the surrogate parenting process, courts
may tend to make decisions based on other considerations.
Whether a court would apply these public policies to find a surro-
gate parenting contract unenforceable may depend on whether the
sett & Braverman, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEo.
L.J. 1295, 1299-1300 (1979) (stating that because fetal experimentation statutes were en-
acted to address abortion and not in vitro fertilization it seems unlikely that courts would
construe their terms so broadly that they apply to in vitro fertilization).
210. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1744A, at 88 (3d ed. 1972
& Supp. 1985).
211. In theory, a court can find that the state statutes that appear to prohibit surro-
gate parenting do not apply and then find that public policy prohibits surrogate parenting.
In reality, however, a court looks to the state's public policy to determine whether the stat-
utes apply. Therefore, if the statutes do not apply, the public policy behind the statute will
not apply.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 189-200.
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court views the contract as an adoption agreement or as a custody
agreement.
D. ENFORCEABILITY OF THE SURROGATE PARENTING CONTRACT
Assuming that a state statute appears to prohibit aspects of
surrogate parenting, a court most likely would hold that the surro-
gate contract is unenforceable either because the object of the con-
tract is illegal 13 or because the consideration is illegal.21 4 Whether
the contract is enforceable, however, ultimately may depend on
whether the court views the contract as an adoption agreement 15
or as a custody agreement.16
1. Contract Viewed as an Adoption Agreement
If a court views the surrogate agreement as an adoption con-
tract, it probably will hold that the contract is unenforceable be-
cause statutes prohibiting payments to a mother for her child2 17
and statutes prohibiting payments to persons aiding in adop-
tions218 appear to invalidate the contract.219 In Kentucky v. Surro-
gate Parenting Associates, Inc.,220 a Kentucky court of appeals
held that a surrogate parenting contract was, in effect, an adoption
contract,22I and in Doe v. Kelley,22 a Michigan court of appeals
implicitly held that adoption statutes applied to a surrogate
parenting arrangement. 223 If other courts follow this lead and find
213. J. MURRAY. MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 344, at 729 (2d ed. 1974).
214. S. WILLISTON, supra note 210, § 1782, at 332-33. No cases have been reported in
which either the surrogate mother or the intended parents have tried to enforce a surrogate
parenting contract. The reported cases involving surrogate parenting have not been conflicts
between the contracting parties, but conflicts with the state or problems with using state
laws to adopt the child produced through surrogate parenting.
215. See infra text accompanying notes 219-35.
216. See infra text accompanying notes 232-46. For a thorough discussion of fetal ex-
perimentation, see generally supra section II of this Special Project.
217. See supra note 189.
218. See supra note 190.
219. Most courts apply state statutes to fact situations that appear to fall within the
statute's prohibition without considering the purposes and goals of the legislature when it
passed the statute. See supra text accompanying notes 189-200.
220. 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1359 (Ky. Ct. App., Apr. 26, 1985).
221. Id. at 1359-60. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that Surrogate Parenting
Associates, Inc., by receiving payments for arranging surrogate parenting situations, violated
a Kentucky statute providing that "no person, agency, or institution not licensed by the
cabinet for Human Resources may accept remuneration for the procurement of any child for
adoption."
222. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981).
223. Id. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441. The court held that Michigan's adoption stat-
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that state adoption statutes apply, the surrogate parenting con-
tract could be illegal and, therefore, unenforceable. 24
In theory, once the court characterizes the surrogate parenting
contract as an adoption contract, the court could hold that state
statutes do not apply, but that public policy prohibits the contract
anyway. In reality, however, once a court determines that state
statutes do not apply to the surrogate/adoption contract it proba-
bly will hold that state public policy does not apply because the
state's public policy is precisely what the court examined in order
to determine whether the statutes applied to the surrogate/adop-
tion contract. The only occasion, therefore, when a court probably
will examine whether state public policy prohibits a contract to
adopt is when there are no statutes that appear to regulate the
surrogate/adoption contract.
In Reimche v. First National Bank of Nevada,225 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an adop-
tion contract between the mother of an illegitimate child and the
putative father was enforceable when the adoption was in the
child's best interests and financial gain was not the mother's moti-
vating factor.226 This analysis could apply to a surrogate parenting
contract. When the parties agree to use the artificial insemination
method, the surrogate/adoption contract is between parents and,
therefore, under the Reimche analysis, the contract would not vio-
late public policy if it is in the best interest of the child and the
surrogate mother's motivation is not pecuniary. Arguably, the sur-
rogate contract furthers the best interests of the child by placing it
with parents who desire a child strongly enough to go to extraordi-
nary lengths.22 The surrogate mother's motivation, however, may
be pecuniary.228 Usually the receiving parties agree to pay the sur-
utes did not unconstitutionally preclude surrogate parenting arrangements; the statutes sim-
ply prohibited payments "in conjunction" with the "use of the state's adoption procedures."
Id.
224. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
225. 512 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975). The "[m]other of illegitimate child brought suit for
specific performance of a contract with the putative father to make a will" and the court
"held that it is not against public policy to enforce an agreement to provide for the mother
of an illegitimate child in the putative father's will, incidental to an agreement to permit the
adoption of the child by its father, where the adoption was in the best interests of the child
and pecuniary gain was not the motivating factor on the mother's part." Id. at 187.
226. Id. at 189; cf. Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 39 256, 45 P.2d 927 (1935).
227. See Gelman & Shapiro, Infertility: Babies by Contract, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1985,
at 74 (reporting the difficulties that couples seeking children must go through to get a child
of their own).
228. According to the records of an attorney's surrogate agency, during the first five
646 [Vol. 39:597
1986] CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND BIRTH 647
rogate mother a fee.229 Many surrogate mothers claim that their
primary motivation is not pecuniary, but simply a desire to help
childless couples.3 ° In Gray v. Maxwell,231 the Nebraska Supreme
Court took a stricter view than the Reimche court and held that
the adoption agreement was unenforceable because an agreement
to pay a mother more than the "legitimate expenses of confine-
ment and birth" is against public policy. 3 12 Under the Gray analy-
sis, the surrogate/adoption contract would be unenforceable as
against public policy if the surrogate mother received a fee for her
services. If, however, the surrogate mother does not receive any
compensation other than medical and confinement expenses, the
adoption/surrogate contract probably would be enforceable." 3
years of the operation the adopting couple did not pay the surrogate mothers and only five
babies were born. During the following two and a half years, the adopting couples using his
agency paid surrogate mothers and there were 41 births and 10 women pregnant at the time
of recordkeeping. Surrogate Mothers: Problems and Goals, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1984.
These figures lead to the conclusion that many surrogate mothers may be providing their
services for the money rather than out of compassion.
229. See supra note 180. Commentators have debated whether the fee paid a surro-
gate mother should be characterized as payment for the service of carrying the child or as
payment for the child itself. Some commentators argue that because the surrogate mother
has agreed to the procedure with full knowledge that she will relinquish all rights to the
child after its birth, she is being paid for the service of carrying the child to full terms. See
Greenburg & Hirsh, supra note 197, at 155. The surrogate mother's services include: (1)
undergoing the medical technique of artificial insemination or embryo transplant; (2) pro-
viding a womb for the child for nine months; and (3) giving birth to the child. Other com-
mentators argue that a surrogate mother receives payment for the child rather than the
service performed. These commentators acknowledge that part of the fee is intended to
compensate the surrogate for the physical act of carrying the child to term, but maintain
that the primary object of the parties is that the surrogate ultimately give a baby to the
adopting couple. See Cohen, Surrogate Mothers: Whose Baby Is It?, 10 Am. J.L. & MED. 243,
250 (1984).
230. Surrogate mothers admit that the surrogate fee is important to them, but they
reiterate that their primary motivation is simply the desire to help a childless couple have a
child. See supra note 227; see also Gelman & Shapiro, supra note 60, quoting an associate
professor of parent-child nursing at the University of Michigan who believes that, although
money is a factor, surrogates truly want to make infertile couples happy and to have an
important impact in life.
231. 206 Neb. 385, 293 N.W.2d 90 (1980). The court held that payments to the mother
"in excess of the legitimate expenses of confinement and birth" were against public policy
and that such payments" vitiate[d] the relinquishment previously given" by the mother. Id.
232. Id. at 393, 293 N.W.2d at 95; see also In re Clements, 201 Tenn. 98, 296 S.W.2d
875 (1956); Benefield v. Faulknor, 248 Ala. 615, 29 So. 2d 1 (1974).
233. See 83 Op. ATr'Y GEN. LA 869 (1983) (stating that any payment other than medi-
cal and living expenses violates adoption statute prohibiting the sale of children); 83 OP.
ATr'v GEN. OKLA No. 83-162 (Sept. 29, 1983) (stating that only medical, legal, and hospital
expenses can be paid to a surrogate parent). But see 81 Op. Arry'Y GEN. Ky. 18 (1981) (stat-
ing that no payments are allowed even for medical and legal expenses of surrogate mother);
45 Op. ATr'y GEN. N.C. 24 (1975) (stating that an agreement to pay travel and medical ex-
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2. Contract Viewed as a Custody Agreement
A few states have statutes that prohibit a parent from as-
signing or transferring the right to custody of a child.234 The legis-
lative intent of these statutes was to prevent parents from bargain-
ing for custody of a child.35 When the surrogate contract is viewed
as a contract for custody of the child, the legislature probably
would have intended these statutes to apply to the surrogate
parenting situation because the main purpose of the surrogate/cus-
tody contract is to transfer custody of the child to the intended
parents for a fee. Whether a court would apply the statutes to the
surrogate/custody contract may depend on whether the surrogate
mother is receiving the fee for her services or for custody of the
child.236 Applying such a statute to the surrogate/custody contract
would render the contract void and illegal because the surrogate
mother, as a parent, is assigning or transferring her right to cus-
tody of the child through the surrogate contract.
Because most states do not have statutes prohibiting custody
agreements, several courts have found such agreements unenforce-
able on public policy grounds.3 In Ford v. Ford,35 the United
States Supreme Court found that Virginia had a public policy of
promoting the welfare or best interests of the child" 9 and a policy
of preventing the custody and welfare of children from being the
"subject of barter. 12 40 Because of these policies, the Court held
penses violates adoption statute).
234. See supra note 193.
235. No statutes say that the purpose of the statutes is to prevent parents from bar-
gaining for children, but two cases, In re R.W.S., 370 S.W.2d 698 (Mo. App. 1963) and In re
Smith, 339 S.w.2d 490 (Mo. App. 1960), say that the purpose of the Missouri law is to pre-
vent indiscriminate transfer of children.
236. See supra note 229.
237. See, e.g., Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962). The parents of 3 children made an
agreement as to the custody of the children and the Virginia court dismissed the case be-
cause the parents had made the agreement. The mother sued for full custody of the children
in South Carolina. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the dismissal in Vir-
ginia, which had the effect of approving the parents' custody agreement, was entitled to full
faith and credit in South Carolina. The Supreme Court held that the parents' custody
agreement would not be controlling in a Virginia court because Virginia public policy does
not allow parents to make custody agreements that bind the court and, hence, South Caro-
lina courts are not bound by the full faith and credit clause to enforce the agreement; Ex
parte Smith, 118 Wash. 1, 202 P. 243 (1921). (involving a custody agreement between the
father of a baby girl and the child's maternal grandparents that the court found void as
against public policy).
238. 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
239. Id. at 193; see also Ex parte Smith, 118 Wash. 1, 202 P. 243 (1921).
240. 371 U.S. at 193 (quoting Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 477, 197 S.E. 426,
434 (1938)).
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that custody agreements do not bind courts.2" 1 The Court's reason-
ing indicates that all surrogate/custody contracts, regardless of the
method of surrogate parenting used, would be unenforceable as
against public policy.
Other courts have held that public policy does not prohibit
custody contracts.242 The Kansas Supreme Court, in In re Shirk's
Estate,24 held that a contract between a mother and daughter for
the custody of the granddaughter was enforceable because the con-
tract was a "family agreement" in the best interests of the child,24
rather than an agreement between a parent and a stranger or non-
family member.245 In Tiffany & Co. v. Spreckels,24s the California
Supreme Court held that an agreement between parents concern-
ing their child's custody was legal.24 When the surrogate mother
uses the artificial insemination method,248 the surrogate/custody
agreement is between biological parents and, therefore, under
Shirk and Tiffany, the contract would not violate public policy be-
cause one biological parent would get custody of the child. With
the in vitro fertilization method,249 the contract is between biologi-
241. 371 U.S. at 193. One commentator has suggested that courts should treat surro-
gate parenting contracts as "revocable prebirth agreements"-contracts that the surrogate
mother is free to breach at any time without being held liable. Cohen, supra note 229, at
281-84.
242. See, e.g., Tiffany & Co. v. Spreckels, 202 Cal. 778, 262 P. 742 (1927); (holding that
a custody agreement between parents as to the custody of their child is legal, subject to the
control of the court in proceedings when the child's welfare is involved); Nelson v. Wilson,
97 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (under the theory of quantum merit the court held that
it is not against public policy for a father to recieve land in exchange for custody of his
children); Bassett v. American Baptist Publication Soc'y, 215 Mich. 126, 183 N.W. 747
(1921) (holding an agreement between a father and a spinster in which the father agreed to
relinquish custody to her and the spinster agreed to will all her property to the child at her
death to be enforceable after the spinster's death).
243. 186 Kan. 311, 350 P.2d 1 (1960).
244. Id. at 324, 350 P.2d at 11-12; see also In re Book's Estate, 297 Pa. 543, 147 A. 608
(1929); Nelson v. Wilson, 97 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
245. The result may be different with the in vitro fertilization method and the modi-
fied in vitro fertilization method because the surrogate contract is between strangers. See
infra text accompanying notes 249-50.
246. 202 Cal. 778, 262 P. 742 (1927). The agreement was a formal written agreement
between the husband, wife, and Tiffany jewelry store whereby the husband agreed to pay if
the wife defaulted and the wife agreed to give up custody of the child if she defaulted. The
contract between the husband and Tiffany was uneforceable because Tiffany gave no con-
sideration, but the custody agreement between the husband and the wife was enforceable.
247. Id. at 791, 262 P. at 747. See also Bassett v. American Baptist Publication Soc'y,
215 Mich. 126, 183 N.W. 747 (1921) (upholding a custody contract between unrelated
persons).
248. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
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cal parents and a stranger; therefore, the contract is not an agree-
ment between family members as in Shirk and Tiffany. The bio-
logical parents, however, are the ones getting custody of the child.
Arguably, because biological parents were a part of the agreement
and they receive custody of the child, the parties meet both re-
quirements of Shirk and Tiffany. The Shirk and Tiffany line of
cases would not apply to a surrogate/custody agreement involving
the modified in vitro fertilization 250 method because none of the
contracting parties is biologically related to the child. Public policy
may prohibit such an agreement simply because the situation ap-
pears to be pure child bartering.
E. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Not only may state statutes or public policies render the sur-
rogate parenting contract unenforceable, statutes also may create
criminal liability for some or all of the parties involved in the sur-
rogate parenting situation. Every state has legislation that makes
baby-selling a crime.251 As a result, each party to the surrogate
parenting arrangement-the surrogate mother, the adopting
couple, the placement agency, the. doctor, and the attorney-may
be criminally liable for his or her actions.252
1. Surrogate Mother
Many state statutes prohibiting the payment or receipt of
money in exchange for giving a child over for adoption or in ex-
change for placing a child also impose criminal penalties for viola-
tion of the statutes.253 The statutes usually classify the above ac-
250. See supra text accompanying note 177.
251. See Pierce, Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 11 FAM.
L. REP. 3001 (Jan. 29, 1985). See infra notes 253-55, 258-64 and accompanying text.
252. Handel, Surrogate Parenting, In Vitro Insemination and Embryo Transplanta-
tion, 6 WHITTIER L. REv. 783, 784 (1984). ("If a court holds that we are buying somebody in
this process, we are guiltyof a felony. Of course, if we are planning any of these 'crimes,'-all
of us, doctors, lawyers, psychologists, surrogates, couples, are all talking about and planning
it, before it occurs . . . we are looking at 26 years in jail").
253. See, e.g., Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-114, 8-128 (Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE §
273 (a) (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-115 (2) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (6)
(West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-418(c) (Harrison Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-1511
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1705 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9(a)
(Burns 1985); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-327 (d) (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, §
11A (West Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 867 (West Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.2 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-135(b) (1984); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 25.06(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.33.370(3) (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.716(1) (West 1982).
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tivities as felonies,254 but many states classify the activities as
misdemeanors. 55 If a court determines that the state's criminal
statutes apply to the surrogate parenting arrangement,26 and that
the surrogate mother violated the statutes either by accepting a fee
for her services or by aiding the placement process, she will be sub-
ject to fines and possible imprisonment. Whether the state actually
prosecutes a surrogate mother for violation of the criminal statutes
will depend on the state attorney general's disposition toward sur-
rogate parenting.2 57
2. Adopting Couple
Many of the same criminal statutes that prohibit receipt of
money for a child also prohibit payment of money for a child.2 58
An adopting couple, therefore, could be subject to criminal penal-
ties for paying the surrogate mother. Many state statutes also pro-
hibit payments to placement agencies for their help in procuring a
child.259 States usually classify violations of these statutes as mis-
demeanors rather than felonies.60 If the state prosecutes the
couple and a state court finds that they violated any of these stat-
utes, they will be subject to a fine and possibily imprisonment.
3. Placement Agencies and Attorneys
Most states have statutes prohibiting an agency or an attorney
from receiving a fee 261 or from receiving an unreasonable fee26 2 for
placing a child with a couple. Other states have statutes prohibit-
ing an unlicensed agency or person from placing a child.26 Assum-
254. See ARIZ. STAT. ANN. § 8-128 (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(6) (West
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-418(c) (Harrison Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-1511 (1979); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Burns 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 11A (West Supp.
1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 867 (West Supp. 1985); S.D. COFIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.1
(1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.716(1) (West 1982).
255. See, e.g. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-115(2)
(1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1705 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (first violation is a misdemeanor,
second violation is a felony); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-327(d) (1984); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.33.370(3) (1982).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 183-203.
257. See supra note 233 for several state Attorney General opinions on surrogate
parenting.
258. See supra note 189.
259. See supra note 190.
260. Compare note 254 with note 255.
261. See supra note 190.
262. See supra note 190.
263. See supra note 191. Other statutes also prohibit advertising by placement agen-
cies. See supra note 192.
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ing these types of statutes apply, the surrogate parenting situation
probably violates the statutes. The possible criminal penalties that
courts could impose for violation of these statutes includes fines
and imprisonment.264 In Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong v. Surrogate
Parenting Associates, Inc., 6 5 a Kentucky court of appeals held
that the state's adoption statutes applied to activities of the Surro-
gate Parenting Associates, activities that included placing the chil-
dren and preparing the documents for the surrogate mother and
adoptive couple.266 Because this action was not criminal, however,
Surrogate Parenting Associates did not have to pay a fine.267
F. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES AND PUBLIC POLICIES
RENDERING SURROGATE PARENTING CONTRACTS UNENFORCEABLE
Although state courts have the power to interpret and apply
state statutes or pronounce public policy to render a surrogate
parenting contract void and unenforceable, the statutes or public
policy may be unconstitutional. A party seeking to enforce the sur-
rogate parenting contract may challenge the constitutionality of
the applicable state statutes and public policies.268 Substantive due
process and equal protection are the two constitutional rights at
issue in the surrogate parenting arrangement.
1. Substantive Due Process
The fourteenth amendment 69 to the United States Constitu-
tion provides that a state may not deprive an individual of his or
her rights unless the state's interest is substantial enough to out-
weigh the individual's right. A state statute or public policy that
prohibits a married couple from procreating in whatever means
they desire, or that prohibits a single or married woman from hav-
ing a child for another couple, may violate the substantive due pro-
cess rights of the married couple and the surrogate mother by in-
terfering with their right to procreate and right to privacy. For
264. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-9 (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 224p-224q (West
1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-52 (West 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-E:19 (Supp.
1985); R.I. GEN, LAWS 15-7-1(b) (Supp. 1982); see also supra notes 254-55.
265. 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1359 (Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1985).
266. Id. at 1359.
267. See id. at 1359-60.
268. An attorney representing parties to a surrogate parenting agreement lacks stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of state statutes prohibiting surrogate parenting. See
Sherwyn & Handel v. California State Dep't of Social Serv., 12 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1010
(Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Oct. 9, 1985).
269. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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example, a state statute or public policy that prohibits a couple
from paying for the services of a surrogate mother has the effect of
prohibiting the couple from procreating by means of a surrogate
mother. Arguably, a statute or public policy prohibiting a surrogate
mother from receiving payment for her services effectively abridges
her right to procreate in the manner she chooses.2 70 This prohibi-
tion also may interfere with the couple's right to privacy in family
matters. At least one court,2 71 however, has held that the right to
privacy was not involved in the surrogate parenting situation.2 72
Because the right to privacy 273 and the right to procreate274
are fundamental rights, a state attempting to interfere with these
rights must meet a two-pronged strict scrutiny test2 75 in order for
the regulation to be constitutional.276 In Carey v. Population Ser-
vices International,277 the Supreme Court summarized the two-
prong test as follows: "[W]here a decision as fundamental as that
whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a
burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests,
and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests. '278
(a) Compelling State Interest
In the surrogate parenting situation, states rarely possess a
compelling interest sufficient to meet the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test.27 9 The states generally have two interests for enact-
ing statutes regulating surrogate parenting. First, states are inter-
ested in preventing child bartering. Clearly, the statutes further
270. Concededly, a surrogate mother could agree to carry the child without receiving
compensation. This, however, may discourage a woman from ever agreeing to serve as a
surrogate mother.
271. Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1183 (1983). See supra note 223 for a discussion of the case.
272. Id. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
273. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
274. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
275. The two prongs are (1) that the state have a compelling interest in regulating the
activity, and (2) that the state regulation be narrowly drawn to further only the compelling
interest. Carey v. Population Services Internat'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
276. But see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (refusing to review
a federal district court's holding that a law prohibiting homosexual conduct was
constitutional).
277. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
278. Id. at 686.
279. See supra note 275 for a statement of the first prong.
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this interest when they are applied to black market adoptions. The
Supreme Court has held that the state's interest in promoting the
best interests of the child is compelling.2 0 The states designed the
statutes to prevent a pregnant mother from being pressured into
doing something she really does not want to do. The state interest
in preventing child bartering arguably does not exist in the surro-
gate situation. When the surrogate mother signs the surrogate
parenting contract she is agreeing to become pregnant and is not
being coerced into giving up her baby by an unplanned situation.
The states also designed the statutes to prevent black market
agencies from profiting by the misfortune of infertile couples and
young pregnant girls. Concededly, a surrogate parenting agency
may derive financial gain from the misfortune of the infertile
couple. 81 The agency, however, is not dealing with naive girls, but
with informed women who are voluntary participants. Accordingly,
a state's interest in preventing child bartering may qualify as a
compelling interest in the context of black market adoptions, but
not in the context of surrogate parenting. A Michigan circuit court
held that the state's interest in preventing baby bartering would be
compelling if the right to privacy were involved in the surrogate
parenting situations,22 but the Michigan Court of Appeals did not
address the issue when it affirmed the holding of the circuit
court.283
Second, states are interested, when enacting statutes prohibit-
ing surrogate parenting, in promoting the best interests of the
child. In Prince v. Massachusetts,8 4 the Supreme Court held that
the state could regulate activities of the family if the regulations
furthered the child's best interest. 85 Arguably, regulations prohib-
iting surrogate parenting actually may frustrate, rather than fur-
ther, the best interests of a child. The surrogate parenting arrange-
ment promotes a child's interests because the child is conceived
280. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that Massachusetts
could limit the parents' privacy right in raising their children when the regulation furthered
the best interest of the child).
281. One owner of a surrogate agency estimated in 1984 that the agency charged the
adopting parents from $18,000 to $22,000. Lawyers and doctors took approximately $12,000-
$16,000 and the agency kept the remaining $6,000. Thompson, Bill Seeks to Clarify Limbo
of Surrogate Births, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1984, at B7, col. 4.
282. Doe v. Kelley, 6 FA?. L. REP. (BNA) 3011, 3013-14 (Feb. 19, 1980), aff'd 106
Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
283. 106 Mich. App. 169, 174 307 N.W.2d 438, 441 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183
(1983).
284. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
285. Id. at 166-67.
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and carried in order to live with a family that anxiously has
awaited his or her arrival and has made preparations for his or her
care.286 Furthermore, if states prohibit the surrogate parenting pro-
cess, the result is that the child never will be created. Arguably,
one's interests are furthered by being created rather than never
exiting.
In conclusion, states prohibiting surrogate parenting should
not be able to satisfy the first prong of the strict scrutiny test by
demonstrating that their statutes further a compelling interest.
The state interest in preventing child bartering is not a problem
and, thus, not compelling in the surrogate parenting process. The
state interest in promoting the child's best interests actually is fur-
thered by the surrogate parenting process. Having failed to meet
the first prong of the strict scrutiny test, statutes and policies
prohibiting surrogate parenting should be held unconstitutional for
violating substantive due process.
(b) Narrowly Drawn Regulation
Assuming that the prevention of child bartering and further-
ing the child's best interests are compelling state interests, the
state still must pass the second prong of the strict scrutiny test.
The state must show that its statutes are drawn narrowly to effec-
tuate only the state's compelling interests. If a state passes a stat-
ute clearly applicable to the surrogate parenting process, such as
that of Arkansas, 2s7 the state would have to show that the statute
was narrowly drawn to further the interests of preventing child
bartering and promoting the child's best interests. This showing
will be difficult given the current state of confusion about whether
existing statutes are applicable to the surrogate parenting
process. 8
2. Equal Protection
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
guarantees that no state will deny any person "the equal protec-
tion of the laws. 282 Arguably, a state is treating the surrogate
mother unequally if it prohibits her from receiving payment for
286. See supra note 228; see also A Surrogate's Story of Loving and Losing, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., June 6, 1983, at 77.
287. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
288. See text accompanying notes 183-209.
289. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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her services as a surrogate mother but allows a man to receive pay-
ment for sperm donations. The unfairness of this unequal treat-
ment is exacerbated because the medical risks and legal involve-
ment of the surrogate mother are much greater than those of the
sperm donor. 290 No state has a statute prohibiting payments to
men for sperm donations, 291 but many states prohibit a woman
who gives birth to a child from receiving payment for terminating
her parental rights in favor of the biological father and adoptive
mother.2 92 This gender-based distinction or unequal treatment of
privacy and procreation rights may be unconstitutional.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,293 the Supreme Court held for the
first time that a state must justify its unequal treatment of various
individuals' right to procreate by showing a compelling state inter-
est. Skinner thus applied a strict scrutiny test to unequal treat-
ment of the right to procreate.294 In Caban v. Mohammed,295 how-
ever, the Court applied a heightened scrutiny test. Unequal
treatment based on gender must serve important governmental
objectives and be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives to withstand a constitutional challenge under the equal
protection clause. 9 6 In Frontiero v. Richardson,297 another case in-
volving a gender-based distinction, a plurality of the Court applied
the Skinner strict scrutiny test rather than the Caban heightened
scrutiny test.
Unquestionably, if a case concerns the unequal treatment of
procreation or privacy rights, the two-pronged strict scrutiny test
290. S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 168, at 251 (citing Handel & Sherwyn, Surrogate
Parenting: Coming to Grips with the Future, TRIAL Apr. 1982, at 58).
291. In 1984, the average semen donor received $20 to $35 per ejaculation. GREEN &
LONG supra note 168, 253 (citing Curie-Cohen, Luttress & Shapiro, Current Practice of Ar-
tificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEw ENO. J. MED. 585, 587
(1979)).
292. See supra notes 193 & 197 and accompanying text.
293. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection an
Oklahoma statute that provided for sterilization of "habitual criminals" who committed
"felonies involving moral turpitude," but excepted certain felonies such as embezzlement).
294. 316 U.S. at 541.
295. 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding, under the heightened scrutiny test, that a New
York statute that treated an unmarried man unequally by allowing an unmarried woman to
block the adoption of her child while not allowing the unmarried man to do the same was
unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause).
296. Id. at 388.
297. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional, under the equal protection clause,
United States statutes treating female members unequally in comparison to male members
of the uniformed services by creating a presumption that spouses of male members were
"dependent" and that spouses of female members were not "dependent").
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applies. 298 However, whether the strict scrutiny test of Skinner or
the heightened scrutiny test of Caban applies to a case concerning
gender-based unequal treatment of women remains uncertain. The
two state interests advanced by unequal treatment of the surrogate
mother and a sperm donor are the state's interest in preventing
baby bartering and in promoting the best interests of the child.
If the heightened scrutiny test is applied, a state that has une-
qual treatment might be able to satisfy the test's requirements.
The courts would value highly the state's interests in preventing
baby bartering and promoting the best interests of the child. The
state's interest, therefore, would meet the "important governmen-
tal objective" standard. The state's unequal treatment probably is
"substantially related" to achievement of those objectives because
a man's selling of his semen cannot result in child bartering, while
the surrogate mother's selling of her egg and renting of her womb
could result in child bartering.
If the strict scrutiny test applies, courts should use the same
analysis discussed in the substantive due process subsection of this
Section.299 The state probably would meet the first prong of this
test, even in the surrogate situation, because the state's interest in
preventing baby bartering is compelling. The state then would
have to show that its statute was drawn narrowly to accomplish
only the compelling state interests of preventing baby bartering
and promoting the best interests of the child.
G. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF A SURROGATE PARENTING CONTRACT
IF THE CONTRACT IS ENFORCEABLE
If a surrogate parenting contract is enforceable because the
state statutes do not apply to prohibit surrogate parenting or be-
cause the state statutes that do prohibit surrogate parenting are
unconstitutional, the parties may have various remedies for breach
of the agreement.300 This section assumes that a baby was born,
but one of the parties to the surrogate parenting agreement de-
cides not to comply with the terms of the agreement. The surro-
gate mother may try to keep the child or the adoptive parents may
refuse to accept the child.
298. Other members of the Court applied the "heightened scrutiny" standard. Id. 691-
92.
299. See supra note 176.
300. See supra notes 269-288 and accompanying text.
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1. Specific Performance
A party to a surrogate parenting agreement could require spe-
cific performance if a state statute expressly recognizes the propri-
ety of this agreement. Under Arkansas law,"'1 a surrogate mother
or the adoptive couple could require specific performance of the
contract if the surrogate mother was unmarried. The Arkansas
statute provides that when the surrogate mother is unmarried the
child belongs to the adoptive mother.30 2 Because, however, the vast
majority of states do not have surrogate parenting legislation, spe-
cific performance probably would not be available regardless of
whether or not the surrogate mother was married.
Alternatively, a party to a surrogate parenting contract could
attempt to require specific performance by relying on general con-
tract theory. Courts require specific performance when the object
contracted for is unique and no value has been placed on the ob-
ject.303 One could argue that few objects of an agreement could be
more unique than a child. Courts, however, do not require specific
performance when an agreement is a personal service contract.304 If
courts accept the contention that a surrogate parenting agreement
provides a fee for the surrogate mother's service of carrying the
child to term,30 5 then courts likely would characterize the agree-
ment as a personal service contract not subject to specific
performance.
Regardless of the theory the litigants rely on, a court is un-
likely to require specific performance for a surrogate parenting
agreement. This is particularly true if the surrogate mother is seek-
ing specific performance. Requiring a couple to take custody of an
unwanted child would not further the child's best interests. Of
course, a court's refusal to order specific performance in such a
case effectively would require the surrogate mother, who never in-
tended to keep the child, to maintain custody of a smilarly "un-
wanted" child, at least until she could put the infant up for adop-
tion. A court may be more likely to require specific performance
301. If the child dies before birth, both the surrogate mother and the adopting couple
might have a wrongful death cause of action. S. GREEN & J. LONG, supra note 168, at 258
(citing Dodd, The Surrogate Mother Contract in Indiana, 15 IND. L. REv. 807, 821 (1982));
see generally infra section IX of this Special Project.
302. See supra notes 185-86.
303. See supra note 185.
304. 11 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1418, at 644-46 (3d ed.
1968).
305. See 5A A. CORBIN, COR IN ON CONTRACTS § 1204 (1964).
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when the adoptive parents are suing for breach of the surrogate
parenting agreement. In this instance, the court might conclude
that the surrogate parenting arrangement constituted abandon-
ment by the surrogate mother 0 6 and require specific performance
on the rationale that the surrogate mother has no right to the
child. Regardless of the final result, a suit for specific performance
would be a tragic experience for all parties to the surrogate parent-
ing agreement.3 07
2. Compensatory Damages
If the surrogate mother is the breaching party, most courts
probably would require her to return all fees paid to her by the
adopting couple. The court is unlikely to award any further dam-
ages to the couple based on emotional harm because of the specu-
lative nature of the damages.308 Although the surrogate mother
breaches the agreement, she may be able to obtain child support
from the biological couple if she can prove paternity. In most
states the biological father has a duty to support his child.309 The
adopting couple, therefore, is ultimately in a losing position when
the surrogate mother breaches the contract: they do not get the
child and they may have to pay child support.
Under general contract principles, if the adopting couple is the
breaching party, the surrogate mother has a duty to mitigate dam-
ages.3 10 The surrogate mother would be able to recover her medical
306. See supra note 229.
307. See Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions
for Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REv. 71, 97-100 (1982).
308. In the Stiver-Malahoff incident, a widely publicized surrogate parenting arrange-
ment, the baby was born with microcephaly. Malahoff, the man who had contracted for the
child, told the hospital to withhold treatment from the child. Later blood tests revealed that
the child was not Malahoff's but the child of the surrgoate Judy Stiver's husband. As a
result of the incident, Malahoff has sued the surrogate mother Stiver for not producing the
child he ordered. The Stivers have sued doctors, lawyers, and psychiatrists for not advising
them about the timing of sex. Andrews, supra note 176, at 796-97; see generally infra sec-
tion X of this Special Project.
309. See generally 11 S. WILLIsTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoTRrAcTs § 1341, at
214-223, § 1345, at 231-34 (3d ed. 1968).
310. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-601 (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-716
(Supp. 1985); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 196-196a (West 1982); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-7-101 (1978);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1305 (1981) (indicating father must pay support to the state if the
state takes care of child); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 74-202, 74-312 (Harrison Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, §§ 2514 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MD. F. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1032 (1984);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-5-1 (1983); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.05(H) (Page Supp. 1984);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 83 (West Supp. 1985); OL Rev. STAT. §§ 109.0101-109.015 (1983);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-957 (Law. Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-7-7, 25-8-5
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expenses, legal expenses, and possibly the fee promised to her by
the couple.3 1 1 She also would be able to recover child support.3 12
The requirement of mitigation, however, may demand that she
give the child up for adoption or give the child to the state for
state care3 13 rather than keep the child and receive child support
from the biological father.
H. ACQUIRING RELIEF EXCLUSIVE OF THE SURROGATE PARENTING
AGREEMENT IF THE CONTRACT IS UNENFORCEABLE
Assuming, on the other hand, that the contract is unenforce-
able and that the statutes and public policy rendering the contract
unenforceable are constitutional, one must determine whether
there are any means by which the surrogate mother or biological
father can receive child support or child custody.1 4 Under the arti-
ficial insemination methods 5 and the in vitro fertilization
method,1 6 relief exclusive of the contract may be available1 be-
cause under these methods the adoptive father is the biological fa-
ther. Relief in the form of child support probably is not available
under the modified in vitro fertilization method3 8 because the
adoptive father has no biological relationship to the child.
1. Surrogate Mother's Recovery
If the surrogate mother is the party trying to recover for
breach of the agreement, she probably will be able to recover child
support from the biological father if she keeps the child. In addi-
tion, she most likely will be able to get medical and confinement
expenses from the biological father.3 19 This relief is exclusive of the
(1984 & Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-102, 36-2-108 (1984 & Supp. 1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-45a-1 (1977); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-7-3 to -4 (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
767.25 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-2-115, 14-2-204 (1978). See also On. REv.
STAT. § 109.230 (1983) (stating that a contract between a mother and father of a child born
out of wedlock is a legal contract).
311. See S. WLLISTON, supra note 309, § 1353, at 274-79.
312. See supra notes 191 & 329.
313. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
314. The state may be able to get child support from the biological father. See supra
note 310.
315. The adopting couple could have an action in tort for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress because the surrogate mother knows a breach of the contract will result in
emotional distress to the couple.
316. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 320-41 and accompanying text.
319. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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contract. Before the surrogate mother can recover child support,
medical expenses, and confinement expenses, however, she must
prove that the contracting father is the biolgoical father of the
child.32 0 In states that have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA),321 a married surrogate mother would have to overcome a
presumption that the child is her husband's child.322 Most states
allow the mother to admit the Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA)
blood test, which almost is conclusive evidence of paternity.323
320. Some state statutes specifically state that the father must pay medical and con-
finement expenses. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 84 (West 1966); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 25-8-3 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-102 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-1
(1977).
321. See supra notes 310 & 320.
322. 9A U.L.A. 579 (1979 & Supp. 1985). States adopting the UPA include: Alabama,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at Supp. 329. Delaware,
Hawaii, North Dakota, and Ohio adopted most of the UPA, but did not adopt § 5.
Section 5 provides:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her hus-
band, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband,
the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby con-
ceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him and his wife. The
physician shall certify their signatures and the date of the insemination, and file the
husband's consent with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be kept confi-
dential and in a sealed file. However, the physician's failure to do so does not affect the
father and child relationship. All papers and records pertaining to the insemination,
whether part of the permanent record of a court or of a file held by the supervising
physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for
good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemina-
tion of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not
the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
9A U.L.A. at 592-93.
323. Id. § 5(a), at 592. UPA state sections include: ALA. CODE § 26-17-21(a) (Supp.
1985); CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005(a) (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106(1) (1978); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, § 1453(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56(1) (West 1982);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(1) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061(1) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:17-44(a) (West Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.050 (Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. §
14-2-102(a) (1978). Other states also have the same provision or provisions creating a pre-
sumption of legitimacy. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1983); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
601 (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-720 (Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-96i
(West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101.1 (Harri-
son Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 584-4(a)(1) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 39-5405(3) (1985);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-9(1) (Burns 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (1981); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN, art. 188 (West Supp. 1986); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206 (1974); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 5-1028(c) (1984); MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West Supp. 1985);
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2824(6), 700.111(2)-(3) (West 1980); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73
(McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); NJ). CENT. CODE § 14-09-01 (1981); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 552 (West Supp. 1985); OR REv. STAT. § 109.070(1) (1983); S.D. CODI-
FlED LAWS ANN. § 25-5-1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1983); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §
12.03 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE § 64.1-7.1 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(1) (West Supp.
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Under the UPA32 4 and other state statutes325 a married or unmar-
ried surrogate also would have to prove that statutes stating that a
sperm donor has no duty to a child conceived through artificial
insemination do not apply to surrogate parenting arrangements.
Once the surrogate mother establishes paternity,32  most states
statutorily require the father to pay child support.327 Some states
also specifically require the biological father to pay for the
mother's medical, hospital, and confinement expenses.2 8
2. Biological Father's Recovery
If the biological father is the party trying to enforce the surro-
gate parenting contract, he may be able to get child custody exclu-
sive of the contract. To get custody, he must prove that he is the
biological father. 29 In many states, however, the biological father
may not have standing to sue to establish his paternity of the child
unless he is married.330 Denying unmarried sperm donors standing
to sue to establish paternity, while granting married donors the
1985); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-117 (1977).
324. The Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) test is accurate more than ninety percent
of the time. Herzog, The HLA Test: New Method for Resolving Disputed Paternity Cases,
N.Y. ST. B.J., May 1983, at 34.
325. See supra note 150, § 5(b), at 593. UPA state sections include: ALA. CODE § 26-17-
21(b) (Supp. 1985); CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-6-106(2)
(1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1453(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
257.56(2) (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(2) (1985); NEV. REv. STAT. § 126.061 (2)
(1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(b) (West Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050
(Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103(b) (1978).
326. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-69j (West 1981); IDAHO CODE § 39-5405(1)-
(2) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 1452(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); O& REV. STAT. §
109.239 (1983); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(b) (Vernon 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(2)
(West Supp. 1985).
327. See supra note 310.
328. See supra note 320.
329. One commentator has argued that, as a practical matter, if threatened with a
lawsuit, the surrogate mother may relinquish her rights to the child under duress, knowing
that she cannot afford to defend a custody suit. Cohen, Surrogte Mothers: Whose Baby Is
It?, 10 A. J.L. & MED. 243, 246 (1984).
330. See, e.g. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9 (Supp. 1985); NEB. REv. STAT. §43-1411 (1984);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-03 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 3,70 (West Supp. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-5-4 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-103 (Supp. 1985); see also
notes 151B & 152. But see, e.g., ARK STAT. ANN. § 34-716 (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-
103 (Harrison Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-2(a)(2) (Bums Supp. 1985); MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 5-310(a)(6) (1984); MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 722.714(f) (West Supp.
1985); NEV. RE. STAT. § 126.071 (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 460.29 (1983); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 49-14 (Sup. 1985); OR REV. STAT. § 109.125 (1983); TEX FAM. CODE ANN. §
11.03(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.45 (1)(d) (West 1981 & Supp. 1985-
1986).
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necessary standing to sue to establish paternity may be unconstitu-
tional unequal treatment."'
In Syrkowski v. Appleyard,ss2 the Michigan Supreme Court
held that the biolgoical father could use state paternity statutes to
prove his paternity of a child conceived through a surrogate
mother.33 3 In other states, the biological father has standing to sue,
but if the surrogate mother is married he must overcome a pre-
sumption that the child is the legitimate child of the married sur-
rogate's husband.33 4 Assuming the biological father has standing to
sue to establish paternity, he can use the HLA test 335 to prove his
paternity.
After proving his paternity, several states require a biological
father to overcome a presumption that child custody should re-
main with the mother."3 ' If he does not overcome this presump-
tion, he will not receive custody of the child. In states that have
adopted the UPA, 37 he may have no right to child custody because
the UPA provides that a sperm donor has no interest in a child
conceived through artificial insemination.3 ' Such statutes may be
unconstitutional as violations of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.339 If the biological father successfully
proves his paternity but is unable to overcome the presumption
that child custody should remain with the surrogate mother, his
paternity may subject him to liability for child support.34 0 A bio-
logical father who cannot get child custody at least should be able
331. See Greenberg & Hirsh, Surrogate Motherhood and Artificial Insemination:
Contractual Implications, 1983 MaD. TRL TECH. Q. 149, 157 (stating that "[w]hile there
may be legitimate state interests in maintaining the unity of the family, the failure to allow
standing to an unmarried donor to adjudicate paternity where standing is allowed on the
part of a husband may run afoul of the United States Supreme Court decisions... that
have held that reproductive autonomy belongs to the indivdiual and not to the family as a
unit").
332. 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985).
333. Id. at 374-75, 362 N.W.2d at 214.
334. See supra note 323.
335. See supra note 333.
336. As a practical matter, the surrogate mother's chance of prevailing in a custody
battle increases the longer the child stays with her after birth because of the child's increas-
ingly dependent relationship with her. See supra note 3, at 258.
337. See supra note 322.
338. See supra notes 325; see also supra note 326 (listing non-UPA statutes).
339. It may be unconstitutional for the state to treat males unequally in comparison to
women. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
340. See supra note 313.
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to get visitation rights.3 4 1
I. LEGISLATIVE REFORM
State legislatures generally have failed to address the un-
resolved legal problems3 42 that have arisen as medical technological
advances have made surrogate parenting an increasingly viable
means of procreating. Children born through surrogate parenting
are being born into a legal vacuum. The validity of such contracts
and their legal consequences must be calrified. Surrogate parenting
is not a fad that will be forgotten in a few years. Medical technol-
ogy makes it possible for more and more couples each year to dis-
cover that they are unable to have children.4 Not enough babies
are available for adoption. As a result, thousands of couples each
year are turning to surrogate parenting as a means of having
children.
Either the states or the federal government must act in this
area of legal and moral confusion. Adoption and custody typically
have been governed by state statute, but federal legislation may be
more desirable to achieve uniformity because most of the surrogate
parenting cases reported have involved parties from different
states.
J. CONCLUSION
Because of the lack of surrogate parenting statutes and the
uncertain applicability of existing statutes, the enforceability of a
surrogate parenting agreement is unpredictable. The situation be-
341. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-715 (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.40, § 607
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05(B) (Page Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1985); see also C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821, (N.J.
Cumberland Cty. Ct. 1977) (holding that a sperm donor had a right to visit the child con-
ceived by his girlfriend through artificial insemination).
342. As of 1984, surveys of the National Committee For Adoption found legislative
activity related to surrogate parenting in 21 states and the District of Columbia. Discussions
in Alabama, D.C., Kentucky, and Oklahoma were centered on prohibiting surrogates. Mis-
souri and Ohio had considered similar prohibition, but took a neutral stance. In 15 states,
however, activity focused on allowing surrogate arrangements. These states included:
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia. The Com-
mittee concluded that Michigan is the only state with strong advocates, legislatively and
otherwise, on both sides of the issue. See Pierce, supra note 169, at 3003.
343. In the United States one in six couples has difficulty conceiving or bearing a
child. Approximately 27 percent of women between the ages 15 and 44 cannot have children.
The sperm count of males has fallen more than 30 percent in 50 years. Approximately 25
percent of men are considered sterile. Wellborn, Birth: To Couples That Could Never Be
Parents, a Thousand Children Are Born, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 11, 1985, at 48.
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comes even more complex when parties to the surrogate parenting
agreement are from different states. Statutes and policies appear
to regulate the contract, but a closer analysis reveals the suspect
nature of their applicability. Even if applicable, existing statutes
and policies may violate substantive due process and equal
proteciton. How the courts characterize the surrogate parenting
contract may affect its enforceability. Possible criminal liability or
recovery upon breach are subject to ambiguity because of the un-
predictable characterization and validity of the surrogate parenting
arrangement.
The chaotic atmosphere of this particular method of parenting
must be recognized and alleviated. Lawyers faced with these ar-
rangements must be aware of the multifarious problems and alert
their clients accordingly. Furthermore, judges must pay more at-
tention to the need for predictability and stability. Finally, the leg-
islature should act to fill this vast legal vacuum.
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A. INTRODUCTION
A tragic plane crash killed a husband and wife, both partici-
pants in the frozen embryo artificial reproduction program in Mel-
bourne, Australia.3 44 The couple's death left two frozen embryos in
a social, ethical, and legal quagmire because neither of the parent's
wills contained any reference to the embryos 45 The tragedy tossed
the husband's one million dollar estate into chaos. 46 The accident
forced scholars, physicians, ethicists, and particularly lawyers to
consider the inheritance rights of artificial reproduction prod-
ucts.34 7 Although the new artificial reproduction technologies raise
various legal,3 48 social,3 49 ethical, 350 and medical 5' issues, this Part
addresses the question: "Who should inherit what from whom?".
Because natural, or coital, reproduction was the exclusive form
of reproduction available for many centuries,352 bodies of law have
developed to control the inheritance rights of children born as a
result of a man and woman engaging in sexual intercourse. Artifi-
cial reproduction, by contrast, has become an option made possible
only fairly recently by advances in medical technology. As a result,
bodies of law have not developed yet to control the inheritance
rights of children born as a result of artificial, or noncoital, repro-
duction. Law, by nature, must lag behind technology because law-
makers cannot regulate a phenomenon until it is known to society.
Once aware of the availability of a technology, however, society
must regulate the use of these technologies. Lawmakers, therefore,
must now determine the appropriate legal response to recent medi-
344. Walis, Quickening Debate over Life on Ice, TiMe, July 2, 1984, at 68.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Georgetown law professor Alexander Morgan Capron states: "Many of the new
reproductive possibilities remain so novel that terms are lacking to describe the human rela-
tionships they can create .... I'm not even sure we know what to call the area under
inquiry." Friedrich, A Legal, Moral, Social Nightmare, TnMm, Sept. 10, 1984, at 54.
348. E.g., Legal Aspects of New Reproductive Technologies - A Panel Discussion, 6
WHIMrlER L. REV. 781-810 (1984).
349. E.g., Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L.
REv. 465 (1983).
350. E.g., Fletcher, Moral Problems and Ethical Issues in Prospective Human Gene
Therapy, 69 VA. L. REv. 515 (1983). See generally, Symposium on Biomedical Ethics, 69 VA.
L. REv. 405 (1983).
351. E.g., Human Gene Therapy - A Background Paper, Office of Technology Assess-
ment, U.S. Congress (1984).
352. For a more thorough discussion of natural reproduction, see supra notes 8-13 and
accompanying text in section II of this Special Project.
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cal advances in reproduction technologies, specifically addressing
the issue of the inheritance rights of a child produced by artificial
reproduction. A related issue is whether a couple or a single parent
possesses a "right" under the United States Constitution to use the
new techniques.5 3 At least two attorneys practicing in the artificial
reproduction field believe that the Constitution guarantees a fun-
damental right to procreate.5 4 Several commentators, 5' relying on
a fundamental right to procreate 5 6 or a fundamental right to pri-
vacy,3 57 assert that potential parents may have a constitutional
right to use the new reproduction technologies .3 5 8 Even absent con-
stitutional protection, "there is no way to return the genie to the
bottle," 5 19 and the use of the techniques is likely to continue grow-
ing. Given these prospects, the legal profession should encourage
legislation addressing the novel issues presented, regardless of
whether constitutional rights are implicated.
Section B of this Part analyzes the legal inheritance rights of
children by examining the five types of possible parent-child rela-
tionships: legitimate, halfblood, adopted, foster and illegitimate.
Section C scrutinizes the various artificial reproduction technolo-
gies in which third party donors may participate: artificial insemi-
nation, in vitro fertilization, in vivo fertilization, and surrogate
motherhood. Following an explanation of the numerous possible
artificial reproduction combinations and a probe of the reasons for
using the various techniques, Section C raises and answers the
question "Who should inherit what from whom?". Section C also
establishes a framework for analyzing this question by considering
the law's historic approach to child inheritance, the technologies of
the reproduction alternatives, and public policy considerations.
353. See infra note 439.
354. Handel, Surrogate Parenting, In Vitro Insemination and Embryo Transplanta-
tion, 6 WHIrTR L. REV. 783, 788 (1984) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)). Handel states:
any laws which adversely affect surrogate parenting and in vitro fertilization are proba-
bly unconstitutional ... [because] we believe that there is a fundamental right to pro-
create. If it happens that the couple does not have the normal means of conceiving and
has to go to outside sources to do so, that does not diminish their rights. We believe the
cases will go in our direction as the law is formulated in this field.
Id. at 788.
355. See infra note 439.
356. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
357. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
358. See infra note 439.
359. L. ANDREwS, supra note 5, at 263 (paraphrasing John F. Kennedy).
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Section D applies the analytical framework developed in Section C
to the special inheritance problem posed by the storage of frozen
embryos. Section E concludes by urging state legislatures to define
clearly the inheritance rights of the participants in and products of
artificial reproduction.
B. CHILDREN AND INTESTATE INHERITANCE
If a person dies without a will,36 0 state intestate succession
laws govern the distribution of the estate among the decedent's
heirs and relatives.3 61 A child's legal relationship to the decedent
dictates that child's inheritance rights under the intestate succes-
sion laws. 6 2 The following five categories constitute the possible
classifications of the child's legal status under present law: legiti-
mate, halfblood, adopted, foster and illegitimate.6 3
Legitimate children receive maximum protection under most
intestate succession statutes. 64 The law classifies a legitimate child
as any child born to and biologically related to a married woman
whose husband fathered the child.36 5 Under most state intestate
laws, a legitimate child inherits one-half of the deceased parent's
estate; if more than one child survives, the children equally share
two-thirds of the decedent's estate. 66
360. This section focuses only on intestate succession. Because a person can devise
assets to a child simply by naming the child as a beneficiary or by using an inter vivos or
testamentary trust, inheritance problems arise only when a person dies intestate. See gener-
ally, J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, 137-290, 451-611 (3d ed.
1984).
A testator can avoid problems raised by artificial reproduction by addressing these is-
sues in his or her will. A typical will clause could read as follows:
The term "child" or "children" shall not include any of the following: any frozen em-
bryos which are biologically related to me; any children resulting from donation of my
eggs [sperm]; or any children whom I may have carried full term but who were adopted
upon their birth or shortly thereafter.
361. Id. at 89. Under the English common law doctrine of primogeniture, a family's
property descended to the eldest son. Primogeniture remained the dominant inheritance
system until the adoption of the Statute of Wills in 1540. Id. at 266-67.
362. Id. at 94 (showing Table of Consanguinity).
363. Id. at 95.
364. Id. at 92.
365. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6152, 6205 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§ 33 (McKinney 1977); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 1980). But see N.Y. DoM. Rn.
LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977) (classifying as legitimate a child born as a result of artificial
insemination).
366. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6401-6402 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1981); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38 (Vernon 1980). But see
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102, 8 U.LA 59 (1982) (providing spouse fifty thousand dollars plus
one-half remaining estate, even when decedent leaves issue).
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Traditionally, a will bequest to the "children" excluded half-
bloods .3 7 As the term "halfblood" suggests, discrimination against
halfbloods resulted from the child's lack of a "pure" bloodline rela-
tionship with the testator.3 s8 The notion of "pure" blood descend-
ants often resulted in the stepchild receiving no inheritance from
the stepparent. Modern laws largely eradicate this prejudice by al-
lowing halfbloods to inherit as though they were whole blood. 69
Adopted children also suffered prejudice under early intestate
succession laws, which denied adopted children the protection and
benefits available to legitimate children.370 With the increased pop-
ularity of adoption in America in the early twentieth century, how-
ever, the intestate laws began to treat adopted children equita-
bly.3 71 Although a court may interpret the term "child" in a will to
exclude adopted children,372 the intestate succession statutes of all
states provide that adopted children inherit from the adopting par-
ents.373 By removing the needless stigma formerly attached to
adopted children, the law now encourages adoptions and attempts
to minimize the adopted child's feelings of alienation. The justifi-
cation for the transformation in the law's treatment of adopted
children is that the adopting parents undertake an obligation to
367. 4 W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 34.17 (1961).
368. Intestate statutes, in fact, often do not mention stepchildren. J. DUKEMINIER & S.
JOHANSON, supra note 360, at 92.
369. For example, Uiform Probate Code § 2-107 provides: "Relatives of the half
blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they were of the whole blood." UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-107, 8 U.LA 66 (1982).
370. In fact, adoption did not exist under the common law of England, for as Glanville
penned, "God alone, and not man, can make an heir." See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON,
supra note 360, at 111 n.19 (citing R. GLANVILLE, DE LEGIBUS Er CONSUErUDxNmus REGNI
ANGLIAE, bk. 7, ch. 1, at 98 (Woodbine ed. 1932) (original in Latin)).
371. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 360, at 111.
372. Noreen v. Sparks, 103 F. Supp. 588, 590 (D.D.C. 1952), rev'd on other grounds,
204 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1953). The Noreen court did conclude, however, that the adopted
child is included in the term "children" if that is the testator's intent. Id.
373. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-109, 8 U.L.A. 66 (1982) ("[For purposes of
intestate succession ... an adopted person is the child of an adopting parent." See also J.
DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 360, at 111. Some states even allow adopted chil-
dren to inherit from both the natural and adopting parents. Id.
The doctrine of equitable adoption has developed to allow a child to inherit from a
decedent when the decedent has not formally adopted the child but has openly treated the
child for all purposes as if she were an adopted child. See e.g., Barlow v. Barlow, 170 Colo.
465, 463 P.2d 305 (1969), Heien v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1963) (discussing in dicta
the principles of equitable adoption). But see Note, Equitable Adoption: They Took Him
into Their Home and Called Him Fred, 58 VA. L. REv. 727 (1972) (eight states refuse to
allow equitable recovery by the child because adoption is purely a creature of statute). For
examples of adoption statutes, see, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6408 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1977); Tsx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40 (Vernon 1980),
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rear, educate, support, and love the adopted child. Because of
these obligations, the intestate succession laws dictate that
adopted children inherit from the estate of an adopting parent.
Foster children, however, do not enjoy the same inheritance
rights as adopted children. 74 Intestate succession laws completely
deny foster children any inheritance, despite the foster parents' ac-
ceptance of a moral, if not legal, obligation to rear the child. As in
adoption, a foster child bears no biological relationship to either
parent. The inheritance distinction between adopted and foster
children apparently exists because the adopting parents legally ob-
ligate themselves to care for the child, whereas foster parents un-
dertake no similar legal obligation.375
English common law treated illegitimate children, or bastards,
as filius nullius.37 6 The law, consequently, did not allow illegiti-
mate children to inherit from either parent. 77 The negative moral,
social, and religious connotations associated with birth to an un-
wed mother precipitated the legal system's denial of any inheri-
tance rights to the illegitimate child.3 78 The inconsistency of al-
lowing a child to inherit from parents unwilling to claim the child
as their own was another rationalization for the inferior treatment
afforded illegitimate children. Although states eventually passed
legislation that allowed an illegitimate child and its mother to in-
herit from one another,7 9 the United States Supreme Court has
374. But see Note, supra note 373, at 727.
375. The doctrine of equitable adoption arguably should not apply to foster children.
In the typical equitable adoption case, the decedent planned to adopt the child but failed to
do so prior to death. See Monahan v. Monahan, 14 Ill. 2d 449, 153 N.E. 2d 1 (1958). Foster
parents generally do not intend to adopt their foster child and often maintain custody of the
foster child only temporarily. See Mayberry v. Pryor, 422 MICH. 579, 374 N.W.2d 683 (1985);
Commonwealth v. Bibb, No. 82-CA-2569-MR & 82-CA-2389-MR (Ky.Ct. App. Sept. 16,
1983) (available March 27, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Ky file)' see also 1979 Att'y Gen.
Op. Utah 78-291.
376. Meaning "the child of no one," J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra note 360, at
113.
377. Id. Blackstone advocated withholding inheritance rights from illegitimates:
The incapacity of a bastard consists principally in this, that he cannot be heir to any
one, neither can he have heirs, but of his own body; for, being nullius filius, he is
therefore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can
be derived.
Interestingly, Blackstone labelled as "odious, unjust and cruel to the last degree" any other
form of discrimination against illegitimates. Stenger, The Supreme Court and Illegitimacy:
1968-1977, 11 FAm. L.Q. 365, 367 (1978) (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *459).
378. See Helmholz, Support Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule of Filius Nullius: A
Reassessment of the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REv. 431 (1977), cited in J. DUKEMINIER & S.
JOHANSON, supra note 360, at 113 n.20.
379. Stenger, supra note 377, at 370; see also H. DRAus, ILLEGITIMACY? LAW AND So-
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held8 0 that this type of statute is unconstitutional as a violation of
the equal protection clause."8 The Court reasoned that none of the
justifications 382 asserted for the rule was "consistent with a pur-
pose of ameliorating the condition of illegitimate children to in-
herit from intestate parents." 8 3 The illegitimate child, therefore,
must inherit from both parents or neither.
The foregoing examination of the established law of intestate
succession reveals three primary considerations in determining a
child's inheritance rights: (1) the existence of the bloodline or bio-
logical genetic connection;384 (2) the care, support, and comfort
that the parents provide;3 85 and (3) society's acceptance and ap-
proval of the method of reproduction.8 6 These three considera-
tions also should govern the determination of an artificially repro-
duced child's inheritance rights. Presently, the most certain way to
establish a legal relationship for inheritance purposes between "in-
tended parents '38 7 and their child produced by artificial reproduc-
tion is for one of the parents to adopt the child. 8 Yet some meth-
ods of artificial reproduction dictate a biological relationship
between the intended parents and child.3 89 Accordingly, requiring a
CIAL POLICY 25 (1971).
380. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Trimble represented one of fourteen ille-
gitimacy cases that the Supreme Court decided between 1968 and 1977. Stenger, supra note
377, at 365.
381. Trimble, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977).
382. The Supreme Court in Trimble discussed the following four justifications set
forth by the Illinois Supreme Court for the Illinois inheritance statute: (1) promotion of
legitimate faimily relationships, id. at 768; (2) establishment of an accurate and efficient
method of disposing of intestate property, id. at 770; (3) the decedent easily could have
provided for his illegitimate child by will, id. at 773; and (4) the statutory attempt to mirror
the presumed intent of the decedent, who must be presumed to know the law and therefore
to intend to exclude an illegitimate child from inheriting by taking no action to make a will
or legitimate the child. Id. at 774.
383. Stenger, supra note 377, at 393.
384. See supra notes 364-366 and accompanying text.
385. Thus, the adopted child inherits from its adopting parents, see supra note 373
and accompanying text, but usually does not inherit from the biological parents who con-
sented to the adoption.
386. The illegitimate, resulting from premarital or extramarital sex, at one time inher-
ited from no one. See supra notes 376-77 and accompanying text
387. "Intended parents" refers to the male and female who plan to serve as the child's
societal father and mother.
388. Human Embryo Transfer: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and
Oversight of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 167 (1985)
(statement of Lori B. Andrews, research attorney, Am. Bar Foundation) [hereinafter cited
as Andrews Statement].
389. See infra text accompanying notes 294-96 (discussing artificial insemination);
431-33 (discussing in vitro fertilization); 463 (discussing in vivo fertilization); and 492-93
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biological parent to undergo adoption proceedings to become the
child's legal parent,390 as occurs, for example, with surrogate moth-
erhood3e' seems absurd. Furthermore, by requiring adoption pro-
ceedings, the legal system is impliedly labeling the products of ar-
tificial reproduction "illegitimate," thus evoking all the negative
connotations of that categorization. State legislatures should de-
velop logical, rational, and consistent definitions of the legal rela-
tionships between the participants in and offspring of artificial re-
production. These definitions would then govern inheritance
rights. An analysis of the technologies of reproduction alternatives,
the traditional legal response to these alternatives, and public pol-
icy considerations provides a useful framework for determining the
inheritance rights of the alternative reproduction products and
participants.
C. ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION USING THIRD PARTY DONORS:
METHODS AND INHERITANCE
In examining the inheritance rights implicated by artificial re-
production, this section of the Special Project will treat separately
the following methods: artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization,
in vivo fertilization and surrogate motherhood. In the strictest
medical sense, artificial insemination is actually a form of in vivo
fertilization because artificial insemination is a type of fertilization
that occurs within the body of a woman. 2  Similarly, surrogate
motherhood is not a purely scientific classification. For legal pur-
poses, the label surrogate motherhood denotes the combination of
participants in which a woman carries a fertilized ovum, or zy-
gote,393 to term and relinquishes all parental rights. From a scien-
tific perspective, however, the implanted zygote may have been fer-
tilized by any of the various means of artificial reproduction known
to modern medicine. Thus, medical classifications focus on the sci-
entific procedure involved. By contrast, legal classifications for the
purpose of determining inheritance rights must focus on the par-
(discussing frozen embryos), see generally supra section III of this Special Project.
390. The law fails to provide that the biological father may become the legal father if
this is what he intends. See generally, Andrews Statement, supra note 388, at 178-79.
391. See generally supra section HI of this Special Project.
392. For a more thorough explanation of the relation between in vivo fertilization and
artificial insemination, see supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text in section II of this
Special Project.
393. For an explanation of the appropriate labels attached to the various stages of
fetal development, see supra note 15.
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ticipants involved.
1. Artificial Insemination
(a) Background
Using artificial insemination, doctors inseminate a woman
with the sperm of either her husband39 4 or a third party donor.3 95
The child's biological father, therefore, may be either the child's
intended father s 6 or the third party donor.39 7 One survey indicates
that husband infertility represents the major reason couples resort
to artificial insemination.3 98 Recent estimates show that artificial
insemination annually accounts for ten to twenty thousand births
in the United States.399
(b) Legal Authority
Because artificial insemination is the oldest of the artificial re-
production techniques, 00 more cases, 0 1 statutes,402 and attorney
general opinions0 3 have addressed artificial insemination than any
of the other, newer techniques.
394. For simplicity of illustrationwhen discussing a "couple" this Special Project uses
as a model a husband and wife. Of course, participants in the process may include unmar-
ried women and unmarried men. Artificial reproduction methods also make it possible for
male or female homosexuals to become "parents."
395. For an explanation of the artificial insemination procedure, see supra notes 17-19
and accompanying text.
396. "Intended father" refers to the man who intends to take custody of the child and
become its legal father.
397. The following chart posits the two combinations possible with artificial
insemination:
Sperm Egg
HW
T W (where T=third party donor)
Thus, the child results from the union of the wife's egg (W) with either the husband's sperm
(H) or a third party-usually anonymous-donor's sperm (T).
398. Curie-Cohen, supra note 19. Other commonly cited reasons for resorting to artifi-
cial insemination include the following: preventing the transmission of genetic defects or
diseases, a woman's wish to have a child without sexual contact with the father, and hus-
band impotence. Id.; see also supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
399. Id. at 588 (arguing, however, that six to ten thousand annually represents a more
realistic estimate).
400. W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFmIciAL INSEMINATON 63 (1964); see also, Comment, Artificial
Human Reproduction: Legal Problems Presented by the Test Tube Baby, 28 EMORY L. J.
1045, 1047 (1979) (claiming first human conception by means of artificial insemination oc-
curred two hundred years ago).
401. See generally supra section III of this Special Project.
402. Id.
403. Id.
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Early case law did not take a clear, uniform approach to artifi-
cial insemination."°" In 1954 an Illinois court 4 5 found a woman
guilty of adultery for undergoing the "artificial insemination by do-
nor" (AID) process although her husband had consented to the
procedure. The court then granted the husband's request for di-
vorce on adultery grounds.0 6 In 1963, however, a New York
court 40 7 required a husband to provide child support payments be-
cause he consented to his wife's artificial insemination by a third
party donor. The court, nonetheless, declared the child an illegiti-
mate.40 8 A 1968 California court 0 9 held that the husband of a wo-
man artificially inseminated by an anonymous third party donor's
sperm was the legal father of the resulting child. The court relied
on the husband's consent to the artificial insemination. 410 Thus, a
court for the first time declared the mother's husband, who had no
biological relationship to the child, the child's legal father instead
of making the biological father the legal father.411 A New York
court4 12 broke new ground in 1973 by stating that a child conceived
by consensual AID during a valid marriage is a legitimate child. In
addition, the court held that the husband's consent was a condi-
tion precedent when the mother remarried and her new spouse
wanted to adopt the child.4 13 Thus, by 1973, courts had accepted
the concept of AID, deemed the mother's husband the legal father,
and found the child to be legitimate. The courts at this point, how-
ever, had not considered the child's inheritance rights.
Twenty-five state statutes declare that the husband of the ar-
tificially inseminated woman is the legal father if he consented to
the artificial insemination.414 Furthermore, twelve states exclude a
404. Cf. infra notes 405, 407, 409, and 412 and accompanying text.
405. Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (IM. Super. Ct. 1954), appeal dismissed
on procedural grounds, 12 IlM. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
406. Id.
407. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
408. Id. at 1088, 242 N.Y.S. 2d at 411.
409. People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
410. Id. at 285, 437 P.2d at 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
411. The Sorenson court appropriately dismissed as absurd any charge of adultery
between the woman and doctor because the doctor may be a woman, or the husband himself
may administer the insemination by a syringe. Charges of adultery between the woman and
donor are equally absurd because at the time of insemination the donor may be a thousand
miles away or may even be dead. Id. at 289, 437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
412. In re Adoption of Anonymous, 74 Misc. 2d 99, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1973).
413. Id. at 105, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 435-36.
414. See, ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1971); CAL.
CIv. CODE § 7005(a) (West 1983); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-6-106(1) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT.
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third party sperm donor from the list of the child's potential legal
fathers.415 These statutes, however, generally establish legal pater-
nity for the purpose of child custody and support, rather than ad-
dressing the issue of the inheritance rights of a child created by
artificial insemination.
At least two Attorney General Opinions have addressed issues
concerning artificial insemination. A 1982 opinion by the Georgia
Attorney General limits the performance of the artificial insemina-
tion procedure to licensed physicians.416 The opinion rejected argu-
ments that a licensed physician should be allowed to delegate such
authority to an assistant or to other qualified health personnel.4
17
A year later, the Ohio Attorney General issued an opinion restrict-
ing the activities of surrogate motherhood agencies that were not
licensed as child-placing agencies by the State Department of Pub-
lic Welfare. 418 The opinion specifically prohibited three activities:
(1) soliciting potential surrogate mothers; (2) negotiating fees for
the surrogate; and (3) arranging for payment to the surrogate.41 9 As
with early case law and existing statutory law, Attorney General
Opinions have failed to address the inheritance issues associated
with artificial insemination.
ANN. § 45-69i (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-
101.1(a) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 1453(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
23-129 (1981); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1986); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.
§ 1-2069(b) (1974); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2824(6), 700.111(2) (West 1980); MNN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.56(1) (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(1) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 126.061(1) (1983); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1
(1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 552 (West Supp. 1985); OPi REv. STAT. § 109.243 (1981);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1983); Tax. FAm. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1975); VA.
CODE § 64.1-7.1 (1980); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West Supp. 1983-84); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 767.47(9), 891.40(1) (West 1981 & Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103(a) (1978),
cited in Andrews Statement, supra note 45 at 11 n.44.
415. CAL. CiV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-6-106(2) (1978);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-69j (West 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 1453(b) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56(2) (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(2)
(1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061(2) (1983); 0& REV. STAT. § 109.239 (1981); TEX. FAML CODE
ANN. § 12.03(b) (Vernon 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(2) (West Supp. 1983-84);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40(2) (West Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103(b) (1978), cited in
Andrews Statement, supra note 388 at 11 n.46.
416. 1982 Ga. Op. Att'y Gen. 187 (1982).
417. Id.
418. 83 Ohio Off. Att'y Gen. 001 (1983).
419. Id.
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(c) Inheritance Analysis
One court that considered the inheritance issue noted that "it
has never been suggested that a sperm donor other than the hus-
band is liable for child support in an artificial insemination
case."4 20 The novel issue is whether a child should have the right to
inherit from a sperm donor other than the husband. When a wo-
man is artificially inseminated with the sperm of someone other
than her husband, state legislatures must clearly define the child's
rights to inherit from its "legal" father and its "biological" father.
The need for legislation is particularly important because artificial
insemination inheritance statutes could provide a model for subse-
quent cases concerning in vitro fertilization and surrogate mother-
hood. Because use of in vitro fertilization, in vivo fertilization, sur-
rogate motherhood, and storage of frozen embryos is more recent
than use of artificial insemination, statistics and logic suggest that
parties will litigate the inheritance rights of children born by artifi-
cial insemination before the rights of those children born by use of
the other techniques.
Present legistlative attempts to ensure that the anonymous
donor avoids the status of legal father of the child,42 1 as a practical
matter, will prevent the child from inheriting from the sperm do-
nor because the donor's identity is kept anonymous.422 Doctors
performing artificial insemination do not keep medical records on
the donors.423 Furthermore, a recent survey indicated that a high
percentage of doctors conduct merely a cursory medical history in-
420. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 110 Misc. 2d 978, 981 n.5, 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 n.5 (N.Y.
Farn. Ct. 1981) (barring mother from receiving child support payments from nonhusband
father when she deceived him into believing that she was taking birth control pills). The
question raised herein, however, is whether the child is entitled to inheritance from the
donor regardless of the donor's liability for support.
421. See supra note 415 and accompanying text.
422. The failure to keep medical records on the sperm donor in artificial insemination
cases has serious consequences in addition to the child's inability to inherit from the sperm
donor. First, the child cannot fulfill its psychological desire to learn about its biological
father. Curie-Cohen, supra note 19 at 1303. Second, participants may be unaware of genetic
defects transmitted by the donor's sperm. Id. at 1302. For these reasons, a Presidential
Commission issued its conclusion that "a genetic history should be obtained on all potential
sperm donors and, where appropriate, the results of genetic screening should be available to
prospective recipients." J. AREEN, P. KING, S. GOLDBERG & A. CAPRON. LAW, SCIENCE AND
MEDICINE 1305 (1984) (quoting SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS 70
(1983). These consequences, although outside the scope of this Special Project, provide sup-
port for the argument that thorough medical histories of sperm donors should be obtained
and retained. See generally Lorio, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile Ar-
eas for Litigation, 35 S.W.L.J. 973, 978-84 (1982).
423. Currie-Cohen, supra note 19 at 1301, 1303.
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vestigation.4'2 Reasons for not keeping medical records include:
minimization of the emotional stress on the "parents," the donors,
and the child; encouragement of potential donors by assuring them
anonymity;425 and legal protection of the donor.426 To ensure un-
certainty over the identity of the true biological father, some phy-
sicians inseminate the woman with the sperm of several men, mak-
ing it virtually impossible to determine the biological father.2 7
These justifications for maintaining anonymity of the donor not-
withstanding, legislatures must consider and address specifically
the inheritance issues implicated by artificial insemination.
In fashioning appropriate legislation, lawmakers should look
to the three considerations that determine inheritance under ex-
isting intestate succession laws4 28 - bloodline, support, and societal
acceptance. These considerations indicate that when artificial in-
semination is the method of artificial reproduction used, the child
can inherit from an inseminated woman who clearly qualifies as
the legal mother. This result is appropriate even though societal
acceptance of artificial insemination may not be as prevalent as
acceptance of natural, or coital, reproduction.2 9 When the sperm
donor for artificial insemination is the husband of the inseminated
woman, the donor, or biological father, is also the legal father. As a
result, the child can inherit from him. The bloodline factor is satis-
fied because the biological father and the legal father are the same
man. The support factor is satisfied because the biological father
intends to take custody of and support the child. The societal ac-
ceptance factor may not be fully satisfied if society is more com-
fortable with natural reproduction than artificial reproduction. So-
ciety, however, is more likely to accept artificial insemination when
the husband is the sperm donor.
When the sperm donor is an anonymous third party, the in-
heritance analysis becomes more difficult. The anonymous donor
satisfies the bloodline factor because he is biologically related to
the child, whereas the husband is not. The anonymous donor does
not satisfy the support factor, however, because the husband in-
424. Id. at 1300. In fact, many physicians expect medical students and hospital resi-
dents to "screen" themselves before they donate sperm. Id.
425. Id.
426. In addition to encouraging potential donors, anonymity also protects the donor
from legal involvement insubsequent determinations about the legitimacy and inheritance
rights of children born through artificial insemination. Id. at 1303.
427. Id. at 1301-02.
428. See supra notes 384-86 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text in section II of this Special Project.
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tends to take custody of and support the child. The sperm donor
probably never even intended to know of the child's existence,
much less support the child. Society would not be likely to expect
the child to be able to inherit from an anonymous man who never
intended to know of the child's existence. Accordingly, the societal
acceptance factor probably is not satisfied when a woman is artifi-
cially inseminated with the sperm of an anonymous man. The exis-
tence of a bloodline between the anonymous donor and child is not
sufficient to provide the child with inheritance rights vis-a-vis the
donor.430 The child remains adequately protected because the child
inherits from the mother and probably from the husband.
2. In Vitro Fertilization
(a) Background
In vitro fertilization raises inheritance issues similar to the is-
sues surrounding artificial insemination because both techniques
may involve anonymous contributors to the reproduction pro-
cess. 43 1 In vitro fertilization requires removal of an egg from a wo-
man's ovary. A physician combines the egg with a processed sperm
in a petri dish and, once the sperm fertilizes the egg, implants the
resulting embryo into the woman's uterus. Couples use the proce-
dure to overcome reproduction problems such as the wife's blocked
fallopian tubes or the husband's low sperm count.432 Anonymous
egg or sperm donors may participate in the in vitro process.
Four possible combinations of egg and sperm donors exist
when the in vitro method of artificial reproduction is employed.
First, the husband may provide the sperm and the wife may pro-
vide the egg. Second, a third party may provide the sperm and the
wife may provide the egg. Third, the husband may provide the
sperm and a third party may provide the egg. Fourth, a third party
may provide the sperm and another third party may provide the
egg.4 3 Thus, the use of the in vitro procedure requires analysis of
430. As a precondition to relieving the donor of legal responsibility and denying the
child the right to inherit from the donor, however, the law should require the donor to
provide the doctor with a complete and thorough medical history. The hospital should re-
tain and reveal the records to the child upon a minimal showing of either psychological
desire or physical need. The records need not, however, contain the donor's identity unless
he so agrees. See supra note 422.
431. See supra text accompanying note 422.
432. For a scientific explanation of the in vitro method of artificial reproduction, see
supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text; see also L. ANDREws, supra note 5 at 121.
433. Sperm Egg
H W Mother fertile but unable to conceive.
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what inheritance rights, if any, the child should have from an
anonymous donor.
(b) Legal Authority
In the United States, only two reported court cases discuss the
in vitro fertilization question.434 The first case, Del Zio v. Manhat-
tan's Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center,435 concerned a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress by the first couple to
attempt in vitro fertilization in the United States.436 After a physi-
cian removed an egg from Mrs. Del Zio, fertilized the egg with Mr.
Del Zio's sperm, and placed the combination inside an incubator,
the chairman of defendant's Department of Obstetrics and Gyne-
cology destroyed the embryo. The chairman's action prevented
Mrs. Del Zio from giving birth to a biologically-related child of her
own. 43 7 The jury concluded that the defendant's conduct was so
extreme, outrageous, and shocking that it exceeded all reasonable
bounds of decency and awarded Mrs. Del Zio fifty thousand dollars
for her emotional distress.
The second in vitro fertilization case, Smith v. Fahner,435
challenged the constitutionality4 9 of the Illinois in vitro statute.440
In response to the filing of Smith, the Illinois Attorney General
issued an opinion441 exonerating doctors from criminal liability un-
less the doctor wilfully endangers or injures the embryo.442 The
opinion also provided that termination of a defective embryo con-
T W Father infertile, mother fertile but unable to conceive.
H T Mother infertile but able to carry child.
T T Both parents infertile, but mother able to carry child.
Wallis, The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46, 49 (diagram of various repro-
duction technique combinations).
434. See infra notes 435 and 438 and accompanying text.
435. No. 74-3558 (S.D.N.Y. filed April 12, 1978).
436. L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 155-57.
437. Id.
438. No. 82c 4324 (N.D. Ill., memorandum opinion February 4, 1983).
439. For general discussion concerning constitutional right to artificial reproduction,
see L. ANDREWS, supra, note 5, 153-54 (1984); Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman,
Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEo. L.J. 1295, 1302-11
(1979); Lorio, supra note 422, at 1006-10; Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405 (1983); Smith & Iraola, Sexual-
ity, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. Rav. 263, 277-85 (1984); Note, In Defense of
Surrogate Parenting: A Critical Analysis of the Recent Kentucky Experience, 69 Ky. L.J.
877, 917-30 (1980-81); Comment, supra note 400, at 1052-61.
440. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 81-26(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
441. L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 155.
442. Id.
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stitutes lawful termination of a pregnancy. 443 These legal opinions,
however, have not addressed the issue of the inheritance rights of
children created by in vitro fertilization.
Because legislatures and administrative agencies444 have been
hesitant to deal with issues that the new techniques raise,4 " very
little statutory law adresses in vitro fertilization,446 and none of the
statutes define the inheritance rights of children created by in vi-
tro fertilization. For example, an Illinois statute declares the doc-
tor performing the procedure the "custodian" of the child for pur-
poses of an 1877 Child Abuse Act.447 Under that Act, the doctor is
criminally liable for endangering the life or health of the em-
bryo.448 A Pennsylvania statute, by contrast, simply requires quar-
terly reports to the Pennsylvania Department of Health summariz-
ing the in vitro fertilization that a doctor conducts.4 9 The
Pennsylvania statute, therefore, implicitly condones the procedure,
whereas the Illinois statute discourages use of the in vitro pro-
cess. 4 0 Such statutes, which expressly address new reproductive
technologies, are only the first step. Legislatures must begin to
consider all consequences of these technologies, particularly the in-
443. Id.
444. For example, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and
Human Services) never approved or disapproved a Vanderbilt University grant application
to the National Institutes of Health for in vitro fertilization study and research. Although
the Ethics Advisory Board of HEW recommended consideration of the application in May
1979, the Secretary never acted. Lorio, supra note 422 at 977-78.
445. A number of commentators have called for legislative action. See, e.g., Andrews
Statement, supra note 388 at 13, 15; L. ANDREWS, supra note 5; Andrews, supra note 5, at
797-98; Smith & Iraola, supra note 439, at 290-91; Wadlington, supra note 6, at 482-86, 512-
14; Note, Artificial Conception: A Legislative Proposal, 5 CARDozo L. REv. 713, 735 (1984);
Note, The Legal Status of Artificial Insemination: A Need for Policy Formulation, 19
DRAKE L. REV. 409, 436-40 (1970); Comment, Artificial Insemination-A Model Statute, 24
CLEv. ST. L. REV. 341, 351-54 (1975); Comment, Surrogate Motherhood in California: Legis-
lative Proposals, 18 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 341 (1981); Comment, New Reproductive Technolo-
gies: The Legal Problem and a Solution, 49 TENN. L. REv. 303, 308 (1982); Comment, supra
note 400, at 1064-71, 1076-79. But see Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Inter-
ests of the Sperm Donor, 14 FAm. L.Q. 1, 12-13 (1980) (suggesting that development of pro-
fessionals standards is a more pressing need than legislation).
446. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 38, § 81-26(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (doctor per-
forming in vitro fertilization subject to criminal liability under 1877 Child Abuse Act); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3213(e) (Purdon 1983) (requiring quarterly reports by all persons con-
ducting or researching in vitro fertilization).
447. L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 150. But see supra notes 438-42 and accompanying
text (statute's effectiveness diminished as a result of attorney general's opinion in response
to suit to declare statute unconstitutional).
448. L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 150.
449. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3213(e) (Purdon 1983).
450. L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 150.
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heritance consequences.
Some existing state statutes, which legislatures did not intend
to regulate in vitro fertilization, confuse the situation because of
their possible applicability to this form of artificial reproduction.
Several state statutes indirectly threaten continued use of the in
vitro fertilization procedure by restricting research on embryos.451
Because the embryo forms prior to implantation into the woman's
uterus, the procedure arguably violates statutes that prohibit re-
search endangering the life or health of embryos.452 Fear of crimi-
nal prosecution discourages some doctors in states with tight re-
strictions on fetal research from performing in vitro fertilization at
all.'5 Legislatures passed these statutes, however, unaware of in
vitro fertilization.454 The statutes represented a response to the le-
galization of abortion455 and a concomitant attempt "to maintain
451. Fetal research statutes possibly affecting in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer, or
embryo freezing (+indicates that statute explicitly extends to research on embryos; indi-
cates that the statute only covers research in conjunction with an abortion):
+ ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (Supp. 1982-83);
+ CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25956 (West 1984);
+ ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 81-32, -32.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985);
+ IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1985);
" Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.026 (1985);
* LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2 (West 1974);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1593 (1980);
* MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12J (West 1983);
* MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685 - .2692 (West 1980) (allows therapeutic research on
embryo or fetus);
* MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.421, .422 (West 1986);
* Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(3) (1985);
+ NED. REV. STAT. §§ 28-342, -346 (1979);
* N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1 to -6 (1981);
* N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.2-01 to -02 (1981);
+ OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Page 1982);
+ OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-735 (West 1984);
+ PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3216 (Purdon 1983);
* R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-54-1, -2 (Supp. 1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1977);
+ TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208 (1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1978);
+ Wyo. STAT. 35-6-115 (1977),
collected in L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 297-98 app. (updated as of March, 1986).
452. See generally L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 148-49 (discussing fetal research
statutes).
453. Id. at 149.
454. Id. at 148.
455. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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respect for human dignity" by prohibiting research on embryos.""
Indiscriminate application of this old legal framework to modern
technology, therefore, has the unintended consequence of stifling
progress in the artificial reproduction field. 5 Applying embryo re-
search laws to a medical technological process that legislatures did
not contemplate when passing these laws constitutes another com-
pelling reason for legislation that directly addresses in vitro
fertilization.
(c) Inheritance Analysis
Under all four in vitro combinations4 s the three factor test,
based on bloodline, support, and societal acceptance, strongly sug-
gests that the child should inherit from.the intended parents and
not from the third party participant. In the first combination, the
intended father's sperm fertilizes the intended mother's egg. Both
intended parents are biologically related to the child and, thus,
both intended parents satisfy the bloodline factor. The intended
parents are also the only parties who intend to support the child.
Because no third parties participate in this combination, no one
else would be eligible to provide support. Finally, societal accept-
ance is uncertain. Some may consider the in vitro process unnatu-
ral, but this first combination is likely to be most acceptable to
society because only the intended parents are involved.
In the second combination, a third party's sperm fertilizes the
mother's egg. In the third combination, the intended father's
sperm fertilizes a third party's egg. In both situations a doctor im-
plants the embryo in the intended mother's uterus. These two ap-
proaches raise similar inheritance problems because only one of
the intended parents participates. The child is related biologically
to one of the intended parents, but also is related biologically to a
third party donor. The bloodline factor, therefore, favors neither
the intended parents nor the third party donor. The intended par-
ents, however, plan to raise, support and care for the child,
whereas the anonymous donor does not plan to do so. The support
factor, therefore, favors the intended parents. Societal acceptance
again is uncertain. Once the process has occurred, however, society
would likely favor a legal framework that treats the child as the
natural child of the intended parents. Inheritance rights would, of
456. L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 149.
457. See supra notes 451-56 and accompanying text.
458. See supra note 433 and accompanying text.
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course, accompany this status. The child that the second and third
combinations produce, therefore, should inherit only from the in-
tended parents.
In the fourth combination, a third party's sperm fertilizes a
third party's egg. A doctor implants the embryo in the intended
mother's uterus, and she carries the child full term. The bloodline
factor does not favor the intended parents in this situation because
neither of the intended parents bears a biological relationship to
the child. Neither of the third party donors, however, intends to
care for or support the child. Thus, the support factor favors the
intended parents, who do plan to support the child. Societal ac-
ceptance may seem dispositive in this stalemate between the other
two factors. American society's acceptance of the in vitro process
involving two anonymous donors is difficult to predict. Society is
most likely, however, to favor the intended parents. In the child's
interests, society would seek to ensure that someone care for and
provide for the child. The anonymity of the donors precludes the
possibility of the child turning to them for support. The intended
parents, on the other hand, will gladly care for the child. Further-
more, the intended parents' obligations to the child become more
clear if the law entitles the child to inherit from them. In addition,
society serves its own interests by having the child inherit from the
intended parents because the child could rely on that inheritance
rather than welfare programs if the intended parents die. In the
final analysis, therefore, the child should inherit from the intended
parents.
3. In Vivo Fertilization
(a) Background
In vivo fertilization involves the artificial insemination of a
woman with the sperm of either an anonymous donor or the "in-
tended father. 45 9 The in vivo process differs from in vitro in that
in vivo fertilization occurs inside the uterus; in vitro occurs outside
the uterus in a petri dish. Following conception inside the impreg-
nated woman's uterus, the embryo is "flushed out"'460 and reim-
planted into the uterus of the "intended mother."4 61 Couples use
the procedure when the wife has difficulty conceiving, but can
459. See supra note 17 and accompanying text in section H of this Special Project.
460. Wallis, supra note 344, at 55.
461. Id.
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carry and deliver the child safely.4 2 Variations of the in vivo
method exist as they do in other artificial reproduction techniques.
For example, the "intended mother" could conceive the child, flush
it out, and implant it in a surrogate mother.
The in vivo process is invaluable because it permits the wife to
give birth to her husband's biological child if the husband is fertile
and the third party "uterus donor" agrees to artificial insemination
with the husband's sperm.463 In vivo fertilization offers greater po-
tential benefit than in vitro fertilization because women with no
ovaries or inaccessable ovaries and women who do not wish to pass
on a genetic defect can use the in vivo fertilization technique.464 In
effect, the in vivo process is simply a combination of artificial in-
semination 465 and partial surrogate motherhood.46 " This characteri-
zation will prove useful in analyzing the inheritance rights and re-
sponsibilities of each party.
(b) Legal Authority
The in vivo fertilization process arguably violates statutes that
prevent any research on an embryo467 even more directly than the
in vitro process.468 In fact, the "flushing out" may constitute an
"abortion" and fall within those embryo research statutes prohibit-
ing research in conjunction with an abortion.469 This result would
be absurd because the purpose of in vivo fertilization, rather than
462. Id.
463. See supra chart at note 433.
464. L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 252.
465. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
466. See infra notes 472-74 and accompanying text.
467. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (Supp. 1982-83); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-436 to -
441 (West Supp. 1983); IND. CODE § 35-1-58.5-6 (Burns 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87.2
(West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1593 (1980); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 § 12J
(West 1983); MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685 to .2692 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145.421 (West 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-20-108 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-342, -346 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-3
(1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2.-Ol to -02 (Allen Smith 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2919.14 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 1-735 (West 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §
3216 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 and -2 (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
310 (1978); and Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977). Cited in Andrews Statement, supra note 45,
at 169 n.8. See also Andrews, supra note 5, 70 A.BA. J. 50 (1984) (further analysis of the
above cited laws).
468. L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 253.
469. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1593 (West 1980); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 §
12J (a)III (West 1983); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 333.2690 (West 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. §
28-342 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-02.2 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(e) (Supp.
1985); and Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1977). Cited in Andrews Statement, supra note 388, at
269 n.9.
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to terminate life, is to reimplant the embryo into the "mother"
who intends to give birth to the child.470
(c) Inheritance Analysis
The in vivo inheritance results should be nearly indentical to
those of the in vitro process because both involve a potential egg
donor and potential sperm donor. In vivo fertilization differs from
the in vitro procedure only in that the egg donor doubles as a
uterus donor. The "intended mother" ultimately delivers the child
as in the in vitro procedure. Even though conception occurs within
the egg donor's womb, the resulting child should possess the same
rights to inherit from the "intended parents" under in vivo fertili-
zation as under in vitro fertilization.471
The three factor test produces the same results under both in
vivo methods. Regardless of whether the intended father or a third
party biologically fathers the child, the intended mother carries
the child full term. As with in vitro fertilization involving one third
party donor, the bloodline and support factors favor the intended
parents in in vivo fertilization. The only distinction between the in
vitro and in vivo procedures is that, in the in vivo procedure, the
embryo is created in a third party's uterus rather than in a petri
dish. Unless this distinction drastically erodes societal acceptance,
which result seems unlikely, the same analysis discussed in the
context of in vitro fertilization should apply in the in vivo situa-
tion. The child produced by means of in vivo fertilization, there-
fore, should inherit from the intended parents.
4. Surrogate Motherhood
(a) Background
Surrogate motherhood highlights the possible combinations
and variations of the other artificial reproduction techniques.472
The surrogate mother carries the child full term and upon delivery
470. See supra note 460 and accompanying text.
471. See supra text following note 458.
472. The surrogate mother may be fertilized by artificial insemination, in vitro fertili-
zation, in vivo fertilization, or natural reproduction. The participants may include the
adopting husband, the adopting wife, anonymous sperm donors, and anonymous egg donors.
The following chart presents the wide variations possible in surrogate motherhood:
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presents the child to the intended parents.47 Under present prac-
tice, surrogates receive compensation upon their release of the
child to the intended parents.7 4 A separate Section of this Special
Project addresses the legal complications arising out of the surro-
gate motherhood process.7 5
(b) Legal Authority
Very little existing case law or legislation clarifies the legal
consequences of surrogate parenting. As with in vitro476 and in
ViV 04 7 fertilization, courts often judge surrogate motherhood under
statutes that should not apply to the new reproduction alternative.
Two types of statutes illustrate this problem.
First, the contractual arrangments between the couples and
the surrogates violate state statutes prohibiting the payment of
money in return for a woman's consent to the adoption of her
child.478 Courts have held that this illegality voids the surrogate
motherhood contract.47 9 The legislatures, however, did not intend
these statutes to govern surrogate motherhood, a process unknown
Sperm Egg Fertilization medium Gestation medium
H T artificial insemination T
T T artificial insemination T
H W in vitro T
H T in vitro T
T W in vitro T
T T in vitro T
H T in vitro T
473. See generally supra section III of this Special Project.
474. See Handel, supra note 354, at 786 (estimating average surrogate fee at twelve
thousand dollars plus medical expenses). See generally, Note, supra note 439, at 883 n.39.
475. See generally supra section III of this Special Project.
476. See supra notes 451-56 and accompanying text.
477. See supra notes 467-69 and accompanying text.
478. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1977); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-114.B (Supp.
1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 1970); COLO. Rv. STAT. § 19-4-115 (1978); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13 § 928 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1) (d) (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-
19 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-1511 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 §§ 1526, 1701, 1702
(1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Burns 1985); IowA CODE ANN. § 600.9(2) (West 1981);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 199-590(2) (Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16 § 83 (1981); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 210 § 11A (West Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 710.54 (West Supp.
1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.290 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54(a) (West Supp. 1983-84);
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 374(6) (West 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1984); OHIO Rv. CODE
ANN. § 3107.10(B) (Page 1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 25-6-4.2 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-1-135 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (1978 & Supp. 1985); and Wis. STAT. ANN. §
946.716 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). Cited in Andrews Statement, supra note 388, at 4 n.12.
479. See, e.g., 83 Op. Atty Gen. La. 869 (1983) (payment beyond "prenatal care and
living expenses" violates statute prohibiting the sale of children).
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when the legislatures adopted the statutes. 80 Second, several state
statutes addressing artificial insemination inadvertently interfere
with surrogate motherhood. 8' In twenty-two states,4 2 the law
deems the husband of a woman artificially inseminated by a third
party donor's sperm with the husband's consent to be the legal fa-
ther of the child.48 3 These statutes, passed expressly to govern arti-
ficial insemination, interfere with continued development of medi-
cal technology by undermining the clear intent of the parties that
the anonymous donor, rather than the surrogate's husband, be-
come the child's legal father. 4  Other statutes expressly state that
a non-husband donor shall not be the child's legal father,8 5
thereby similarly subverting the intent of the parties.
Surrogate motherhood presents yet another legal quagmire
which state legislatures must resolve through responsive, well-rea-
soned laws. The legislatures should look to the intent of the parties
and seek a fair, just, and equitable solution.
(c) Inheritance Analysis
A combination of the artificial insemination, in vitro, and in
vivo alternatives results in ten variations4 6 by which to fertilize
480. L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 226.
481. See infra notes 482 and 484.
482. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141 (1971); CAL. CIV. CODE
9 7005 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. Rxv. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69i
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (Supp. 1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 1452 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-129 (1981); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 188 (West Supp. 1986); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b)
(1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 9§ 333.2824(6), 700.111 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
257.56 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); NEv. REv. STAT. § 126.061(1)
(1986); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (West 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit.10, § 552 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.243, (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §
68-3-306 (1983); TRX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03(a) (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1986); VA. CODE §
64.1-7.1 (1980 & Supp. 1985); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1983-84); WIs. STAT.
ANN. §§ 767.47(9), 891.40 (West 1981 & Supp. 1985); and Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-'103a (1978).
Cited in Andrews Statement, supra note 388 at 11 n.44.
483. L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 226-27. See also Andrews Statement, supra note
388, at 175-77.
484. Andrews Statement, supra note 388, at 176.
485. CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983); COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-6-106(2) (1978);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-69j (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 1453(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56(2) (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106(2) (1981); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 126.061(2) (1979); OR. Rxv. STAT. § 109.239(1) (1983); TX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
12.03(b) (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1986); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(2) (West Supp.
1983-84); Wis, STAT. ANN. § 891.40(2) (West 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103(b) (1978). Cited in
Andrews Statement, supra note 388, at 11 n.46.
486. See supra note 472.
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the egg that ultimately develops into the child the surrogate deliv-
ers. In seven487 of the ten scenarios, at least one member of the
intended couple bears a genetic relationship to the child. In these
instances, the bloodline factor favors the intended parents. In the
other three combinations, 88 the child possesses no biological rela-
tionship to either "parent." The various donors, however, do not
intend to support the child. The support factor, which usually fa-
vors the intended parents, is negated when the surrogate offers to
raise the child herself or with her mate. The societal acceptance
factor may favor either the surrogate or intended parents. On one
hand, society winces at the thought of taking a newly born child
from the woman who carried the child for nine months, especially
when the arrangement deprives the mother of the child against her
wishes. The situations in which the child inherits the delivering
mother's genes 489 exacerbate society's revulsion. On the other
hand, denying the intended parents their long awaited child is
equally reprehensible. The latter denial becomes intolerable if the
child contains the genes of both of the intended parents. 490 This
487.
Sperm
H
H
H
T
H
H
T
Fertilization Medium
artificial insemination
in vitro
in vitro
in vitro
in vitro
in vivo W
in vivo W
T = third party donor TA = anonymous third party donor
488.
Sperm Egg Fertilization Medium
T T artificial insemination
T T in vitro
T TA in vitro
T = third party donor TA = anonymous third party donor
489.
Sperm Egg Fertilization Medium
H T artificial insemination
T T artificial insemination
H T in vitro
T T in vitro
T = third party donor
490.
Sperm Egg Fertilization Medium
H W in vitro
H W in vivo W
Gestation Medium
T
T
T
T
A
T
T
Gestation Medium
T
T
T
Gestation Medium
T
T
T
T
Gestation Medium
T
T
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conflict has led some critics to oppose the entire surrogate mother-
hood concept.4 91
Reasonable minds, undoubtedly, may differ. Nevertheless,
given the goal of facilitating new repoduction possibilities, the in-
tended parents, who intend from the outset to serve as the child's
parents, must assume the role of legal parents. The law, therefore,
should allow the surrogate mothered child to inherit from each of
the intended parents through intestate succession or as a "child"
under their respective wills. To reinforce the intended parents'
commitment to the child, the law should allow the child to inherit
from the couple at any time after conception. Although the law
should favor the intended parents' relationship with the child, the
child's best interests dictate that the death of both intended par-
ents operate to place the surrogate in the position of legal mother.
Although the suggestion contradicts the original intent of the par-
ties, this result ensures that the child inherits from the surrogate
and, more importantly, ensures the child's well-being in the event
of a catastrophe. Finally, the surrogate may allow another couple
to adopt the child. In that case the state's normal adoption proce-
dures and legal consequences should apply.
D. FROZEN EMBRYOS: A SPEcIAL DILEMMA
Although freezing of sperm and eggs occurred much earlier, 92
embryo freezing represents a very recent phenomenon.493 Physi-
cians often freeze embryos that are formed, but not used, during in
vitro fertilization.4 4 The frozen embryo procedure allows the wo-
man to try again if the first implanation proves unsuccessful.495
Modern medicine's ability to freeze embryos greatly facilitates arti-
ficial repoduction, but portends potentially catastrophic repercus-
sions for estate planning law. The medical technology of freezing
embryos poses a special dilemma for estate planning because dur-
ing the storage period the rights-and indeed the identities-of
the participants are suspended indefinitely.98 An estate could re-
491. See Note, supra note 439, at 887-905 (analyzing Kentucky Attorney General
opinion which "came down emphatically against" surrogate parenting).
492. Frozen sperm and eggs are useful in artificial insemination, in vitro, in vivo, and
surrogate motherhood methods of fertilization. L. ANDRE WS, supra note 5, at 256-58.
493. Id. See supra notes 378 & 379 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
process of freezing embryos.
494. L. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 256-58.
495. Id.
496. Another period of time in the artificial reproduction process indefinitely suspends
the rights of all participants. When physicians fertilize ova in a petri dish, they allow the
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main unsettled for years while a decedent's biologically related em-
bryo remained frozen. Similarly, a planned settlement and distri-
bution of an estate could be thrown into question upon the
discovery of previously undiscovered frozen embryo "heir."
In the summer of 1984, the inheritance rights of frozen em-
bryos received much attention when the world learned of the exis-
tence of two "orphaned" frozen embryos.4 9 In 1981, Elsa Rios, a
Los Angeles resident, attempted in vitro fertilization at the Queen
Victoria Medical Center in Melbourne, Australia.498 Physicians re-
moved a number of eggs and fertilized them with anonymously
donated sperm.499 Doctors implanted some of the resulting em-
bryos in Ms. Rios and froze two others. 500 The implantation failed
to result in a pregnancy, but, before Ms. Rios returned to have the
frozen embryos implanted, she and her husband died in a plane
crash in Chili.5 0' The Rios' respective wills contained no mention
of the embryos, leaving an estimated one million dollar estate in
limbo. 502 Questions immediately arose concerning the inheritance
rights of the embryos, 503 and the moral, social, ethical, and legal
obligations of the Medical Center.504
The law, unfortunately, provided no immediate answers. The
Victoria state government requested a "committee of scholars," 505
formed earlier to study the potential consequences of artificial re-
production technologies, 50 to recommend a proper course of action
to take with respect to the embryos. 51 The committee proposed
destruction of the embryos.5 08 The upper house of the Victoria
morula to undergo division for several days before implantation. The more advanced early
embryo has more likelihood of successful implantation. See supra notes 373-74 and accom-
panying text. Unlike the more lengthy storage of frozen embryos, this period of only two or
three days is relatively insignficiant for purposes of inheritance rights.
497. Wallis, supra note 1, at 68.
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Id.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id.; see also "A Legal, Moral, Social Nightmare" TiME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 55-56.
505. Study Deals with Rights of Test-Tube Babies, Tennessean, Sept. 5, 1984, at 7A.
506. Id.; see also, TIME supra note 504, at 68.
507. Tennessean, supra note 505.
508. Legislation Permits Embryos' Adoption, Tennessean, Oct. 24, 1984, at 1A, 3A.
The committee also recommended abolition of surrogate motherhood because it is "too com-
plicated legally," but the committee did recommend that the "social parents" become, by
law, the legal parents. Tennessean, supra note 505.
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state parliament responded to the ensuing public outrage509 by
adopting legislation allowing the hospital to thaw and implant the
embryos into two of the thousands of volunteer surrogate
mothers. 510 The legislation, however, applied only to those particu-
lar two frozen embryos. 11 Clearly, to facilitate estate planning any
legislation must address the inheritance rights of all frozen
embryos.
The particular reproductive technique chosen to bring the fro-
zen embryo into the world as a child should dictate the child's in-
heritance rights. If the chosen techniques would otherwise favor
inheritance from the intended parents,512 the use of a frozen em-
bryo should not vary that result. When the embryo's "intended
parents" both die, however, the embryo's rights must cease vis-a-
vis the intended parents. The chaos and uncertainty otherwise re-
sulting in estate planning is intolerable. The couple's physician
should have a duty to locate immediately a potential mother, sur-
rogate or otherwise, and a couple seeking a child. The physician
should thaw the embryo and implant it. At this point, the particu-
lar technique chosen again should govern the child's inheritance
rights. The law should impute consent to such consequences by
virtue of the intended parents participation in the frozen embryo
procedure.
E. CONCLUSION
The law should protect children created through artificial re-
production technology by clearly defining their inheritance rights.
Legislation would infuse predictability into the artificial reproduc-
tion techniques by ensuring that each participant in the new meth-
ods realizes the potential legal consequences. Increasing use of ex-
isting artificial reproduction methods creates mounting pressure
for the estate planner to ensure that the estate distribution reflects
the client's wishes. Furthermore, the complexity of the estate plan-
ner's task grows with each technological breakthrough in the artifi-
cial reproduction field. Legislators should adopt the analytical
framework of applying the bloodline factor, the support factor, and
the societal acceptance factor to the method of artificial reproduc-
tion to determine from whom the resulting child may inherit. Re-
509. Id.
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. See supra text accompanying notes 429-30, text following note 115, and text fol-
lowing note 471.
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gardless of the analysis adopted, however, the current chaotic situ-
ation demands that legislators respond adequately to rapidly
advancing medical technology by passing legislation defining the
inheritance rights of children created by artificial reproduction.
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A. INTRODUCTION
The decision of a woman to abort her pregnancy is a personal
choice, but one that also implicates others. Few issues in the his-
tory of American law have created a furor equal to the controversy
surrounding abortion. In addition to the important legal issues
raised, questions of ethics, autonomy, and morality touch everyone
and incite many. The abortion controversy arises from a conflict
between two largely incompatible principles. One principle, now
692 [Vol. 39:597
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constitutionally recognized, 13 is the autonomy of the woman and
her right to make a private decision about her body and her preg-
nancy. The other principle, currently argued with great conviction,
is the right of the unborn fetus to realize its potential "human"
existence. Proponents of this principle seek state action overriding
the woman's choice.
The pregnant woman does not make her abortion decision in a
vacuum. The decision necessarily involves third parties. This Part
focuses on the primary outside party: the woman's attending phy-
sician.514 The physician's role in the abortion process has attained
a constitutional status itself.515 However, many opponents of abor-
tion in state legislatures have concluded that if they cannot inter-
fere directly with the woman's right to an abortion, regulation of
the attending physician can serve the same purpose. Consequently,
since the United States Supreme Court first recognized the wo-
man's constitutional right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade, state leg-
islatures have enacted a myriad of provisions regulating the physi-
cian and his relationship with the pregnant woman.1 Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have largely invalidated such efforts. 7
New methods of interfering with the physician's role, and conse-
quently with the woman's constitutional rights, however, are being
513. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
514. This section characterizes the physician as the primary outside party because un-
less an abortion is self-induced, an increasingly rare occurrence now that abortion is legal, a
physician or other medical personnel must perform every abortion. Not every pregnant wo-
man will have a husband or living parents, although these are certainly important parties.
States' attempts to give husbands or parents the right to notification of or consent to the
woman's abortion are viewed in this section as attempts to regulate the physician's constitu-
tionally protected rights in the abortion process. Accordingly, the physician is the most in-
fluential party, other than the woman herself, in the abortion decisionmaking process.
515. Although outside the scope of this section, one of the underlying issues in the
regulation of the physician is the extent to which the woman's right to an abortion protects
the individual performing the abortion. The abortion process inextricably intertwines the
woman and her physician. The physician or individual performing an abortion, however,
does not necessarily have standing to attack an abortion statute because it violates the wo-
man's rights. Although serious standing problems arise, the physician's role as deci-
sionmaker, nevertheless, has attained a constitutionally protected status. See infra note 385.
516. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-613 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-303 (1978 & Supp.
1985); TENN. CODE ANN.; § 39-4-202(0 (1978). See generally, Bryant, State Legislation on
Abortion After Roe v. Wade: Selected Constitutional Issues, 2 AM. J.L. & MED. 101, 102-03
(1976-77); Note, Implications of the Abortion Decision: Post Roe and Doe Litigation and
Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (1974).
517. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983) (striking down mandatory abortion information disclosure); Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979) (striking down Pennsylvania's abortion statute that regulated physicians);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down maternal consent
requirements).
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This Part of the Special Project examines the validity of these
new regulations within the context of Roe and its progeny.
Section B analyzes the development and resulting recognition of
the woman's constitutional right to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy. Section C discusses the physician's role in the abor-
tion decision by reviewing the framework set out in Roe v. Wade,
discussing the physician's decisionmaking ability, examining the
viability determination, and analyzing the maternal health deter-
mination. Section D focuses on states' attempts to regulate the
physician indirectly by requiring consent or notification of the wo-
man's spouse or parents. Section E applies the analysis of Section
C to two cases recently heard by the Supreme Court. Section F
concludes that the physician, rather than the states, should define
viability in order to adequately protect the woman's right to decide
whether to terminate her pregnancy.
B. THE RIGHT TO AN ABORTION
1. The Development of the Right
With the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution,519 the states surrendered much of their au-
thority to the federal government, including the federal courts.2 0
Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, fed-
eral courts attained the power to examine and invalidate state laws
that interfere with a person's interest in life, liberty, or property.521
The type of interest being interfered with generally determines the
standard of review that the courts will apply.522 If a state statute
interferes with an interest expressly recognized in the Constitution,
courts will subject the statute to a "strict scrutiny" standard and
uphold the statute only if it is narrowly tailored to further a "com-
pelling state interest. '528 If a state statute interferes with an inter-
est that the Constitution does not recognize, courts will uphold the
518. See infra notes 373-457 and accompanying text.
519. The text of the fourteenth amendment reads in pertinent part: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
520. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 414-24
(2d ed. 1983).
521. Id. at 416-17.
522. Id. at 418-19.
523. Id.
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statute if it has a "rational basis. 5 24 Consequently, under the less
strict rational basis test, courts generally will uphold a statute that
interferes with a particular liberty interest that is not found in the
Constitution. 25
The Supreme Court has recognized interests that, although
not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, are sufficiently im-
plicit within the penumbra of the Constitution to deserve a pro-
tected status.522 The Court has subsumed many of these interests
under what is called the "right to privacy." In due process terms,
the right to privacy means "a right to engage in certain highly per-
sonal activities. 521  A state statute that interferes with an individ-
ual's right to privacy is subject to strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court recognized the right to procreative pri-
vacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.5 28 In Griswold the Court invali-
dated a Connecticut anticontraception statute529 because it inter-
fered with a married individual's right to privacy.530 Although the
Court did not expressly state which provisions of the Constitution
created the right,51 the Court did hold that the right arose from
the "penumbras" and "emanations" of the Bill of Rights.5 3 2 Once
the Supreme Court recognized that the right to privacy is constitu-
tionally protected and decided that statutes infringing upon that
right are subject to strict scrutiny, the Court's next task was to
decide exactly what interests this general right subsumes. One such
interest is a woman's right to choose an abortion.
524. Id. at 418; see Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
525. This two-tier approach of applying either a strict scrutiny or a rational basis test,
although without explicit foundation in the Constitution, is necessary to implement consti-
tutional protections in a rational way. The Constitution should afford citizens greater pro-
tection against state action affecting expressly enumerated freedoms than garden-variety
liberty interests that are not explicitly mentioned, but remain protected under the due pro-
cess clause. See generally, Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
526. See supra notes 359-65 and accompanying text.
527. NOWAK, supra note 520, at 735.
528. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
529. The Connecticut statute read in pertinent part: "Any person who uses any drug,
medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not
less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be
both fined and imprisoned." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-32 (West 1958) (repealed 1971).
530. 381 U.S. at 483-84.
531. The Court found the right to privacy implicit in the Bill of Rights-specifically
the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. 381 U.S. at 484.
532. The right to privacy "emanates" from several amendments. Id. The "penumbras"
are enforceable against the states under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 482. This zone of
privacy encompasses the marriage relationship. Id. at 484-85.
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2. The Recognition of the Right
In Roe v. Wade53 3 the Supreme Court recognized that a wo-
man's liberty interests under the fourteenth amendment include a
right to be free from state interference with her decision to procure
an abortion, except in certain instances. In so holding, the Court
specifically identified the right to privacy as an aspect of the four-
teenth amendment and held that the right to privacy "is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy." 534 Consequently, any state statute that un-
duly burdens this right will be subject to strict scrutiny.
Since Roe, many states have enacted statutes that regulate a
woman's right to have an abortion. 35 Many of these statutes di-
rectly or indirectly regulate the attending physician, often subject-
ing him or her to severe criminal sanctions. 6 In an effort to limit
the number of abortions, states have enacted legislation that inter-
feres with the physician-patient relationship. These statutes may
impose a mandatory process for review of the physician's deci-
sion,537 dictate the information the physician is required to disclose
to a pregnant woman,38 prescribe the method of abortion used, 39
require consent of the woman's parents or spouse,540 or require no-
tification of the parents or spouse. 54' The role of the attending
physician has become a pivotal issue in abortion litigation. Because
these statutes also burden the woman's decision, they have been
strictly scrutinized. The following Sections examine the validity of
these regulations in light of Roe and its progeny and analyze two
recent court of appeals decisions that the Supreme Court is now
considering.
533. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe addressed a challenge by Jane Roe, an unmarried, preg-
nant woman, to the Texas criminal abortion laws. The Texas law made it a crime to admin-
ister or obtain an abortion unless necessary to save the mother's life. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. arts. 4512.1-.4, 4512.6 (Vernon 1976).
534. 410 U.S. at 153.
535. See supra note 515.
536. Id.
537. See infra notes 542-45 and accompanying text.
538. See infra notes 562-65 and 575-87 and accompanying text.
539. See infra notes 598-613 and 620-24 and accompanying text.
540. See infra notes 628-33 and 643-60 and accompanying text.
541. See infra notes 635-41 and 661-75 and accompanying text.
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C. THE ROLE OF THE PHYSICIAN IN THE ABORTION DECISION
1. The Roe Framework
In Roe the Supreme Court severely limited the power of a
state to interfere with the abortion decision. Although the Roe
Court held that the right to an abortion is a fundamental constitu-
tional right, the Court also explicitly rejected the notion that the
right is absolute.5 42 State regulations that do not unduly burden a
woman's procurement of an abortion are valid. State abortion reg-
ulations are not unduly burdensome if they serve a compelling
state interest and are narrowly tied to the implementation of that
interest.543
The Court in Roe identified two compelling state interests: the
interest in the health of the mother and the interest in the poten-
tial life of the fetus.5 44 Because first trimester abortions are gener-
ally safer than childbirth, the state interest in the mother's health
does not become compelling until after the first trimester. 45 The
state interest in the life of the fetus becomes compelling at the
point of "viability."'541 Viability is defined as the point when the
fetus "presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb. '547 The Court indicated that viability occurs ap-
proximately 24-28 weeks after conception.5 4s Regulations proscrib-
ing abortion after viability are thus permissible except when an
542. 410 U.S. at 153.
543. Id. at 153, 155. For a thorough discussion of virtually all abortion cases in the
federal courts through 1979, see L. WARDLE, THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE: A COMPEN-
DIUM AND CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL ABORTION CASES (1980).
544. 410 U.S. at 162-63.
545. Id. at 163.
546. The state interest in the fetus' potential life appears more important because
when this interest becomes compelling-at viability-the state can fully regulate or even
prohibit abortions except when the mother's health is endangered. Conversely, the state's
interest in the woman's health, though arising at an earlier stage in the pregnancy-after
the first trimester-carries with it a narrower scope of permissible state regulation.
Although theoretically the state could prohibit abortions for the sake of maternal
health, the least restrictive alternative requirement (for statutes restricting fundamental
rights) would lead to lesser restrictions. For example, the state might be able to dictate only
the place or method of abortions as opposed to prohibiting abortions altogether.
547. 410 U.S. at 163. Notably, the Court refused to conclude that a fetus was a "per-
son" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 158. If the fetus were a per-
son, an abortion would be murder. This refusal to define a fetus as a person within the
fourteenth amendment does not preclude a finding that the state could still assert an inter-
est in a potential person, that is, a viable fetus.
548. Id. at 160. For a discussion of the relation of medical technology to the definition
of viability, see supra notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
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abortion is necessary to protect the life or health of the mother.5 49
The state, however, must narrowly tailor the regulations to imple-
ment the precise state interest at stake.550
In a summary of its holding, the Court delineated the frame-
work of the Roe decision:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judg-
ment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first tri-
mester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may,
if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably re-
lated to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its inter-
est in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judg-
ment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." 1
After Roe, the physician becomes the pivotal outsider in the
woman's constitutionally protected abortion decision. In particular,
the physician's role is crucial in three distinct situations: the deci-
sion to abort, the determination of when viability occurs, and the
determination of when the pregnancy endangers the mother's
health. The following subsections consider the extent to which the
state can interfere with these three determinations. Significantly,
protection of the woman's right to an abortion has allowed the
physician's role in making these determinations to assume consti-
tutional dimensions.
2. The Decision to Abort the Pregnancy
The Roe framework leaves many important questions unan-
swered, including the question of who decides whether to termi-
nate the pregnancy. The Court initially identified the decision of
549. Id. at 163-64.
550. Id. at 165.
551. Id. at 164-65. The Court's decision in Roe has been severely criticized. In his
dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the woman's abortion decision was not a fundamen-
tal right. Consequently, the Court need only examine state interference with the decision
according to the deferential rational basis test. Id. at 172-73.
Many commentators have greeted Roe with negative reactions. The main criticism of
the decision is that it revives the substantive due process doctrine in which the Court sub-
stitutes its own opinion for that of the state legislatures. A leading observer has noted that
"[w]hat is frightening about Roe is that this super-protected right is not inferable from the
language of the Constitution." Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935-36 (1973); see also Morgan, Roe v. Wade and the Lesson of the
Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (1979); but see Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972
Term, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1973).
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whether to abort as the woman's decision.55 2 This determination is
the necessary corollary of the determination that it is the woman's
right of privacy that the Constitution protects. Other language in
the Roe opinion, however, interjects the physician into the deci-
sionmaking process: "Up to [viability], the abortion decision in all
its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and ba-
sic responsibility for it must rest with the physician."55 3 The Roe
decision, therefore, left unclear exactly whose decision the Consti-
tution protected from state interference.
A related question that Roe left unanswered was to what ex-
tent state regulation that interfered with the physician's role in the
decision to abort the pregnancy was permissible. Arguably, as long
as the woman makes the abortion decision, and as long as the state
does not hinder the woman's access to a physician, the state is
complying with Roe 5 4 Language in Roe, however, implies that the
Constitution also protects the physician's role.555 The strict holding
of Roe is that state regulations must not unduly burden the wo-
man's right to an abortion. Later cases, however, demonstrate that
if regulations limiting the physician's freedom actually restrict the
woman's access to an abortion, those restrictions are invalid.5
In the companion case to Roe, Doe v. Bolton,557 the Court ad-
dressed several questions concerning permissible regulation of phy-
sicians. In Doe the Court examined a Georgia criminal abortion
statute that required, among other things, that a hospital abortion
committee approve the abortion procedure and that two other
552. 410 U.S. at 153. For additional indication that the woman is the party primarily
concerned in the abortion decision, see the language in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 60 (1976).
553. 410 U.S. at 166.
554. The physician has no constitutional "right to abort." However, state legislation
that interferes with the physician's role also interferes with the woman's ability to secure an
abortion. Regulation of the physician thus indirectly interferes with the woman's rights.
State regulation of the physician within this context, therefore, is impermissible.
555. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
556. See cases cited supra note 517.
A physician would, of course, have standing to challenge an abortion statute placing
criminal penalties on physicians. Typically, physicians challenge these statutes on grounds
of vagueness. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983) (statute so vague it provides insufficient notice). The question arises about how a
physician can challenge an abortion statute on substantive Roe grounds. Allowing a physi-
cian to challenge such a statute would appear to violate the standing requirements that
prohibit a plaintiff from asserting the rights of others. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975). In cases such as Akron, however, the Supreme Court has allowed the plaintiff physi-
cians or abortion clinics to attack directly the merits of the abortion law.
557. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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physicians confirm the attending physician's determination. 5 s The
Court held that these provisions were unconstitutional under Roe
because they severely burdened the woman's privacy right and un-
duly interfered with the judgment of the attending physician.559
The Court's decision in Roe thus reaffirmed the crucial role of
the physician in the abortion decision. Although the state has a
compelling interest in the woman's health under Roe, the attend-
ing physician is in the best position to determine when an abortion
is necessary. The Court enumerated those factors relevant to the
patient's well-being-physical, emotional, psychological, familial,
and age-that a physician could consider in exercising his medical
judgment. The Court reasoned that consideration of these health-
related factors allowed the attending physician room to make the
best medical judgment.56 0
Thus, the Roe and Doe decisions essentially create a team ap-
proach to the abortion decision. The woman, in consultation with
her attending physician, decides whether to abort the pregnancy.
The state, with its interests in the life of the fetus and the health
of the woman, seemingly is relegated to postviability regulation.
Many states, however, have not accepted this interpretation and
have enacted statutes regulating previability, as well as
postviability, abortions.56'
Informed consent provisions are among the many intricate
post-Roe regulations that states have imposed on the abortion de-
cision."2 These provisions require the physician to inform the
pregnant woman of various facts that the state legislature, rather
than the physician, deems important.5 63 Although some states' tort
laws impose on all physicians a general duty to disclose,564 the in-
formed consent abortion statutes often require disclosure of infor-
mation beyond that necessary to educate the woman. More funda-
mentally, the statutes intrude into the traditional domain of the
558. See, GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(5) (1972) (repealed 1973). The Georgia statute was
modeled after the MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 26-1201 to -03 (1972) (repealed 1973).
559. 410 U.S. at 197-98.
560. Id. at 192.
561. See supra note 516.
562. Typically such provisions are, in effect, tantamount to the informed consent re-
quired under the common law.
563. See infra notes 566-85 and accompanying text.
564. See, e.g., Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital, 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186
(1958); Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966); Belcher v. Carter, 13 Ohio App.
2d 113, 234 N.E.2d 311 (1967).
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physician by removing his discretion to determine what informa-
tion should be disclosed. Apparently, courts determine the dividing
line between permissible and impermissible informed consent pro-
visions by the effect the provision will have on the physician's
discretion.565
In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,561 the Supreme Court up-
held a Missouri abortion statute5 67 that required, among other
things, a written certification of the woman's consent to the abor-
tion. Rejecting the contention that the statute imposed an extra
burden on the woman, the Court reasoned that because the deci-
sion to abort is important and often stressful, it is desirable and
imperative that the woman make the decision with full knowledge
of its nature and consequences.568 The state may constitutionally
assure the woman's awareness of the decision and its significance
by requiring her prior written approval .56  The Court recognized
that Missouri did not require the consent regulation for other
types of surgery, yet determined that such selectivity was permissi-
ble because of the special nature of the abortion decision.7
A possible reading of Danforth-that states are relatively free
to interject consent requirements into the physician-patient rela-
tionship-proves incorrect because the proper focus is on the ex-
tent of the burden that the consent requirement imposes. In Roe
the Court held that it would impose strict judicial scrutiny only
when a regulation "unduly burdens" the woman's decision. 71 Be-
cause the Court found the burden in Danforth relatively insub-
stantial, the Court employed the more deferential "rational basis"
test.57 2 The Court warned, however, that if a consent requirement,
or any other abortion regulation, becomes "an undesired and un-
comfortable straitjacket"573 on the physician, the statute must sur-
vive strict scrutiny.574
This "straitjacket" of unduly restrictive consent requirements
565. See generally infra section VIII of this Special Project.
566. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
567. House Bill 1211, 1974 Missouri Laws (reprinted at 428 U.S. at 84).
568. 428 U.S. at 67.
569. Id.
570. Id. at 65-67.
571. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156. See also, Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (an
abortion regulation is unconstitutional if it unduly burdens a woman's right to seek an
abortion).
572. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977). See generally WARDLE, supra note 543, at
573. 428 U.S. at 67 n.8.
574. Id.
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appeared in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health,7 5 in which an abortion clinic challenged a city ordinance
requiring the attending physician to inform the woman of a num-
ber of facts, only some of which directly concerned her abortion.5 78
The Court invalidated the ordinance and reiterated the overriding
principle that the validity of a requirement such as informed con-
sent depends on the state's interest in protecting the health of the
pregnant woman. 7 Although Danforth had recognized the validity
of general informed consent provisions, the Akron Court asserted
that the physicians had the responsibility to ensure that they con-
vey appropriate information to their patients based on their pa-
tients' particular circumstances. 7 8 Accordingly, a state regulation
is impermissible if it becomes overly specific regarding the infor-
mation a physician conveys.
One concern of the Court when evaluating informed consent
requirements is the depth of intrusion into the physician's domain.
The Akron Court did note that a state may require the physician
to inform the patient about the physical and emotional implica-
tions of having an abortion.7 9 Yet the state cannot impose obsta-
cles in the physician's path by requiring, him or her to convey a
lengthy and inflexible list of information.5 80 The Court, however,
has provided little guidance beyond these general parameters. In
practice these parameters will be difficult to apply consistently, es-
pecially when state statutes require detailed and specific disclo-
sures that relate to the state's legitimate interest in maternal
health.
The Akron Court also was concerned with the state's motiva-
tion for requiring disclosure of certain information. Although the
state has an interest in ensuring that the woman make the abor-
tion decision with full knowledge, this interest does "not justify
abortion regulations designed to influence the woman's informed
575. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
576. Id. at 442. The statute required disclosure of "the status of her pregnancy, the
development of her fetus, the date of possible viability, the physical and emotional compli-
cations that may result from an abortion, and the availability of agencies to provide her
with assistance and information with respect to birth control, adoption, and childbirth." Id.
577. Id.
578. Id. at 443.
579. Id. at 445. "Consistent with its interest in ensuring informed consent, a State
may require that a physician make certain that his patient understands the physical and
emotional implications of having an abortion." Id.
580. Id.
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choice between abortion or childbirth. '581 Thus, the Akron deci-
sion indicates that the Court will not uphold informed consent re-
quirements, as well as other abortion regulations, if they either
overly intrude into the physician's domain or seek to influence the
woman to reconsider her abortion decision. The Court found an-
other provision of the Akron statute, which required the attending
physician to inform the woman of the risks of the particular abor-
tion procedure 5 2 as well as any other information that he believes
is relevant to her decision,5 3 to be clearly related to the state's
legitimate interests in requiring informed consent.5 8 4 The Court
struck down the provision, however, because it required the physi-
cian to personally inform the patient, rather than permitting his
assistant to do it.58
3. The Determination of Viability
In Roe the Court identified "viability" as the point at which
the state's interest in the fetus becomes compelling. The state's
other legitimate interest, the health of the mother, becomes com-
pelling at the beginning of the second trimester. Because these two
interests have different justifications, they arise at different points
in the pregnancy. 8e
The state's interest in a fetus becomes compelling at viability
because at that point the fetus "presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb. 5 8 7 To protect this
compelling interest, the state may regulate or even prohibit abor-
tions, except when an abortion is necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother.5 88 The establishment of viability as the oper-
ative point in abortion regulation has given rise to a host of legal
questions. Two principal questions arise. First, when does viability
581. Id. at 443-44 (emphasis added).
582. For a discussion of the various abortion procedures and accompanying risks, see
infra notes 639-56 and accompanying text.
583. Id. at 449; see id. at 446 for the full text of the provision.
584. Id. at 446.
585. A statute found not unduly burdensome would be subject to the more accommo-
dating rational basis test.
586. The state's interest in the potential life of the fetus arises when the fetus is capa-
ble of life independent of the mother. The Roe Court identified this point as arising at 24-28
weeks. The state's interest in the health of the mother becomes compelling at the point
when abortion is more dangerous to the mother than childbirth. This point occurs, accord-
ing to the Roe Court, at approximately the end of the first trimester. See supra notes 544-49
and accompanying text.
587. 410 U.S. at 163.
588. Id. at 163-64.
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occur? Second, who decides when viability occurs?
The Court's deference to the medical judgment of the attend-
ing physician indicates that the answers to these two questions es-
sentially converge; viability occurs when the physician says so. Al-
though the Court in Roe did not define the exact point at which
viability occurs, the Court did provide limited guidance. The Court
stated that the medical and scientific community considers a fetus
viable if it is potentially capable of living outside the mother's
womb, even with artificial aid.58 The fetus must be capable of
meaningful life. In a later opinion, the Court asserted that mean-
ingful life means more than mere momentary survival.5 90
The Court reported that the medical community usually
places viability at seven months, or 28 weeks, although viability
may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.59 ' The Court's data, however,
reflects the judgment of the medical community in 1973. As medi-
cal technology advances, the point of viability is pushed further
back toward conception.592 The Court's trimester approach thus
becomes an outmoded concept as the viability determination is
tied to advancing medical technology.193 This realization strength-
ens the argument that each attending physician should make the
viability determination. Because viability is a medical phenome-
non, it changes constantly as technology advances. In addition, via-
bility depends inevitably on the particular circumstances of each
case. These factors are best known and weighed by the attending
physician, thus compelling the conclusion that the attending physi-
cian should make the viability decision. The current situation,
589. Id. at 160; see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979) (quoting Roe,
410 U.S. at 160).
590. See, Colautti, 439 U.S. at 387.
591. 410 U.S. at 160.
592. This dynamic notion of viability led Justice O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion
in City of Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) to assert
that:
The Roe framework ... is clearly on a collision course with itself. As the medical risks
of various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the State may regulate for
reasons of maternal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth. As medical
science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point
of viability is moved further back toward conception ....
[Thus] that framework is clearly an unworkable means of balancing the fundamental
right and the compelling state interests that are indisputably implicated.
Id. at 458-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
593. See generally, Note, Demise of the Trimester Approach? City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 23 J. FAM. L. 267 (1985).
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however, creates the irony that the state can prosecute physicians
for postviability abortions, but the physician is the party most ca-
pable of deciding when viability occurs. The Court has never recog-
nized this irony although it has concluded that the physician
should determine viability.
In Roe the Court did discuss the attending physician's deci-
sionmaking role up to the point of the viability decision:
[This] decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical
treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where im-
portant state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up
to these points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and pri-
marily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the
physician.' 4
Although this passage implies that the physician plays the pivotal
outside role in the abortion decision, the Court merely identified
the physician as the person best qualified to make medical deci-
sions about the pregnancy. By deferring to the physician's exper-
tise only up to the point of viability, the Court stopped short of
making the physician the determiner of viability.
In Danforth the Court filled this void left by Roe by clearly
establishing the attending physician's role as the determiner of via-
bility. Recognizing that viability is essentially a medical concept
and may vary with each pregnancy, the Court stated the determi-
nation of whether a particular fetus is viable must be a matter for
the judgment of the attending physician 95 This assertion, which is
clearly an expansion of Roe, could be construed as an additional
limitation on state regulation. If the viability determination is
solely that of the physician, then any state regulation attempting
to define viability would be impermissible. The Danforth Court,
however, did not go this far. Although the Court did leave the ac-
tual determination of viability to the physician, Danforth did not
totally foreclose state legislation from defining viability.596
A dilemma remains after Roe and Danforth. If the state has a
legitimate interest in protecting the life of a "viable" fetus, which
the state clearly does under Roe, how can the state protect this
594. 410 U.S. at 165-66 (emphasis added).
595. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 64. The Court stated expressly that "it [was] not the
proper function of the legislature or the courts to place viability, which essentially is a medi-
cal concept, at a specific point in the gestation period." Id.
596. The Court actually upheld the Missouri provision defining viability "as 'that
stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely
outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems.'" Id. at 63 (quoting § 2(2)
of the Missouri abortion legislation, reprinted at 428 U.S. at 84).
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interest if the state, on its own, cannot identify when viability oc-
curs? Perhaps the answer lies in the Court's unexpressed conclu-
sion that the state's interest is not nearly as great as the woman's
interest. If the Court gives the state too much power to regulate
the viability decision, the result may be that women are unable to
exercise their right to an abortion. The threat of prosecution may
deter a physician who is otherwise willing to perform an abortion
on what he considers to be a nonviable fetus. Consequently, the
state's binding determination concerning viability would penalize
the woman.597
In Colautti v. Franklin598 the Court attempted to clarify the
scope of permissible postviability regulation, but actually confused
the issue.5 99 In Colautti the Court invalidated the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act,600 which placed broad restrictions on abor-
tions and imposed criminal liability on noncomplying physicians.601
The Pennsylvania legislature had seized upon the language in Roe
which indicated that a state may prohibit abortions when the fetus
is "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with
artificial aid. '60 2 Based on this language, the legislature felt justi-
fied in imposing criminal liability on a physician who failed to use
the statutorily prescribed abortion technique when the fetus was
viable or when there was sufficient reason to believe that the fetus
may be viable.6 03 The Pennsylvania act, therefore, confronted the
Court with the conflict it had created in Roe and Danforth-the
state's power to protect its interest in the fetus through criminal
legislation versus the physician's freedom to treat his patient as he
597. A state is always free to prohibit abortions after viability. The question here is
when viability occurs. Of course, the state need not enact any abortion legislation at all.
598. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
599. See NOWAK, supra note 520, at 747-50.
600. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977) (repealed 1982).
601. The Act reads in pertinent part:
(a) Every person who performs or induces an abortion shall prior thereto have made a
determination based on his experience, judgment or professional competence that the
fetus is not viable, and if the determination is that the fetus is viable or if there is
sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable, shall exercise that degree of
professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus which
such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of
any fetus intended to be born and not aborted and the abortion technique employed
shall be that which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive
so long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or
health of the mother.
Id.
602. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160.
603. See supra note 601.
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sees fit and the woman's right to receive unencumbered medical
treatment.
The Court, after restating its earlier holdings concerning via-
bility and noting that no decisions have upheld state attempts to
stretch the time of viability in one direction or the other,0 4 found
the Pennsylvania statute impermissibly vague.60 The Court fo-
cused on the section of the statute that required the physician to
conform to a prescribed standard of care. Because the statute con-
ditioned potential criminal liability on confusing and ambiguous
criteria and did not give broad discretion to the attending physi-
cian, the Court concluded that the statute had a "chilling effect on
the exercise of constitutional rights. '60 6 The Colautti Court found
that the statute's sanctions for an abortion performed when there
is sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable were
unjustified.6 07 Because it was unclear whether the statute imposed
a subjective or objective criterion, the provision regarding who may
determine the fetus' potential viability was ambiguous. 08 Thus,
the statute, as construed by the Court, improperly attempted to
impose criminal liability without fault.6 09
The state argued, and the dissent agreed, 10 that no prosecu-
tion would occur under the statute when the physician made a
604. 439 U.S. at 389.
605. Id. at 390. ("We agree. . . that the viability-determination requirement of § 5(a)
is ambiguous, and that its uncertainty is aggravated by the absence of a scienter require-
ment with respect to the finding of viability.").
606. Id. at 394. Interestingly, the Court makes reference to the physician's "constitu-
tional rights." The Court, however, does not elaborate. Because the Court was speaking in
the context of the lack of notice provided by the statute, the physician's due process rights
are apparently the rights that are chilled. However, the use of "exercise" here implies that
the Court is referring to the physician's abortion role because to speak of the exercise of the
right to notice under a statute would seem odd. Consequently, apparently either a) the phy-
sician has a constitutionally recognized "right to abort" or b) the physician can somehow
"exercise" the woman's right to an abortion. Neither proposition has been recognized explic-
itly and neither has any logical foundation. Yet one of the propositions must be true in
order for the Court's statements in Colautt! to have any meaning.
607. Id. at 391.
608. The provision was ambiguous about whether there must be "sufficient reason"
from the perspective of the judgment, skill, and training of the attending physician, or
whether there must be "sufficient reason" from from the perspective of a cross section of the
medical community or a panel of experts. Id.
609. The Court noted that as a matter of due process, a criminal statute is void for
vagueness when it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that the conduct
contemplated is forbidden or when the statute is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary
and erratic convictions. Id. at 390.
610. Id. at 407-08 (White, J., dissenting).
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mistake about whether or not a fetus was viable. 1' This admission
by the state renders the majority's holding inconsistent. One can
only conclude that the majority either did not believe the statQ's
assertion-in which case the Court should have ordered absten-
tion, thus allowing the state courts to interpret the statute612 -or
that the majority was consciously expanding the physician's role
by prohibiting state regulation of a "potentially" viable fetus. Jus-
tice White commented in dissent that the Court appeared to be
tacitly disavowing the "potential ability to live outside the
mother's womb" component of viability described in Roe. Justice
White viewed this attitude as an additional constitutionally unwar-
ranted intrusion on the states' police powers. 13
Although the Colautti Court purported to be merely restating
the crucial role of the attending physician, the decision actually
lessened the states' power to protect their recognized interest in a
viable fetus and correspondingly increased the physician's power to
decide whether to perform an abortion. The state apparently may
not enumerate the elements making up the viability determination.
What role the state can play remains unclear after Colautti. Some
commentators, however, read Colautti as indicating that a state
can write only a general statute prohibiting abortions after viabil-
ity and hope that physicians will not abort a viable fetus. 14 If this
reading is accurate, then the state's compelling interest in protect-
ing a viable fetus is form without substance.
4. The Determination of Danger to Maternal Health
In Roe the Court identified protection of the mother's health
as a legitimate state interest. 15 The Court, however, created a con-
611. Id. at 407.
612. Abstention is a judicially created doctrine that allows a federal court to remand a
case to the state courts when an interpretation of an unclear state statute may avoid a
constitutional issue. See Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Gener-
ally, the plaintiff can reserve his federal questions in state court and have the federal court
decide them if the case returns to federal court. See England v. Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). See generally, Field, Abstention in Constitutional
Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. P& L. REv. 1071 (1974).
613. 439 U.S. at 406-07 (White, J., dissenting).
614. See NOWAK, supra note 520, at 749.
615. Because first trimester abortions are safer than childbirth, the Court held that
the Constitution virtually precludes states from regulating first trimester abortions. See Del-
lapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality and Law, 40 U. Pirr. L. REV. 359,
413-14 (1979). The states may regulate first trimester abortions only if the regulations "have
no significant impact on the woman's abortion right" and are "justified by important state
health objectives." Akron, 462 U.S. at 430. After the first trimester, the state may regulate
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flict by also identifying protection of the viable fetus as a legiti-
mate interest. This conflict between fetal and maternal rights
poses the question of defining the scope of permissible state regu-
lation of abortion of a viable fetus when the mother's health is en-
dangered. The Court answered this question by allowing an excep-
tion that permits an abortion of a viable fetus when the abortion is
necessary to protect the life and health of the mother. 1
In allowing this exception, however, the Court created another
question: when is the mother's health in jeopardy, and who makes
this decision? Although Roe left this question unanswered, the
Court in Doe concluded that the attending physician should make
the medical determination of maternal health in the light of all
factors relevant to the patient's well-being.617 This language effec-
tively leaves the health determination to the physician and
removes whatever state power might have been left after Roe. Af-
ter Doe, if the physician determines that an abortion is necessary,
even in the last week of pregnancy, the state apparently is pre-
cluded from intervening. 8
In response to the latitude given to physicians after Roe and
Doe, many states enacted regulations proscribing abortions of a vi-
able fetus, or prescribing the required 'method of abortion, even
though the pregnancy could result in harm to the mother. Typi-
cally these regulations merely forbid postviability abortions and
impose criminal penalties.1 9 Problems arise, however, when these
provisions call for a trade-off between the health of the mother and
the life of the fetus.
A "trade-off" conflict between the mother's health and the fe-
tus' life was present in Colautti when the Pennsylvania statute re-
quired the physician to employ the abortion technique that pro-
vided for the greatest opportunity for fetal survival unless a
different method would be necessary to preserve the life or health
of the mother.62 0 The plaintiffs attacked this provision because it
the abortion procedure only to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to preserv-
ing and protecting the mother's health. Id.
616. 410 U.S. at 163-64.
617. Doe, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
618. See generally, Note, Hospitalization Requirements for Second Trimester Abor-
tions: For the Purpose of Health or Hindrance?, 71 GEO. L. J. 991 (1983).
619. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35,
§ 6605(a) (Purdon 1977) (repealed 1982).
620. 439 U.S. 379, 397 (1979). The Pennsylvania statute required the physician to:
exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and
health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted and the abortion technique
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prohibited the widely used saline amnio-infusion method of abor-
tion.62 1 Although saline solution is the method of abortion chosen
most often by physicians because of the method's safety value, it is
also nearly always fatal to the fetus. 22 The alternate abortion
methods that were available under the statute increased the likeli-
hood of fetal survival 23 These methods, however, also increased
the health problems for the mother.2 4
The Court found that the statute's failure to provide that the
mother's health prevail over the fetus' survival rendered the stat-
ute unconstitutional. Because the statute only required a safer
technique when it was "necessary" to protect the mother's health,
with the implication that lack of a necessity was insufficient, the
statute impermissibly burdened the mother's right and intruded
into the physician's protected domain.6 25 Because "necessary" is a
vague guideline for the imposition of criminal sanctions, the stat-
ute gave the physician insufficient notice of his potential criminal
liability. The Court concluded that the statute would ultimately
hinder the woman in her effort to find a willing physician. 26
After Colautti a state apparently cannot subject the physician
to criminal penalties if the physician reasonably concludes an
abortion is necessary to protect the life or health of the mother.
Accordingly, any provision regulating postviability abortions must
not overly intrude on the physician's ability to perform an abortion
when he or she concludes it is necessary to protect the mother's
health. The Court has yet to make clear exactly what type and
degree of threat to maternal health gives rise to the exception.
The question also remains concerning how much of a trade-off
between the mother's health and the fetus' survival is permissible.
employed shall be that which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be
aborted alive so long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to pre-
serve the life or health of the mother.
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 35, § 6605(a)(Purdon 1977) (repealed 1982).
621. Saline abortion involves injecting a saline solution into the amniotic fluid which
burns the fetus. Labor is then induced to expell the dead or injured fetus. See infra text
following note 644.
622. 439 U.S. at 398.
623. Id. at 398-99.
624. Id. The Court noted that "it is uncertain whether the statute permits the physi-
cian to consider his duty to the patient to be paramount to his duty to the fetus, or whether
it requires the physician to make a 'trade-off' between the woman's health and additional
percentage points of fetal survival." Id. at 400. The Court held only that when conflicting
duties of this magnitude are concerned, a state must be more precise before it can subject a
physician to possible criminal sanctions. Id. at 401.
625. Id.
626. Id.
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Language in Doe indicates that the physician must make the
health determination in light of all factors, including the woman's
emotional well-being. Given this approach, the Colautti opinion
leaves open the possibility that a physician could abort an eight-
month fetus because childbirth might be too emotionally wrench-
ing for the mother or because the mother might suffer temporary
or minor medical complications. Seemingly, a relatively minor
health problem should not defeat the state's interest in the fetus.
Yet the question is more than just one of degree. Any statute that
forces a trade-off between the woman and the fetus will invariably
intrude into the recognized domain of the physician. The Court
has not upheld any such intrusion. Consequently, with the mater-
nal health determination, as well as with the viability determina-
tion, the ultimate decision is that of the physician rather than the
state.
D. INDIRECT REGULATION OF THE PHYSICIAN: THIRD PARTY
CONSENT OR NOTIFICATION STATUTES
Under Roe and its progeny, the abortion decision is primarily
the concern of the woman in consultation with her physician. The
physician's role itself has acquired constitutional protection, al-
though this protection apparently arises from the woman's consti-
tutional right of privacy.62 7 In an attempt to regulate abortions,
states have interfered with the physician by direct regulation of his
practice. In a conceptually distinct, although practically similar,
manner states also have interfered with the abortion process by
interjecting various third parties. Typically such provisions require
the physician either to notify a parent or spouse of the abortion or
to obtain their consent before performing the abortion.
1. The Spouse as Third Party
Although the male partner contributes equally to the preg-
nancy, his subsequent legal rights are minimal. The woman's au-
tonomy and constitutional rights are not diminished when she and
the father are married. Some states, in an attempt to hinder the
woman's abortion decision, have attempted to interject the male
into the decision process when he and the woman are married.
These states require the physician either to notify the husband of
the abortion or to obtain his consent, or both. Generally these at-
627. See supra note 606.
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tempts have failed, particularly when the states require consent.62 8
Arguably, the spouse has a real interest in the decision to
abort. Besides the obvious emotional and familial ties, the state
may legally obligate the male to support the child even though he
may have desired that the mother procure an abortion. Similarly,
he may fervently desire that the child be born and yet have no role
in the decision to abort. Although these interests are strong, they
do not justify state delegation of power to the spouse to defeat a
woman's fundamental constitutional right.
(a) Spousal Consent Statutes
In Danforth629 the Supreme Court struck down a provision of
the Missouri abortion statute 30 that required the spouse's prior
written consent before a woman could have her pregnancy aborted.
The State argued that the provision merely implemented its legiti-
mate interest in the institution of marriage.631 The Court held that
the state may not constitutionally require spousal consent as a
condition for abortion during the first trimester. 32 This conclusion
is a logical corollary of Roe, which said that because the state has
no authority to regulate or proscribe abortion during the first tri-
mester when the decision belongs to the physician and the woman,
the state cannot delegate that authority to any other person, even
the spouse.633 Consequently, the Court has established that states
may not require spousal consent.
(b) Spousal Notification Statutes
The question remains whether spousal notification statutes are
constitutional. To date, only one lower court has considered the
question. In Schienberg v. Smith 34 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a Florida spousal notification
provision. 3 The State justified the requirement by emphasizing
628. See generally Note, Spousal Notification: An Unconstitutional Limitation on a
Woman's Right to Privacy in the Abortion Decision, 12 HOFSTPA L. REV. 531 (1984).
629. 428 U.S. 52.
630. Section 3(3) of House Bill No. 1211, 1974 Missouri Laws reprinted at 428 U.S. at
85.
631. 428 U.S. at 68.
632. Id. at 69.
633. Id.
634. 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981).
635. FL.& STAT. ANN. § 390.001(4)(b) (West 1981). The provision required "a married
woman presently living with her spouse to notify her husband of her intent to terminate her
pregnancy and to provide him with the opportunity to consult with her concerning the abor-
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the state's interest in the marital relationship and the husband's
interest in procreation.6 36 The Fifth Circuit agreed, holding that
the state's interest in marriage justifies the burden imposed on the
woman's abortion decision. The court reached this decision by re-
lying on "the basic values that underlie our society. ' 637 The court
distinguished Danforth, which rejected a spousal consent stat-
ute.6 38 The parties did not challenge a notification provision in
Danforth, and, therefore, that case should not be cited as authority
for the validity of notification provisions.
The Fifth Circuit found the state's interest in the marriage
compelling, noting that the Supreme Court has traditionally recog-
nized the crucial role of the marriage relationship in society. The
court found that this interest justifies the burden it imposes on the
woman. This conclusion, however, is unacceptable in light of Su-
preme Court decisions holding that state interference with first tri-
mester abortions must be related to maternal health. Because the
State's justification in Schienberg was its interest in marriage, not
maternal health, the case arguably is wrongly decided. 639
A notification statute may be permissible only if it does not
"unduly burden" the woman's abortion decision. A statute that did
not impose an undue burden would survive the rational basis test.
Scenarios could arise, however, in which spousal notification will
unduly burden the woman's decision to abort. As the district court
in Schienberg noted,640 spousal notification could result in physical
and mental abuse of the woman. Given the traditionally dominant
role of the husband, the male's opinion could well be outcome-de-
terminative. This situation could severely burden the woman's
constitutionally protected right to decide whether to terminate her
pregnancy.64 1
tion procedure." 659 F.2d at 482.
636. 659 F.2d at 483.
637. Id. at 484 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
638. 659 F.2d at 484-85.
639. For another commentator's conclusion that Schienberg was wrongly decided, see
Werth, Spousal Notification and the Right of Privacy, 59 CHi.[-]KENT L. REv. 1129, 1145-50
(1984).
640. 482 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979) aff'd in part vacated in part 659 F.2d 476 (5th
Cir. 1981).
641. Id. at 538. The district court noted:
Specific instances where a woman might desire or choose not to communicate with her
husband concerning an impending termination of pregnancy include:
1) where the husband is not the father of the fetus; for instance, where the fetus is
the product of an extramarital affair;
2) where the wife has been a rape victim, has not disclosed the incident to her
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2. The Parent as Third Party
(a) Parental Consent Statutes
When the pregnant woman is an unmarried minor, her parents
may have an interest in the decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy. States have attempted to protect this parental in-
terest by passing statutes requiring the parent's consent before the
minor can have -an abortion.642
Roe did not answer the question of whether the traditional le-
gal differentiation between minors and adults extends to abortion
law. Arguably, because abortion is a fundamental right and be-
cause minors enjoy the same constitutional protections as adults, 43
courts should fully protect minors from state interference. The Su-
preme Court, however, has not so held.
In Danforth the Court invalidated a Missouri parental consent
provision. The Court held that a state cannot impose a blanket
consent provision because this type of a provision constitutes a
delegation of a power that the state does not possess.6 44 The Court,
however, acknowledged that a state's regulatory authority over
children is broader than the state's authority over adults. 4 5 Al-
though the state asserted a compelling interest in maintenance of
the family unit as a justification for the blanket consent require-
ment, the Court responded that the statute's parental veto would
not further that interest. '46 The Court found that the statute was
husband, and has subsequently become pregnant;
3) where the husband,because of strong religious or moral precepts, would stre-
nously object;
4) where the husband is seriously ill or emotionally unstable and is unable to par-
ticipate in an abortion decision; and
5) where the woman is a "battered wife" and fears that discussion concerning an
abortion may precipitate physical violence.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The district court's list is not exhaustive. For example, a woman might choose not to
communicate with her husband concerning an impending termination of pregnancy if the
marriage was unstable and the wife was contemplating divorce.
642. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40: 12.35, 35.5 (West Supp. 1980) (requiring pa-
rental notice for all unmarried women under 18 years old); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343.2(a)
(West 1984) (requiring 48-hour parental notice); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-202(f) (1982) (re-
quiring parental notice for minors under 18 years of age).
643. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. The Danforth Court applied the same reasoning to
Missouri's spousal consent provision. See supra text accompanying notes 629-32.
644. 428 U.S. at 74.
645. Id. at 74-75.
646. Id. at 75. The Court stated:
It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a parent with absolute power to
overrule a determination, made by the physician and his minor patient, to terminate
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overly broad and, therefore, unconstitutional.
In Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II)647 the Court readdressed the
issue of state parental consent statutes. The Court sustained a
challenge to a Massachusetts law that regulated minors' access to
abortions and attempted to define the permissible scope of such
regulations. The Massachusetts statute required an unmarried
pregnant minor under the age of eighteen to obtain the consent of
both parents before she could obtain an abortion. 4 8 The Supreme
Court first compared the constitutional rights of children to those
of adults. The Court noted that although the Constitution protects
children, the rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults . 49 The Court cited three reasons for this difference in treat-
ment: (1) the peculiar vulnerability of the child; (2) the relative
inability of the child to make a mature, informed decision; and (3)
the importance of the parental role in the childbearing process.1 0
The Court concluded that the state may adjust its legal system to
take into account children's vulnerability5 1 and recognized the
need for states to defer to parental control.652 The Court inter-
jected a vague caveat to this holding: because of the unique nature
of the minor's decision to obtain an abortion, 5 ' states must act
with "particular sensitivity" when attempting to involve parents in
the process. 54
Turning its attention to the statute in question, the Court re-
iterated the Danforth requirement that states cannot impose blan-
the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither is it likely that
such veto power will enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the
nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the
pregnancy already has fractured the family structure. Any independent interest the
parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more
weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have be-
come pregnant.
Id.
647. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). In Bellotti 1, 428 U.S. 132 (1976), the Court ordered the
district court that had originally tried the case to abstain and send the case to the state
courts for an interpretation of the statute. Bellotti II is the opinion of the case after it had
worked its way back up to the Supreme Court.
648. Id. at 625,
649. Id. at 633-34.
650. Id. at 634.
651. Id. at 635.
652. Id. at 637-38.
653. Id. at 642. In distinguishing the abortion decision from other situations in which
parental consent is required before the minor may act-for example, the decision to
marry-the Court emphasized the "grave and indelible" consequences of unwanted mother-
hood and the impossibility of postponing the decision.
654. Id. at 642.
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ket parental consent requirements in the first twelve weeks of
pregnancy. 655 The Court chose not to forbid all consent require-
ments and held instead that the state must provide an alternative
procedure to obtain authorization for the abortion. 56 The alterna-
tive procedure for obtaining authorization must ensure that an ab-
solute veto power is unavailable to the parent.57 The Court then
delineated an alternative procedure in which a pregnant minor can
obtain judicial approval for an abortion without requiring parental
notification or consent. Judicial approval for the abortion must be
given if the minor can show either that she is sufficiently mature
and informed to make the decision or that the abortion is in her
best interests. 8 The Court found that the Massachusetts statute
fell short of this requirement. Although the statute provided an
alternative procedure for obtaining authorization, the procedure
was deficient because it permitted judicial approval to be withheld
from a mature and competent minor, and because it required pa-
rental consultation or notification in each case.6 59 By refusing to
prohibit all requirements of parental consent, however, the Court
in Bellotti 1I allowed the state to delegate authority to the parent
that the state did not possess, and, thus, expanded the state's
power to restrict teenage abortions.6
(b) Parental Notification Statutes
In H. L. v. Matheson""' the Court significantly extended the
scope of state control over teen-age abortions by upholding the
Utah parental notification statute. In Matheson a fifteen-year-old
girl challenged the constitutionality of a Utah statute that required
the physician to notify the parents or guardian of a minor upon
whom an abortion was to be performed. 62 Although a majority of
655. Id. at 643.
656. Id.
657. Id.
658. Id. at 644.
659. Id. at 651.
660. Danforth expressly held that states cannot delegate a power that they do not
possess. See supra text accompanying note 643. Because states, prior to Bellotti II, could
not restrict immature minors' access to abortions, the result in Bellotti II was a clear expan-
sion of state power.
661. 450 U.S. 398 (1980).
662. Id. at 400. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1978) provides:
To enable the physician to exercise his best medical judgment [in considering a
possible abortion] he shall:
(1) Consider all factors relevant to the well-being of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed included, but not limited to,
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the Court could not agree on a rationale for upholding the law, a
plurality found the statute imposed burdens that were sufficiently
tailored to the state's legitimate interest in the welfare of the
minor.6 3
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger distinguished the
Utah statute from the Massachusetts statute invalidated in Bel-
lotti 11.664 Whereas the Massachusetts statute in Bellotti II had
required parental consent for abortions performed on mature mi-
nors, the Utah statute required only parental notification. The
Court quoted a concurring opinion in Danforth which stated that
the state furthers a constitutionally permissible end when it en-
courages an unmarried minor to seek the help and advice of her
parents in deciding whether to terminate her pregnancy.6 65
The Court also relied on language in earlier decisions recogniz-
ing the parents' constitutional right to direct the rearing of their
children in their own household.6 The Bellotti II Court's concern
that parental consent could effectively preclude an abortion deci-
sion by a mature minor apparently is not present when the state
only requires parental notification. To the contrary, the Court
found that the Utah statute furthered the important state interests
of family integrity and adolescent protection because the statute
applied to immature and dependent minors.6 The plurality, how-
ever, virtually ignored the extent of the burden that such a statute
places on the minor's constitutional right to an abortion.
In his concurrence, Justice Powell, along with Justice Stewart,
limited the effect of the Court's holding. Powell joined the Court's
opinion "on the understanding that it leaves open the question
whether [the statute] unconstitutionally burdens the right of a ma-
ture minor or a minor whose best interests would not be served by
(a) Her physical, emotional and psychological health and safety,
(b) Her age,
(c) Her familial situation.
(2) Notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed, if she is a minor or the husband of the woman, if she is
married.
(emphasis added)
663. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Stew-
art, White, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justices Powell, Stewart and Stevens filed concurrences.
Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun dissented.
664. See supra notes 647-60 and accompanying text.
665. 450 U.S. at 409-10 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 91 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
See also Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting).
666. 450 U.S. at 410.
667. 450 U.S. at 411.
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parental notification. 6 68
Justice Stevens' concurrence examined the physician's role in
the minor's abortion decision. Justice Stevens reasoned that the
physician's medical judgment is to be respected, but even the most
conscientious physician's interests in the overall welfare of a minor
cannot be equated with those of most parents.6 ' Concluding that
the physician's opinion does not outweigh state and parental inter-
ests, 70 Justice Stevens upheld the state intervention in this case.
In dissent Justice Marshall emphasized the narrowness of the
Court's holding because the Court had not examined the constitu-
tionality of the statute as applied to mature minors. 71 Justice
Marshall nevertheless chastised the plurality for ignoring the real-
ity of teenage pregnancies. He reasoned that parental interference
resulting from the state-imposed notification requirement will
cause many minors to delay their abortion decisions until after the
first trimester. 2  Consequently, these minors will incur greater
health risks. 7 s Other teenagers likely will attempt more radical al-
ternatives such as illegal or self-induced abortions. 74 Conse-
quently, Justice Marshall concluded that the statute impermissibly
burdened the minor's fundamental right to choose, in consultation
with her physician, whether to terminate her pregnancy.675
If the Court has accepted the notion that the Constitution en-
titles minors to less protection than adults, then a pregnant teen-
ager's right to secure an abortion is seriously jeopardized. The re-
sult is curious because the state's interest in the family justifies
statutes allowing parents, not states, to restrict the minor's right
to have an abortion. In this sense, the state action is neutral. In
reality, however, the state is successfully circumscribing the mi-
nor's rights. The Court has held firm to the principle that the state
cannot require parental consent, and the concurrences emphasize
Matheson's narrow ruling. The present mature-immature distinc-
tion in Matheson may prove workable, yet this case is one of the
few Supreme Court decisions allowing state intrusion on the physi-
668. Id. at 414 (Powell, J., concurring).
669. Id. at 420 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring).
670. Id. at 419-20 (Stevens, J., concurring).
671. Id. at 425-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court had denied standing to the
plaintiff in this class action to the extent that she purported to represent mature minors. Id.
at 405-06.
672. Id. at 438.
673. Id. at 439.
674. Id.
675. Id. at 454.
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cian-patient abortion decision. That the case allows states to inter-
ject others into the decision, rather than directly interfering itself,
is of little practical consequence. The net result is an interference
with a pregnant minor's exercise of her constitutional right to de-
cide whether to terminate her pregnancy.
E. THE ROLE OF THE PHYSICIAN RE-EXAMINED: INFORMED
CONSENT CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Although existing case law insulates the physician fairly well
from state intrusion, the Supreme Court, quite possibly, may ex-
pand the states' power to regulate abortion. During the 1985 Octo-
ber Term, the Court heard oral arguments' 7" on appeal 77 of two
recent court of appeals decisions that struck down provisions of
informed consent abortion statutes. Because the holdings in both
cases appear to comply with existing Supreme Court precedent,
the Court's grant of certiorari may indicate that the Court is con-
sidering changing the law to allow for greater state intervention. 78
In Charles v. Daley 79 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit struck down various provisions of the Illinois
abortion law. 80 Precedent clearly warrants the holding, although
an alternative resolution of the case was possible. Because the
court struck the statute on grounds of vagueness, the Seventh Cir-
cuit could have abstained and remanded the case to the Illinois
state courts for a determination of the state law. 81 The provisions
at issue in Daley regulate the attending physician. The most im-
portant provisions impose a standard of care on physicians and
their assistants who abort a fetus. According to the statute, the
physician performing any abortion of a viable fetus 8 2 or a fetus
676. The Supreme Court held oral arguments for the cases on November 5, 1985.
677. The case names on appeal are Diamond v. Charles, 84-1379 and Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 84-495.
678. The Court most likely would not grant certiorari and hear full oral arguments if it
merely planned to affirm the cases. Because only four votes are required to hear the case,
however, a majority of the Court may intend to affirm.
679. 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984).
680. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 81-26 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (amended 1984).
681. See supra note 612.
682. Section 6(1) of the Illinois law provided:
No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy after the fetus is known to be
viable shall intentionally fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and dili-
gence to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted.
Any physician or person assisting in such a pregnancy termination who shall intention-
ally fail to take such measures to encourage or to sustain the life of a fetus known to be
viable, before or after birth, commits a Class 2 felony if the death of the viable fetus or
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that is possibly viable, ss must use the same standard of care that a
physician would use in preserving the life and health of the fetus.
The Seventh Circuit struck down the provision regulating
abortions of viable fetuses on grounds of vagueness. Because the
statute did not specify who was to make the viability determina-
tion-the physician or his assistant-the statute was vague. 84 The
provision was unconstitutionally vague because it prescribed crimi-
nal sanctions for physicians without adequately describing the pro-
hibited conduct. This type of sanction hinders the physician be-
cause he is given insufficient notice of a possible violation that, in
turn, significantly burdens a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy. 8 5
The Seventh Circuit also invalidated the provision regulating
abortions of a possibly viable fetus. Because the statute might in-
duce a physician to refuse to perform an abortion for fear of crimi-
nal sanctions, the court held that the statute interfered with a wo-
man's right to an abortion. 6  On a more fundamental level, the
court rejected the state's proferred interest in enacting the stat-
ute-an interest in the viable fetus. Because the statute necessarily
applied to previability fetuses, the statute exceeded the scope of
the state's interest.6 87
A separate provision of the Illinois act required the physician
to inform the patient of the abortion method being used and
whether the procedure would result in fetal death. 88 Specifically,
the statute required physicians who prescribe "abortifacients, '6 89
infant results from such failure.
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38 § 81-26 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (amended 1984).
683. Section 6(4) provided:
No person who intentionally terminates a pregnancy shall intentionally fail to exercise
that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of
the fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life
and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted when there exists, in the
medical judgment of the physician performing the pregnancy termination based on the
particular facts of the case before him, a possibility known to him of more than mo-
mentary survival of the fetus, apart from the body of the mother, with or without arti-
ficial support.
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 81-26 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (amended 1984).
684. 749 F.2d at 459-60.
685. Id. at 461.
686. Id. at 460-61.
687. Id. at 461.
688. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38 §§ 81-22(7), 81-31(c) (Smith-Hurd 1983).
689. The statute defines "abortifacient" as any substance or device which is known to
cause fetal death. Id. at ch. 38 § 81-22(7). This definition would include such devices as the
intrauterine device (IUD) and DES ("morning after pill"). For a discussion of this issue, see
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to inform the mother that these devices cause fetal death. 90 After
reviewing the Supreme Court cases dealing with informed consent
provisions, the Seventh Circuit found that the Illinois requirement
impermissibly regulated the physician. Requiring the physician to
disclose this information impermissibly intruded on the physician's
medical discretion at a stage when the state's interest is not com-
pelling. 91 The state's interest in the woman's health does not jus-
tify such a disclosure requirement because the state is, in essence,
foisting on the woman the state's theory of fetal death. 2 Because
neither recognized state interest is compelling, the regulation was
impermissible." 3
The Supreme Court's decision in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health,94 clearly warranted this conclu-
sion. Although in Akron the state required detailed information to
be given, the information required in Daley was different only in
degree, not in substance. The Court has consistently recognized
the physician's need to retain control of his relationship with his
patient.69 5
In American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v.
Thornburgh,6  the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit struck down various provisions of Pennsylvania's abortion
law that directly regulated the physician.9g Although the court was
deferential to the legislature, construing provisions narrowly to
avoid constitutional infirmities and "overlooking what may reason-
ably be deemed to be a pervasive invalid intent," ' the court in-
validated provisions requiring informed consent and the "trading-
off" of the mother's health.
The statute's informed consent provision required that the
physician convey five categories of information to the pregnant wo-
man.' 99 The Third Circuit noted that no Supreme Court opinion
text accompanying notes 139-40. See also Rust, "The Abortion Cases," 72 A-BA J. 50, 51
(Feb. 1, 1986).
690. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38 §§ 81-22(7), 81-31(c).
691. 749 F.2d at 462.
692. Id. The problem rests in part upon a disputed definition of "fetal death," specifi-
cally whether abortifacient devices cause "death" similar to abortion. See Rust, supra note
689, at 51.
693. 749 F.2d at 462.
694. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
695. See supra notes 542-626 and accompanying text.
696. 737 F.2d 283 (3rd Cir. 1984).
697. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 3201-3220 (1983).
698. 737 F.2d at 292.
699. Id. at 295. These factors include the possible adverse physical and emotional side
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has allowed states to require the types of information with such
specificity as that imposed in the Pennsylvania statute. 00 The
Third Circuit found two principal defects in the Pennsylvania pro-
vision. First, it improperly detailed the information to be conveyed
to the patient, thereby impermissibly encroaching on the physi-
cian's medical judgment. 0 ' Second, the provision was improperly
"'designed to influence the woman's informed choice between
abortion or childbirth.' ",702 The Supreme Court's opinion in Akron
compels this result. Clearly the Pennsylvania statute is "designed
not to inform the woman's consent but rather to persuade her to
withhold it altogether. '703
A separate provision of the Pennsylvania law requires that the
abortion method used when the fetus is viable be the one most
likely to result in the fetus being aborted alive.70 4 The only excep-
tion to this requirement is when the abortion procedure would
cause a "significantly greater" risk to the pregnant woman.70 5 Rely-
ing on an earlier opinion in Colautti v. Franklin,06 the court held
the provision invalid because it required an impermissible trade-off
between the mother's health and fetal survival. 7  The Third Cir-
cuit's conclusion is sound because the Colautti court clearly re-
quired that maternal health be the main factor when the state's
interests in maternal health and fetal survival converge.08
Daley and Thornburgh present no substantial federal ques-
effects, the fetus' gestational age, the availability of benefits for prenatal and postnatal care,
and the father's liability in child support. Id. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3205(a)(1) (1983).
700. 737 F.2d at 295.
701. Id. at 296.
702. Id. (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983)).
703. Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983).
704. 737 F.2d at 300. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3210(b) (1982).
705. 737 F.2d at 300. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 3210(b) (1982).
706. Taylor, High Court Hears Two Abortion Cases, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1985, at 22,
col. 4.
707. Thornburgh presents a problem with the "finality" rule. Under 28 U.S.C. §
1254(2), the Court will only hear an appeal from the final order of a lower court. Because
the Third Circuit only considered portions of the statute, and remanded the rest to the
district court, the plaintiffs are not appealing the whole case.
Diamond concerns a serious question of standing. Because the State of Illinois decided
not to appeal the ruling, only a physician who has intervened below remains as an appellent.
The physician, however, has not been prosecuted under the statute and does not even per-
form abortions. Consequently, he may be denied standing to challenge the statute. See Rust,
supra note 689, at 52-53.
708. 439 U.S. 379 (1979). In Colautti, the Supreme Court invalidated an earlier ver-
sion of the Pennsylvania statute because the statute did not clearly specify "that the wo-
man's life and health must always prevail over the life and health of the fetus when they
conflict." Id. at 400.
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tions because the issues are governed by Supreme Court precedent.
If the Court is predisposed to giving states more power to interfere
in the abortion decision, then regulation of physicians is an effec-
tive approach. The Court has recognized various state interests as
legitimate, yet the state is virtually powerless to protect these in-
terests. Consequently, the Court could allow state intervention to
effectuate state interests. For example, the Court could allow
states to create medical panels to render ad hoc judgments of fetal
viability; or it could allow states to specify the exact maternal
health problems that give rise to the health exception. These re-
sults would require a new balancing between the states' interests
and maternal rights.70 9 Up to the present, the Burger Court has
steadfastly protected the woman's abortion right created in Roe.
One factor complicating any prediction of the Court's decision in
these cases is the procedural posture in which they have reached
the Court. Because the questioning at oral arguments primarily
concerned jurisdictional questions,7 10 the Court possibly may avoid
totally the merits of each case. 11
F. CONCLUSION
The role of the physician in the abortion decision represents a
fundamental conflict in abortion law-a conflict between the desire
to protect and implement the state's judicially recognized interest
in maternal health and fetal viability and the woman's fundamen-
tal right to secure an abortion. The notion of viability is at the
center of this conflict. Obviously, the states cannot be left to define
viability because many states would define viability so broadly that
abortions would be unattainable. Conversely, the states' most ef-
fective means of protecting a viable fetus-criminally punishing a
physician who aborts it-is limited when the physician is the one
who defines viability. The only effective way to protect the wo-
man's constitutional right to privacy in deciding whether to termi-
nate her pregnancy may be to guarantee her physician autonomy
in the decisionmaking process by freeing him from all but the most
709. 737 F.2d at 300.
710. Id. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 379.
711. Because the Supreme Court refused to allow the Justice Department to argue
orally in support of its brief that Roe be overturned, the Court, most likely, is not reconsid-
ering Roe. Further evidence of the unlikelihood that the Supreme Court will significantly
modify Roe may be found in the fact that the current Court expressly upheld Roe in the
1983 Akron decision.
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A. INTRODUCTION
"Wrongful pregnancy" and "wrongful conception" are labels
attached to a cause of action alleging that but for a third party's
negligence, the plaintiff-parents would not have conceived or given
birth to an unplanned yet healthy child.713 Arguably, these labels
apply to two different causes of action created by different factual
circumstances.7 14 In a strictly defined wrongful conception case, a
negligent sterilization operation results in the conception of a fe-
tus. The fetus, however, is never born because the mother either
miscarries or has an abortion. In a strictly defined wrongful
pregnancy action, the child conceived after a negligent sterilization
operation is born.71 6 Courts, however, frequently use the terms
712. The author of this Section would like to thank Professor Thomas R. McCoy of
Vanderbilt Law School for his invaluable advice.
713. See Collins, An Overview & Analysis: Prenatal Torts, Preconception Torts,
Wrongful Life, Wrongful Death, and Wrongful Birth: Time for a New Framework, 22 J.
FAM. L. 677, 690-91.(1984).
Although, in the narrowest sense, the term "wrongful birth" applies when the parents
allege the health care provider's negligence deprived them of the choice not to give birth to
a defective infant, see infra notes 614-30 and accompanying text, wrongful birth broadly
defined could also include situations normally labeled wrongful pregnancy or wrongful con-
ception. Id. at n.65.
714. See id. at 690 nn. 63-64.
715. In medical terms, a miscarriage is a spontaneous abortion. See generally supra
section II of this Special Project.
716. Damages computation is the only area in which the question of whether the unin-
tentionally conceived child is born becomes relevant. Plaintiff parents in the theoretical
wrongful conception case would not be able to recover the costs of rearing a child who was
never born. Thus, the negligent conception case would not present the difficult issue of to
what extent expenses of rearing such a child are recoverable-an issue on which courts split
sharply. See infra notes 560-68 and accompanying text.
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"wrongful conception" and "wrongful pregnancy" interchangea-
bly. 17 For purposes of this Section, the term "wrongful pregnancy"
will refer to those causes of action in which parents allege that a
third party's negligence resulted in the unplanned conception of a
child, regardless of whether that child was carried to term.
Several features distinguish the wrongful pregnancy action
from wrongful birth, wrongful life, and fetal wrongful death ac-
tions-the other prenatal torts. One such feature is the identity of
the proper plaintiff. Although the fetus is the plaintiff in some pre-
natal torts,"1 ' wrongful pregnancy clearly is a parental cause of ac-
tion.719 A second distinguishing feature is that the infant in a
wrongful pregnancy action is healthy and not defective.720 A third
distinction between wrongful pregnancy actions and other prenatal
torts is the nature of the negligent act. Birth tort actions other
than wrongful pregnancy allege negligent genetic testing or a fail-
ure to provide adequate genetic counseling, depriving parents of an
informed choice of whether to conceive or, after conception,
whether to abort a fetus.72' In contrast, the gravamen of a wrongful
pregnancy complaint is that the parents, who had already made a
conscious decision not to conceive, tried to prevent pregnancy by
obtaining professional health care, yet pregnancy occurred because
the professional negligently provided that care.722
717. See, e.g., Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671, 673 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (wrong-
ful conception synonymous with wrongful pregnancy); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v.
Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 442, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1984) (stating that "we will refer to wrongful
pregnancy or wrongful conception actions as those brought by the parents of a child whose
conception or birth was due to the negligence of a physician in performing a sterilization or
abortion.").
718. See generally infra section VIII of this Special Project.
719. See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Super. Ct., 136 Ariz. 579, 581
n.1, 667 P.2d 1294, 1296 n.1 (1983) (stating that "wrongful pregnancy" is the usual label
placed on "an action brought by the parents of a healthy, but unplanned child"). Cf. Miller
v. DuHart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (denying siblings of "wrongfully conceived"
child a cause of action against doctor who performed negligent sterilization operation on
their mother); Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. App. 1974) (denying siblings of child
conceived after negligent vasectomy recovery for reduction in the proportional share of pa-
rental love, affection, and economic loss resulting from birth of the unwanted child).
720. See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Super. Ct., 136 Ariz. at 581 n.1,
667 P.2d at 1296 n.1 (stating that "[a wrongful pregnancy] action is distinguished from a
'wrongful birth' claim brought by the parents of a child born with birth defects").
721. See infra notes 614-30 and accompanying text. In a negligent genetic counseling
case, the negligent act occurs before the parents make a conscious choice to conceive. Negli-
gent genetic testing usually occurs after conception, and the harm inflicted on the parents is
a deprivation of their opportunity to choose whether to abort an infant that the defendant
erroneously has led them to believe is healthy.
722. See Comment, Wrongful Pregnancy: Damages Recoverable for the Birth of a
725
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Not surprisingly, many wrongful pregnancy cases concern neg-
ligently performed sterilization operations such as tubal ligations7 23
and vasectomies. 24 "Wrongful pregnancy," however, also applies to
a great variety of other fact situations, including negligently per-
formed abortions,725 negligently filled birth control prescriptions, '72 6
failures to perform sterilization operations,727 failures to reinsert
contraceptive devices following medical examinations, 7 2s and other
negligent conduct.7 29  Additional confusion results from judicial
mislabeling of the various birth torts730 or failure to apply any la-
bel at all.s
Normal, Healthy Child, 7 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 385, 385-86 (1984).
723. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982); Coleman v. Garrison,
327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), afl'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Flowers v. District of
Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653
(1984); Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846
(1983); Spoljaric v. Pangan, - Ind. App. -, 466 N.E.2d 37 (1984); Jones v. Malinowski,
299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984); McCullough v. Hutzel Hosp., 81 Mich. App. 545, 276
N.W.2d 569 (1979); Miller v. DuHart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Kingsbury v.
Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); Bentacourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344
A.2d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 453
A.2d 974 (1982).
724. See, e.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Super. Ct., 136 Ariz. 579,
667 P.2d 1294 (1983); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Fassoulas v.
Ramey, 450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984); Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
725. See Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979); Nanke v.
Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1984); Jean-Charles v. Planned Parenthood, 99 A.D.2d 542,
471 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
726. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
727. See Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978). Cf. Boone v.
Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982) (involving situation in which doctor told plaintiff
that cyst removal operation had rendered her sterile; plaintiff consequently ceased using
birth control pills and became pregnant).
728. See Jackson v. Bumgardner, 71 N.C. App. 107, 321 S.E.2d 541 (1984).
729. See, e.g., J.P.M. v. Scbmid Laboratories, Inc., 178 N.J. Super. 122, 428 A.2d 515
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (negligence/products liability action against condom manu-
facturer for wrongfully conceived child); Roman v. City of New York, 110 Misc. 2d 799, 442
N.Y.S.2d 945 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (wrongful conception action based on alleged negligent
misrepresentations contained in pamphlet that advised no contraceptives were needed fol-
lowing sterilization operation); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d
242 (1974) (failure to diagnose pregnancy in timely manner precluded mother from option of
terminating pregnancy).
730. See Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982) (action for damages
resulting from unplanned healthy child characterized by court as action for "wrongful birth"
or "wrongful conception").
731. See Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (characterizing
pregnancy following sterilization operation as breach of express warranty and negli-
gence--no mention of wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception). Likewise, a court may
have labeled this action "medical malpractice," with no mention of the unique facts of the
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Wrongful pregnancy actions have proliferated in recent years.
Most state supreme courts addressing the issue in cases of first im-
pression"s2 have had little trouble in recognizing wrongful preg-
nancy as a valid cause of action despite policy arguments that this
recognition would spawn fraudulent claims, that damage recoveries
would be disproportionate to defendants' liability, and that the
proximate cause link in these cases would be too weak. 733 At least
one state supreme court, however, has flatly refused to recognize
the wrongful pregnancy action.73 4
The broad acceptance of the wrongful pregnancy action stems
in part from its similarity, in essence, to a medical malpractice ac-
tion.3 5 Thus, courts can readily identify and consider the tradi-
tional tort elements of duty, breach, proximate cause, and in-
jury.736 Other issues, however, have created more disparity among
jurisdictions. Statute of limitations problems often arise in these
cases; Section B of this Part addresses these problems and exam-
ines both legislative and judicial responses. The most controversial
wrongful pregnancy questions arise in the area of damages. Section
C addresses the damages issue. Section D concludes that attorneys
must take care to identify wrongful pregnancy claims accurately
and to comply with the relevant jurisdiction's statute of limita-
particular case. See Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978) (complaint
labeled action as medical malpractice and breach of contract). Practitioners involved in
what are herein described as wrongful pregnancy actions should research carefully what la-
bels, if any, courts have applied to birth tort actions in the relevant jurisdiction and ex-
amine the factual circumstances that the labels have described. In light of the confusion
surrounding these labels, plaintiffs' attorneys possibly should label their complaints medical
malpractice actions to avoid having their cases dismissed on summary judgment by a judge
who is hostile to a particular label.
732. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Fulton-DeKalb
Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984); Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H.
237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982).
733. In Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984), the
Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged these policy arguments, but noted that parties have
raised them frequently regarding other tort claims and that the predicted problems have
had satisfactory solutions under traditional tort theories. Id. at 442-43, 314 S.E.2d at 654.
734. See Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983). In rejecting a wrongful preg-
nancy action seeking costs of rearing a healthy child, the Kentucky Supreme Court used
sweeping language regarding the various birth tort claims. "That a child can be considered
as an injury offends fundamental concepts attached to human life. . . . The establishment
of a cause of action based on the matter of wrongful conception, wrongful life or wrongful
birth is clearly within the purview of the legislature only." Id. at 862-63.
735. E.g., Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 341, 470 N.Y.S. 2d 634, 637 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983) (wrongful pregnancy claim is "brought under common-law negligence or medical
malpractice principles").
736. E.g., Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 291 (Wyo. 1982) (wrongful pregnancy
plaintiff must prove negligence, causation, and damages to prevail).
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tions. Section D also urges courts to consider carefully the complex
policy issues surrounding the damages question in adopting an ap-
proach that best serves the competing interests at stake.
B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ISSUES
A common problem in wrongful pregnancy cases is that the
relevant statute of limitations may run before the plaintiff discov-
ers the alleged negligence, especially when conception does not oc-
cur until several years after a negligent sterilization operation.73 7
This barrier, which can also bar other medical malpractice
claims,Is generally arises in states with an "occurrence" statute of
limitations. Under an "occurrence" statute, the statutory period
begins to run when the negligent act occurs, regardless of when the
negligence is discovered.7 3 9 Spoljaric v. Pangan"4 O illustrates how
an occurrence statute of limitations affects a wrongful pregnancy
case. In Spoljaric the parents of a child conceived nine months
after a negligently performed tubal ligation filed their complaint
more than two years after the operation. The Indiana Court of Ap-
peals, noting that the Indiana statute of limitations for medical
malpractice cases is an occurrence statute,74 1 held the plaintiff's
claim time-barred.742
Recognizing the potential injustice caused by occurrence stat-
utes, some courts have found ways to allow plaintiffs recovery in
spite of these statutes.7 43 Legislatures, however, have restricted
these judicial methods in response to arguments that the resulting
increased malpractice awards will raise insurance premiums and
ultimately have a detrimental effect on health care.7 44 Many states
have adopted a special medical malpractice statute of limitations
737. E.g., Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn. 1978) (claim for negligence in
performance of sterilization where operation performed in 1972, but wife did not become
pregnant until December 1975).
738. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 30 at 165 (W.P. Keeton, D.
Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
739. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 26 § 30 at 165.
740. - Ind. App. - , 466 N.E.2d 37 (1984).
741. Id. at -, 466 N.E.2d at 40.
742. Id. at -, 466 N.E.2d at 45.
743. For a list of the devices courts have used to avoid the statute of limitations bar,
see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 738 § 30 at 166-68.
744. Id. See Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822, 825, 826-27 (Tenn. 1978) (uphold-
ing medical malpractice statute of limitations as constitutional when measured against the
rational basis test because legislature was concerned about high malpractice insurance pre-
miums and resulting increase in health care costs as well as detrimental effect on medical
profession).
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with shorter time constraints than those applicable to other negli-
gence actions. 745 Other states have passed "discovery" medical
malpractice statutes of limitations under which the statutory pe-
riod is tolled until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered
the negligence.74 6 "Discovery" statutes, however, often contain a
statute of repose that establishes an absolute time limit after
which the plaintiff may not file an action, regardless of whether the
injury has been discovered.747
Plaintiffs have used various theories in attempting to circum-
vent statutes of limitations that otherwise would bar their claims.
A triology of recent Missouri appellate decisions illustrates these
theories. In the earliest of these cases, Miller v. DuHart,4 s the par-
ents and siblings of a child born three and one-half years after the
mother had a tubal ligation brought suit. In an attempt to avoid
the barrier imposed by the statute of limitations, the siblings, seek-
ing damages for loss of parental society and financial support, ar-
gued that their claims were timely because of a statutory exception
that tolled the running of the statute749 in actions brought by chil-
dren younger than ten years of age.7 50 The court, however, found
no cognizable legal basis for the siblings' action because "[i]t would
be ludicrous to find that the defendants owed a duty to the appel-
lant children to prevent the birth of their brother. ' '751 The Miller
court next addressed the parents' wrongful pregnancy claims and
held that, although the claims stated a cognizable cause of action,
the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice barred
the action.752 The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the
general tort statute of limitations, which did not begin to run until
the injury caused by the defendants' alleged negligence was ascer-
745. See, e.g, CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (4)(b)
(West 1982).
746. PROSSER & KETON, supra note 738 § 30 at 166-67.
747. Id. § 30 at 167-68.
748. 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). The case was before the court on appeal by
the plaintiffs of a state lower court order granting defendants' motion to dismiss on the
ground that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred.
749. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.105 (West Supp. 1986).
750. Miller, 637 S.W.2d at 185. The statute tolling the running of the statute of limita-
tions until the children reached age twelve. All the plaintiff children were under the age of
ten.
751. Id. at 187. At least one other jurisdiction has rejected an action, presumably in-
tended to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations, brought by siblings. See Aronoff v.
Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
752. Miller, 637 S.W.2d at 188.
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tainable,7 53 governed the cause of action. The court held instead
that wrongful pregnancy actions clearly are governed by the medi-
cal malpractice statute of limitations that began to run at "the
date of the act of neglect complained of." '7 4 The court also found
that the facts did not warrant application of the "continuing treat-
ment" exception to the statute of limitations, 55 which tolls the
statute while the plaintiff remains under the doctor's care.756 Con-
sequently, the Miller court thwarted both the siblings' and the
parents' attempts to avoid the statute of limitations.
A year after Miller, the Missouri Court of Appeals faced an-
other wrongful pregnancy action in Hershley v. Brown.757 In
Hershley, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant doctor failed to
perform the requested tubal ligation. The doctor inserted a tubal
ring in the plaintiff to prevent conception, rather than cauterizing
or removing portions of the plaintiff's fallopian tubes as agreed.5
The court noted that the plaintiffs' claims would be barred by the
statute of limitations unless the allegations fell under one of the
recognized exceptions to that statute.759 The first statutory excep-
tion applies when a foreign object is negligently introduced and
permitted to remain in the body.760 The court asserted that this
"foreign objects" exception did not apply to the Hershley facts be-
cause in Hershley the doctor had intentionally inserted the tubal
ring. The exception by its terms applies only when the object was
unintentionally introduced into the body.7 " The court, however,
753. Id.
754. Id. While rejecting plaintiffs' request that the court adopt a discovery rule, id. at
190, the court noted that, at the time of its decision, at least 13 state courts had adopted a
discovery rule in cases concerning negligent sterilization operations. Id. at 188 n.2. The
court cited Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. 1968), in which the Missouri Su-
preme Court refused to adopt a discovery rule in another type of medical malpractice case,
saying that adoption of such a rule is a legislative, not a judicial, function. Id. at 189.
755. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that the statute of limitations does not
begin to run against a plaintiff until treatment by the defendant ceases. Thatcher v. DeTar,
351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943).
756. Miller, 637 S.W.2d at 190. The court found that plaintiff had failed to allege any
further treatment by the defendant following the sterilization operation and, thus, could not
claim that the defendant's continued treatment effectively tolled the statute.
757. 655 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). The trial court granted defendant's motions
to dismiss the case on grounds that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted and that the claim was time-barred. The plaintiffs then appealed the case to the
Missouri Court of Appeals.
758. Id. at 674.
759. Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.105 (West Supp. 1986).
760. Id.
761. Hershley, 655 S.W.2d at 675-76.
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found that the plaintiff's action was governed by a second statu-
tory exception that tolls the medical malpractice limitations period
until the plaintiff discovers the negligence."6 2 This exception, the
"fraudulent concealment of medical malpractice" exception, ap-
plies whenever the patient fails to discover her injuries because the
health care provider fraudulently conceals his negligence. 6 3 The
court held that the doctor had committed a battery when he per-
formed a surgical procedure other than the one the plaintiff re-
quested."" The court found that the doctor fraudulently concealed
this tort from the plaintiff because the doctor knew he had per-
formed unauthorized surgery and, therefore, failure to inform con-
stituted fraud.765
Missouri's most recent wrongful pregnancy decision appears to
expand the scope of Hershley. In Sanders v. Nouri,66 the court
held that, as in Hershley, the "fraudulent concealment of medical
malpractice" exception kept the plaintiff's claim alive despite the
absence of any indication that the defendant doctor had commit-
ted a battery.7 67 In Sanders, the Court held that because the de-
fendant doctor knowingly had removed a smaller portion of the
plaintiff's fallopian tubes than he had agreed, the plaintiff had suf-
ficiently alleged a case of medical malpractice and fraudulent con-
cealment thereof."8 Thus, Sanders arguably widens the opening
created by the Hershley decision and, consequently, expands the
definition of the fraudulent concealment exception in Missouri.
Sanders could provide wrongful pregnancy plaintiffs a means of
hurdling the barrier imposed by the state's "occurrence" medical
malpractice statute.
These cases merely illustrate various attempts by plaintiffs to
avoid statutes of limitations and do not constitute an exhaustive
list of plaintiffs' theories. Each jurisdiction will vary in its statutes,
exceptions, and judicial interpretations, thereby requiring practi-
tioners to conduct careful research according to the jurisdiction.
This research will be difficult, however, in light of the probability
762. Id. at 676-77.
763. Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (West Supp. 1986).
764. Hershley, 655 S.W.2d at 676.
765. Id.
766. 688 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). The case was before the court on appeal by
the plaintiffs. The trial court had dismissed the case as barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.
767. Id. at 27. "That appellants have used the label battery rather than negligence is
not fatal to their claim." Id.
768. Id.
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that courts have dismissed many of their jurisdictions' wrongful
pregnancy cases on summary judgment because the complaints
were untimely filed.
C. DAMAGES ISSUES
The availability of certain types of damages in wrongful preg-
nancy actions is well established. Most states agree that the plain-
tiff-mother in wrongful pregnancy actions may recover the tradi-
tional damages available in most medical malpractice suits. 769
These damages generally include physical and mental pain and
suffering incurred during pregnancy and childbirth,70 medical ex-
penses incurred during pregnancy and delivery,"7 lost wages,772
and, in the case of a negligent sterilization, either a refund for the
cost of the original surgery773 or the cost of the second operation.77 4
Courts generally permit the plaintiff-father to recover for loss of
769. See Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984).
Noting that the "vast majority" of courts permit recovery of expenses of the unsuccessful
medical procedure, pain and suffering, medical complications, costs of delivery, lost wages,
and loss of consortium, the court said that these damages are similar to those in most medi-
cal malpractice cases and, thus, "represent no real deviation from traditional tort remedies."
Id. at 443, 314 S.E.2d at 654.
770. E.g., Bushman v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d
683 (1978) (allowing plaintiff to recover for pain, suffering, and discomfort in wrongful preg-
nancy action); accord Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978) (award-
ing damages for mental anguish in wrongful pregnancy action despite general preclusion of
these damages when the suit is brought as a breach of contract action; exception permitting
these damages applied because subject matter of the contract was intensely personal); Jean-
Charles v. Planned Parenthood, 99 A.D.2d 542, 471 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
(limiting mother's recovery for pain, suffering, and mental distress to the extent distress
resulted from actual or anticipated physical pain and suffering associated with pregnancy
and childbirth).
771. E.g., Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 IM. App.3d 51, 63, 391 N.E.2d 479, 488 (1979)
(permitting recovery of hospital and medical expenses incurred in childbirth after physician
negligently performed abortion, noting that to preclude recovery "would allow tortious con-
duct by a medical practitioner.., to be totally uncompensable"); cf. James G. v. Caserta,
332 S.E.2d 872, 877 n.7 (W. Va. 1985) (stating that "if the parents chose to terminate the
unplanned pregnancy, the costs of such an operation would also be recoverable").
772. E.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (plaintiff who
became pregnant because of negligently filled birth control prescription entitled, among
other things, to lost wages during confinement). But cf. Jean-Charles v. Planned
Parenthood, 99 A.D.2d 471, N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (denying recovery for
mother's future wages lost because obligation to raise child precludes ability to earn wages).
773. E.g., Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 314 S.E.2d 653 (1984)
(allowing recovery of costs of ineffective sterilization procedure and noting that "[tlhe vast
majority of courts allow recovery of expenses for the unsuccessful medical procedure which
led to conception or pregnancy").
774. E.g., Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1984) (permitting re-
covery for cost of future tubal ligation when first operation unsuccessful).
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consortium. 775
In contrast to this unanimity on traditional malpractice dam-
ages, the states split sharply on whether and to what extent par-
ents also may recover the costs associated with rearing the unplan-
ned child to the age of majority.776 At present, courts take three
distinct positions on this issue. A minority of states follow the "full
recovery" position, which allows parents to recover all the costs of
rearing the unplanned child. The majority of states reject the full
recovery position in favor of one of two alternatives. Some "strict
rule" jurisdictions preclude recovery for any rearing costs. Others
strike a middle ground and adopt a "benefits rule," permitting re-
covery for the economic rearing costs offset by the value of the
emotional benefits the parents derive from the child. The following
cases illustrate the policy considertions underlying these positions.
1. The Full Recovery Rule
Under general principles of tort law, a tortfeasor is liable for
all foreseeable harm his negligence proximately causes.777 Cer-
tainly, parents will incur foreseeable economic burdens because of
the birth of an unplanned child.7 78 The full recovery rule recog-
nizes both the foreseeability and the proximate causal connection
between these burdens and the negligent act. According to this
rule a negligent health care provider should be liable for all the
costs of rearing the unplanned child.779
The court in Custodio v. Bauer7 0 first articulated the full re-
covery rule. In Custodio the California Court of Appeals stated
that a defendant doctor's negligence would entitle the plaintiffs to
recover all damages proximately caused thereby.781 The Custodio
775. E.g., Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982).
776. Clearly, in the strictly defined "wrongful conception" case, in which the unplan-
ned fetus' birth is prevented by abortion or miscarriage, the plaintiff parents' recovery is
limited to the traditional medical malpractice damages. The issue of rearing costs will not
arise in such a case. These cases, therefore, are less controversial and probably more likely
to be settled out of court. See supra note 714.
777. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 738, § 42 at 273.
778. In Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), the court stated
that to hold that the costs of rearing the plaintiff's child were not foreseeable consequences
of the defendant doctor's negligence "would defy logic and be contrary to the concept of
causation in tort." Id. at 47. The court held, however, that public policy precluded recovery.
Id. at 48.
779. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967).
780. Id.
781. Id. at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476-77.
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court, however, did not determine the size of the damages award in
that particular case782 and subsequent California decisions have
backed away from the full recovery rule in favor of the benefits
test rule.783
An Ohio Supreme Court case, Bowman v. Davis, 8 4 appears to
follow the Custodio decision. In Bowman, the plaintiff gave birth
to twins following a negligent tubal ligation performed by the de-
fendant-doctor. Appealing the jury's $450,000 verdict, the defend-
ant argued that public policy and the plaintiff's signature on a con-
sent form barred the plaintiff's recovery of damages.785 The court
rejected the public policy argument, noting that the choice not to
procreate enjoys constitutional protection.786 The court also held
that the consent form did not bar the plaintiff's claim because the
form applied only when a patient whose sterilization was effective
attempted to show she was unaware of the operation's permanent
effect. 7 7 Many courts cite Bowman for the proposition that Ohio
has adopted the full recovery rule7 8 because the Ohio Supreme
Court's ruling effectively affirmed the trial court's jury instructions
to award all damages "which are reasonably certain to exist now or
in the future as the proximate result of defendant's liability. ' 789 A
careful reading of Bowman, however, reveals that the decision did
not adopt definitively the full recovery theory. First, the court's
remarks regarding recovery for all foreseeable consequences were
dicta; the holding rested on the public policy and consent form is-
sues.790 A second reason for reading Bowman narrowly is found in
a footnote to the case. The court stated that the defendants had
not raised the issue of whether recovery in a wrongful pregnancy
action should be limited to the expenses of pregnancy only and
782. Id, at 325-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78.
783. See Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal. App. 3d 23, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
784. 48 Ohio St.2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
785. Id. at 43-44, 356 N.E.2d at 498.
786. Id. at 46, 356 N.E.2d at 499.
787. Id. at 44-45, 356 N.E.2d at 498.
788. See, e.g., Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Iowa 1984); Jackson v. Bum-
gardner, 71 N.C. App. 107, 321 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1984).
789. 48 Ohio St.2d at 43, 356 N.E.2d at 498. The Ohio Supreme Court's opinion states:
"For this court to endorse a policy that makes physicians liable for the foreseeable conse-
quences of all negligently performed operations except those involving sterilization would
constitute an impermissible infringement of a fundamental right." Id. at 46, 356 N.E.2d at
499.
790. Id. at 44-46, 356 N.E.2d at 498-99.
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that the court, therefore, was not deciding that issue. 79' Thus,
whether any jurisdiction actually has adopted and still applies the
full recovery rule remains highly questionable. 92
2. The Strict Rule
The majority of state courts793 recognizing wrongful pregnancy
have held that public policy concerns absolutely preclude parental
recovery of the costs associated with rearing unplanned children.9
The policy reason most commonly cited in support of the strict
rule is that the birth of a healthy infant, even if unplanned, can
never be considered an injury.795 Courts generally buttress this
broad statement with the argument that, as a matter of law, the
value of being a parent outweighs any of its costs. 79 6 Strict rule
courts disclaim reliance on sentimentality. 9 7 In addition to finding
no injury, many courts argue that if a court imposes orthodox tort
law rules permitting recovery for all foreseeable damages in wrong-
ful pregnancy actions, the court likewise must impose other tort
principles, including the duty to mitigate damages and the avoida-
791. Id. at 44 n.1, 356 N.E.2d at 498 n.1.
792. In a recent case, Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 699 P.2d 459, 462 (Kan. 1985),
the Kansas Supreme Court also concluded that the Bowman court had not actually adopted
the full recovery rule.
793. Cases that apply the strict rule include Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d
568 (1982); Flowers v. District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073 (D.C. 1982); Cockrum v. Baum-
gartner, 95 Ill.2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 479 cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846 (1983); Wilczynski v. Good-
man, 73 I1. App.3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa
1984); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W. 2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44
(Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Kingsbury v. Smith, 129 N.H. 237, 442 A.2d 1003 (1982); J.P.M. v.
Schmid Laboratories, Inc., 178 N.J. Super. 122, 428 A.2d 515 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981); Jean-Charles v. Planned Parenthood Assoc., Inc., 99 A.D.2d 542, 471 N.Y.S.2d 622
(N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1983); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Ma-
son v. Western Pa. Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d
872 (W.Va. Ct. App. 1985); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242
(1974); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
794. See Collins, supra note 713, at 698.
795. Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So.2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
("[A] parent cannot be said to have been damaged by the birth and rearing of a normal,
healthy child.").
796. See id. at 1085-86. To illustrate the principle that the benefits of parenthood
outweigh the burdens as a matter of law, courts have stated that "the validity of the princi-
ple may be tested by asking any parent the purchase price for that particular youngster."
Id. at 1086.
797. E.g., Fulton-DeKaIb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 443, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655
(1984) (stating that "[tlhis is not to say that we may lapse into sentimentality or embrace a
maudlin picture of home and family").
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ble consequences rule.7 " Under this theory, the parents' failure to
procure an abortion or place the unwanted child for adoption could
preclude recovery for rearing costs because the parents failed to
mitigate or avoid the damages created by the defendants'
negligence. 99
The "emotional bastard '80 0 argument is another policy reason
often cited by strict rule courts. Courts using this argument seek to
protect the unplanned child from the emotional harm they believe
could result if he should later learn of his parents' attempt to make
another individual pay for his upbringing.801 Courts also cite the
policy of avoiding interference with the family relationship, and
the problems such interference potentially could cause, as another
reason for precluding recovery of rearing costs.802 Likewise, some
courts have stated that permitting parents to recover all economic
damages, while allowing them to retain all benefits of parenthood,
makes the defendant-doctor a "surrogate parent."80 3 At least one
court has held that allowing recovery for both wrongful death and
wrongful pregnancy is too contradictory to be permitted.8 0 ' Courts
also cite many of the standard public policy arguments, frequently
used to preclude recovery in other torts, to support decisions deny-
ing recovery of rearing costs. These standard public policy argu-
ments include speculativeness of damages, 80 5 lack of foreseeabil-
ity,808 disproportionality of damages to the negligent conduct,807
creation of a windfall for the plaintiffs,80 8 encouragement of fraud-
ulent claims, 809 and deferral to the legislature. 10
798. See Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 519, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245
(1974).
799. E.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Ark. 1982); Flowers v.
District of Columbia, 478 A.2d 1073, 1076 (D.C. 1982).
800. Wilbur, 275 Ark. at 244, 628 S.W.2d at 571.
801. See id.
802. E.g. Flowers, 478 A.2d at 1077 (citing a fear that permitting parents to hold a
third party financially responsible for their child could destabilize families).
803. E.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 518, 219 N.W.2d 242, 244-
45 (1974) (stating that to hold "[e]very child's smile ... is to remain with the mother and
father ... [and] every financial cost ... would be shifted to the physician . .. [would]
create a new category of surrogate parent.").
804. Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, -, 699 P.2d 459, 468 (1985)
("We recognize wrongful death actions because of the great value we place on human life.
Conversely, we cannot recognize actions for. . . wrongful conception ... .
805. E.g., James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985).
806. E.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
807. Id.
808. E.g., Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237, 243, 442 A.2d 1003, 1006 (1982).
809. E.g., Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). The
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The strict rule's denial of any rearing costs has provoked
sharp criticism. The strongest arguments center on the rule's con-
clusion that a healthy child is no injury. Critics contend that
courts reaching this conclusion are imposing personal value judg-
ments favoring having children while ignoring the realities of the
burdens on unwilling parents.81 Critics also contend that the strict
rule underestimates the jury's ability to award appropriate dam-
ages, noting that juries are required to evaluate intangible factors
in many other areas of tort law.s12 Critics refute claims that recov-
ery of rearing costs will encourage fraudulent claims and dispro-
portionate liability by noting that the same claim has been made
in other tort cases.1 3 Despite such criticisms, however, the strict
rule remains in force in many jurisdictions.814
3. The Benefits Test Rule
A third approach to damages recovery in wrongful pregnancy
actions permits plaintiffs to recover the costs of rearing their un-
particular facts of the Rieck case may well support the notion that fraudulent claims will
increase if courts permit recovery for rearing costs because Rieck addressed an untimely
diagnosis of pregnancy that deprived parents of the choice to abort. Unlike the Rieck case,
cases of negligent sterilization operations present little chance of fraudulent claims because
the parents' intent to prevent further pregnancies is clear. A recent New York Supreme
Court decision, however, appears to have opened the door for recovery in cases just like
Rieck. In the March, 1985 case of Samuels v. Weiss (reported in 71 A.B.A.J. 102 June, 1985)
Justice Ascione labeled a woman's complaint "wrongful diagnosis" and permitted her to
recover for emotional harm after her doctor's diagnosis of pregnancy came too late for her to
obtain an abortion.
810. E.g., Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983).
811. E.g., University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Superior Ct., 136 Ariz. 579, 667
P.2d 1294 (1983). Discussing Public Health Trust's statement of "universally shared emo-
tion and sentiment," the Arizona Supreme Court stated: "[W]e believe that the strict rule
. . . ignores logical consideration. . . . [W]e must recognize. . . that there are cases where
the birth of an unplanned child can cause serious emotional or economic problems to the
parents." Id. at 584, 667 P.2d at 1299.
812. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984).
813. See University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Super. Ct., 136 Ariz. 579, 583,
667 P.2d 1294, 1298 (1983) ("[T]his is . . . the hue and cry in many tort cases and in es-
sence is no more than the fear that some tort cases will be decided badly.").
814. For cases expressly adopting the strict rule, see cases cited supra notes 793-96,
798-801. See also Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 IMI. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983); Wilczyn-
ski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979); Nanke v. Napier, 346 N.W.2d 520
(Iowa 1984); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); J.P.M. v. Schmid
Laboratories, Inc., 178 N.J. Super. 122, 428 A.2d 515 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.1981); Jean-
Charles v. Planned Assoc., Inc., 99 A.D.2d 542, 471 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984);
Weintraub v. Brown, 98 A.D.2d 339, 470 N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Sala v. Tom-
linson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp.,
499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
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planned child to the age of majority, reduced by the value of the
emotional benefits plaintiffs will receive in their role as parents.815
Courts adopting this rule generally state that in doing so, they sim-
ply are applying "settled common-law principles. 8 16 These courts
expressly reject the contention of strict rule courts that the bene-
fits of a healthy baby always outweigh the burdens, noting that the
extent of benefits and burdens will turn on the unique facts and
circumstances of each case. s17 For this reason, benefits test juris-
dictions leave damages computation to the jury,18 arguing that the
risk of speculativeness is no greater in wrongful pregnancy actions
than in any other area of tort law.8 19 Several courts that recognize
the benefits test rule have stated that in computing damages the
jury should consider the parents' preconception reasons for desir-
ing to avoid the birth.820 These courts regard the parents' reasons
as "the most telling evidence of whether or to what extent the
birth of the child actually injured the parents."8 '' Consequently,
parents who sought to avoid conception because of fears of genetic
defects or threats to the mother's health are not likely to be able to
show greater burdens than benefits if their fears prove to have
been unfounded. Conversely, if economic factors motivated the
choice to avoid conception, the burdens -of the unplanned child's
birth might outweigh the benefits.
Courts adopting the benefits test approach uniformly have
stated that the plaintiff has no obligation to mitigate damages by
either aborting the child or placing it for adoption. 22 In response
to the argument that mitigation is required, one court stated that
815. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
816. Id. at 245, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513. See also University of Ariz. Health Sciences
Center v. Super. Ct., 136 Ariz. 579, 586, 667 P.2d 1294, 1301 (1983) (no reason not to apply
"ordinary damage rules" to wrongful pregnancy cases).
817. See Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 269, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (1984) (rejecting
proposition that as a matter of law that no legally valid claim could exist for the expenses of
rearing unplanned child); University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Super. Ct., 136 Ariz.
579, 585, 667 P.2d 1294, 1300 (1983); see also Coleman v. Garrison, 281 A.2d 616 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1971), dismissed 298 A.2d 320 (Del. 1972) ("[I]t cannot be said as a matter of law
that a healthy child always confers a benefit greater than the expense of his birth and sup-
port. . . . Otherwise, all married couples would have children.").
818. 136 Ariz. at 585, 667 P.2d at 1300.
819. Id.
820. See id.; see also Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473 A.2d 429 (1984).
821. University of Ariz. Health Sciences Center v. Super. Ct. 136 Ariz. 579, 585, 667
P.2d 1294, 1300 (1983).
822. Id.; see also Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal. App. 3d. 23, 185 Cal. Reptr. 76 (1982);
Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982); Jones v. Malinowski, 299 Md. 257, 473
A.2d 429 (1984); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
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imposing such a duty on the injured plaintiff ignores the difference
between the avoidance of conception and the disposition of the
human organism after conception. 23 The court further asserted
that the defendant does not have the right to insist that the victim
of his negligence be willing to abort or place a child for adoption. 24
Other courts addressing the issue have stated that the plaintiff's
duty is only to mitigate damages through reasonable means and
that abortion and adoption are not reasonable means of
mitigation. 25
Critics of the benefits test raise several objections. Some argue
that the test requires parents to show that they do not want their
child in order to increase their recovery. 26 Other critics of the ben-
efits test argue that it seeks to weigh two different interests-love
and companionship versus economics. 2 7 Critics also state that the
benefits test could harm the child emotionally and might require
speculative damages computation.8 28
D. CONCLUSION
In light of the inevitable time delay between a negligent steril-
ization operation and the resulting pregnancy, practitioners repre-
senting wrongful pregnancy plaintiffs much pay special attention
to their jurisdiction's statute of limitations. Similarly, because a ju-
risdiction may or may not expressly recognize wrongful pregnancy
as a cause of action, attorneys should pay particular attention to
the label attached to allegations that a third party's negligence re-
sulted in the conception or birth of unplanned yet healthy child.
Regardless of the factual circumstances, wrongful pregnancy is re-
ally nothing more than a traditional medical malpractice action
with an additional twist in damages computation on the question
of whether to require the tortfeasor to bear the costs of raising the
product of his negligence. This issue involves complex policy con-
siderations that courts must weigh carefully. 29
823. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 257, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1971).
824. Id.
825. E.g., Morris v. Frudenfeld, 135 Cal. App. 3d 23, 185 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1982).
826. See Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 243, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982) (rule requires
parents to "demonstrat[e] they do not want the child in order to get a greater reward. If
they admit the child is a welcome addition ... they may get nothing.").
827. See Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 252 Ga. 441, 444, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655
(1984).
828. See Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 237 Kan. 215, 699 P.2d 459 (1985), and au-
thorities cited therein.
829. For additional information on policies and theories in wrongful pregnancy cases,
739
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Despite the rule that a tortfeasor should be liable for all dam-
ages proximately caused by his negligence, courts generally have
rejected the full recovery approach that embodies this rule. Be-
cause courts have not used this approach to decide a case, and be-
cause a majority of jurisdictions have adopted the antithetical
strict rule, the full recovery approach merits discussion only on a
theoretical basis. The strict rule approach, precluding all recovery,
appears to be an overly-simplistic judicial response to a very com-
plex area. This position is based on an inherent distrust of the
jury's ability to compute a complex damages award and ignores the
judge's ability to reduce an excessive award. The strict rule ap-
proach also allows a tortfeasor to escape paying any damages. The
benefits test, permitting recovery for some portion of rearing costs
has the advantage of holding the tortfeasor responsible for dam-
ages while recognizing the mitigating factors of the benefits of
child-rearing. Even this modified rule, however, likely will result in
jury awards that could lead to increased health care insurance pre-
miums, which could raise the costs of medical care for all of soci-
ety. Increased premiums also may discourage talented persons
from entering the medical profession, ultimately decreasing the
quality of health care available. In light of so many competing pol-
icy concerns, no easy answers yet emerge to the controversial
problems of the wrongful pregnancy action.
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see generally Note, Judicial Limitations on Damages Recoverable for the Wrongful Birth of
a Healthy Infant, 68 VA. L. REV. 1311 (1982); Comment, Wrongful Pregnancy: Damages
Recoverable for the Birth of a Normal, Healthy Child, 7 Am. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 385 (1985);
Comment, Recovery of Childrearing Expenses in Wrongful Birth Cases: A Motivational
Analysis, 32 EMORy L.J. 1167 (1983).
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A. INTRODUCTION
Wrongful birth is an action in which a health care provider
breaches a duty "to impart information or perform medical proce-
dures with due care," and that breach is a proximate cause of the
birth of a defective child. s 0 Like wrongful pregnancy, the action is
frequently mislabeled.8 3 1 Despite the lack of longstanding judicial
precedent in the area,83 2 courts have developed several distinct ele-
ments that characterize the wrongful birth action. This tort is gen-
erally a parental cause of action-parents seek recovery for harm
inflicted on them. 33 Furthermore, the label "wrongful birth" ap-
plies only when the infant is defective.3 4 The most significant
characteristic of wrongful birth is the conduct alleged to be negli-
gent. The crux of the wrongful birth action is a negligent depriva-
tion of choice. 8 5 The plaintiff parents do not allege that the de-
fendant caused their infant's abnormality. Rather, the parents
allege that the health care provider's negligence deprived them of
the information necessary to make an informed choice of whether
to conceive or to continue a pregnancy. Had such information been
presented to them, the parents allege, they would not have had the
child. In sum, the parents allege that but for the health care pro-
vider's negligence, the child would not have been born.83
This Part examines the fundamental features of the wrongful
birth cause of action. Section B discusses typical fact situations
that give rise to a wrongful birth claim. Section C considers the
elements of the wrongful birth tort-duty, breach, proximate
cause, and injury-that distinguish this tort from other medical
830. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 467, 656 P.2d 483, 488 (1983).
831. See supra note 725 and accompanying text; see also Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978) (exemplifying misapplication of label "wrongful
life" to parental cause of action that was "wrongful birth").
832. The wrongful birth action, by definition, can arise only in the context of ad-
vanced medical knowledge and technology in which doctors can detect prenatal defects or
test genetic carriers. The absence of this knowledge and technology prior to the 1970s ex-
plains why this area of tort law is recent. As technology and medical science continue to
advance in the area of prenatal care and genetic testing, the number of wrongful birth ac-
tions will also increase. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 98 Wash.2d 460, 472, 656 P.2d 483,
491 (1983).
833. E.g., DiNatale v. Lieberman, 409 So. 2d 512, n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(describing wrongful birth as "the parent's" cause of action for the expenses of caring for
the defective child"). But see infra note 853 (discussing cases allowing the child the bring
the cause of action).
834. In the case of a healthy but unplanned child, the cause of action is "wrongful
pregnancy." See supra note 713 and accompanying text.
835. See Collins, supra note 713 at 690-91 n.65.
836. See id.
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malpractice claims. Section D addresses the damages issue. Section
E concludes that attorneys who frame their allegations properly
will find courts receptive to claims of wrongful birth.
B. TYPICAL CASES
The factual circumstances giving rise to a wrongful birth ac-
tion generally involve negligent genetic testing or negligent genetic
counseling. In a typical negligent genetic testing case,8 37 the par-
ents, aware that they may be carriers of a genetic disease or aware
that other circumstances increase the probability of a defective
child,83 8 seek professional genetic tests on themselves or the fetus.
The health care provider's failure to use due care in performing or
interpreting the results of these tests deprives the parents of the
opportunity to choose to avoid the birth of a defective child."s The
underlying rationale in negligent genetic testing cases is that the
parents have relied to their detriment on the negligent information
the defendant provided. Naccash v. Burger84 0 illustrates the typi-
cal wrongful birth action resulting from negligent genetic testing.
In Naccash an expectant father had a blood test performed to en-
sure that the was not a carrier of Tay-Sachs 4 disease because, as
the expectant mother testified at trial, "[t]here is nothing on this
earth that would have made [us] have a baby with Tay-Sachs dis-
ease."842 After the defendant assured the plaintiff-parents that the
father did not carry this disease, the expectant mother decided to
have the baby. Later, after the infant was diagnosed as having
Tay-Sachs, the plaintiffs discovered that defendant had confused
the husband's blood sample with the sample of a noncarrier 4 3 The
court permitted the wrongful birth action, noting that the errone-
837. E.g., Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).
838. See supra notes 731-58 and accompanying text.
839. E.g. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 407, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. 1978) ("It
is not contended that the defendant physicians' treatment ... caused the abnormalities in
[plaintiffs'] infants. . ., but only that had plaintiffs been properly advised by defendants of
the risks of abnormality, their infants would never have been born.").
840. 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982). The case was before the Virginia Supreme
Court on appeal by the defendant doctor.
841. Id. at 410, 290 S.E.2d at 827. "Tay-Sachs disease is a fatal, progressive, degenera-
tive disease of the nervous system which occurs primarily in Jewish infants of Eastern Euro-
pean ancestry. A diseased child appears normal at birth, but at four to six months of age,
the child's central nervous system begins to degenerate, and he suffers eventual blindness,
deafness, paralysis, seizures, and mental retardation. His life expectancy is two to four
years." Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1031, 471 N.E.2d 530, 532, n.2 (1984).
842. Naccash, 223 Va. at 411, 290 S.E.2d at 828.
843. Id. at 410-11, 290 S.E.2d at 827.
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ous test results deprived the plaintiffs of the chance to decide
whether to terminate the pregnancy." Other negligent genetic
testing cases have produced similar results.8 45
Many wrongful birth actions concern allegations of negligent
genetic counseling. 46 Plaintiffs often allege negligent genetic coun-
seling when the defendant fails to inform them of an increased
probability of a deformed child and of tests that could determine if
such deformities were present.8, 7 In an early wrongful birth case,
Becker v. Schwartz,8 48 a New York court permitted the parents of
a child born with Down's Syndrome 49 to recover from the doctor
who negligently failed to inform them that the mother's age in-
creased the probability of this defect and that an amniocentesis
test could detect the defect. Other wrongful birth actions arise
from the doctor's failure to diagnose a genetic disease in the par-
ents' first child in time to permit the parents to avoid the risk of
producing a second defective child.8 50 For example, in Schroeder v.
Perkels51 a New Jersey court permitted the parents of two children
born with cystic fibrosis852 to recover from the doctor who had
treated the first child but had failed to diagnose the child's disease
in time to permit the parents to avoid the birth of a second child.
844. Id. at 414, 290 S.E.2d at 830.
845. E.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(negligent interpretation of amniocentesis test to determine if fetus afflicted with Tay-
Sachs); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984) (negligent interpretation of tests per-
formed on mother to determine if she was carrier of Duchenne muscular dystrophy).
846. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(N.Y. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
847. Id.
848. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). See also Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); cf. Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 Ill. App.3d 1029, 471
N.E.2d 530 (1984) (permitting recovery after defendants failed to inform expectant Jewish
parents of higher probability of Tay-Sachs disease in Jewish population and to recommend
amniocentesis test); Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 820, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 1341
(1977) (holding failure to perform amniocentesis on pregnant mother who later gave birth to
child with cri-du-chat syndrome stated no cause of action because doctor's failure was "per-
missible exercise of medical judgment and not a departure from then accepted medical
practice").
849. Down's Syndrome is a form of mental retardation that results in a variety of
physical abnormalities. This syndrome is caused by the presence of an extra chromosome.
See Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 406 n.1, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808 n.1, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
896 n.1 (1978).
850. See Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981); cf. Turpin v. Sortini, 31
Cal.3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (permitting child with hereditary deaf-
ness to recover from doctor who failed to detect the deafness in her older sister).
851. 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
852. Cystic fibrosis is a genetic disease that results in chronic respiratory problems.
Victims usually die in their late teen years. Id. at 58, 432 A.2d at 836.
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Courts have also permitted wrongful birth actions when physicians
negligently misrepresent the inheritability of a genetic disease, 853
negligently misrepresent the probability of birth defects arising
from prescription drugs,854 fail to correctly diagnose in an expec-
tant mother an illness known to be associated with birth defects,8 55
or negligently perform sterilization operations or abortions re-
quested by the parents to avoid birth of a defective child.50
C. ELEMENTS OF TORTS IN WRONGFUL BIRTH ACTION
Courts have recognized the validity of wrongful birth claims
despite policy arguments to the contrary.8 57 Most courts have few
theoretical problems with the action because they see it as a mere
extension of traditional tort law to new factual circumstances. 858
However, because of the unusual twists in traditional tort princi-
ples resulting from these circumstances an examination of the ele-
ments of duty, breach, proximate cause, and injury is helpful in
understanding the wrongful birth claim.
1. Duty and Breach
The initial question in a wrongful birth action is what duty, if
any, the health care provider owes parents who affirmatively seek
specific medical advice regarding a genetic disease. Courts readily
conclude that the health care provider owes the parents a duty of
853. Park v. Chessin, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978) (parents were told
incorrectly that chances of having second child with polycystic kidney disease were "practi-
cally nil").
854. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (diabetic
mother told prescription drug could cause cleft palate and temporary hirsutism, but drug
actually caused severe birth defect of fetal hydantoin syndrome).
855. This failure to diagnose commonly occurs when an expectant mother has con-
tracted rubella, which causes severe defects, and the doctor negligently misdiagnoses the
illness. See Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106
Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Prochanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis.2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
856. Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981). In these circumstances the
plaintiff parents might also have a claim for wrongful pregnancy. See supra notes 713-729
and accompanying text.
857. See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, No. 718 PAB4, slip. op. (N.C. Dec. 10, 1985) (refusing
to recognize wrongful birth as valid cause of action).
858. See Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 83, 439 A.2d 110, 113 (1981); see also Naccash
v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 413, 290 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1982) ("Only a novel twist in the medical
setting differentiates the present situation [a wrongful pregnancy case] from the ordinary
malpractice action.").
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reasonable care . 59 In Naccash v. Burger,8 0 for example, the court
held that when the plaintiffs presented themselves to the defend-
ant for Tay-Sachs testing, the defendant owed the plaintiff-parents
a duty of reasonable care in performing the tests and also had a
duty to give "reasonably accurate information" regarding the test
results so that the parents could make an informed decision
whether to abort the child.6 Similarly, in Park v. Chessin,862 the
court permitted parents to recover after they had specifically in-
quired about the risks of having a second child with polycystic kid-
ney disease. The court stated that the physician's duty to the
plaintiff-parents was merely an extension of the classic tort duty
"that one may not speak without prudence or due care when one
had a duty to speak, knows that the other party intends to rely on
what is imparted, and does, in fact, so rely to his detriment. '86 3
Absent a specific inquiry by the prospective parents, however,
the scope of the doctor's duty becomes a more complex question.
Defendants often urge courts to limit a physician's duty to in-
stances in which the parents ask questions and request specific
care. 864 Courts have rejected this suggestion, however, and instead
have imposed on physicians an affirmative duty to disclose facts
relevant to the parents' decision to avoid the birth. Some courts
base this affirmative duty to disclose on the theory that, because of
the physician-patient relationship, the doctor has a duty to advise
the patient in accordance with correct medical practice.8 65
Other courts similarly have found an affirmative duty of dis-
closure, but on the theory that parents have a right not to have a
defective child and that, consequently, physicians have a duty to
assist parents in exercising that right.8 6 Under this theory, the
parents' constitutionally protected right to obtain an abortion cre-
ates the physician's duty.8 7 This right, coupled with medical sci-
ence's increased ability to predict the occurrence of defects attrib-
859. E.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,386 N.E.2d 807,
813 (N.Y. 1978) ("There can be no dispute ... that plaintiffs have alleged the existence of a
duty flowing from defendants to themselves and that the breach of that duty was the proxi-
mate cause of the birth . . ").
860. 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982).
861. See id. at 414, 290 S.E.2d at 829.
862. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), aff'd 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (N.Y. 1978).
863. Id. at 86, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
864. Goldberg v. Ruskin, 128 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1039, 471 N.E.2d 530, 537 (1984).
865. Id.
866. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 472, 656 P.2d 483, 491 (1983).
867. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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utable to genetic disorders, imposes the duty of affirmative
disclosure on the physician.0 s Once courts have determined that
the physician owes the plaintiff a duty of care, a breach of that
duty occurs when the physician negligently fails to provide parents
with information material to the parents' decision of whether to
avoid the birth. 69
2. Proximate Cause and Injury
To bring a cause of action in tort, the plaintiff must show the
defendant's negligence proximately caused his or her injury.8 70 In
the context of a wrongful birth action, the plaintiff claims that the
defendant's negligence proximately caused the birth of a defective
child in the following manner: the physician's negligence deprived
plaintiffs of the information necessary for their decision whether to
avoid the birth of the defective child; the plaintiffs allege that, had
they known their child would be defective, they would have
avoided the birth through abortion or sterilization; thus, the plain-
tiffs allege that but for the physician's failure to provide them with
relevant information, the defective child would not have been
born.8 '
In Eisbrenner v. Stanley872 a Michigan court addressed a com-
mon defense physicians raise in wrongful birth cases and discussed
the proximate cause element of the action. The defendant-doctor
had argued that the plaintiffs had not shown proximate cause be-
cause the physician's allegedly negligent conduct had not caused
the child's birth defects and because no one could have prevented
the defects. In response, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that
this argument misconstrued the plaintiffs' theory. The plaintiffs
did not claim that the defendant's conduct caused the defects.
Rather, the parents claimed that because the defendant breached
his duty to render proper medical treatment, they were deprived of
information that would have led them to terminate the pregnancy.
868. See Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 256, 698 P.2d 315, 318-19 (1984); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 472, 656 P.2d 483, 491 (1983).
869. The court will find a breach of this duty when the physician failed "to conform to
the appropriate standard of skill, care or learning." Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98
Wash.2d 460, 473, 656 P.2d 483, 492 (1983). Cf. Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818,
364 N.E.2d 1340 (N.Y. 1977) (defendant's failure to perform amniocentesis test on mother
who later gave birth to cri-du-chat child held to be "no more than a permissible exercise of
medical judgment and not a departure from then accepted medical practice.").
870. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 738 6 § 30 at 165.
871. E.g., Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 60-61, 432 A.2d 834, 837 (1981).
872. 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981).
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The child was born and lived as a result of the defendant's negli-
gence. Thus, according to the court, the plaintiffs properly alleged
proximate cause.87 3
The injury complained of in a wrongful birth action is the
birth of a deformed child.8 74 Recognition of the injury is closely
tied to the other elements of the action. The Washington Supreme
Court has stated that an inevitable by-product of recognizing a pa-
rental right to avoid giving birth to a defective child is a recogni-
tion that the birth of a defective child is an actionable injury.a75
The Idaho Supreme Court has added that establishing proximate
cause and injury in the wrongful birth action will present no prob-
lem as long as the plaintiffs show that had the physician not been
negligent, they would have aborted their child or avoided conceiv-
ing it in the first place. 76
D. DAMAGES
Although every state that has considered a wrongful birth
claim has recognized the validity of the action, 77 courts do not
agree on the types of damages that plaintiffs may recover. The ma-
jority of jurisdictions recognizing the action permit parents to re-
cover, at a minimum, the extraordinary medical costs needed to
raise the defective child.8 78 The rationale behind extraordinary
medical expense awards is that, while the plaintiffs intended to
have a child, the defendant deprived them of their choice to avoid
873. Id. at 366, 308 N.W.2d at 213.
874. E.g., Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984). Contra Azzolino v.
Dingfelder, No. 718PA84, slip. op. at 11 (N.C. Dec. 10, 1985). In Azzolino the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held that "claims for relief for wrongful birth of defective children shall
not be recognized in this jurisdiction absent a clear mandate by the legislature." The court
refused to recognize this claim because, in its view, the tort element of injury was absent. It
criticized other jurisdictions that recognized the actions as "tak[ing] a step into entirely
untraditional analysis by holding that the existence of a human life can constitute an injury
cognizable at law." Id. at 12. The court admitted, however, that it was adopting "a view
contrary to ... a strong trend among other jurisdictions." Id. at 11.
The dissent argued that the majority opinion misconstrued the nature of the injury by
characterizing it as the child's existence, when the real injury to the parents was the depri-
vation of their choice to make an informed choice. Id. at 22, (Exum, J., dissenting).
875. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 473, 656 P.2d 483, 492 (1983).
876. See Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984).
877. Recognition "that society has a vested interest in ... preventing birth defects,
and in requiring that wrongdoers [compensate their victims] . . . has led to unanimous ac-
ceptance by the courts of wrongful birth as a claim for relief." Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253,
257, 698 P.2d 315, 319 (1984).
878. E.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the birth of a defective child. 79 Under general tort principles, the
defendant must put the plaintiff in as good a position as he or she
would have been in had it not been for the defendant's negli-
gence.88 0 Applying this principle to a wrongful birth cause of ac-
tion, the court in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis stated that the plain-
tiff-parents should recover the expenses associated with the
delivery and rearing of their infant that would not have arisen had
the child been normal.8 1 Parents may not recover, however, for
loss of consortium, pain and suffering incurred in childbirth, and
wages lost during pregnancy because these losses would have oc-
curred in any pregnancy, regardless of whether the child was defec-
tive. 2  Several jurisdictions expressly have permitted recovery of
extraordinary medical expenses for the life of the child, rather
than just to the age of majority, after noting that statutes bind
parents to support an adult unable to support himself.8 3 Other ju-
risdictions have permitted recovery of extraordinary medical ex-
penses by the child himself in cases in which the statute of limita-
tions may bar a parental cause of action but not an action brought
by certain minor children. 84
A minority approach precludes parents from recovering ex-
traordinary medical expenses, but permits them to recover for the
emotional damage they have suffered because of the birth of a de-
879. Id.
880. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 738 § 85 at 608.
881. 98 Wash.2d 460, 479, 656 P.2d 483, 495 (1983).
882. Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (damages for
physical pain and suffering and mental anguish not recoverable because mother "wanted to
become pregnant ... and the pregnancy and delivery in connection with [her deformed
child] were no more difficult or painful than if he had been normal"). But see Park v. Ches-
sin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y.App. Div. 1977), aff'd 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d
807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (N.Y. 1978) (recovery for loss of mother's services permitted).
883. E.g., Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332
S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985).
884. See Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (infant plaintiff permitted
recovery when parents' claim for these expenses would be barred by statute of limitations).
While statute of limitations issues theoretically may arise in wrongful birth actions, see
Anderson v. Wagner, 61 Ill. App.3d 822, 378 N.E.2d 805 (1978) (parents' medical malprac-
tice case for failure to diagnose rubella during pregnancy resulting in birth defects to child
barred by statute of limitations); Nelson v. Kriser, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984) (reversing
statute of limitations bar in a wrongful birth action), the lack of case law in this area indi-
cates these issues arise less frequently in wrongful birth actions than they do in wrongful
pregnancy cases. One possible explanation is that because many inherited birth defects ap-
pear at an early age, parents are likely to discover they have a wrongful birth action soon
after their infant is born, but several years may pass between a negligent sterilization opera-
tion and the conception of a child whose birth forms the basis of a wrongful pregnancy
action.
748 [Vol. 39:597
19861 CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND BIRTH 749
fective child. 5 In Berman v. Allen""8 a North Carolina court al-
lowed recovery of damages for mental and emotional distress, but
held that the parents of a Down's Syndrome child could not re-
cover for her medical expenses. The court stated that permitting
the parents to retain all the benefits of the child's love while "sad-
dling defendants with the enormous expenses attendant upon her
rearing" would be a disproportionate remedy.8
Several jurisdictions have allowed wrongful birth plaintiffs to
recover both extraordinary medical expenses and emotional dis-
tress damages.8 8 At least one jurisdiction permitting this dual re-
covery, however, requires that the emotional distress award be off-
set by the benefits of parenthood that the plaintiffs will receive.8 89
Other jurisdictions have stated that dual recovery is impermissible
because the plaintiffs failed to meet the state's common law re-
quirements for negligent infliction of emotional distress.890 As the
area of wrongful birth continues to receive judicial attention, fur-
ther damages issues are certain to develop. 91
E. CONCLUSION
Courts have had little difficulty recognizing wrongful birth as a
cause of action. The traditional tort elements of duty, breach,
proximate cause, and damages are easily discernable in this cause
of action. Practitioners contemplating a wrongful birth action must
take careful steps to ensure that the court recognizes that the com-
plaint alleges the deprivation of an opportunity for parents to
choose to avoid the birth of a deformed child-not that the physi-
cian caused the defect. Damages allowable in wrongful birth claims
will depend on the jurisdiction's approach to the issues of ex-
traordinary medical costs and emotional distress.
885. At least two courts have permitted the defective child to recover for wrongful
birth; see supra note 853.
886. 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984).
887. Id. at -, 322 S.E.2d at 581.
888. See Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984); Naccash v. Burger, 223
Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash.2d 460, 656 P.2d 483
(1983).
889. Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984).
890. E.g., Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (claim for emo-
tional distress stricken because of failure to meet impact doctrine); cf. Goldberg v. Ruskin,
128 Ill. App.3d 1029, 471 N.E.2d 530 (1984) (remanding case to permit parents to show
physical injury or illness in effort to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
891. See generally, Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
618 (1979); Note, Father & Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for
Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488 (1978).
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Wrongful birth will likely be an expanding area of tort law in
the coming decades. This continued expansion is contingent, how-
ever, upon two factors: (1) the continued expansion of medical
technology's ability to detect genetic carriers and genetically im-
perfect fetuses and (2) the future direction of the United States
Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade decision.882 The wrongful birth ac-
tion is permised on the parents' right to choose whether to con-
tinue a pregnancy. If the Supreme Court should curtail or abolish
the right to an abortion, wrongful birth would be a valid action
only in instances when parents, as genetic carriers, could be tested
prior to conception.
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A. INTRODUCTION
Advances in medical technology, including amniocentesis 9 3
and various methods of genetic testing,94 have greatly increased
the amount and sophistication of information available to adults
engaged in family planning. The technical nature of this medical
capability to predict inheritable birth defects and diseases has in-
892. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a discussion of Roe v. Wade and its progeny, see gener-
ally infra section V of this Special Project.
893. For an explanation of the amniocentesis method of detecting genetic disease, see
supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Two other methods that allow early sampling of
fetal cells are discussed supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
894. For a discussion of testing for genetic disease, see supra notes 46-54 and accom-
panying text.
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creasingly involved the expertise of physicians in family planning
decisions. Consequently, new professional legal duties have arisen.
When negligently performed genetic testing and counseling about
the risk of birth defects results in a misinformed or uninformed
decision to have a child who is later born with predictable abnor-
malities, many courts have recognized a "wrongful birth" cause of
action on behalf of the mother. 95 These wrongful birth actions as-
sert that the mother is damaged by her reliance on the erroneous
advice of the defendant-physician.""6
Courts have been much more reluctant, however, to recognize
the impaired child's claim for wrongful life in similar situations of
negligent testing and counseling.s97 The gravamen of a wrongful
life claim is that the plaintiff is damaged by her very existence and
would not have been born but for the defendant's negligence. 9 s
The claim essentially asserts that the defendant breached a duty
owed directly or inuring derivatively to the plaintiff-child by not
informing the parents of the risk of predictable abnormalities. Be-
cause the parents were thereby deprived of information that would
have convinced them to decide against having the child, this
895. See, Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981); Eisbrenner v. Stanley,
106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981). For a more thorough discussion of wrongful
birth, see supra section VII of this Special Project.
896. The physician may render advice prior to conception. More commonly the physi-
cian's consultation with the prospective parents occurs after conception with a view toward
aborting the pregnancy if there are significant risks of birth defects. In this latter situation,
any damage resulting from the physician's negligence is contingent on the woman's right to
have an abortion. Absent a right to have an abortion, the physician's erroneous advice would
not deprive the prospective mother of information necessary to make an informed choice
because she would have no legal right to choose between abortion and child bearing. Conse-
quently, the constitutional right to have an abortion, established by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), has had a major impact on the development of wrongful birth cases.
897. To date, the decisions recognizing wrongful life claims have limited that cause of
action to cases concerning erroneous information about the risks of birth defects or disease.
See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 911-14. Wrongful life claims have failed in fact situations
not involving faulty testing and counseling. For example, in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 II. App.
2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964), a healthy, illegitimate child
unsuccessfully sued his father for damages resulting from his illegitimacy. Other unsuccess-
ful claims have arisen from improperly performed sterilization, see, e.g., Stribling v. de-
Quevedo, 288 Pa. Super. 436, 432 A.2d 239 (1980); Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala.
1978), or improperly performed abortion, see, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d
110 (1981), which usually resulted in the birth of a healthy but unplanned child. See, e.g.,
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982). No court has admitted that a life may be
wrongful absent some physical affliction, and currently prevailing case law suggests that
courts will uniformly reject any future wrongful life claims by healthy children.
898. See Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 771-72, 233 N.W.2d 372, 375
(1975).
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breach is the proximate cause of the child's birth 99 and the result-
ing injury of life in an impaired state.900
Currently, the highest court in thirteen states refuse to recog-
nize a cause of action for wrongful life.901 Appellate courts in three
other states90 2 and federal district courts applying the law of two
other states903 have dismissed wrongful life claims. In sum, eigh-
899. In this context the physician's breach of duty is not the proximate cause of afflic-
tions to what would otherwise be a healthy child. See Note, Wrongful Life: A Modern Claim
Which Conforms to the Traditional Tort Framework, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 125, 137
(1978). "The impaired child plaintiff in a wrongful life claim never had the opportunity to
be born healthy." Id. at 144.
This statement is true in most but not all wrongful life cases. Stated more accurately
from the time of the alleged breach of duty, the impaired child did not have the chance to
be born healthy. See generally Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d
483 (1983).
900. No court has allowed a child to assert a wrongful life claim against her parents.
Arguably, if an afflicted child's life can be wrongful because of the physician's negligence,
then that life could be wrongful because of the parents' negligence. Realistically, some pro-
spective parents may have a child with defects after a physician properly has informed them
of the risks of defects. In that case, the child would have the same afflictions for which a
negligent physician would have been liable according to the wrongful life theory. The child,
however, would have no available recovery from her parents because a woman's right to
abort during the first trimester of pregnancy is absolute. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163
(1973). Regardless of the mother's constitutional rights, any other ruling would have a stag-
geringly adverse impact on familial relationships and implicitly would encourage abortion to
avoid parental liability. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 228, 643 P.2d 954, 959, 182
Cal. Rptr. 337, 342 (1982). Parents under the specter of a lawsuit could not act entirely in
the child's best interest. Preserving unencumbered parental freedom of choice is a more
desirable social result for all parties than is parental liability. But see Curlender v. Bio-
Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980) (partially
overruled in Turpin v. Sortini) (if properly informed parents make a conscious choice to
have a seriously impaired infant, "we see no sound public policy which should protect those
parents from being answerable for the pain, suffering and misery which they have wrought
upon their offspring"). In response to Curlender, the California legislature enacted a statute
expressly prohibiting this type of suit. See, CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982).
901. Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8
(Del. 1975) (parent's claim treated as one for wrongful life); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253,
698 P.2d 315 (1984); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986); Schork v. Huber,
648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983) (wrongful life discussed though facts did not present the issue);
Smith v. Cote, Available on LEXIS Aug. 3, 1986, No. 85-015 (N.H. 1986); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Azzolino v. Dingfelder,
315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981)
(affirming by three to three decision lower court's dismissal of claim); Nelson v. Krusen, 678
S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d
288 (Wyo. 1982). Cf. Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982) (daugh-
ters who would not have been born but for ingestion of DES could not recover).
902. Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Eisbrenner v. Stan-
ley, 106 Mich. App. 351, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo.
App. 1982).
903. White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146 (D. Kan. 1981) (applying Georgia law);
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teen jurisdictions have reported decisions denying recovery to
plaintiffs alleging that their existence constituted a culpable
injury.904
Courts have rejected wrongful life claims for various policy
reasons. Some courts maintain that allowing a wrongful life cause
of action implies that nonlife is preferable to life in an impaired
state, an unacceptable disavowal of the sanctity and worth of all
human life.90 5 Other courts consider the tort beyond judicial ad-
ministrability.90 6 These courts reason that the compensatory na-
ture of tort law would require courts to compare the harm of an
impaired life with nonexistence when measuring damages.0 7 Be-
cause man is incapable of making this comparison, these courts be-
lieve that they should not allow the claim absent legislative enact-
ment. 0 8 In addition to policy reasons, some courts have rejected
wrongful life claims because the plaintiffs failed to establish a
duty, breach, or injury-the fundamental elements of a tort
claim.90 9 These courts have applied a standard negligence formula
Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D. S.C. 1980) (applying South Carolina law).
904. These statistics include claims asserted by healthy child plaintiffs. Some courts
that have confronted claims by healthy children, however, used sweeping language which
indicates that a life would not be wrongful under any circumstances, including severely im-
paired life. See Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978). But see Beardsley v. Wierdsma,
650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982) (addressing only healthy child's claim and withholding judgment
on the validity of impaired children's claims).
905. See Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978) ("a legal right not to be born
is alien to the public policy of this State to protect and preserve human life"); see also
Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537 (D. S.C. 1980).
906. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978) (discussing physician's failure to advise plaintiffs of the increased risk of Down's Syn-
drome in children born to women over 35 and of the availability of amniocentesis test);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (discussing physician's
alleged misdiagnosis of reubella as a rash on pregnant woman).
907. See Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d at 771, 231 N.W.2d at 375-76.
908. A statute would be in derogation of the common law in those states that have
judicially rejected wrongful life claims. A statute recognizing wrongful life claims might re-
move the conceptual difficulty of assessing damages by stating what components would be
allowable.
909. See, Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984). In Nelson a physician alleg-
edly rendered erroneous advice that a pregnant woman was not a carrier of Duchenne mus-
cular dystrophy. The court found it impossible to decide rationally whether the plaintiff had
been damaged. Id. at 925. The concurrence further stated:
Courts examining "wrongful life" suits have had difficulty with virtually every element
of the cause of action-the nature of the duty, if any, owed to an unborn child under
these circumstances, the concomitant question of breach, and the issue of proximate
cause in a situation where both the child's life and his or her defective condition are
due to the same negligent act.
Id. at 928-29 (Robison, J., concurring).
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and have concluded that wrongful life does not fit into the tradi-
tional tort framework.
Judicial recognition of a wrongful life tort is a fairly recent
phenomenon. Prior to 1982, only three decisions had allowed
claims for wrongful life, and higher courts subsequently overruled
or modified all of these decisions.91 0 Since 1982, however, the Su-
preme Courts of California,911 Washington, 91 and New Jersey9 13
have recognized wrongful life claims. Two state courts of appeals
also have recognized causes of action for wrongful life.914 These five
opinions do not represent a trend toward uniform acceptance of
wrongful life claims; seven state courts have rejected these claims
since 1982.911 Nevertheless, these five decisions represent signifi-
cant steps toward allowing impaired children to assert claims for
wrongful life and lay a foundation for future wrongful life actions.
Section B of this Part discusses five recent opinions that have
recognized a wrongful life cause of action and evaluates these
courts' analytical approaches to the elements of the claim-duty,
causation, injury and damages. Section C examines the merits and
flaws of these opinions and suggests a better-reasoned analytical
approach to wrongful life cases. Section D concludes that a well-
reasoned approach to wrongful life claims, with a proper assess-
ment of injury and damages, will enable courts to provide just
compensation for the children who suffer the consequences of the
medical community's negligence in prenatal care.
910. Parke v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), modified sub nom.
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Becker v.
Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477 (1980), partially overruled in Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337 (1982).
911. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal.3d at 228, 643 P.2d at 959, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
912. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
913. Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
914. Continental Casualty Co. v. Empire Casualty Co., No. 83 CAT 139 (Colo. Ct.
App. June 27, 1985); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp. 134 IMI. App. 3d 823, 480 N.E.2d
1227 (1985).
915. See Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984); Bruggeman v. Schimke,
718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Smith v. Cote,
available on LEXIS Aug. 3, 1986, No. 85-015 (N.H. 1986); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C.
103, 337 S.E. 2d 528 (1985); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984); James G. v.
Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985).
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B. PRINCIPAL CASES RECOGNIZING A WRONGFUL LIFE CAUSE OF
ACTION
1. State Supreme Court Decisions
(a) Turpin v. Sortini
In Turpin v. Sortini 16 the California Supreme Court consid-
ered a deaf child's claim for general and special damages resulting
from a hearing specialist's erroneous diagnosis. The plaintiff's par-
ents consulted the defendant about the suspected hearing
problems of their infant child, Hope. The parents alleged that af-
ter the specialist incorrectly diagnosed Hope's hearing as being
within normal limits, they conceived Joy, the plaintiff.9 17 Another
specialist subsequently informed the parents of Hope's deafness
and of the reasonable probability that any of their future children
would inherit the hearing defect.918 The parents alleged that had
they known of the hereditary deafness, they would not have con-
ceived Joy, who suffered from the same disease.919 The court con-
cluded that if Joy sustained her burden of proof on remand, she
could recover the extraordinary expenses occasioned by the heredi-
tary ailment.2 0
The Turpin court did not analyze the elements of duty,
breach, and causation because the defendant did not challenge
these aspects of the claim on appeal.9 2 ' Addressing the injury ele-
ment, the court discussed Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs, Inc.,922 a
California court of appeals decision that recognized a claim for
wrongful life. The Curlender court refused to recognize a right not
to be born and, therefore, rejected the state of nonlife as the
proper reference for establishing an injury. Instead, the Curlender
court found the child's condition at birth to be the proper point of
reference.92 The Turpin court, however, reasoned that finding that
the injury is the child's impaired condition implies that the child
916. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). The trial court had dis-
missed the child's cause of action on demurrer.
917. Id. at 224, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
918. Id.
919. Id.
920. Id. at 238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348. The court did not provide
guidelines for determining these extraordinary expenses, apparently leaving the details of
the assessment to the trial court if it found liability.
921. Id. at 230, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
922. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
923. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 231, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (citing
Curlender, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 828-29, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488).
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would have been healthy but for the tortfeasor's negligence. 24 The
court dismissed the Curlender reasoning as inapplicable by noting
that the child in the instant wrongful life claim never had a chance
to be healthy.e25 The Turpin court stated that establishing injury
in a wrongful life claim necessarily requires comparison of life in
an impaired state with no life at all. 26 The court thus rejected one
of the primary justifications for denying wrongful life claims-the
notion that life is always better than nonlife as a matter of law.9 27
In rejecting that notion the court found support in statutory92 8 and
case law929 acknowledging the rights of terminally ill persons to re-
fuse life sustaining procedures. 3 0
The court next considered whether a fact finder could deter-
mine that nonlife was preferable to life in the instant case. Ac-
knowledging that such a jury finding would be unlikely, the court
nevertheless stated that the plaintiff could claim special damages if
the "defendant's negligence was in fact a proximate cause of the
child's present and continuing need for such special, extraordinary
medical care and training. '9 31 By defining the injury in this man-
ner, the court implicitly found the injury to be the child's impaired
state, although the court had rejected explicitly that definition ear-
lier in the opinion.9 3 2 Achieving the same result as the Curlender
court, the Turpin court held the defendant liable for failure to di-
agnose a hereditary condition that could not have been prevented.
Turning to the issue of damages, the court first considered
whether to award general damages. Relying on the landmark deci-
sion Gleitman v. Cosgrove,933 the court stated that calculation of
924. 31 Cal. 3d at 231, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
925. Id.
926. Id. at 232, 633 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
927. Id. at 233, 633 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
928. The court cited CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1986).
929. The court cited In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). In that case, the
court considered a request for authority to discontinue extraordinary procedures sustaining
the life of a drug overdose victim who suffered irreversible brain damage and who survived
in a vegetative state. The Quinlan court noted the right of privacy found in the penumbra
of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. "Presumably this right is broad enough to encompass
a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much the
same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy
under certain conditons." Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
930. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233, 633 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal.Rptr. at 345.
931. Id. at 238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
932. See supra text accompanying note 904.
933. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). Gleitman was the first state supreme court case
analyzing a wrongful life claim by an impaired child. Many later decisions relied on the
reasoning of Gleitman in rejecting the claim.
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general damages requires comparing the plaintiff's pain and suffer-
ing to no existence at all, an assessment of which man is incapa-
ble. 34 This problematic comparison, however, served as the court's
essential basis for establishing the injury element of the claim.935
The Turpin court thus suggested that, for purposes of finding a
tort injury, life in an impaired state may be worse than nonlife, but
that a court cannot determine the extent of the difference to assess
damages. Although the court considered general damages incalcu-
lable, the court found the special expenses attendant to the plain-
tiff's deafness "readily ascertainable" and concluded that these ex-
penses were the proper measure of damages. 6 The court, however,
did not explain why the problematic comparison of impaired life
and nonlife did not affect the award of special damages. In this
respect, the award of special damages is arbitrary even if, as the
court suggested, those figures are readily ascertainable.
The precedent that Turpin established is clearer than the rea-
soning behind the holding. In California, a child-plaintiff may as-
sert a cause of action for wrongful life. Physicians have the duty,
although not clearly delineated in Turpin, to inform potential par-
ents of discoverable hereditary defects that their child might have
at birth. If the defendant's breach of this duty deprives the par-
ents of information that would have led them to decide against
having the child, causation is established. Courts actually are de-
fining the injury in terms of damages, which consist of the special
costs associated with the defect during the plaintiff's life.
Turpin is significant not only because it was the first state su-
preme court decision that recognized a claim for wrongful life, but
also because this decision established in California that the basis
for liability is linked not to the severity of a birth defect, but to its
predictability. Moreover, Turpin attacked, albeit inconsistently,
the premise that life is always better than nonlife. Finally, Turpin
provided an administrable measure of damages that proved attrac-
tive to future courts.937
934. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 235, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
935. See supra text accompanying note 906.
936. 31 Cal. 3d at 238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
937. See, e.g., Procanik v. CiUo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
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(b) Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.
In Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc135 the defendant-physicians
had prescribed Dilantin, an anticonvulsant drug, to the plaintiffs'
mother to control her epilepic seizures.9 39 Although the plaintiffs'
parents inquired about the risks associated with pregnancy while
on the drug, the defendants did not research the issue or inform
the parents about the known correlation between Dilantin and
birth defects.9 40 The children-plaintiffs were born with fetal hy-
dantoin syndrome, which is characterized by several physical and
developmental abnormalities. 1 The parents testified that they
would not have had the children-plaintiffs had the defendants in-
formed them of the risks associated with Dilantin9 42
Relying on Turpin, the Washington Supreme Court observed
that allowing a wrongful birth action by parents while denying re-
covery to impaired children would be anomalous 3 The court
noted that the parents' recovery did not include care for the chil-
dren after the age of majority, although the childrens' need for
special medical care and training would continue throughout their
lives. 44 The court preferred to place the burden of these continu-
ing special medical care and training costs on those who caused
them.' 5 For these reasons, the Washington court recognized the
wrongful life cause of action. 46
Addressing the elements of this cause of action, the court im-
posed on the defendants a duty to inform prospective parents of
the risks that the defendants should have discovered, given the
standard of care in the profession. 7 In this case, the defendants'
failure to alert the plaintiffs' parents to the effects of Dilantin on
938. 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
939. Id. at 462, 656 P.2d at 486.
940. Id. at 463, 656 P.2d at 487.
941. The plaintiffs had "mild to moderate growth deficiencies, mild to moderate devel-
opmental retardation, wide-set eyes, lateral ptosis (drooping eyelids), hypoplasia of the fin-
gers, small nails, low-set hairline, broad nasal ridge, and other physical and developmental
defects." Id. at 463, 656 P.2d at 486.
942. The district court made fact findings and certified to the Washington Supreme
Court the question whether the plaintiffs could maintain a claim for wrongful life.
943. 98 Wash. 2d at 479, 656 P.2d at 495 (quoting Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220,
238, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348 (1982)).
944. Id.
945. Id.
946. Id.
947. Id. at 480-82, 656 P.2d at 495-96. The district court held that the physicians
breached this standard by falling to conduct a literature search of the effects of Dilantin of
pregnancy. Id. at 483, 656 P.2d at 497.
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pregnancy foreseeably endangered the plaintiffs' health. 4 8 Having
established the defendants' breach of this duty, proof that the
plaintiffs would not have been born but for the defendants' negli-
gence established causation. 49 Considering the issue of injury, the
Harbeson court recognized prior courts' difficulty with establishing
this element of the claim. The court nonetheless concluded that an
injury exists "to the extent that [the minor plaintiffs] require spe-
cial medical treatment and training beyond that required by chil-
dren not afflicted with fetal hydantoin syndrome." 950 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court, therefore, defined injury in terms of
damages, much like the California Supreme Court did in Tur-
pin.9 51 The court denied recovery of general damages because the
court considered the difference between impaired life and nonlife
impossible to calculate. 52 Like Turpin, Harbeson does not explain
why the impossibility of this calculation precludes recovery of gen-
eral damages for pain and suffering, yet does not affect a determi-
nation of special damages. The Harbeson court, however, did
render an administrable decision that served two objectives: to de-
ter malpractice and to ease the burdens of the impaired plaintiff.
(c) Procanik v. Cillo
In Procanik v. Cillo95 the New Jersey Supreme Court over-
ruled the landmark decision of Gleitman v. Cosgrove,95" which had
refused to recognize a cause of action for wrongful life. In Procanik
the plaintiff's mother consulted the defendant during the first tri-
mester of pregnancy to determine whether she had contracted ru-
bella.9 55 Erroneously assured that she had not contracted the dis-
ease, the plaintiff's mother allowed her pregnancy to continue,
948. Id. at 480, 656 P.2d at 496.
949. Id.
950. Id. at 483, 656 P.2d at 497.
951. See supra notes 904-10 and accompanying text.
952. Id. at 480, 656 P.2d at 496. One commentator has concluded that for this reason
the court should not have found an injury. Recent Development, Washington Recognizing
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life-A Critical Analysis-Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 58
WASH. L. REv. 649, 676 (1983). "Existing principles should not be stretched beyond recogni-
tion in order to allow recovery in specific cases. If a claim does not fit within accepted tort
principles, there should be no recovery unless the tort principles are changed by the legisla-
ture." Id.
953. 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
954. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 589 (1967). See supra note 933.
955. Id. at 343, 478 A.2d at 758. Because the case presented an appeal from a granted
motion to dismiss, the court accepted as true plaintiff's allegation regarding the consulta-
tion. Id.
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eventually giving birth to the infant-plaintiff who suffered from
congential rubella syndrome. 56 A proper evaluation by the defend-
ant during pregnancy would have revealed the mother's disease
and the corresponding likelihood of the child's afflictions.9 57 The
defendant's error thus deprived the plaintiff's parents of informa-
tion necessary to make an informed choice about terminating the
pregnancy.958
In considering whether to recognize a wrongful life cause of
action, the court admitted the logical problems inherent in a
wrongful life claim, such as recognizin~g the child's standing and
injury. The court, however, concluded that "[1]aw is more than an
exercise in logic, and logical analysis, although essential to a sys-
tem of ordered justice, should not become an instrument of injus-
tice."9 59 The court noted that this case served as a good example of
potential injustice because, although New Jersey recognized a pa-
rental cause of action for wrongful birth, the statute of limitations
had run on the parents' claim.9 60 Concerned that the child may
have had no other prospects for recovery, the court, therefore, con-
cluded that if the plaintiff sustained the burden of persuasion, he
could recover the "extraordinary medical expenses attributable to
his affliction."96 1
The court stated its findings on duty, breach, and causation
with little elaboration.962 Addressing the issues of injury and dam-
ages, the Procanik court, like the Turpin and Harbeson courts,
made the analytical leap from injury to damages without explana-
tion. 63 Confining recovery to special damages, the court stated
that "the ultimate decision is a policy choice summoning the most
sensitive and careful judgment." 64 The court asserted that the two
956. The child's multiple birth defects included eye lesions, heart disease, and audi-
tory defects. Id. at 344, 478 A.2d at 758.
957. Id. at 343, 478 A.2d at 758.
958. Id. at 348-49, 478 A.2d at 760.
959. Id. at 351, 478 A.2d at 762.
960. Id. at 352, 478 A.2d at 762.
961. Id. at 342-43, 418 A.2d at 757. The court asked: Must the child "forego medical
treatment for his blindness, deafness, and retardation? We think not." Id. at 352, 478 A.2d
at 762.
962. The court merely stated: "The defendant doctors do not deny they owed a duty
to the infant plaintiff, and we find such a duty exists .... [W]e assume, furthermore, that
the defendant doctors were negligent in treating the mother [and] that their negligence de-
prived the parents of the choice of terminating the pregnancy ...... Id. at 348-49, 478 A.2d
at 760.
963. See id. at 353-54, 478 A.2d at 763.
964. Id. at 354, 478 A.2d at 763.
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policy objectives of tort law-compensating injury and deterring
future wrongdoing-both require a more ascertainable and predict-
able measure of damages than is possible in the highly speculative
determination of whether nonlife may be preferable to a plaintiff's
impaired life. 65 The court found that damages measured by the
cost of extraordinary care provides both a predictable, ascertaina-
ble means of compensating the plaintiff and a "sufficient sting" to
deter future malpractice.9 66 Thus, the court arguably defined the
tort in traditional negligence terms, but the decision ultimately re-
lied on policy grounds. In this respect, the Procanik court's ration-
ale had a different emphasis from Turpin and Harbeson, although
the result was the same.
In a separate opinion, Justice Handler concurred in the award
of special damages, but dissented from the court's denial of general
damages. 67 Justice Handler saw no reason to deny general dam-
ages and suggested alternative methods of assessment, including
comparing the benefits of an impaired life with its burdens, 68 com-
pensating for diminished parenthood,96 9 and compensating for im-
paired childhood.9 70 More importantly, Justice Handler, unlike the
majority, openly addressed the element of injury and the formulas
for compensation. 71 He argued that the infant's injury does not
necessitate either a preference for nonlife over life or an irrational
comparison of the two.97 2 Rather, the injury consists of the conse-
quences of depriving the parents of their right to determine on the
child's behalf whether he should have been born.9
By characterizing the injury in this manner, Justice Handler
solved two analytical problems. First, he removed the calculation
965. Id.
966. Id.
967. Id. at 368, 478 A.2d at 764-72. (Handler, J., concurring). Justice Schreiber dis-
sented from the award of special damages and would have denied recovery entirely. He
viewed the award as compensation for the defects, which implied that the defendants had
caused the defects. Because the physicians did not cause the defects, Justice Schreiber con-
sidered holding the physicians liable unjust. Id. at 370-71, 478 A.2d at 772-73 (Schreiber, J.,
dissenting).
968. Id. at 368, 478 A.2d at 771. See infra notes 1011-14 and accompanying text.
969. 97 N.J. at 368, 478 A.2d at 771 (Handler, J., concurring). Parents who are kept
ignorant of a child's defective state until his birth are, according to Justice Handler, less fit
to assume parental responsibilities than they otherwise would be. Thus, this element of
damages includes both emotional and psychological harm. See id. at 358-59, 478 A.2d at
766-68.
970. Id. at 368, 478 A.2d at 771.
971. Id. at 356-69, 478 A.2d at 764-772.
972. Id. at 358, 478 A.2d at 765.
973. Id. at 364, 478 A.2d at 769.
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of life versus nonlife from a finding of injury. Thus, a court could
define the four elements of the tort in a principled manner. The
court could make the life-nonlife calculation, if at all, when assess-
ing damages. Any difficulty in assessing damages would not be a
bar to recovery.9 74 Second, by emphasizing the parents' fundamen-
tal right of choice, his approach avoids a judicial determination
that nonlife is preferable to life, because the parents, not the court,
make the choice. Justice Handler's policy was simply to protect the
child's right to have his parents sufficiently informed to act in his
best interest.7 5
2. State Appellate Court Decisions
(a) Siemienec v. Lutheran General Hospital
In addition to the preceding state supreme court decisions, in-
termediate courts in Illinois and Colorado have recognized claims
for wrongful life in Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 9 7
and Continental Casualty Co. v. Empire Casualty Co.,97 7 respec-
tively. The Illinois Court of Appeals, in Siemieniec v. Lutheran
General Hospital,97 8 allowed a child-plaintiff's claim97 9 for ex-
traordinary expenses attendant to hemophilia 980 after he reached
the age of majority. The complaint alleged that the defendant-phy-
sician erroneously informed the plaintiff's mother that the risk
that her child would be born a hemophiliac was very low." 1 The
plaintiff's mother claimed that she would have terminated her
pregnancy if the results of tests determining the likelihood of he-
mophilia in her offspring had been positive. 82 Relying on the inac-
974. Id. at 368, 478 A.2d at 771.
975. Id. at 365, 478 A.2d at 769.
976. 134 IM. App. 3d 823, 480 N.E.2d 1227 (1985).
977. No. 83CA0139 (Colo. Ct. App. June 27, 1985) (available Oct. 20, 1985, on LEXIS,
States library, Colo. file).
978. 134 Ill. App. 3d 823, 480 N.E.2d 1227 (1985).
979. The court stated that the claim was not one for wrongful life, Id. at -, 480
N.E.2d at 1235, but that the semantic description of the claim was without significance. The
fact situation in Siemieniec paralleled those of the previously discussed wrongful life cases.
980. Hemophilia is a hereditary blood clotting disorder that primarily affects males.
The deficiency or inactivity of coagulation factors needed for blood clotting causes the disor-
der, which occurs in different levels of severity. Id. at 825 n.1, 480 N.E.2d at 1229 n.1.
981. The lower court submitted certified questions to the Appellate Court of Illinois,
First District, Second Division. One question was whether the child had a cause of action for
extraordinary medical expenses during his age of majority. The court considered the perti-
nent alleged facts to be true for purposes of analysis. Id. at _, 480 N.E.2d at 1228.
982. Plaintiff's mother apparently made this allegation to establish a prima facie
showing of causation. In a wrongful life suit, the plaintiff must show that, but for the de-
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curate information, she decided to have the child.
The court summarily disposed of previous decisions that had
denied recovery on similar facts, stating that those "decisions often
reflect[ed] the now discarded rationale of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Gleitman ... that it could not weigh the value of an im-
paired life against no life at all." 8 3 The Illinois court indicated
that it would not preclude recovery because of the impaired life
versus nonlife dilemma. In this case, however, the plaintiff sought
only specific damages for the extraordinary expenses relating to
hemophilia and, therefore, the problematic comparison of impaired
life with nonlife was unnecessary.""4 According to the court, only a
claim for general damages would require that assessment, and such
a claim was not before the court.""' The Illinois court thus used the
same argument asserted in previous cases-special damages, unlike
general damages for pain and suffering, are readily ascertainable
and, therefore, allowable. The court did not define the plaintiff's
injury and then measure damages; rather, the court ascertained the
damages figures and then found an injury."8 Thus, the Siemieniec
court, like the court in Turpin, allowed a cause of action for a
plaintiff who faced costly physical problems, but who could con-
ceivably lead a full, productive life.
fendant's erroneous information or lack of information, the plaintiff would not have been
born. The Siemieniec court noted two types of hemophilia, factor VIII and factor IX. The
plaintiff was born with factor IX hemophilia, for which no reliable test existed. Thus, the
physician was allegedly negligent in failing to apprise plaintiff's mother of the risk of factor
IX hemohilia, for which he could not test. Plaintiff's mother alleged she would have aborted
the pregnancy if tests for hemophilia had been "positive." Id. at -, 480 N.E.2d at 1228.
Would she have aborted, however, if informed of the risk of factor IX hemophilia? The
court failed to address this question although it appears crucial to a prima facie showing of
causation.
Plaintiff's mother obviously wanted to have a healthy child, but a fact finder must de-
termine the degree of risk she was willing to assume. Because courts use a subjective test to
analyze the element of causation in a wrongful life case, the fact finder must determine what
the prospective mother would have decided had she been properly informed. In the instant
case, the mother's testimony would likely have been the only available evidence on the issue
of causation. Unless her testimony was not credible, the plaintiff could probably estalish
causation in a conclusory fashion. The foregoing analysis illustrates the inherent difficulty of
defending against this element of the tort.
983. Id. at -, 480 N.E.2d at 1233.
984. Id. at -, 480 N.E.2d at 1235.
985. Id.
986. The court noted that "'the damage here is both certain and readily measura-
ble.'" Id. (quoting Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 238-39, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 348 (1985)). The court then stated that "[i]f, as alleged, defendants' negligence
was in fact a proximate cause of the child's present and continuing need for such special,
extraordinary medical care and training, we believe.., defendants [should be held] liable
for the cost of such care." Id.
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(b) Continental Casualty Co. v. Empire Casualty Co.
In Continental Casualty Co. v. Empire Casualty Co.9 7 the
Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's finding that a
physician was liable on four counts of negligence.988 The physician
had mistyped the plaintiff's mother's blood type during her first
pregnancy;98 9 proper testing would have revealed the RH incom-
patibility of the parents' blood types. This incompatibility posed a
significant risk to their later offspring.99e In cases of RH incompati-
bility, administering a drug to the mother within seventy-two
hours after giving birth prevents her future offspring from being
exposed to the devastating consequences of blood sensitization.9 91
Because the physician did not discover the RH incompatibility and
render appropriate treatment following plaintiff's mother's first
two pregnancies, 92 her third child, the plaintiff, suffered a stroke
either in utero or shortly after birth.993 Furthermore, because the
physician incorrectly advised the mother before her third preg-
nancy that she still could have normal children, the physician de-
prived her of information that would have affected her decision to
have the third child. 94
The appellate court limited its review to deciding whether a
wrongful life claim was legally cognizable.9 95 Holding that wrongful
life was a proper claim, the court determined that the trial court's
findings of fact supported the imposition of liability in this case. 9 6
Applying basic tort principles,9 97 the court found that the physi-
987. No. 83CA0139 (Colo. Ct. App. June 27, 1985) (available Oct. 20, 1985, on LEXIS,
States library, Colo. file).
988. The four counts were (1) mistyping plaintiff's mother's blood in July 1972; (2)
failing to retype her blood in March 1974 during her second pregnancy; (3) failing to investi-
gate the stillbirth of her second child in 1974; and (4) subsequently advising the parents
affirmatively that they could have normal children in the future. Id.
989. Id.
990. "[The child plaintiff] suffered from a hemolytic disease known as erythroblastosis
fatalis." Id.
991. Id. For an explanation of the process in which a mother develops antibodies that
attack fetal cells, see supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
992. The mother's second child was stillborn. Id.
993. Id.
994. Id.
995. Id.
996. Id.
997. The court cited § 311 of The Restatement (Second) of Torts, which reads as
follows:
Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such
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cian's duty to inform the parents of potential deformities inured to
the child as a foreseeable victim of the physician's actions or omis-
sions."9 8 Failure to inform the plaintiff's parents constituted a
breach of duty, and the plaintiff established causation when the
parents showed that they would have prevented the plaintiff's
birth if they had been properly informed.9 9 The court did not re-
quire the plaintiff to show that nonlife is preferable to life, but the
court's reasoning logically suggests that this showing is necessary
to establish injury.
Noting that previous courts had refused to find an injury be-
cause public policy dictates a universal preference for life,1000 the
Continental Casualty court was "unwilling to say as a matter of
law that life, even with the most severe and debilitating of impair-
ments, is always preferable to non-existence."'001 The court ac-
knowledged that the recent trend was for courts to allow only spe-
cial damages. The court, however, expressed no view on the limited
damages rule because the issue was not raised on appeal.0 0 2 Thus,
the Colorado court's decision arguably was more internally consis-
tent than the previous decisions. Those earlier decisions had sug-
gested that life may not always be preferable to nonlife, but had
refused to allow general damages because that comparison was
unmeasurable.
Although similar to Harbeson in some respects, Continental
Casualty presented the unusual situation of a defendant being lia-
ble to the child under two different theories. First, the defendant
was liable in a standard malpractice claim for the preventable
stroke that he proximately caused. 0 3 Second, the defendant was
liable in a wrongful life claim because he deprived the parents of
information necessary to their decision whether to have the child.
This dual liability, however, would not result in a greater award of
information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action
taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 311 (1965).
998. Continental Casualty, No. 83CA0139.
999. Id.
1000. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 905.
1001. Continental Casualty, No. 83CA0139.
1002. Id.
1003. Id.
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damages unless the harm caused by one tort was different from
that caused by the other. Therefore, the result may be an award of
the same amount that would have been recoverable under only a
standard malpractice action, which presumably would include the
computation of extraordinary expenses. Although a dual liability
claim produces the same result as a single liability claim, the inci-
dence of dual claims for wrongful life and standard malpractice
may increase because positing. more than one theory may increase
the chances of recovery.
C. ANALYSIS
The concept of a wrongful life tort has existed for only twenty
years and only recently has found some judicial favor. The forego-
ing decisions that have recognized wrongful life claims represent a
radical departure from the pre-1982 judicial consensus rejecting
claims of wrongful life. Moreover, the Turpin and Siemieniec
courts allowed claims for deaf and hemophiliac plaintiffs, sug-
gesting that a birth defect or disease need not be completely
debilitating for a court to allow recovery. All five courts employed
a result-oriented approach to establish an administrable system of
recovery for plaintiffs. Unfortunately, the courts achieved this re-
sult at the expense of sound legal analysis. Law should not be a
servant of logic, 100 4 but too much departure from logic weakens the
public's confidence in the judiciary. If courts continue to "define"
wrongful life as they do currently, and if courts continue to allow
recovery, they should define the plaintiff's injury more precisely.
Moreover, courts must relate the definition of injury to the relief
allowed. The following analysis highlights some of the merits and
some of the flaws in the current reasoning and suggests a more
principled approach to these issues.
Comparing the elements of duty and injury in a wrongful life
claim to those of a conventional malpractice claim is helpful.
Wrongful life is a category of malpractice that has evolved from
the doctrine of informed consent. In recent years, courts have ac-
knowledged a physician's preconception or prenatal duty to subse-
quently born children.10 05 Prevention of future birth defects de-
pends on proper information gathered through case histories,
1004. See supra text accompanying note 959.
1005. See generally Collins, An Overview and Analysis: Prenatal Torts, Preconcep-
tion Torts, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Death, and Wrongful Birth: Time for a New Frame-
work, 22 J. FAM. L. 677 (1983-84).
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genetic testing, amniocentesis, or physical examination of the pro-
spective mother. Public policy, therefore, dictates that physicians
owe future children a duty to provide adequate information to pro-
spective parents according to the standards of the profession. The
physician cannot ensure that prospective parents will use this in-
formation wisely or follow his advice, but fulfilling this duty to in-
form the prospective parents better enables them to act in the best
interest of the child. Whether the duty is owed directly or inures
derivatively to the child, the boundaries of the duty are the same
in the context of informing the prospective parents. The courts
recognizing wrongful life claims have concluded that this duty to
the child, which had been established in the standard malpractice
context, should also apply to a defendant in a claim for wrongful
life.1008 Breach of the defendant's duty to inform causes the in-
jury-the child's impaired state-because the parents, equipped
with proper information, could have prevented the child's impaired
condition. This approach to the duty element is a sound mode of
analysis.
The issue of injury and damages in wrongful life claims are
more problematic. The wrongful life cases discussed in Section B
established the extraordinary expenses associated with a plaintiff's
abnormalities as the proper measure of injury and damages. The
primary reason for focusing on extraordinary expenses was that
courts are capable of calculating these expenses and reaching an
ascertainable figure.1 007 That a court may ascertain this figure does
not explain, however, why calculable extraordinary expenses
should be the measure of a defined injury. In addition to the fact
that the extraordinary expenses formula provides an administrable
means of awarding recoveries to handicapped plaintiffs, the courts
may have chosen this amount as the measure of damages because a
parent in a wrongful birth action can recover extraordinary ex-
penses throughout the child's minority. These courts were troubled
by the unsettling proposition that parents could recover extraordi-
nary expenses for wrongful birth while a child could recover noth-
ing.1008 This discrepancy, however, does not logically suggest that a
child has suffered an injury in a wrongful life case. Rather, this
1006. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 476, 656 P.2d 483, 493
(1983); Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 230, 643 P.2d 954, 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 343
(1982).
1007. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 936 and 966.
1008. See supra text accompanying note 51; see also Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d at
238, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
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concern indicates that recovery for extraordinary expenses in a
wrongful birth claim should not be a windfall to the parents, but
should be preserved for the child's benefit. Thus, any perceived
anomaly in denying recovery for the child is related to the inade-
quacy of a blanket award in a wrongful birth claim, not the proper
legal definition of an injury.
Courts should reject this illogical approach and develop a
more precise, discreet definition of the injury in wrongful life
claims. Traditional tort principles can frame this definition. As a
general rule, the compensatory purpose of tort law is to place the
plaintiff in the position she would have been in but for the
tortfeasor's negligence.""os A compensable injury exists if the fact
finder determines that the plaintiff is in a worse position after the
alleged tort.1010 From the plaintiff's perspective in a wrongful life
suit, the consequences of the defendant's negligence are the change
from nonexistence to life-with all of the benefits and burdens
that accompany the plaintiff's life. In the wrongful life context,
therefore, courts must assign values to nonexistence, the burdens
of life, and the benefits of life.
Because a preference for nonexistence is unfathomable, courts
have balked at assigning any value to nonexistence. Courts could,
however, assign nonexistence a value of zero because it is neither a
positive or negative position; it is nothing.1011 Consequently, courts
would not measure nonexistence in assessing damages,0 12 but,
starting with the plaintiff's birth, would compare the benefits and
burdens of the plaintiff's life in an impaired state. If the burdens
exceed the benefits, then the plaintiff has been injured and tort
1009. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 537
(7th ed. 1982).
1010. Cf. id.
1011. A finding that life is worse than nonlife means that "the balance between happi-
ness and misery in life is negative, or positive, but that finding is not literally a comparison
of a person's condition with the condition of not-being, as in the latter state there is neither
happiness nor misery whatsoever." Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life," 1
ISRAEL L. REV. 513, 530 (1966).
1012. In another context, the law has not necessitated an evaluation of anything be-
yond the victim's life. Survival statutes allow the estate of a deceased tort victim to recover
ascertainable damages on the victim's behalf. Generally, the judiciary determines damages
according to traditional tort principles. No state requires a metaphysical assessment of the
benefit or burdens beyond death, nor does any state allow the prospect of this assessment to
diminish or increase recovery. The law considers only what can be empirically known
through human experience. If the law does not allow the question of a hypothetical benefit
or burden resulting from death to affect recovery, the law need not preclude recovery when
the unknown areas exist prior to, rather than after, life.
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law, therefore, entitles her to recovery. 10 13
Courts could determine the burdens by using traditional con-
cepts of damages, including an assessment of pain and suffering.
Measuring the benefits of life in an impaired state may seem irra-
tional. Courts, however, routinely place pecuniary value on the
burdens of pain, suffering, and mental distress and have estab-
lished administrable patterns of awards for these burdens. 1014
Courts could develop a similar pattern regarding the benefits of
life in an impaired state. Moreover, if a court allows a wrongful life
claim, refusing to account for the benefits of life essentially makes
the defendant liable for the impaired child's deformities. Wrongful
life claims, however, assert that the defendant proximately caused
the plaintiff's life, not the plaintiff's defects.
The administrability of basing awards on extraordinary ex-
penses is appealing, but assessment of the benefits and burdens of
the plaintiff's life more closely relates to the injury that the plain-
tiff alleged and, therefore, the relief that the plaintiff seeks in a
wrongful life claim. Furthermore, defining injury as the amount by
which the burden of an impaired life exceeds its benefits properly
distinguishes wrongful life claims from other malpractice claims.
Finally, this approach inherently ensures that recovery would de-
pend on the severity of the defects. Wrongful life claims would be
successful only in cases of extremely impaired plaintiffs.
In addition to establishing a more rational approach to deter-
mining the elements of a wrongful life claim and to assessing a
proper damages award, courts must consider the policy implica-
tions of these decisions. The courts that have allowed wrongful life
claims have thus far declined to state expressly that nonexistence
is preferable to life in an impaired condition, but the reasoning
inherent in allowing a wrongful life claim suggests this conclusion.
Explaining the tort through more clearly articulated principles
1013. See Cohen & Chessen, The Continuing Judicial Development of the Theory of
"Wrongful Life," 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 211, 227 (1978).
In some situations, the plaintiff can be said to benefit from the defendant's tort. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his prop-
erty and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that
was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages,
to the extent that this is equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) (emphasis added). Thus, if the fact finder
determines that the benefits of impaired life exceed the burdens, no recovery would inure to
the plaintiff. In this situation, the defendant could not counterclaim for the excess benefits
because allowing him to recover for his own negligence would be inequitable.
1014. See Cohen & Chesson, supra note 1013, at 227.
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does not dispose of the far-reaching policy concerns that recogni-
tion of the claim presents. Some courts may consider a determina-
tion that life's burdens exceed its benefits tantamount to sanction-
ing suicide, but making an objective determination for purposes of
tort recovery need not go so far. The moral propriety of affirming
all life can coexist with an understanding that certain life may im-
pose intolerable burdens. In the final analysis, although courts
should consider the logical implications of their rulings, practical
experience indicates that explicit judicial recognition of the view
that life in an impaired state is worse than nonlife for purposes of
tort recovery is unlikely. As the current trend suggests, courts in-
clined to recognize claims for wrongful life do not necessarily feel
constrained by logic.
D. CONCLUSION
Wrongful life, a concept that failed in the courts for almost
twenty years, has finally gained recognition as a viable tort claim
for children who suffer the consequences of the medical commu-
nity's negligent prenatal care and counseling. Courts that have rec-
ognized this cause of action have rejected the notion that life, even
in a seriously impaired state, is always preferable to nonexistence.
These courts have developed an administrable approach to provid-
ing remedies that accommodate the child-plaintiff's impairments.
Unfortunately, courts have reached these commendable results in
result oriented opinions that are analytically unsound. Proper de-
termination of whether and how much a court should allow a
plaintiff to recover in a wrongful life claim requires a well-reasoned
approach to each element of the tort and to the damages issue.
Particularly, courts should be careful to define the injury as the
plaintiff's life, with all of its benefits and burdens. Courts should
then assess those benefits and burdens and, if the burdens out-
weigh the benefits, award damages accordingly. This approach,
with a more accurate characterization of injury and a more precise
correlation of injury and damages, best serves the goals of tort law
by providing plaintiffs just compensation for their injuries and by
holding defendants responsible for the consequences of their
negligence.
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A. INTRODUCTION
The expansion of fetal rights in tort law10 15 has prompted judi-
cial consideration of recovery for fetal death under state wrongful
death statutes.10 10 Wrongful death statutes provide for monetary
awards to designated beneficiaries when the decedent dies because
of a tortfeasor's intentional negligent act.1017 With respect to recov-
1015. See generally Collins, supra note 1005 (wrongful life section) (surveying and
analyzing the development of tortfeasors' liability). See also sections VI, VII, and VIII of
the Special Project.
1016. State legislatures initially patterned their wrongful death statutes after Lord
Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, which compensated families
of persons killed in accidents. The Act read, in part, as follows:
WHEREAS no Action at Law is now maintainable against a Person who by his wrong-
ful Act, Neglect, or Default may have caused the Death of another Person, and it is
often times right and expedient that the Wrongdoer in such Case should be answerable
in Damages for the Injury so caused by him: Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's
most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Au-
thority of the same, That whensoever the Death of a Person shall be caused by wrong-
ful Act, Neglect, or Default, and the Act, Neglect, or Default is such as would (if Death
had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action and recover
Damages in respect thereof, then and in every such Case the Person who would have
been liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an Action for Damages, notwith-
standing the Death of the Person injured, and although the Death shall have been
caused under such Circumstances as amount in Law to Felony.
Id. This Act statutorily overruled Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808), which
had held that death is not a civil injury. Id. The Baker decision, although substantively
superceded by statute in both the United Kingdom (excluding Scotland) and the United
States, continues to support the proposition that no common law remedy for wrongful death
has ever existed. But see infra note 1040 (discussing Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375 (1970), in which Justice Harlan cast doubt on that theory). In the United
States, every state except Massachusetts recognizes wrongful death as an exclusively statu-
tory remedy. See Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 71, 284 N.E. 2d 222, 229 (1972).
1017. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-902 (1984). ("An action may be
maintained against a person whose wrongful act causes the death of another.").
Wrongful death statutes must be distinguished from survival statutes. Survival statutes
allow a victim's estate to enforce a victim's right to sue because that right "survives" his
death. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §3-817(a)(1981); MODEL SuRvrvAL AND DEATH
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ery for fetal death, the relevant inquiry is whether a fetus is a
"person" within the meaning of the state's wrongful death statute.
If the fetus is a person under the statute, and the defendant proxi-
mately caused the decedent's death, the designated benefi-
ciaries-usually the parents of the unborn child-may recover to
the extent allowed by statute.1018 Courts that have allowed recov-
ery generally have held that only a "viable"'019 fetus has an inde-
pendent status as a person for purposes of wrongful death
statutes.02 0
Section B of this Part briefly traces the development of prena-
tal tort theories, theories which culminated in recovery for the tor-
tious death of the unborn. Section C examines the reasoning of
courts that refuse to acknowledge a cause of action for fetal death
under a wrongful death statute and then considers other decisions
allowing recovery. Section D delineates various components of
damages that courts have allowed. Section E argues that recovery
should be available for the wrongful death of the unborn and that
conception, rather than viability, is the appropriate point for de-
termining personhood for purposes of wrongful death recovery.
Section F concludes that allowing recovery for wrongful death oc-
curring at any point after conception best serves the policies un-
derlying wrongful death statutes and the goals of tort law.
B. DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF WRONGFUL DEATH OF THE
UNBORN
In a wrongful death action the plaintiffs must show that the
decedent, had he lived, could have maintained a cause of action
against the tortfeasor.1°02 Consequently, as long as courts refuse to
AcT § 2 (1979). Wrongful death statutes, on the other hand, grant the victim's surviving
relatives a separate cause of action. The award recovered under each type of statute gener-
ally goes to the same parties, but the recoverable damages may differ. For example, the
decedent's pain and suffering is a proper element of damages under a survival statute; loss
of services to a spouse is a proper element of damages under a wrongful death statute.
1018. State statutes generally designate proper plaintiffs in a wrongful death action.
See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (Vernon Supp. 1986) (favoring (1) the spouse, children,
father, or mother of the deceased, natural or adoptive; (2) the brother or sister of the de-
ceased or their descendants; or, if no one available in the first two groups, (3) a plaintiff ad
litem). The parents of a deceased unborn child would have the initial right to sue under
most statutes.
1019. A fetus is "viable" when its life can be sustained apart from its mother. DOR-
LAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1455 (26th ed. 1985).
1020. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985);
Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982).
1021. See infra text accompanying note 1052.
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recognize suits by plaintiffs who survived injuries inflicted in utero,
no action for prenatal death resulting from such injuries can lie
under a wrongful death statute. In Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northhampton'02 2 Justice Holmes denied recovery for the wrong-
ful death of a child who died shortly after birth because of injuries
suffered in utero.0 2 3 Justice Holmes held that recovery under the
statute did not include injuries to the unborn child because the
child was a part of its mother, but that the mother could recover
damages for the injuries in her own suit.10 24 Sixty years later the
court in Bonbrest v. Kotz0 2 5 departed from Dietrich by denying
summary judgment to a physician who allegedly injured the plain-
tiff while removing her from her mother's womb. 0 26 The court dis-
tinguished Dietrich on the ground that the instant plaintiff was
viable at the time of the alleged injury and, therefore, had an inde-
pendent status to sue. 0 27 The decision in Bonbrest initiated uni-
form recognition of a right to recovery for prenatal torts occurring
after the point of viability when the victim survives birth.0 28 Fur-
thermore, many courts allow recovery for surviving victims when
the tort occurs after conception but prior to the point of
viability.0 29
Once courts established recovery for surviving victims of pre-
natal torts, the next logical step was to consider an action for
wrongful death when the victim died in utero. The Minnesota Su-
preme Court, in Verkennes v. Corniea, was the first court to ac-
1022. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
1023. The injury occurred during the fifth month of pregnancy, when the child's
mother slipped and fell on defendant's highway. Id. at 14.
1024, Id. at 17. Justice Holmes noted that "no case, so far as we know, has ever de-
cided that, if the infant survived, it could maintain an action for injuries received by it while
in its mother's womb." Id. at 15.
1025. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D.C. 1946).
1026. Id. at 139.
1027. Id. at 140. The court made the distinction because the plaintiff was, in fact,
viable at the time of the alleged injury. The court, however, indicated that viability was not
necessarily a prerequisite to recovery. The court stated that "[i]ndeed, apart from viability,
a non-viable fetus is not a part of its mother." Id. "'By the eighth week the embryo or
foetus, as we now call it, is an unmistakable human being, even though it is still only three-
quarters of an inch long.' "Id. at 11 (quoting G. CORNER, OURSELVES UNBORN: AN EMBRYOLO-
GIST'S ESSAY ON MAN (1944)). Later courts, however, have clung to the viability distinction,
which is still necessary for recovery in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., Werling v. Sandy, 17
Ohio St. 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1980).
1028. See Collins, supra note 1005 (wrongful life section), at 679-80.
1029. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Isbeil, 291 Ala. 327, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973); Sinkler v. Kneale,
401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960). Few courts, however, allow recovery when defendant has
breached a duty prior to conception. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 II. 2d 348,
367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
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knowledge that recovery was available in these circumstances. 10 30
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to attend to his
wife's needs after labor had commenced and that this neglect
caused his child to be stillborn.10 3 1 Relying on the viability distinc-
tion enunciated in Bonbrest, the Minnesota court found that an
action for wrongful death lies when the wrongful act of another
destroys a life capable of independent existence. 03 2
Currently, courts disagree over whether a fetus is a person
within the meaning of a particular wrongful death statute.0 33 A
decided and increasing majority holds that a fetus is a person and
that recovery is available.03 4 In addition, South Dakota and Ten-
nessee have explicitly amended their survival statutes to include
recovery for the death of an "unborn child" and of a "viable fe-
tus," respectively. 03 5 In sum, thirty-seven jurisdictions allow re-
covery under existing statutes for the wrongful death of a viable
fetus.1036 A few of these jurisdictions indicate that viability is not a
1030. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
1031. Id. at 366-67, 38 N.W.2d at 839.
1032. Id. at 370-71, 38 N.W.2d at 841.
1033. Compare Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985) (fe-
tus is a person) with Kuhnke v. Fisher, - Mont-__, 683 P.2d 916 (1984) (fetus is not a
person).
1034. See infra note 1036 and accompanying text.
1035. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-5-1 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (6)(b)
(1980). For an explanation of the distinction between survival statutes and wrongful death
statutes, see supra note 1017.
1036. See Simmons v. Howard University, 323 F. Supp. 529 (D. D.C. 1971); Eich v.
Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So.2d 354 (1974); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144
Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956);
Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955); Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570,
651 P.2d 11 (1982); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 IMI. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973);
Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d
830 (Iowa 1983) (interpreting rule of civil procedure); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368
P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d
1019 (La. Ct. App. 1980); State ex rel. Oldham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964);
Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); O'Neil v. Morse, 385
Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838
(1949); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d
904 (Mo. 1983); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101
N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826
(1980); Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984); Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 3d
45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v.
Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974); Amadio v. Levin, - Pa. , 501
A.2d 1085 (1985); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); Fowler v.
Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distrib.,
Inc., 697 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975);
Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980); Moen v. Hanson, 85
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prerequisite to a cause of action.10 s Ten jurisdictions, however,
hold that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the particu-
lar statute, and thus deny recovery.10 38 Section C discusses the rea-
soning behind this split in authority.
Wash. 2d 597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E.2d 428
(1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
Relevant statutory provisions include ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-611 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-555 (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 3704 (1974 & Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2701 (1981); GA. CODE ANN.§ 3-505 (1975);
IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-1-1-2 (Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA R. CIv. P. 8; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1901 (1983); KY.
CONST. § 241; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1985); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-902 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (West 1985); MICH. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 600.2922 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (West Supp. 1985); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (Vernon Supp. 1986); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 41-2-1 (1978); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 556:7 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-21 (1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-01 (Supp. 1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (Page Supp.
1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West Supp. 1985); OIL REv. STAT. § 30.020 (1985); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601 (Pardon 1982); RI. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-51-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-5-1 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §
20-5-106 (1980); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REMEDIES CODE § 71.002 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-11-12 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1491 (1974); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010
(Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.03 (West 1983).
1037. See Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955) (fetus must be
"quick" at time of injury); Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So.2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (concep-
tion); Amadio v. Levin, - Pa. -, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985) (conception); Presley v. New-
port Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976) (viability not a factor); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 21-5-1 (1985) (unborn child).
1038. Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D.C. Alaska 1962) (holding no cause of action
for wrongful death of nonviable fetus); Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97,
565 P.2d 122 (1977); Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1980); Kuhnke v. Fisher,
Mont. - , 683 P.2d 916 (1984); Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., Inc., 222 Neb.
776, 387 N.W.2d 490 (1986); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v.
Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Didonato v. Wortman,
available on LEXIS Aug. 3, 1986 No. 8526SC1015 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); Lawrence v. Craven
Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969); Estate of Baby Foy v. Morningstar Resort,
Inc., 635 F.Supp. 741 (D.C. Virgin Islands 1986).
Relevant statutory provisions include ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (1985); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 377 (West 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.19 (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-512
(1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-809 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (West 1982); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-a (1984);
VA. CODE § 8.01-50 (1984).
Five states have no reported decisions on the matter. Statutes creating a cause of action
for wrongful death in those states include ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-906 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-202 (1973 and Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (1981 and Supp. 1985); see also WYO. CONST. art. 9, § 4.
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C. ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO WRONGFUL DEATH OF THE
UNBORN
1. Rationale for Denying Recovery
Statutory construction and findings of legislative intent have
led some courts to deny recovery for the wrongful death of a viable
fetus. In Justus v. Atchison'039 the California Supreme Court af-
firmed the dismissal of claims against physicians for the wrongful
death of viable unborn children. The court acknowledged the pol-
icy arguments articulated by the parties, but stated that the legis-
lature had the sole authority to create law in this area.1°0 0 The
court, therefore, refused to allow recovery when the terms of the
statute did not clearly manifest an intent to allow recovery. 041 Ac-
cording to the court, the legislature's express recognition of the
rights of the unborn for limited purposes excluded, by negative im-
plication, any right of recovery for the death of the unborn.0 42 Fi-
nally, the court noted that although the legislature had amended
the statute several times, the statute still did not include any refer-
ence to the unborn.1 04 3 In sum, the Justus court found legislative
preemption of the area of wrongful death and then inferred, from
legislative silence, affirmative legislative intent to deny recovery for
the death of a fetus.104 4
The Florida Supreme Court also interpreted legislative silence
1039. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
1040. Id. at 574, 565 P.2d at 128, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 103. The court distinguished Jus-
tice Harlan's opinion in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). In
Moragne Justice Harlan postulated that even if legislative action had created recovery for
wrongful death, that remedy was so pervasive that over time it had become a part of the
common law. Accepting this argument, the judiciary can supplement existing statutory regu-
lation of wrongful death. In the context of fetal death, this concept of a common law aspect
of wrongful death would force courts to consider the policy arguments for and against recov-
ery instead of reluctantly expanding the definition of "person" within a given statute. See
generally Note, Wrongful Death and the Stillborn Fetus: A Common Law Solution to a
Statutory Dilemma, 43 U. PITr. L. REv. 819 (1982).
1041. Justus, 19 Cal. 3d at 580, 565 P.2d at 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
1042. Id. at 579, 565 P.2d at 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
1043. Id.
1044. Justice Tobriner concurred in the result, but disagreed with the majority's rea-
soning. He could not discern an affirmative legislative intent to preclude judicial develop-
ment of wrongful death principles because wrongful death theory had evolved to become a
part of the common law. He would, however, have rejected the plaintiff's claim for policy
reasons. Id. at 586-87, 565 P.2d at 136-137, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111-12 (Tobriner, J., concur-
ring). Justice Tobriner concluded: "[W]e should not recognize a new cause of action for the
wrongful death of a fetus, a wholly intangible injury to plaintiffs for which any monetary
recovery can provide no real compensation. . . ... Id. at 586, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr.
at 111 (citation omitted).
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as an intent to deny recovery, although following somewhat differ-
ent reasoning. In light of judicial decisions allowing recovery to
surviving victims of prenatal torts, the court in Stern v. Miller'
0 45
considered the reasons for allowing recovery for the tortious death
of the unborn to be compelling.0 4 6 The court,. nonetheless, con-
strued legislative intent to require a different result. In a previous
decision, Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 0 47 the Florida
court stated that a child must be born alive before an action lies
for wrongful death. 0 48 After Stokes, but prior to Stern, the legisla-
ture had amended the wrongful death statute, but did not redefine
the word "person" to include a fetus.10 49 The Stern court con-
cluded that it could interpret the legislature's continued use of the
same definition only as approval of the Stokes decision. 0 50 The
Florida court, therefore, refused to overrule its previous holding
denying recovery.
In addition to inferring legislative intent, courts have em-
ployed other means of statutory construction to deny recovery.
The Virginia Supreme Court addressed the issue of recovery for
the wrongful death of the unborn in Lawrence v. Craven Tire
Co.'0 51 The court noted that because a cause of action under the
wrongful death statute is derivative, the decedent must have been
entitled to sue had he not died. 0 52 The court narrowly interpreted
this requirement to mean that the decedent must have had a
vested right to sue at the time of the commission of the tort.0 53
Because an unborn child could not have a vested right to sue, the
parents' right to recover under the wrongful death act did not
1045. 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977).
1046. Id. at 306. The court reasoned as follows:
A viable fetus is a human being, capable of independent existence outside the womb; a
human life is therefore destroyed when a viable fetus is killed; it is wholly irrational to
allow liability to depend on whether death from fatal injuries occurs just before or just
after birth; it is absurd to allow recovery for prenatal injuries unless they are so severe
as to cause death; such a situation favors the wrongdoer who causes death over the one
who merely causes injuries, and so enables the tortfeasor to foreclose his own liability.
Id.
1047. 213 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1968).
1048. Id. at 700.
1049. 348 So. 2d at 307.
1050. Id.
1051. 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
1052. Id. at 140, 169 S.E.2d at 441. All states have a similar requirement.
1053. Id. The court stated: "If plaintiff's decedent had no right, at time of death, to
maintain an action for personal injuries, then the right to maintain the present action could
not be transmitted to her personal representative." Id.
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vest.105 4 The court, therefore, found that the statute, by its very
terms, precluded recovery for the death of a fetus.10 55
By requiring that the decedent must have had a right to sue at
the time of the tort, the Craven court read into the statute a tim-
ing requirement that arguably did not exist. The court could have
determined that an unborn child would have had a right to sue for
prenatal injuries if it had survived birth. This finding would have
satisfied the derivative requirement of the statute. Nonetheless,
even if the court had not employed this statutory construction as a
rationale, the court would have denied recovery because the court
suggested that a fetus was not a person under the statute.1056
In Endresz v. Friedberg'0 57 the New York Court of Appeals
summarily concluded that the legislature did not intend to allow
recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus.0 58 Moreover, the court
looked beyond legislative intent and articulated policy reasons for
denying recovery. The court discussed policy rationales in an effort
to harmonize its holding with Woods v. Lancet,0 19 a case in which
the court had allowed recovery for tortious prenatal injuries for a
victim born alive. Comparing the two situations, the Endresz court
noted that the deceased fetus did not face impaired mental or
physical health as did the surviving injured fetus.10 10 Furthermore,
the mother could recover adequate damages for injuries to her per-
son in the case of a tortiously inflicted stillbirth;1061 any additional
recovery for the death of the fetus, therefore, would be essentially
punitive in character. 0 62 The court also stated that the inherent
problems of proving causation and establishing damages militate
against allowing a cause of action. 06 3 For these reasons, the court
refused to extend the Woods holding to encompass recovery for the
wrongful death of a fetus.
2. Rationale for Allowing Recovery
A shrinking minority of states follow the reasoning of the pre-
ceding decisions and deny recovery for the wrongful death of an
1054. Id.
1055. Id. at 142, 169 S.E.2d at 442.
1056. Id. at 140-42, 169 S.E.2d at 441-42.
1057. 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969).
1058. Id. at 486, 248 N.E.2d at 905, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
1059. 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
1060. Endresz, 24 N.Y.2d at 483, 248 N.E.2d at 903, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
1061. Id. at 484, 248 N.E.2d at 904, 301 N.Y.2d at 69.
1062. Id.
1063. Id.
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unborn child.10 6' Predictably, increasing recognition of the right to
recover has followed the expansion of liability for torts committed
prior to birth. Legislative preemption arguments 165 have not pre-
cluded most courts from reaching the policy considerations attend-
ant to prenatal wrongful death claims. Considering both the pros
and the cons of allowing recovery, most courts have concluded that
the arguments favoring recovery are more persuasive. Representa-
tive decisions from the Supreme Courts of Idaho, Arizona, and Al-
abama elucidate the policy considerations for allowing recovery.
In Volk v. Baldazo,1066 the plaintiffs appealed from a partial
summary judgment denying recovery for the wrongful death of a
viable unborn child. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had
negligently struck an automobile driven by Mrs. Volk, who was
then nine months pregnant and who delivered a stillborn child
eleven hours after the accident.1 0 68 The Idaho Supreme Court de-
termined that the plaintiffs' complaint stated a valid claim.106 8 The
court found wrongful death statutes to derogate the common law
rule that upon death an injured person's cause of action ceased to
exist.106 9 Consequently, the court stated that it should construe lib-
erally the statute to effect the legislature's intent to compensate
designated survivors and deter wrongful conduct.10 70 The court
held that allowing recovery for the wrongful death of a viable un-
born fetus promotes these objectives.1 71 To conclude otherwise
would mean holding a defendant liable for injuries to a fetus sub-
sequently born alive while immunizing the defendant from suit if
he killed a fetus.10 72 This result would subvert the legislature's in-
tent in passing the wrongful death statute.107 The court, therefore,
furthered legislative policy by allowing the plaintiffs' claim.
In Summerfield v. Superior Court,1 0 7- the Arizona Supreme
1064. These states are California, Florida, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, and Virginia. See cases cited supra note 1038.
1065. The phrase "legislative preemption argument" refers to the position that state
legislatures have the sole authority to create law in the area of wrongful death and that
courts, therefore, are "preempted" from the field of wrongful death. See supra text accom-
panying note 1040.
1066. 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982).
1067. Id. at 571, 651 P.2d at 12.
1068. Id.
1069. Id. at 573, 651 P.2d at 14.
1070. Id. at 574, 651 P.2d at 15.
1071. Id.
1072. Id.
1073. Id.
1074. 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985).
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Court overruled an earlier decision, Kilmer v. Hicks,0 75 that had
denied recovery for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. Cognizant
of legislative preemption arguments, the court argued that a cause
of action for wrongful death had common law attributes.1 76 The
court found that although the legislature may have thought it was
creating a new cause of action, the wording of the statute required
judicial application of common law principles. For example, the
statute allowed "such damages as [are] fair and just" and required
consideration of "mitigating and aggravating circumstances.' 0 7 7
Because the statute called for a more active judicial role than mere
statutory construction, the court did not confine its analysis of
wrongful death to a strict interpretation of the word "person" in
the statute. Rather, the court interpreted the word in light of legis-
lative goals. Like the Volk court, the Arizona Supreme Court in
Summerfield sought to promote the two legislative objectives of
compensating survivors and deterring wrongful conduct.10 71
The defendants in Summerfield argued that interpreting the
word "person" to include a fetus would contravene the principles
of Roe v. Wade,'0 7  which held that a fetus was not a person for
fourteenth amendment purposes. The Arizona court responded
that a word could have different meanings in different contexts. 0 80
Roe held that a mother's right to privacy in the first trimester of
pregnancy outweighed any rights of the fetus, but the decision did
not address whether a tortfeasor may terminate the life of a viable
fetus against the mother's will.'0e ' Moreover, the Arizona court
1075. 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P.2d 706 (1974).
1076. 144 Ariz. at 473-74, 698 P.2d at 718-19. The court found these attributes in the
long history of judicial precedent interpreting the wrongful death statutes. Cf. supra note
1040 (discussing Justice Harlan's theory of the common-law aspect of wrongful death).
1077. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-613 (1982).
1078. 144 Ariz. at 476, 698 P.2d at 721.
1079. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1080. 144 Ariz. at 478, 698 P.2d at 723.
1081. See id. The divergent policies behind Roe and the wrongful death statutes may
account for the different meanings of the word "person" in these different contexts. The
mother's right to privacy under Roe and the survivors' right to recovery for wrongful death,
nevertheless, conflict if a state allows recovery at any time following conception. Suppose,
for example, that a pregnant woman aborts her pregnancy in the second month. Roe pro-
tects her right to do so. Suppose further that the father of a not-yet-viable fetus wants to
sue for the wrongful death of his unborn child. The courts cannot accommodate the inter-
ests of both parties in this situation. As one commentator has stated:
If the woman's right to abortion and the fetus' right to be free from tortious injury are
both accepted as socially desirable, then it may be necessary to accept some inconsis-
tency and conclude that prenatal life will be protected against intentional or negligent
interference, absent some compelling countervailing interest on the part of another.
780 [Vol. 39:597
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noted that its holding was consistent with Roe to the extent that
Roe recognized a state's interest in protecting a fetus after viabil-
ity.10 82 The court, after disposing of the defendants' constitutional
arguments and stating its interpretation of legislative policy, con-
cluded that the plaintiffs could recover under the wrongful death
act.10 83
The Alabama Supreme Court allowed recovery for the wrong-
ful death of a fetus in Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores.0 8 4 In contrast
to other courts that had allowed recovery, the Eich court did not
consider the wrongful death statute to be compensatory.1085 In-
stead, the court declared that the purpose of the statute was to
preserve human life. The statute accomplished this objective by
punishing wrongful conduct resulting in death.0 86 With this view
of the legislative purpose, the court felt compelled to allow recov-
ery for the wrongful death of a viable fetus. The court posited a
hypothetical situation of twins fatally injured during pregnancy,
with one born alive before its death and the other stillborn. 0 87 The
court deplored the thought of allowing recovery for the death of
the twin born alive and simultaneously denying recovery for the
death of the stillborn twin. 0 88 Because the legislature designed the
statute to punish the tortfeasor, the court was unwilling to permit
him to escape liability in either case. Consistent with this analysis,
the court allowed the mother to recover for her child's death.0 8 9
These cases illustrate that courts that are inclined to allow re-
covery for the wrongful death of viable fetus focus on the remedial
and deterrent policy objectives of the statutes. The remedial objec-
tive is to provide compensation to survivors of a deceased tort vic-
tim. The deterrent objective is to protect and preserve life by de-
terring future wrongdoing. Prompted by these policy
considerations, courts allowing recovery find support for their
holdings in the common law recognition of liability for injuries in-
curred in utero. Moreover, the Summerfield court implied that,
Kader, The Law of Tortious Prenatal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REv. 639, 660
(1980).
1082. Summerfield, 144 Ariz. at 478, 698 P.2d at 723.
1083. Id. at 479, 698 P.2d at 724.
1084. 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354 (1974).
1085. See supra text accompanying notes 1062, 1070, and 1078 (discussing other
courts' emphasis on compensatory goals).
1086. 293 Ala. at 99, 300 So. 2d at 357.
1087. Id.
1088. Id.
1089. Id.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:597
vis-a-vis the legislature, judicial authority is growing in the area of
wrongful death because of the common law attributes of the cause
of action. When these considerations-compensation, deterrence,
and judicial authority-are weighed against strained statutory con-
struction and legislative preemption arguments, no compelling rea-
sons remain to deny recovery.
D. DAMAGES
The specific damages recoverable in actions for wrongful death
vary depending on the applicable state statute. Some statutes al-
low recovery for such components as past and future lost support
and services, loss of companionship, mental pain and suffering, and
funeral expenses.1090 Other statutes leave the issue of damages to
judicial discretion by simply allowing an award that would be
"just."1091
Some courts in jurisdictions purportedly limiting awards to
pecuniary harm have interpreted pecuniary loss broadly to include
"[c]ounsel, guidance, aid, advice, comfort, assistance, and protec-
tion which the child would have given had she lived. '092 Future
1090. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (West Supp. 1986). The Florida statute provides
in part:
All potential beneficiaries of a recovery for wrongful death, including the dece-
dent's estate, shall be identified in the complaint, and their relationships to the dece-
dent shall be alleged. Damages may be awarded as follows:
(1) Each survivor may recover the value of lost support and services from the date
of the decedent's injury to his death, with interest, the future loss of support and ser-
vices from the date of death and reduced to present value. In evaluating loss of support
and services, the survivor's relationship to the decedent, the amount of the decedent's
probable net income available for distribution to the particular survivor, and the re-
placement value of the decedents services to the survivor may be considered. In com-
puting the duration of future losses, the joint life expectancies of the survivor and the
decedent and the period of minority, in the case of healthy minor children, may be
considered.
(2) The surviving spouse may also recover for loss of the decedent's companionship
and protection and for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury.
(3) Minor children of the decedent may also recover for lost parental companion-
ship, instruction, and guidance and for mental pain and suffering from the date of
injury.
(4) Each parent of a deceased minor child may also recover for mental pain and
suffering from the date of injury.
(5) Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's injury or death may be re-
covered by a survivor who has paid them.
Id.
1091. E.g., CAL. CIv. PROc. CODE § 377 (West 1986). The California statute provides:
"In every action under this section, such damages may be given as under all the circum-
stances of the case, may be just ...... Id.
1092. See Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 301, 222 N.W.2d 334, 336 (1974).
1986] CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND BIRTH 783
earning power is a significant element of damages 09 3 and distin-
guishes wrongful death claims from other claims that allow a
mother to recover medical and burial expenses. 1094 The Kentucky
Supreme Court in Rice v. Rizk,'095 demonstrated the importance of
future earnings by reversing and remanding that case for a new
trial because the jury failed to award damages for future earning
power.1096 The court also declared that the child is presumed to
have had some earning capacity; proof of the infant's earning
power is not a prerequisite to recovery.19 7
Wrongful death statutes generally do not allow damages for
the mental distress suffered by survivors. Panagopoulous v. Mar-
tin,1098 however, held that recovery up to $10,000 was allowable
under West Virginia law without a showing of pecuniary loss.10 99
Consequently, the court considered appropriate an award for the
sorrow, distress, and bereavement experienced by relatives of the
deceased unborn child.100
Further generalization about allowable damages is difficult be-
cause of the number of differing statutes and their interpretations.
Once a court determines that a fetus is a person within the mean-
ing of the particular statute, allowable components of damages
should be determined according to the precedent set by other
wrongful death cases not concerning the unborn. An attorney
claiming damages must consult the applicable state statute and its
judicial interpretation to determine what damages are recoverable
in his or her jurisdiction.
E. ANALYSIS
Wrongful death statutes represent a legislative response to the
anomalous situation that occurred when a tort resulted in the vic-
tim's death. The tortfeasor faced no civil liability" 0' and no one
was compensated for the loss because the victim, ordinarily the
1093. Demonstrating the significance of the earning power component, the Illinois Su-
preme Court in Jones v. Karraker, 98 IM. 2d 487, 457 N.E.2d 23 (1983), affirmed an award of
$125,000 for the wrongful death of a viable fetus.
1094. See Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65
(1969).
1095. 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970).
1096. Id. at 735.
1097. Id.
1098. 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969).
1099. Id. at 226-27.
1100. Id. at 227.
1101. See supra note 1016.
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plaintiff, was dead. Thus, the two fundamental goals of tort law,
deterrence and compensation, were thwarted in the most egregious
cases. Legislatures rectified this situation by granting a cause of
action to the victim's beneficiaries through wrongful death stat-
utes. As courts began to recognize torts against the unborn, 110 2
however, another anomaly arose-a tortfeasor was held responsible
if the victim survived the tort and was born, but escaped liability if
the victim did not survive. Given this development, the courts re-
sponded most appropriately by allowing recovery under wrongful
death statutes for the death of a fetus.1 103 Logic, fairness, and tort
law policies mandated this response.
Unfortunately, logic, fairness, and tort policy did not prevail
in every respect when courts began to apply wrongful death stat-
utes to cases concerning the unborn. In determining personhood
for the purpose of wrongful death statutes, the arbitrariness of fix-
ing birth as the point of personhood was readily apparent because
of the similarity of human status immediately before and after
birth. 10 4 Courts, therefore, chose viability, rather than birth, as
the determinative feature of a "person" under wrongful death stat-
utes. Viability, however, ultimately replaced one arbitrary distinc-
tion with another.110 5 Allowing recovery when death occurs one
1102. See supra text accompanying notes 1027-29.
1103. See generally Collins, supra note 1005 (wrongful life section). Beginning with
Bonbrest v. Kotz a rapid series of cases "brought about a rather spectacular reversal of the
no-duty rule. The child, if he is born alive, is now permitted in every jurisdiction to main-
tain an action for the consequences of prenatal injuries, and if he dies of such injuries after
birth an action will lie for his wrongful death." PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 55, at 368 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
1104. See Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981), overruled in Amadio v.
Levin, - Pa. -, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985), in which the court admitted the arbitrariness of
the distinction, but maintained the live birth requirement. According to the court, "the re-
quirement of live birth is in some sense an arbitrary requirement, but the line must be
drawn somewhere, and wherever it is drawn, it will be the subject of argument and criti-
cism." Id. at 491, 431 A.2d at 961.
1105. Comment, Wrongful Death of the Fetus: Viability is Not a Viable Distinction,
8 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rav. 103 (1984). According to the commentator "[b]irth and viability
are equally arbitrary lines for courts to use in deciding whether to allow recovery for the
wrongful death of a fetus." Id. at 115. See Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d
748 (1976). The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated:
[L]ogic does not permit the insistence on viability as the line of demarcation between
those for whom an action will lie and those who are without rights under the statute
.... If we profess allegiance to reason, it would be seditious to adopt so arbitrary and
uncertain a concept as viability as a dividing line between those persons who shall
enjoy the protection of our remedial laws and those who shall become, for most intents
and purposes, nonentities.
Id. at 187-88, 365 A.2d at 753-54.
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minute after birth but denying recovery when death occurs one
minute prior to birth is inequitable. Similarly, allowing recovery
for death occurring one minute after viability, assuming such a de-
termination could be made,110 6 and denying recovery for death oc-
curring a short time earlier is equally unfair. The tortfeasor may
have committed the same wrongful act causing the survivors to ex-
perience equal loss in both situations. Deterrence and compensa-
tion should not turn on the fortuity of the precise stage of fetal
development at the time death occurs.
In light of these considerations and the difficulty in establish-
ing viability, conception is a more logical point of reference for de-
termining when a person exists for purposes of wrongful death re-
covery.' 10 7 Opponents of a conception standard may argue that it
will produce unjust awards because, regardless of tortious conduct,
the probability of prenatal death is greater before rather than after
the viability stage.1108 Miscarriage may occur early in pregnancy
for a number of reasons. The prospective parents in these cases
arguably will obtain a windfall if they recover damages for a child
that would not have survived much longer after the tortious act
and never would have been born. This argument is unconvincing.
All wrongful death cases require courts to speculate on how long
the victim may have lived had the tort never occurred. This uncer-
tainty, however, does not preclude recovery. Rather, courts take
the uncertainty into account when assessing damages. Courts
should take the same approach when the victim is unborn. The
possibility of prenatal death absent the tort should be considered
in assessing damages, but should not preclude recovery altogether.
1106. The determination of viability is ordinarily a question of fact, but how are jurors
to ascertain the point in time at which a fetus could survive outside its mother? See Com-
ment, Torts-The Right of Recovery for the Tortious Death of the Unborn, 27 How. L.J.
1649, 1662 (1984) ("The determination of viability by medical standards is both complex
and difficult to diagnose. It may differ with each pregnancy.").
1107. "[T]he requirement of viability will be scrapped as courts begin to accept the
notion that a child is an entity, or a 'person' from the moment of conception, and that as
such it is entitled to be protected as is every other person." S. SPEISER, 1 RECOVERY FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH § 4:38, at 564 (2d ed. 1975).
Fixing conception as the point at which the unborn acquire personhood for purposes of
wrongful death recovery, however, presents a conflict with the constitutional analysis of per-
sonhood in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra notes 1079-81 and accompanying
text for a discussion of this problem.
1108. "It is difficult to state an absolute occurrence rate for spontaneous abortion
.... [Statistics] indicate a total [spontaneous] abortion rate of 27 percent, with most oc-
curring in the first few weeks of gestation and a marked decrease after the 12th week." S.
RoMNEY, M. GRAY, A. LITTLE, J. MERRILL, E. QUILLIGAN & R. STANDER, GYNECOLOGY AND Os.
sTsTRics 570 (2d ed. 1981).
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Although some courts allowing recovery for prenatal wrongful
death have acknowledged problems with the viability standard, 1109
very few have departed from it. Only two courts have held that
conception is the proper standard."' 0 Establishing conception as
the critical point would avoid the problem of determining the
point of viability and would advance in a consistent and logical
manner the goals of deterring wrongful conduct and compensating
survivors for their loss.
F. CONCLUSION
A decided majority of courts now allow recovery for tortious
death of the unborn by allowing actions under wrongful death stat-
utes. This development was a logical progression from the recogni-
tion of other causes of action for prenatal torts. More importantly,
recovery under wrongful death statutes provides a means of hold-
ing defendants liable, thereby deterring future wrongdoing and
compensating the victim's beneficiaries for the loss. To best serve
these goals of deterrence and compensation, however, recovery
should not depend on a fortuitous circumstance such as the stage
of fetal development at the moment death occurs. A developing life
exists from the time of conception and courts have recognized that
the parents suffer a compensable loss when that fetus is tortiously
killed before birth. The tort and the loss are the same regardless of
the viability of the fetus. Conception, therefore, should be the only
prerequisite to finding a "person" whose death is compensable
under a wrongful death statute. This approach will accommodate
the underlying purposes of wrongful death statutes and promote
traditional tort law policies in the developing arena of rights of the
unborn.
X. Baby Doe: The Controversy
Surrounding Withholding Treatment From
Severely Defective Newborns
A. INTRODUCTION ..................................... 787
1109. See, e.g., Werling v. Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985); Presley v.
Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976).
1110. See Amadio v. Levin, - Pa. _, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985); Presley v. Newport
Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); see also, Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So. 2d 1019 (La.
Ct. App. 1980) (Lottinger, J., concurring).
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A. INTRODUCTION
Recent medical advances in neonatal care have enabled physi-
cians to sustain the fragile lives of infants born prematurely"" or
with congenital defects." 2 Only a decade ago, most of these
newborns would have died within days or weeks of birth. 13 The
1111. Approximately seven percent of all infants born in the United States each year
weigh less than 2500 grams (5.5 lbs.) and are classified as low birth weight (LBW). Improve-
ment among the smallest of these infants-those weighing from 1000-1500 grams-has been
especially dramatic, with the neonatal mortality rate dropping from 50% to 20% in the past
25 years. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
197 (1983) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION.]
1112. Congenital defects are morphologic abnormalities of internal or external organs
arising before birth that have actual or potential clinical significance. 1 J. WYNGAARDEN & L.
SMITH, CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 22 (1982), noted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION at 201.
About four percent of the infants born in the United States are afflicted with one or more
readily detectable congenital defects. PRESmENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1111, at 201.
1113. Between 1970 and 1980 the death rate among infants in the first 28 days of
life-the neonatal period-was reduced by almost 50%. This decline represents the greatest
proportional decrease in neonatal mortality since national birth statistics first were gathered
in 1915. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1111, at 197. Most of this decline is the result
of improved survival rates of low birth weight infants, rather than a decline in the propor-
tion of high risk births. See Kwang-Sun Lee, Neonatal Mortality: An Analysis of the Re-
cent Improvement in the United States, 70 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 15 (1980), noted in PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION at 197.
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continually increasing ability of medical technology to prolong the
lives 114 of severely defective"' 5 infants has magnified the profound
moral and legal dilemma faced by parents and physicians who
must decide in which cases, if any, life-sustaining treatment may
be withheld from a critically ill newborn."' 6 Physicians and par-
ents must consider not only whether they can treat a particular
defect, but also whether they should treat the defective
newborn."' 7
Medical and legal commentators began debating the ethics of
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from severely
defective newborns in the early 1970's."' 8 Several cases of selective
1114. Although physicians frequently are successful in increasing the length of a de-
fective infant's life, they often are unable to increase the quality of the newborn's life. In
many cases, the surviving infant enjoys no interaction whatsoever with his environment. See
Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 213, 246-55 (1975) (discussing whether the potential quality of an infant's life is a valid
consideration in treatment decisions).
1115. A "severely defective newborn" may be defined as one who is "not likely to sur-
vive without surgical and medical intervention and whose prognosis, even assuming this in-
tervention, may be poor in terms of cognitive life and minimal functioning." Ellis, Letting
Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 Am. J. LAW & MED. 393, 394 (1983), quoted in Com-
ment, Baby Doe Decisions: Modern Society's Sins of Omission, 63 NEB. L. REV. 888, 899
n.46 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Baby Doe Decisions].
1116. See Note, The HHS' Final Rule on Health Care for Handicapped Infants:
Equal Protection Not Guaranteed, 11 J. LEGIs. 269, 271 n.11 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The HHS' Final Rule]. Physicians must make treatment decisions based on a wide
variety of congenital abnormalities as well as low birth weights. Ethical debates, however,
have focused on two general categories of critically ill newborns: infants born with neural
tube defects (NTD) and infants born with permanent handicaps accompanied by life-
threatening, surgically correctable lesions. The first category of cases involves NTD cases,
which include anecephaly (partial or entire absence of the brain) and meningomyelocele,
commonly called spina bifida (abnormally developed brain and spinal cord). Treatment de-
cisions in NTD cases involve procedures that possibly will extend a child's life, but in no
way will correct the defect. The second category of cases involves infants with correctable
life-threatening defects combined with irremediable physical handicaps that are not life-
threatening. These handicaps include Down's Syndrome and mental retardation. PREsI-
DENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1111, at 202. For a discussion of the scientific aspects of
Down's Syndrome, see supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
1117. Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery,
289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890, 892 (1973).
1118. Members of the medical profession have debated the ethics of withholding treat-
ment from defective newborns for as long as medical technology has made treatment possi-
ble. The debate was accelerated, however, by a 1973 medical journal article that publicly
discussed the Yale-New Haven Hospital's treatment policies resulting in the death of 43
newborns due to non-treatment during a 30-month period. See Duff & Campbell, supra note
1117, at 892; see also Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental Desires, and the Right to Life, 16
PERsP. BI. & MED. 517 (1973); Horan, Euthanasia, Medical Treatment and the Mongoloid
Child: Death as a Treatment of Choice?, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 76 (1975); Jonsen, Critical Is-
sues in Newborn Intensive Care: A Conference Report and Policy Proposal, 55 PEDIATRICS
756 (1975); Lorber, Selective Treatment of Myelomeningocele: To Treat or Not to Treat, 53
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nontreatment that recently received widespread media coverage"1 9
accelerated this debate. These widely publicized cases generated
intense debate throughout the nation, particularly among members
of the medical"120 and legal'1 21 professions, parents of similarly af-
flicted infants,1 22 and other commentators concerned with the
rights of handicapped newborns." 23
B. INITIAL RECOGNITION OF THE CONTROVERSY
1. Birth of Bloomington "Baby Doe"
The "Baby Doe"'12 4 situation in Bloomington, Indiana, on
April 9, 1982, was the first nontreatment case to receive extensive
PEDIATRICS 307 (1974); Note, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative
Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202 (1973).
1119. See infra notes 1140 and 1174.
1120. For a selection of pre- and post-Baby Doe medical commentaries, see Howell &
Shannon, Pediatricians' Attitudes Affecting Decisionmaking in Defective Newborns, 60 PE-
DIATRICS 197 (1977); Koop, Ethical & Surgical Considerations in the Care of the Newborn
with Congenital Abnormalities, in INFANTICIDE AND THE HANDICAPPED NEWBORN 89 (D.
Horan & M. Delahoyde eds. 1982); noted in Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116,
at 270 n.6; Murray, The Final Anticlimactic Rule on Baby Doe, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5
(June 1985); Paris & Fletcher, Infant Doe Regulations and the Absolute Requirement to
Use Nourishment and Fluids for the Dying Infant, 11 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 210
(1983); Robertson & Fost, Passive Euthanasia of Defective Newborn Infants: Legal Consid-
erations, 88 J. PEDIATRICS 883 (1976); Singer, Sanctity of Life or Quality of Life?, 72 PEDIAT-
RICS 28 (1983); Strong, The Tiniest Newborns, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14 (1983).
1121. For a selection of recent legal commentaries, see Blumstein & Smith, Baby Doe:
Public Judgments or Private Choices? A Jurisdictional Approach, NEW PEIsP., Fall 1984, at
14; Longino, Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: Who Decides and On What
Criteria?, 31 KAN. L. REV. 377 (1983); Shapiro, Medical Treatment of Defective Newborns:
An Answer to the "Baby Doe" Dilemma, 20 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 137 (1983); Shatten &
Chabon, Decision-Making and the Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment for Defective
Newborns, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 59 (1982); Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116; Com-
ment, Baby Doe Decisions, supra note 1115, at 88; Special Project, Baby Doe: Problems and
Legislative Proposals-Legislative Workshop, 4 Amiz. ST. L.J. 601 (1984); Comment, Defec-
tive Newborns: Inconsistent Application of Legal Principle Emphasized by the Infant Doe
Case,14 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 569 (1983).
1122. R. STINSON & P. STINSON, THE LONG DYING OF BABY ANDREW (1983) (views of the
parents of a severely defective newborn) cited in Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note
1116, at 270 n.7; Brant & McNulty, Treating Defective Newborns: The Ethical Dilemma, 10
HUMAN RIGHTS, Fall 1982, at 34 (discussing In re McNulty from a parental perspective).
1123. Members of other professions also were active in the debate. For a debate of the
issues surrounding the controversy, see INFANTICIDE AND THE VALUE OF LIFE (M. Kohl ed.
1978) (ethicist); P. RAMSEY, ETHICS AT THE EDGES OF LnE MEDICAL AND LEGAL INTERSEC-
TIONS (1978) (ethicist); B. WEIR, SELEcTIvE TREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS (1984)
(clergy). Additional articles include McCarthy, Treating Defective Newborns: Who Judges
Extraordinary Means?, 62 Hosp. PROG. 45 (1981) (clergy) cited in Note, The HHS' Final
Rule, supra note 1116, at 270 n.7; Paris, Terminating Treatment for Newborns: A Theologi-
cal Perspective, 10 LAW. MED. & HEALTH CARE 120 (1982) (ethicist).
1124. The media labeled the unnamed Bloomington infant "Baby Doe" or "Infant
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media coverage. 1 25 Baby Doe suffered from two separate birth de-
fects-Down's Syndrome1 126 and an esophageal atresia with associ-
ated tracheoesophageal fistula,12 7 a congenital defect that often
accompanies Down's Syndrome. s2 Baby Doe's parents considered
various recommended treatment alternatives,"29 but decided not
to authorize a routine surgical procedure to correct the esophageal
defect."30 Rather, the parents opted to provide the infant with
medication sufficient only to keep him relatively comfortable and
pain free until his inevitable death from pneumonia or
starvation." 31
Hospital officials sought judicial guidance and reported the
Doe." The term "Baby Doe" currently is used to refer to many similarly situated newborns.
Because the court sealed the official records of this case in accordance with Indiana law,
only limited facts and findings are available. See Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note
1116, at 271 n.12.
1125. Pearl, Baby Jane and Infant Doe: Treatment of Newborns with Birth Defects,
16 Urn. LAw. 701 (1984).
1126. Down's Syndrome results when an infant receives an extra chromosome from its
parents. See supra text accompanying and following note 70. Down's Syndrome occurs ap-
proximately once in every 700 live births. Although children afflicted with Down's Syndrome
are mentally retarded, many can hold simple jobs and live fairly normal lives. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION, supra note 1111, at 202-03. For additional information on Down's Syndrome,
see W. NYHAN AND E. EDELSON, THE HEREDITY FACTOR 128-29 (1976); W. NYHAN & N. SAKATI,
GENETc AND MALFORMATON SYNDROMES IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 117-23 (1976), cited in PRES-
IDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1111, at 202 n.23.
1127. An escphageal atresia is a blockage of the esophagus and a tracheoesopbageal
fistula is a separation between the esophagus and stomach. The defects prevented Baby Doe
from eating or breathing normally. Physicians can repair the condition by using a surgical
procedure that is "typically successful." PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssION, supra note 1111, at 203.
Conflicting opinions reported Baby Doe's chance for survival from "probably successful" to
a "50-50 chance of success" to a "minimal chance of surviving the operation." See Com-
ment, Baby Doe Decisions, supra note 1115, at 890 n.4.
1128. A majority of Down's Syndrome victims require no extraordinary care at birth.
A few, however, are born with life-threatening, surgically correctable defects. The two most
common defects that accompany Down's Syndrome are gastrointestinal blockage and con-
genital heart defects. PRESIDEN 'S COMMISSION supra note 1111, at 203. Baby Doe's es-
ophageal defect was a form of gastro-intestinal blockage.
1129. Two Bloomington pediatricians, including the Doe family pediatrician, recom-
mended immediate transfer of the infant to another hospital for corrective surgery. The
attending obstetrician, however, recommended the nonsurgical treatment procedures that
the parents ultimately followed. Comment, Baby Doe Decisions, supra note 1115, at 890.
1130. Id. Some people refer to the withholding of life-sustaining treatment from a de-
fective newborn as "passive" or "involuntary" euthanasia or "dystanasia." A voluntary with-
drawal of treatment is known as "mercy killing" or "euthanasia." The primary difference
between "dystanasia" and "euthanasia" is that, in the first case, treatment is never adminis-
tered, and in the second case, existing treatment is affirmatively withdrawn or removed. Id.
at 890 n.6 (citing Robertson, supra note 1114, at 214 n.6.
1131. Comment, Baby Doe Decisions, supra note 1115, at 890.
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parents' nontreatment decision to county prosecutors. 1132 The
Monroe County, Indiana, Circuit Court upheld the parents'
decision and noted that "after having been informed of the
opinions of two sets of physicians," the infant's parents had the
right to select "a medically recommended course of treatment" for
Baby Doe."33 Unsatisfied with the circuit court's ruling, the
Monroe County Prosecutor filed an emergency petition with the
local juvenile court. 311 4 On April 13, the referee pro tern of the
Monroe County Juvenile Court reasoned that the county had
failed to establish that the parents' refusal to supply Baby Doe
with necessary food and medical attention severely impaired his
physical and mental condition.13 5 The court, therefore, denied the
prosecutor's emergency petition."1 6 On April 14, the prosecutor
made an unsuccessful attempt to appeal both the circuit and juve-
nile courts' rulings to the Indiana Supreme Court.13 7 On April 15,
Baby Doe, receiving neither nutritional sustenance nor corrective
surgery, died at age six days before attorneys could perfect an ap-
peal to the United States Supreme Court."138
2. Federal Response to Baby Doe:
"Baby Doe" Regulations
Baby Doe's death received nationwide coverage in the popular
press" 39 and forced the decision to withhold life-sustaining treat-
1132. Id. at 891.
1133. The circuit court's decision is set forth in Treatments of Infants Born with
Handicapping Conditions, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1982). See Pearl, supra note 1125,
at 703.
1134. Comment, Baby Doe Decisions, supra note 1115, at 891.
1135. Id.
1136. Indiana ex rel Infant Doe v. Monroe Cir. Ct., No. 482-5140 (Ind. Apr. 16, 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1982), cited in Comment, Baby Doe Decisions, supra note 1115,
at 891 n.12.
1137. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the rulings of both the Morgan County Cir-
cuit Court and Juvenile Court by recognizing the parents' right to decide to withhold correc-
tive surgery. See Comment, Baby Doe Decisions, supra note 1115, at 891, n.12.
1138. According to the New York Times, Apr. 15, 1982, at D21, col. 5, Baby Doe died
only hours before Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court was to hear a stay of
the Indiana Supreme Court's ruling. Id.
1139. For examples of public response to infant Doe's death, see Trafford, Doctor's
Dilemma: Treat or Let Die?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 6, 1982, at 58; Wallis, The
Stormy Legacy of Baby Doe: Should the Government Try to Save Severely Afflicted In-
fants?, TImE, Sept. 26, 1982, at 58; Wash. Post, May 19, 1982, at A21, coL 4; N.Y. Times,
Apr. 27, 1982, at A22, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1982, at A6, col. 2; Wash. Post, Apr. 17,
1982, at Al, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1982, at D21, col. 5.
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ment from severely defective newborns out of the privacy of the
medical profession and into the arena of public concern.1 40 Presi-
dent Reagan immediately issued a memorandum"' to the United
States Attorney General and to Richard Schweiker, the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS); the memorandum empha-
sized that federal law prohibits discrimination, including the with-
holding of medically indicated treatment, on the basis of a handi-
cap. 1142  Prompted by President Reagan's memorandum, the
Department of Health and Human Services issued a notice entitled
"Discriminating Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treat-
ment or Nourishment; Notice to Health Care Providers."'1 43 The
notice emphasized the applicability of section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act of 19731 44 to treatment decisions concerning severely
defective newborns.11 45 Section 504 prohibits recipients of federal
1140. The overall public response to Baby Doe's death was one of outrage. Predict-
ably, the child's death enraged human rights groups, handicapped rights groups, and right-
to-life groups who believe that life should be maintained at all costs. In addition, many
individuals and groups who maintain that certain circumstances do justify nontreatment
argued that the "conservative" course of treatment employed in this case was unjustified.
Mathieu, The Baby Doe Controversy, 4 ARiz. ST. L.J. 605 (1984). These groups argued that
the circumstances that justify nontreatment were not present in Baby Doe's case because
the infant's underlying permanent defect of Down's Syndrome was not a severe disability
that would render surgery to correct his life-threatening defect futile. Id.
1141. Baby Doe died on April 15, 1982. See supra text accompanying note 1138. Presi-
dent Reagan issued the memorandum on April 30, 1982. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622 (1984).
1142. See Pearl, supra note 1125, at 703. The President's memorandum does not ap-
pear in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, but is reprinted in the Depart-
ment of HHS Final Rule, Procedures and Guidelines Relating to Health Care for Handi-
capped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622-23 (1984). Id. at 703 n.10.
1143. 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982). HHS issued the notice on May 18, 1982.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1983). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states that "[n]o
otherwise qualified handicapped individual... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
1145. Although HHS previously had not applied § 504 to treatment decisions concern-
ing defective newborns, HHS maintained that the implementing regulations of § 504 (45
C.F.R. 84.61) indicate that the section is applicable to health care and that conditions such
as Down's Syndrome or spina bifida properly are considered handicaps within the meaning
of § 504 (45 C.F.R. 84.3(j)). 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982). The Notice alerted hospitals that it
is unlawful under section 504:
for a recipient of Federal financial assistance to withhold from a handicapped infant
nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life-
threatening condition, if:
(1) The withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; and
(2) The handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance medi-
cally contraindicated.
Id. The Notice also stated that failure to comply with the regulations would result in the
termination of federal financial assistance. Id.
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financial assistance from discriminating against the
handicapped. 1146
Approximately one year later, HHS issued regulations entitled
the "Interim Final Rule,"111 47 which the Department designed to
enforce the prohibitions stated in the preceding "Notice to Health
Care Providers." 14 8 These short-lived regulations commonly were
called "Baby Doe Regulations." Promulgated under section 504,1141
these regulations required any recipient of federal financial assis-
tance providing health care to infants to post "in a conspicuous
place in each delivery ward, each maternity ward, each pediatric
ward, and each nursery, including each intensive care nursery, the
following notice: DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND
CARE FOR HANDICAPPED INFANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS
PROHIBITED BY FEDERAL LAW."" 5 The Baby Doe Regula-
tions also required each poster to include: (1) a statement noting
the applicability of section 504 to the treatment of handicapped
newborns, and (2) a statement instructing any citizen having
knowledge of a severely defective newborn being denied food or
customary medical care on the basis of a handicap to contact HHS
through its toll-free Handicapped Infant Hotline" 5' in Washing-
ton, D.C. HHS issued the regulations without the benefit of pub-
lic comment, as required by the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA)," 52 and the regulations were soon challenged because of this
failure to follow the APA's prescribed procedure for promulgating
regulations.
1146. See supra note 1144.
1147. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap: Interim Final Rule, 48 Fed. Reg.
9630 (1983) ("The purpose of the interim final rule is to acquire timely information concern-
ing violations of section 504 that are directed against handicapped infants and to save the
life of the infant.") (emphasis in original).
1148. See supra note 1145 for the text of the Notice to Health Care Providers.
1149. 48 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983).
1150. Id. at 9631.
1151. Id. The Hotline was available 24 hours a day, and the Department of Health
and Human Services guaranteed that callers' names would remain confidential. Id. at 9632.
1152. Congress enacted the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982), to
eliminate arbitrary bureaucratic actions taken without consideration of and notice to per-
sons affected. The Act generally requires a 30-day public comment period unless the
promulgating agency can justify why a particular notice provision should be waived. 5
U.S.C. § 553(b), (d) (1982).
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3. Challenge to the Baby Doe Regulations:
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler
The Baby Doe Regulations evoked intense emotional re-
sponses-both favorable and unfavorable-from organizations and
individuals concerned with the rights of the handicapped and with
the medical care of severely defective infants.11 " Within several
weeks of the publication of the Baby Doe Regulations, the Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics, the National Association of Children's
Hospitals and Related Institutions, and the Children's Hospital
National Medical Center filed suit against the Reagan Administra-
tion's new Secretary of Health and Human Services, Margaret
Heckler, challenging the validity of the rules.1"4 On April 14, 1983,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia inval-
idated the Interim Final Rule,1155 asserting that the regulations
were (1) arbitrary and capricious,1 5 and (2) promulgated in viola-
tion of the Administrative Procedures Act's public notice require-
ment.115 7 By invalidating the Interim Final Rule on a procedural
ground,115 the district court failed to resolve the basic question of
whether HHS had exceeded its authority under section 504 by
1153. Mathieu, supra note 1140, at 607. Traditionally, decisions to withhold or with-
draw life-sustaining treatment from critically ill newborns have been made within the pri-
vacy of the physician-patient relationship, without intervention by governmental authori-
ties. Groups opposing the Interim Final Rule argued that the regulations placed a "novel
and far-reaching" burden upon the physician and parents' decisionmaking process. Con-
versely, organizations supporting the regulations argued that governmental interference was
essential to insure proper decisions, particularly in borderline cases when parental decisions
may reflect wholly irrelevant economic and familial considerations. American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 396-97 (D.D.C. 1983).
1154. Mathieu, supra note 1140, at 607. Thirteen organizations and individuals filed
briefs as amici curiae supporting either the plaintiffs' or defendants' position. Plaintiffs at-
tacked the regulations as: (1) arbitrary and capricious regulations; (2) promulgated in viola-
tion of the public comment requirement of the Administrative Procedures Act and without
a justification for waiving the requirement; (3) exceeding the scope of the Department's
statutory authority granted by § 504; and (4) an unjustified intrusion into the family-physi-
cian relationship and other confidential relationships protected by the Constitution. 561 F.
Supp. at 396.
1155. 561 F. Supp. at 403.
1156. Id. at 399. The court applied a "test of rationality" to the regulations and con-
cluded that haste and inexperience resulted in agency action based on inadequate consider-
aton that was virtually meaningless beyond its intrinsic in terrorem effect. Id. at 399-400.
1157. The court rejected the Secretary's argument that the rule was either "interpre-
tive" or "procedural" and therefore not subject to the notice requirements of the APA. The
court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the requirements should have been waived
to protect life from imminent harm. Id. at 401.
1158. Id.
1986] CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND BIRTH 795
promulgating regulations in the area of neonatal medical care." 9
The district court's opinion also failed to decide whether the regu-
lations, if properly promulgated, imposed an unconstitutional in-
trusion upon the privileged physician-patient relationship or the
constitutionally protected familial right to privacy.11 10
4. Federal Response to Heckler
After the district court invalidated the Interim Final Rule in
Heckler, HHS quickly issued "Proposed Rules"11 61 that were al-
most identical to their invalidated predecessors.' 6 2 In addition to
restating the requirements of the Interim Final Rule, the Proposed
Rules required state child-protective service agencies to establish
and maintain procedures which would insure that the agency exer-
cised its complete authority under state law to prevent the medical
neglect of severely defective infants. 6 3 Unlike the original regula-
1159. Although invalidating the regulations on procedural grounds, the court did dis-
cuss the propriety of the Department of HHS' regulation under the authority of § 504. The
court conceded that some infants born with physical and mental defects may fit within §
504's broad definition of a handicapped individual. The court could not say with certainty
that § 504 does not authorize some regulation of the types of medical care provided to
handicapped newborns. The court also noted that the application of § 504 to treatment
decisions was unprecedented because, as far as the court could determine, no congressional
committee or member of the House or Senate had ever suggested that § 504 would apply to
medical treatment of defective newborn infants or establish standards for preserving a par-
ticular quality of life. Id. at 400-02. The court concluded that the question of whether § 504
authorizes federal intervention in decisions regarding treatment of handicapped newborns
should await the actual application of the statute to particular circumstances. In conclusion,
the court suggested that Congress should take action to clarify the scope of § 504. Id. at 402.
1160. The court noted that if it interpreted § 504 to minimize or eliminate the role of
a severely defective infant's parents in the treatment decision, the provision's application
might infringe upon the parents' right to familial privacy similar to the privacy rights recog-
nized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965). 561 F. Supp. at 403.
1161. Mathieu, supra note 1140, at 611. The Department issued the regulations less
than three months after the Heckler decision. The regulations officially were entitled Non-
discrimination on the Bases of Handicaps Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants:
Proposed Rules, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules].
1162. For a detailed comparison of the Interim Final Rule and the Proposed Rules, see
Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 276-77.
1163. Id. at 277. The Proposed Rules, in a section to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §
84.61(2)(e), provided that:
Within 60 days of the effective date of this subsection [October 9, 1985], each recipient
state child protective services agency shall establish and maintain written methods of
administration and procedures to assure that the agency utilizes its full authority pur-
suant to State law to prevent instances of medical neglect of handicapped infants.
These methods of administration and procedures shall include:
(1) A requirement that health care providers report immediately to the State
agency suspected cases of medical neglect of handicapped infants;
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tions, the Proposed Rules contained a sixty-day period for public
comment and specifically solicited public responses to nine rele-
vant issues.116 4 The Proposed Rules also contained a supplemen-
tary information section that stated the history of the regulation
and HHS' reasons for promulgating the Proposed Rules. 16 5
During the sixty-day comment period, HHS received over
16,000 responses,'166 an overwhelming majority of which supported
the Proposed Rules.116 7 Physicians, hospital officials, and medical
associations, however, voiced as much criticism to the Proposed
Rules as they had to the Interim Final Rules."6 8s The American
Academy of Pediatrics expressed its dissatisfaction by submitting
to HHS a detailed alternative to the Proposed Rules, suggesting,
among other things, that HHS require hospitals to establish and
maintain infant care review boards ' 6 9 as a condition to participat-
(2) A method by which the agency can receive reports of suspected medical neglect
of handicapped infants from health care providers, other individuals, and the Depart-
ment on a timely basis;
(3) Immediate review of reports of suspected medical neglect of handicapped in-
fants and, where appropriate, onsite investigation of such reports;
(4) Provision of child protective services to medically neglected handicapped in-
fants, including, when appropriate, seeking a timely court order to compel the provi-
sion of necessary nourishment and medical treatment; and
(5) Immediate notification to the Department's Office for Civil Rights of each re-
port of suspected medical neglect of a handicapped infant, the steps taken by the
agency to investigate such report, and the agency's disposition of such report.
48 Fed. Reg. 30,851 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (2)(e)(1)-(5)) (proposed July
5, 1983).
1164. See Proposed Rules, 48 Fed. Reg. at 30,850-51. Some of the specific issues raised
included self-evaluations by health-providing institutions, and mandatory internal review
committees.
1165. The Department included the supplementary information section to defend the
rules against charges that HHS enacted the Proposed Rules, like the Interim Final Rules, in
an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). See Proposed Rules, supra note 1161, at 30,846-47.
1166. Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 277. The Department received
16,739 responses, 16,331 of which supported the Proposed Rules. See Nondiscrimination on
the Basis of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines Relating to Health Care for Handi-
capped Infants: Final Rules, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1623 (1984) (to be codified at 46 C.F.R.
§ 86.55) [hereinafter cited as Final Rules].
1167. For a breakdown of specific groups' support or opposition percentages by occu-
pation, see Final Rules, supra note 1166, at 1623.
1168. See, e.g., Baby Doe Needs No Big Brother, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1983, at 20, col.
1, cited in Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 277 n.58 (discussing the medical
profession's unfavorable response to the proposed rules).
1169. Note, The HHS' Final Rules, supra note 1116, at 277. The alternate proposal
that the American Academy of Pediatrics submitted suggested that the committees be com-
posed of a hospital administrator, a representative of a disability group, a lay community
member, a practicing member of the hospital's medical staff, and a practicing nurse. The
proposal suggested also that the Infant Care Review Committees (ICRCs) assume responsi-
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ing in the federally funded Medicare program. 117 0 The American
Medical Association (AMA), along with several related organiza-
tions,' I71 supported the concept of infant care review boards, but
only on a voluntary basis.1 7 2 Additionally, the AMA opposed all
federal intervention into treatment decisions, including federally
mandated infant care review committees.117 3
C. THE CONTROVERSY REVISITED
1. Birth of "Baby Jane Doe"
While HHS was evaluating the public response to the Pro-
posed Rules and the American Academy of Pediatrics' alternative
proposal, a second parental decision to withhold treatment from a
severely defective newborn caught the attention of the popular
press.17 4 "Baby Jane Doe"" 75 was born on October 11, 1983, in
Port Jefferson, New York, with multiple birth defects including
myelomeningocele (commonly called spina bifida),1176 microceph-
aly,1 7 7 hydrocephalus," 7 8 and a malformed brain stem. "Baby
bility for developing hospital policies and guidelines for the management of specific types of
diagnoses, monitoring adherence to policies through retrospective record review, and review-
ing specific cases when nontreatment is being considered. Under the alternative proposal, an
ICRC would be responsible for alerting state child protective agencies whenever the com-
mittee disagreed with either the parents' or the physicians' decision to withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining treatment from a severely defective newborn. Final Rules, supra note 1166,
at 1623.
1170. Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 277.
1171. These organizations included the Catholic Health Association, the Federation of
American Hospitals, the American College of Hospital Administrators, the American College
of Physicians, and the American Nurses Association. Final Rules, supra note 1166, at 1624.
1172. Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 277.
1173. The AMA refused to support federal intervention in treatment decisions con-
cerning seriously ill newborns, and commented that the attention which the government's
action generated should provide a continued stimulus to develop procedures dealing with
this sensitive area without the unwarranted intrusion of the federal government. Final
Rules, supra note 1166, at 1624.
1174. See generally The Case of Baby Jane Doe, NEwsWEEK, Nov. 14, 1983, at 45-46;
Whose Lives Are They Anyway?, TIME, Nov. 14, 1983; Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 1983, at Al, col.
3, cited in Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 271 n.15.
1175. The news media quickly nicknamed the infant "Baby Jane Doe" because of her
parents' desire for anonymity.
1176. Spina bifida is a congenital defect characterized by an abnormal development of
the osseus spine. See Robertson, supra note 1114, at 213 n.6. The PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION,
noted that vigorous surgical, medical and rehabilitative therapies have improved drastically
the prognosis of infants afflicted with spina bifida. Today, many individuals born with spina
bifida can lead relatively normal, independent lives. PRESIDE T'S COMMISSION supra note
1111, at 202.
1177. Microcephaly is characterized by an abnormally small head circumference and
increased pressure in the cranial cavity. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 588,
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Jane" also suffered other congenital abnormalities, including a
"weak face," bilateral upper extremity spasticity, and a thumb
formed entirely within her right hand."7 9 The infant was trans-
ferred immediately to the University Hospital, State of New York
at Stony Brook"8s0 for emergency surgery to correct both her spina
bifida and hydrocephalus.'l After consulting several neurological
experts, nurses, religious advisors, and a social worker, Baby Jane's
parents refused to consent to the proposed surgical procedures. 182
The parents instead decided to implement a "conservative" course
of medical treatment,1183 consisting of a nutritious diet, ingestion
of antibiotics, and medical dressing of the infant's exposed spinal
sac to encourage the closing of skin over the opening." 4 The hos-
pital, lacking the legal authority to perform the surgical procedures
without parental consent, complied with the parents' choice of
treatment."8 5
On October 16, 1983, a Vermont attorney petitioned the Su-
467 N.Y.S.2d 1186 (N.Y. 1983).
1178. Hydrocephalus is characterized by an excess of free fluid around the brain that
results in a marked enlargement of the head. Id.
Because of the combination of microcephaly and hydrocephalus, an extremely high
probability existed that Baby Jane Doe would have been so severely retarded that she never
could have interacted with her environment or with other people. United States v. Univer-
sity Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 729 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1984).
1179. Id.
1180. The remainder of this Section will refer to the University Hospital, State of New
York as the "Stony Brook Hospital."
1181. 729 F.2d at 146. In the proposed surgical procedures, the doctors first would
excise a sac of fluid and nerve endings from the infant's spinal column malformation and
close the spinal opening. Id. Then the doctors would implant a pump into the infant's head
to drain excess fluid from around the brain and to relieve pressure in the cranial cavity. Id.
These two corrective procedures possibly would have prolonged Baby Jane's life, but would
not have eliminated any of her physical disabilities or lessened the extent of her mental
retardation. Id.
1182. Id.
1183. The treatment that the parents chose in this case differed significantly from the
complete withdrawal of medical treatment and nutritional sustenance that occurred in the
"Baby Doe" controversy. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division noted that the
parents' choice of medical treatment did not place the infant in imminent danger of death.
95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686. The court recognized that surgical procedures possi-
bly would reduce the risk of infection, but also found advantages in the conservative treat-
ment. Although the mortality rate is higher when doctors use conservative medical treat-
ment, the court noted that in this particular case the surgical procedures also entailed great
risk to the infant. Id. The surgery could have deprived the infant of the little function
remaining in her legs, and would have resulted in recurring urinary tract and kidney infec-
tions, skin infections, and edemas of the limbs. Id.
1184. See University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 146.
1185. See United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 575
F. Supp. 607, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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preme Court of the State of New York, Suffolk County, seeking the
appointment of a guardian ad litem for Baby Jane. The attorney
also sought an order compelling the Stony Brook Hospital to per-
form the corrective surgical procedures. 11s The court appointed a
guardian ad litem for Baby Jane.118 7 On October 19 and 20 the
court conducted an evidentiary hearing in which it determined
that Baby Jane needed immediate surgical procedures to preserve
her life. 1 8 The court, therefore, ordered corrective surgery.'" 9 On
October 21, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, re-
versed the lower court's ruling and concluded that the parents'
choice of conservative treatment, rather than surgery, was well
within accepted medical standards. Consequently, the court re-
fused to disturb the parents' decision. 1 90 The New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the appellate division's holding on a procedural
basis. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court had
abused its discretion by allowing the case to proceed because the
petitioner, having no disclosed relationship to the Does, had filed
suit in the court directly, rather than through a state child-protec-
tive service agency as required by New York law." 9' The court of
appeals did not dispute the appellate division's finding that the
parents had acted reasonably and in the child's best interest.1 92
Instead, the court of appeals indirectly affirmed the appellate divi-
sion's reasoning by concluding that the circumstances of the case
did not justify the court's intervention in the treatment process." 93
1186. University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 146. The attorney was not related to Baby Jane
Doe. Id.
1187. Id.
1188. Id.
1189. Id. at 147.
1190. See Weber, 95 A.D.2d at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
1191. Weber, 60 N.Y.2d at 211-21, 456 N.E.2d at 1188. New York law requires con-
cerned citizens to contact the State Department of Social Services, which has primary re-
sponsibility for initiating child neglect proceedings, rather than petitioning the court system
directly. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr § 1011 (McKinney, 1983).
1192. The court viewed the parents' decision as a choice between reasonable medical
alternatives, rather than a conscious decision to withhold treatment. See Weber, 95 A.D.2d
at 589, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
1193. The court of appeals recognized that occasions might arise when a court appro-
priately could intervene in the treatment process, but noted that Baby Jane Doe's case did
not present circumstances justifying intervention. Weber, 60 N.Y.2d at 213, 456 N.E.2d at
1188.
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2. Federal Response to "Baby Jane Doe":
United States v. University Hospital
Before the state courts resolved the battles concerning Baby
Jane Doe's medical treatment,"94 an undisclosed private citizen
alerted HHS that the Stony Brook Hospital was withholding life-
sustaining treatment from Baby Jane on the basis of her congenital
defects. 195 The Department referred the complaint to the New
York State Child Protection Services, 1196 which concluded that
Baby Jane's treatment presented no cause for state interven-
tion.1 97 In addition to referring the complaint to the New York
state agency, the Department secured copies of Baby Jane Doe's
medical records through October 19, which were contained in the
records of related state court proceedings." 98 Department officials
examined the records and uncovered no evidence that the hospital
was denying Baby Jane medical treatment because of her handi-
caps." 99 The Department, however, repeatedly demanded access to
Baby Jane Doe's current medical records, which were in the hospi-
tal's possession. 200 Stony Brook Hospital complied with the par-
ents' request and refused to allow Department officials and federal
investigators access to the confidential records. 120'
Following Stony Brook Hospital's refusal to disclose the re-
quested information, HHS commenced legal action to secure the
1194. For a discussion of related cases in New York state courts, see supra notes 1174-
93 and accompanying text.
1195. University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 147.
1196. Id.; University Hospital, 575 F. Supp. at 611. The New York State Child Pro-
tection Service is approved under the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.
The Service is responsible for investigating alleged instances of child abuse, mistreatment,
and neglect. Id.
1197. Id.
1198. University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 147. The Surgeon General of the United States
reviewed the courts' medical records and concluded that a review of the infant's current
medical records was necessary. The Surgeon General noted that:
[a]n appropriate determination concerning whether the current care of Infant Jane Doe
is within the bounds of legitimate medical judgment, rather than based solely on a
handicapping condition which is not a medical contraindication to surgical treatment,
cannot be made without immediate access to, and careful review of, current medical
records and other sources of information within the possession and control of the
hospital.
Id.
1199. See University Hospital, 575 F. Supp. at 614.
1200. University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 147. For the Department's explanation of why
it needed the records, see supra note 88.
1201. Stony Brook Hospital also based its refusal to release the records on serious
concerns regarding the Department's jurisdiction and the procedures the Department em-
ployed in initiating the inquiry. University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 148.
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remaining records. 2 2 The government claimed access to the
records under the implementing regulations 2 0 3 of section 504.1204
In University Hospital, the Department claimed a legal right to
Baby Jane Doe's records 120 5 to determine whether Stony Brook
Hospital, as a recipient of federal funds, was discriminating against
the infant by withholding treatment on the basis of her
handicaps.120
The district court rejected HHS' argument and granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, Stony Brook Hospital and
Baby Jane Doe's parents.120 7 The court concluded that the infant's
parents had made a reasonable choice between alternative medical
treatments and that the hospital had not discriminated against
Baby Jane Doe in violation of section 504.1205 Thus, HHS had no
valid claim to the records. 120 9
The district court's opinion, however, failed to resolve the dis-
pute over whether HHS had exceeded its authority under section
1202. HHS commenced its action through the Department of Justice. Remaining
anonymous, the infant's parents intervened as defendants in the suit. See University Hospi-
tal, 575 F. Supp. at 609.
1203. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1985).
1204. See id. § 80.6(c).
1205. The implementing regulations require each recipient of federal financial assis-
tance to grant a Department official or other designated person access to all books, records,
and other relevant information that the Department might find necessary to determine
whether a recipient is discriminating against a handicapped individual in violation of § 504.
University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 147-48.
Generally, an administrative agency is entitled to access to all information that is "not
plainly incompetent or irrelevant" to the lawful purpose of the agency in the discharge of its
duties. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943). The power of an admin-
istrative agency, however, to conduct investigations and subpoena records is not unlimited.
University Hospital, 575 F. Supp. at 614.
1206. University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 149.
1207. University Hospital, 575 F. Supp. at 616.
1208. The court expressly rejected defendants' claims that (1) the doctrine of laches
barred the suit, (2) New York's physician-patient privilege barred access to Baby Jane Doe's
records, and (3) medicare and medicaid do not constitute "federal financial assistance"
within the meaning of § 504. Id. at 611-12, 615; see also Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra
note 1116, at 272 n.24. The court noted that defendants' physician-patient privilege argu-
ment was wholly without merit, and commented that
[i]t would be highly paradoxical if an individual's right to privacy could be asserted by
that individual's parent or guardian, purportedly acting in that individual's own best
interests, for the purpose of precluding an inquiry into the question of whether the
parent or guardian was in fact acting in the individual's best interests.
University Hospital, 575 F. Supp. at 615-16.
1209. The court generalized that "if a recipient of federal financial assistance is clearly
not violating [§ 504] by discriminating against handicapped persons, the Department of
Health and Human Services may not obtain access to the records of such recipient pursuant
to 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6(c) and 84.61." Id. at 614.
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504 by attempting to regulate treatment of severely defective
newborns. 1210 The opinion focused on the particular facts of the
Baby Jane Doe controversy and stressed that governmental inter-
vention into Baby Jane's treatment was unwarranted because her
parents' decision was reasonable and was based on adequate "con-
sideration of the medical options available and on genuine concern
for the best interests of their child. 1 211 The opinion left open the
possibility that governmental intervention into medical treatment,
under the authority of section 504, might be appropriate when pa-
rental decisions are unreasonable or contrary to the best interests
of the defective newborn.1 21 2 HHS appealed the district court's de-
cision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.1 213
3. The Department of Health and Human Services'
Final Rules
On January 21, 1984, after the Second Circuit had heard Uni-
versity Hospital,214 but before it had issued an opinion, HHS pub-
lished its "Final Rules" 1215 concerning governmental intervention
into treatment decisions affecting severely defective newborns.
With the Final Rules, which differ substantially from their prede-
cessors, 216 the Department hoped to replace the heated contro-
versy surrounding the Proposed Rules and the Interim Final Rule
with a "spirit of cooperation" between the federal government, the
medical profession, private advocacy groups, and state govern-
ments.1 217 The Department promulgated the Final Rules under the
authority of section 504.121'  The Final Rules, like their predeces-
sors, require hospitals to post warning notices that list a toll-free
1210. See id. at 616.
1211. Id. at 615.
1212. The court noted the possibility that § 504 does authorize challenges by the fed-
eral government to unreasonable choices of medical treatment for handicapped infants. Id.
at 616.
1213. See University Hospital, 729 F.2d at 149.
1214. See Id.
1215. See FINAL RULEs supra note 1166.
1216. For a discussion of the Interim Final Rule and the Proposed Rules, see supra
notes 1147-73 and accompanying text.
1217. Compare 49 Fed. Reg. 1,622 (1984) with 48 Fed. Reg. 9,630 and 30,846 (1983).
Seeking to promote the "cooperative spirit" of the regulations, HHS adopted a portion of
the widely accepted Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants as a general guideline for
compliance with the Final Rules. 49 Fed. Reg. 1,652 (codified at 45 C.F.R. §
84.55(f)(1)(ii)(B)).
1218. 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1983).
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hotline for reporting suspected cases of nontreatment based on
handicaps. 1219 The Final Rule's notice requirements, however, are
less intrusive than the previous regulations' requirements. The no-
tice has a new heading,1zz° a smaller mandatory minimum size,'122
and modified areas of display.1222 Like the Proposed Rules, the Fi-
1219. Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 276-77. Under the Final Rules
hospitals can choose to post either Notice A or Notice B, depending on the hospital's policy
on nontreatment of severely defective newborns. Notice A, the preferred notice, reads in
part:
PRINCIPLES OF TREATMENT OF DISABLED INFANTS
It is the policy of this hospital, consistent with Federal law, that, nourishment and
medically beneficial treatment (as determined with respect for reasonable medical
judgments) should not be withheld from handicapped infants solely on the basis of
their present or anticipated mental or physical impairments.
This Federal law, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of handicap in programs or activities receiving Federal financial
assistance. For further information or to report suspected noncompliance, call:
[Identify designated hospital contact point and telephone number] or
[Identify appropriate child protective services agency and telephone number] or
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): 800-368-1019 (Toll-free;
available 24 hours a day; TDD capability).
The identity of callers will be held confidential. Retaliation by this hospital against any
person for providing information about possible noncompliance is prohibited by this
hospital and by Federal regulations.
49 Fed. Reg. 1,651. A health care provider may post Notice A only if it has a policy consis-
tent with the one stated in the notice; if it has a procedure for reviewing treatment delibera-
tions and decisions to which the notice applies; and if it has a consistent policy regarding
the identity of callers. Id. Otherwise, the health care provider must display Notice B, which
states:
PRINCIPLES OF TREATMENT OF DISABLED INFANTS
Federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap. Under this law, nourish-
ment and medically beneficial treatment (as determined with respect for reasonable
medical judgments) should not be withheld from handicapped infants solely on the
basis of their present or anticipated mental or physical impairments.
This Federal law, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, applies to pro-
grams or activities receiving Federal financial assistance. For further information, or to
report suspected noncompliance, call:
[Identify appropriate child protective services agency and telephone] or
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: 800-368-1019 (Toll-free; available
24 hours a day; TDD capability).
The identity of callers will be held confidential. Federal regulations prohibit retaliation
by this hospital against any person who provides information about possible violations.
Id.
1220. Note, the HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 278. The new heading, PRINCI-
PLES OF TREATMENT OF DISABLED INFANTS, replaces the warning, DISCRIMINA-
TORY FAILURE TO FEED AND CARE FOR HANDICAPPED INFANTS IN THIS FA-
CILITY IS PROHIBITED BY FEDERAL LAW. Compare 49 Fed. Reg. 1,651 with 48 Fed.
Reg. 30,851.
1221. The required minimum size under the Final Rules is 5" x 7", as opposed to 8-
1/2" x 11" in the Proposed Rules and 17" x 14" in the interim Final Rule.
1222. Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 278. The Final Rules require
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nal Rules require state child-protection agencies to establish and
maintain written procedures designed to ensure that the agency
fully exercises its authority under state law to prevent instances of
unlawful medical neglect of handicapped newborns. 1223 The Final
Rules, however, differ from their predecessors in a significant way.
The Final Rules place the major burden of enforcing the regula-
tions on state governments and hospitals, rather than on HHS and
its federal investigators. 12 24
The penalties for violating HHS' Final Rules are relatively le-
nient. The only possible repercussion from a proven violation is
that the state's child-protection agency will be subject to with-
drawal of federal financial assistance under the Child Abuse Pre-
vention and Treatment Act. 2 25 The Final Rules neither threaten
criminal prosecution nor authorize civil actions as penalties for vio-
lations of the requirements. 2 2 6 The Final Rules also eliminate the
federal investigation teams, nicknamed "Baby Doe Squads," that
members of the medical profession violently opposed. 227 Hospitals
need not report suspicions of medical neglect to the designated
state child-protection agency until after hospital officials reviewed
the case and determined that the parents' treatment decision war-
rants state agency intervention. 2 8 Furthermore, state agencies
must report the disposition of cases concerning suspected medical
neglect only on a "timely" basis, 2 219 rather than "immediately" as
the Proposed Rules required. 23 0
The Final Rules encourage, but do not require, 231 hospitals to
hospitals to post notices in locations where nurses and other medical professionals who pro-
vide health care will see them. The hospitals need not place the notices where the parents of
infant patients will see them. 46 C.F.R. § 84.55(b)(2).
1223. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(c) (1985); see also Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note
1116, at 278.
1224. See Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 278. The Proposed Rules
advocated a "vigorous federal role in enforcing the protections of section 504." See Proposed
Rules, supra note 1161.
1225. Murray, supra note 1120, at 6.
1226. Id.
1227. See Special Project, supra note 1121, at 607, 611, 614; see also Taub, Withhold-
ing Treatment from Defective Newborns, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (Aug. 1982).
1228. Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 278.
1229. Id.
1230. Id. The Proposed Rules required that the state agencies maintain procedures for
"[i]mmediate notification to the Department of each report of suspected medical neglect of
a handicapped infant, the steps taken by the agency to investigate such report, and the
agency's final disposition of such report." Proposed Rules, supra note 1161, at 30,851.
1231. "While the Department recognizes the value of ICRC's [(Infant Care Review
Committees)] in assuring appropriate medical care to infants, such committees are not re-
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establish and maintain Infant Care Review Committees
(ICRCs). 232 In the Final Rules, the Department states that the
purpose of an ICRC is to assist health care providers in developing
standards, policies, and procedures concerning the treatment of
handicapped infants in general, and to advise physicians and par-
ents in specific instances when nontreatment is contemplated. 1233
The Final Rules recommend that hospital ICRCs be composed of
individuals representing a broad spectrum of perspectives and a
wide variety of professions,1234 but the Final Rules do not prescribe
either mandatory membership requirements or functional
duties.12 5
The "Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants" were an-
nounced on November 29, 1983. The Principles were developed
through the combined efforts of several prominent medical and
disability groups, including the American Academy of Pediatrics,
the National Association of Children's Hospitals and Related Insti-
tutions, the Association for Retarded Citizens, the Down's Syn-
drome Congress, and the Spina Bifida Association of America. 123 6
The Principles read in part:
It is ethically and legally justified to withhold medical or surgical procedures
which are clearly futile and will only prolong the act of dying. However, sup-
portive care should be provided, including sustenance as medically indicated
and relief of pain and suffering. In cases where it is uncertain whether medi-
cal treatment will be beneficial, a person's disability must not be the basis for
a decision to withhold treatment .... When doubt exists at any time about
whether to treat, a presumption always should be in favor of treatment.
1237
quired by this section." 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(a) (1985).
1232. Id.
1233. Note, The HHS' Final Rule, supra note 1116, at 286. The President's Commis-
sion for the Study of Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research encourages the use
of ICRCs. Id. at 279 n.77. The commission noted that a review committee can serve a wide
variety of functions including the following:
First, it can verify that the best information available is being used. Second, it can
confirm the propriety of a decision that providers and parents have reached or confirm
that the range of discretion accorded to the parents is appropriate. Third, it can resolve
disputes among those involved in a decision, if necessary, by siding with one party or
another in a dispute. Finally it can refer cases to public agencies (child protection ser-
vices, probate courts, or prosecuting attorneys) when appropriate.
49 Fed. Reg. 1,622, 1,623 (1984) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1111, at 227).
1234. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55(a) (1985). The rules suggest that an ICRC's membership
should include a physician, a nurse, an advocate or handicapped persons' rights, a hospital
administrator, and an attorney. Id. § 84.55(f)(2).
1235. The Department noted that the Federal government should not mandate ICRCs
because these review boards, being "largely untried," are not demonstrably effective enough
to justify making them mandatory for 7000 hospitals nationwide. 49 Fed. Reg. at 1,624.
1236. Id. at 1,622.
1237. Id.
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The Principles also state that the actual or anticipated quality of
an individual's life should not determine decisions concerning
medical care.1238
On February 23, 1984, only ten days after the Department's
Final Rules became effective, the Second Circuit issued its opinion
in United States v. University Hospital.123 The Second Circuit
upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Baby Jane Doe's parents and Stony Brook Hospital.124 0 Unlike the
lower court, the Second Circuit conducted an extensive examina-
tion of the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
HHS' regulations under the Act.124' In particular, the Second Cir-
cuit sought to determine whether Congress intended section 504 to
authorize HHS to conduct investigations into treatment decisions
concerning severely defective newborns.1242 The court focused on
the legislative history of the Act 2 43 and concluded that "Congress
never contemplated that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
would apply to treatment decisions involving defective newborn in-
fants" when Congress enacted the statute in 1973, amended it in
1974, or at any subsequent time. 2 44 The court based its decision on
the absence of a "clear congressional directive' 24 5 and supported
the District of Columbia district court's conclusion in American
Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler124 6 that any intervention of a
federal agency into medical treatment decisions should reflect cau-
1238. Id.
1239. 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
1240. Id. at 146.
1241. In analyzing the case, the Second Circuit assumed that the hospital was a recipi-
ent of federal financial assistance within the meaning of § 504 and that the "program or
activity" to which the state applies, if at all, is the entire hospital. The Second Circuit then
noted that the predecessor to HHS-the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW)-had solicited comments on specific issues before issuing a new set of regulations
under § 504. One of these specific issues was whether the regulations should contain provi-
sions regulating institutionalized patients' rights to receive or refuse treatment. After evalu-
ating comments, HEW determined that § 504 did not give the Department authority to
regulate medical treatment. Id. at 152.
1242. Id. at 150.
1243. Id. at 157-61. The court concluded that the application of § 504 to medical
treatment of handicapped infants was dramatically different in kind, as well as degree, from
the applications of § 504 that Congress discussed in the legislative history. Id. at 161. For a
recent commentary criticizing the court's examination of § 504's legislative history see
Gerry, The Civil Rights of Handicapped Infants: An Oklahoma "Experiment", 1 IsSUES L.
& MED. 15. 47-55 (1985).
1244. 729 F.2d at 161.
1245. Id.
1246. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983).
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tion and sensitivity. 1247 The Second Circuit thus noted that until
Congress has clarified the Department's authority under section
504, a court would be unwarranted in exercising its judicial power
to approve the Department's intervention into decisions affecting
the medical treatment of severely defective newborns. 1248
In American Hospital Association v. Heckler12 49 a federal dis-
trict court invalidated the HHS Final Rules under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1210 In an unreported opinion, the
Second Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court's deci-
sion.1251 Both courts regarded the Second Circuit's decision in
United States v. University Hospital 52 as controlling. The dis-
trict court noted that "in light of University Hospital," the regula-
tions are "invalid, unlawful and must be set aside pursuant to the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(c), because
promulgated without statutory authority.' 2 5 1 In June, 1985, the
United States Supreme Court granted HHS' petition for writ of
certiorari to review the case.12 54 On January 15, 1986, the Supreme
Court heard oral arguments in the case'12 55 but has not yet issued a
decision.
4. Congressional Response to University Hospital
In University Hospital the Second Circuit expressed the need
for a congressional statement to clarify whether HHS exceeded its
authority under section 504 by attempting to investigate and regu-
late the medical treatment of severely defective newborns.2 56 Al-
though Congress maintained a "neutral position' 12 57 in the contro-
versy surrounding section 504, Congress indirectly responded to
the Second Circuit's plea by passing the Child Abuse Amendments
1247. 729 F.2d at 161 (citing Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 403). The Second Circuit con-
cluded that under these circumstances Congress, rather than an executive agency, should
first weigh the competing interests at stake. Until Congress has spoken, approval of this
type of agency investigation would be an unwarranted exercise of judicial power. Id.
1248. Id.
1249. 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
1250. Id. at 542.
1251. American Hosp. Assoc. v. Heckler, No. 84-6211 (2d Cir. 1984).
1252. 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
1253. 585 F. Supp. at 542.
1254. Heckler v. American Hosp. Assoc., No. 84-1529, cert. granted sub nom. Bowen v.
American Hosp. Assoc., 105 S. Ct. 3475 (1985).
1255. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1986, at B7, col. 2.
1256. 729- F.2d at 161.
1257. See infra notes 1272-74 and accompanying text.
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of 1984.1158 The Amendments retained HHS' previously granted
authority to regulate the withdrawal of "medically indicated treat-
ment"1259 from handicapped newborns"' 0 and, therefore, elimi-
nated much of the controversy surrounding the Department's regu-
lation under section 504.1261
Enacted in September of 1984, the Amendments expanded the
definition of child abuse under the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 19741262 to include the withholding of medically
indicated treatment from defective newborns.12 63 The Amendments
defined "withholding medically indicated treatment" as "the fail-
ure to respond to the infant's life-threatening conditions by pro-
viding treatment (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and
medication) which, in the treating physician's or physicians' rea-
sonable medical judgments will be most likely to be effective in
ameliorating or correcting all such conditions .... 12 64 Recognizing
that in certain circumstances life-sustaining efforts will be futile,
the Amendments specifically exempted nontreatment in three cat-
egories of cases from the definition of child abuse.2 65
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act authorizes
grants to qualifying states to aid in implementing state programs
to prevent and treat child abuse and neglect.126 6 The Amendments
1258. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5101-5106, 5116-5116g (West
Supp. 1985).
1259. See infra notes 1263-65 and accompanying text.
1260. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(a)(1) (1982).
1261. HHS continued its efforts to establish the validity of the Final Rules promul-
gated under the Rehabilitation Act. See infra notes 1333-36 and accompanying text.
1262. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 5101-5116 (West Supp. 1985). President signed the Act into law in 1974. Under the Act,
the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect makes grants to states for use in imple-
menting child abuse and neglect prevention and treatment programs; funds the activities of
nonprofit organizations relating to the prevention, identification, and treatment of child
abuse and neglect; and assists states and communities in implementing child abuse and
neglect programs.
1263. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5103(b)(2)(k)(3).
1264. Id.
1265. Id. The term "withholding of medically indicated treatment" does not include:
the failure to provide treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medi-
cation) to an infant when, in the treating physician's or physicians' reasonable medical
judgment, (A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of
such treatment would (i) merely prolong dying, (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or
correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions, or (iii) otherwise be futile in
terms of the survival of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment would be
virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under
such circumstances would be inhumane.
Id.
1266. The fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the
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require states, as a condition for participating in the state grant
program,126 7 to implement programs or procedures designed to pre-
vent instances of medical neglect, including the withholding of
medically indicated treatment from severely defective newborns
with life-threatening conditions. 128 To implement the legislation's
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, and the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands are eligible to apply for state grants. Fifty-one of the fifty-seven eligi-
ble jurisdictions meet the requirements of the Act and the regulations. These jurisdictions
currently receive state funds. See Final rules, 50 Fed. Reg. at 14,878.
Each state currently has a statute that includes the failure to provide needed medical
attention within the state's definition of neglect for the purposes of the state's child abuse
statute. See ALA. CODE § 24-16-1(2) (Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.070(5) (1985); ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2281 (Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-807(c) (Supp. 1983); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11165(c) (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(20) (d) (1978);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-120(b) (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 301(3)
(1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(9)(B) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(27) (West Supp.
1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 15.11-2(8)(A) (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 350-1(1) (Supp.
1984); IDAHO CODE § 16-1602(n)(1) (1979 & Supp. 1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-4(1)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-3(a)(1) & (f) (Burns Supp. 1985); IoWA
CODE ANN. § 232.2(6)(e) (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-802(g)(1) (1981); Ky. STAT. ANN.
§ 208.020(1)(d) (1982 & Supp. 1984); LA. STAT. REV. ANN. § 40.1299.36.1 (West Supp. 1986);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4002(6)(B) (Supp. 1986); MD. FAM. LAW CODE. § 5-701(g)(2)
(1984); MASS. GEN, LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.622(d) (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c) (West Supp. 1986); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 43-21-105(l)(i) (1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.110(5) (Vernon 1983 & Supp.
1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(3)(c) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-710-(3)(a) (1977); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200.5011(3) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3 XIX(b) (Supp. 1985); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(a) (West 1976 & Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-6-1(A)(2)
(1984); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 371.4-a(i)(A) (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21)
(1981 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02-5(a) (1974 & Supp. 1985); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.03(C) (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 845(B)(1) (West Supp. 1985); OR.
REV. STAT. § 418.740(1)(e) (1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1985); RI.
GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2d (1984 & Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(C)(3) (Law. Co-op.
1985); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 26-8-6(4) (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(10)(D) (Supp.
1985); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.04(3) (Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-2(17)(c)
(Supp. 1985); VT. Supp. ANN. tit. 33, § 682(3)(c) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 16.1-228(A)(1)
(1984 & Supp. 1985); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(12) (Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 49-1-3(g)(1)(A) (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1)(d) (West Supp. 1985); Wyo.
Stat. § 14-6-201(a)(xvi)(C) (1985); cited in Bopp & Balch, The Child Abuse Amendments of
1984 and their Implementing Regulations: A Summary, 1 IssuEs L. & MED. 92, 102 n.57
(1985).
1267. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(k); Bopp & Balch, supra note 1266, at 101.
1268. The Amendments require that these programs or procedures provide for:
(i) coordination and consultation with individuals designated by and within appropri-
ate health-care facilities, (ii) prompt notification by individuals designated by and
within appropriate health care facilities of cases of suspected medical neglect (includ-
ing instances of withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants
with life-threatening conditions), and (iii) authority, under State law, for the State
child protective service system to pursue any legal remedies, including the authority to
initiate legal proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction, as may be necessary to
prevent the withholding of medically indicated treatment from disabled infants with
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requirements, Congress instructed HHS to develop and publish
proposed regulations within 90 days 1269 and, after evaluating public
comments, to publish final rules within 180 days of the Amend-
ment's effective date. 12 70 The Amendments also directed the De-
partment to follow a similar procedure in issuing model guidelines
designed to encourage hospitals to establish Infant Care Review
Committees. 127'
The authority Congress granted HHS under the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984 closely resembles the authority that the De-
partment claimed, and the Second Circuit rejected, under the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973. Although aware of the controversy sur-
rounding the Department's prior intervention into medical
treatment decisions, Congress took a neutral position and refused
to clarify the scope of the Department's authority under section
504.12 12 The only reference Congress made to the Department's
previous regulations was in a rule of statutory construction, which
stated that "[n]o provision of the Act or any amendment made by
this Act is intended to affect any right or protection under section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.11127' The ultimate determina-
life-threatening conditions.
42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(k). To aid qualifying states in establishing and maintaining the re-
quired programs, the Amendments authorize the Secretary of HHS to make additional
grants to state agencies. See 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §
1340.15) (proposed Dec. 10, 1981), 42 U.S.C. § 5103(c)(A).
1269. 42 U.S.C. § 5103 note.
1270. Id.
1271. Id. The Amendments require the Secretary of HHS to publish interim model
guidelines
to encourage the establishment within health-care facilities of committees which would
serve the purposes of educating hospital personnel and families of disabled infants with
life-threatening conditions, recommending institutional policies and guidelines con-
cerning the withholding of medically indicated treatment ... from such infants, and
offering counsel and review in cases involving disabled infants with life-threatening
conditions.
Id. The Amendments also require the Secretary to solicit and evaluate public comments and
issue model guidelines within 180 days of the enactment of the amendments (Oct. 9, 1984).
Id.
Complying with the required procedures, the Department issued Services and Treat-
ment for Disabled Infants; Model Guidelines for Health Care Providers To Establish In-
fant Care Review Committees, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,893 (1985). The model guidelines encourage
the establishment of infant care review committees within hospitals that provide health care
to infants. The guidelines are purely advisory and are consistent with the Department's
rulemaking authority granted by the Child Abuse Amendments. Id.
1272. The legislative history of the Child Abuse Amendments reflects a deliberate at-
tempt by Congress to maintain a policy of neutrality regarding the Department's authority
under section 504. See Final Rules, supra note 1266, at 14,885.
1273. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5101 note (1984) (codified as a note to 42 U.S.C. § 5101).
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tion of the scope of the Department's authority under section 504,
therefore, depends on the Supreme Court's resolution of Bowen v.
American Hospital Association.2 74
5. Department's Proposed Rules Issues under the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984
On December 10, 1984, HHS issued the "Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking" required by the Child Abuse Amendments of
1984.1275 The Notice solicited public comments to the proposed
regulations that the Department designed to enforce the newly en-
acted section 4(b)(2)(k) of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treat-
ment Act. 1276 The Proposed Rules defined "medical neglect" to in-
clude the "withholding of medically indicated treatment from a
disabled infant with a life-threatening condition.' 2 77 The rules
also attempt to regulate the withdrawal of treatment from severely
defective newborns.12 78 After soliciting and evaluating public com-
ments on the Proposed Rules, the Department issued its most re-
cent regulations under the authority of the Child Abuse Amend-
ments of 1984.127' The final rules do not differ radically from the
Proposed Rules. The final rules, however, do recognize and place
greater emphasis on the delicate balance between the need to ef-
fectively protect the rights of disabled infants and the need to
avoid unreasonable governmental intervention into treatment
decisions. 280
Although an "overwhelming majority"' 281 of the more than
16,000 comments to the Proposed Rules indicated support, the De-
partment revised the rules because of criticisms from individuals
involved in the political compromise that resulted in the 1984
Amendments. 1282 On the one hand, critics of the Proposed Rules,
1274. See supra notes 1249-55 and accompanying text.
1275. 49 Fed. Reg. 48,160 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15) (proposed Dec.
10, 1984).
1276. Id.
1277. Id. at 48,166.
1278. Id. at 48,166-67.
1279. Final Rules, supra note 1266, at 14,878. The Department's ultimate regulation
under the Child Abuse Amendment is entitled the Final Rule. To avoid confusion between
this final rule and the Final Rules that the Department promulgated under § 504, all refer-
ences to the "final rules" in this section will refer to those published pursuant to the Child
Abuse Amendments unless otherwise indicated.
1280. Id. at 14,879. The Department noted that its principal objective was to achieve
the desired balance. Id.
1281. Id.; see supra note 1166.
1282. 49 Fed. Reg. 14,879.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
including medical associations whose support was essential to the
legislative compromise, argued that the careful balance achieved in
the statute was distorted by the inclusion of an inflexible list of
binding definitions that counterproductively constrained the exer-
cise of reasonable medical judgment in response to the innumera-
ble problems in intensive care nurseries. 128 3 These associations
threatened to withdraw their support for the legislation unless the
final rules sufficiently reflected the deference to medical judgment
that the compromise included. 128 4
On the other hand, over 115,000 individuals sent letters in
support of assuring medically indicated treatment to disabled in-
fants with life-threatening conditions. 12 8 5 Many of these individu-
als urged continued emphasis on the final rules' requirement that
medical treatment decisions not be based on subjective opinions
about the potential quality of a defective infant's life.128  The De-
partment gave particular consideration to a letter from the six
principal sponsors 12  of the "compromise amendment," which
later became the pertinent provisions of the Child Abuse Amend-
ments of 1984.288 The letter urged the Department to consider
carefully the numerous requests that it delete the clarifying defini-
tions and also urged the Department to avoid using the word "im-
minent" in describing the anticipated time of death. 2 9 The princi-
pal sponsors also encouraged the Department to emphasize more
clearly that the use of infant care review committees is not
mandatory 290 and to avoid using examples of specific medical di-
agnoses that readers might interpret as prescribing federally estab-
1283. Id.
1284. Id.
1285. Id.
1286. Id.; see infra note 1328 for a discussion of the quality-of-life-approach to medi-
cal decisionmaking. A number of the commentators also endorsed the "clarifying defini-
tions" included in the proposed rule, arguing that the interpretations were a proper supple-
ment to the statutory definition. Final Rules, supra note 1266, at 14,879.
1287. Senators Hatch, Denton, Cranston, Nickles, Dodd, and Kassenbaum sponsored
the amendment. Id.
1288. Id.
1289. The principal sponsors noted that
In the negotiations leading to the final language, there was much discussion about
whether or not to include the word "imminent" in the statutory definition. It became
apparent that "imminent" would create undue confusion both because it was ambigu-
ous and because the expected time of death cannot be predicted with precision. A deci-
sion was made, therefore, not to include "imminent," and we urge that it be dropped
from the regulations as well.
Id.
1290. Id.
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lished medical standards for treating specific cases. 1291
After considering the public comments, the Department issued
a final rule designed to reaffirm the Department's objective of pre-
serving the careful balance accomplished in the 1984 Amendments
"between the need for an effective program and the need to pre-
vent unreasonable governmental intervention." 1 92 The final rules
adopted the definitions of "medical neglect"'1293 and "withholding
of medically indicated treatment"'29 4 without change from the Pro-
posed Rules. The rules also define "infant"'2 and "reasonable
medical judgment"' 298s as the terms apply to the definition of with-
holding medically indicated treatment. The remaining sections of
the rule establish minimum requirements that state child-protec-
tion programs must meet to qualify for participation in the state
grant program under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act.129 7 The Department relocated the clarifying definitions that
the medical profession strongly opposed to an appendix of the final
rules and reclassified the definitions as interpretive guidelines. 1298
The rules also emphasize the importance of the treating physi-
cian's or physicians' reasonable medical judgment to treatment de-
1291. Id.
1292. Id.
1293. The final rules state that the term" 'medical neglect' includes, but is not limited
to, the withholding of medically indicated treatment from a disabled infant with a life-
threatening condition." 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (1985).
1294. See supra note 1265 and accompanying text for the complete definition of
"withholding of medically indicated treatment."
1295. The rules adopt the definition of "infant" from the Joint Explanatory State-
ment of the Principal Sponsors of the Amendments.
The term "infant" is defined as:
an infant less than one year of age. The reference to less than one year of age shall not
be construed to imply that treatment should be changed or discontinued when an in-
fant reaches one year of age, or to affect or limit any existing protections available
under State laws regarding medical neglect of children over one year of age. In addition
to their applicability to infants less than one year of age, the standards set forth in
paragraph (b)(2) of this section should be consulted thoroughly in the evaluation of
any issue of medical neglect involving an infant older than one year of age who has
been continuously hospitalized since birth, who was born extremely prematurely, or
who has a long-term disability.
45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(3)(i) (1985); see also H. Conf. Rep. No. 1038, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 41,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2947, 2970.
1296. The term "reasonable medical judgment" is defined as a "medical judgment that
would be made by a reasonably prudent physician, knowledgeable about the case and the
treatment possibilities with respect to the medical conditions involved." 45 C.F.R. §
1340.15(b)(3)(ii) (1985).
1297. Id. § 1340.15(c)-(d).
1298. Id. § 1340.15 app.
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cisions.1'2 9 The final rules reflect the suggestions of the principal
sponsors by eliminating the use of specific examples of medical
treatment and the word "imminent" and by stressing that infant
care review committees are not mandatory.1300 Finally, the rules
satisfy the concerns of right-to-life organizations by stating that
quality-of-life considerations may not be employed in the decision-
making process. 30' Accordingly, the latest Baby Doe regulations
satisfy organizations representing a wide variety of perspectives.
302
The final rules represent a successful political compromise,
which commentators and the Department of HHS agree will have
a minimal effect on actual treatment decisions.130 3 Both right-to-
life organizations supporting federal intervention into treatment
decisions and medical associations that disapprove of any federal
involvement claimed victory with respect to the final rules;1304 each
side of the controversy received a portion of what it wanted with-
out making any major concessions. 3 0 5
6. Analysis of the Impact of the Final Rules on Actual
Practice
Although the final rules have eliminated much of the contro-
versy surrounding federal intervention into the treatment of se-
verely defective newborns, many argue that the rules will have lit-
tle or no effect on current medical practices. 30 6 One factor that
contributes to the minimal impact of the rules is the penalty pre-
scribed for violations. 30 7 The final rules authorize no civil actions
and threaten no criminal violations;130 8 hospitals, doctors, and par-
ents face no liability under the rules even for the most blatant vio-
lation. The maximum penalty that the rules prescribe is the with-
1299. See Murray, supra note 1120, at 9.
1300. Final rules, supra note 1266, at 14,880.
1301. 45 C.F.R. § 1340 app. (1985). The regulations do not allow decisions based on
opinions about the future "quality-of-life" of a retarded or disabled person. Id.
1302. See Murray, supra note 1120, at 6. The Department stressed that it did not
intend the guidelines either to be binding rules of law or to prejudge the exercise of reasona-
ble medical judgment. Final rules, supra note 1266, at 14,880.
1303. Murray, supra note 1120, at 8-9. The Department admitted that these rules will
play only a minor role in the larger context of medical care for infants. Final rules, supra
note 1266, at 14,886.
1304. For specific examples of both a medical association's and a right-to-life group's
claim to victory, see Murray, supra note 1120, at 6-7.
1305. Id. at 9.
1306. See id.; see also Bopp & Balch, supra note 1266, at 119.
1307. Murray, supra note 1120, at 8.
1308. Id.; see Final rules, supra note 1266, at 14,887.
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drawal of federal financial assistance to state child-protection
agencies under the state grant program of the Child Abuse Preven-
tion and Treatment Act.130 9 The requirements of the rules, like the
maximum penalty, directly affect only state child protection ser-
vices. 310 The regulations' indirect effect on hospitals, physicians,
and parents is wholly dependent on any additional requirements a
state agency may choose to enact.13"
Although the final rules will not affect directly persons making
treatment decisions, the regulations may help answer several
widely debated questions. Three major questions remain in the
Baby Doe controversy: (1) When, if ever, should life-sustaining
treatment be withheld from a defective newborn?; (2) Who should
decide whether life-sustaining treatment should be withheld in a
particular case?; and (3) What criteria should the decisionmaker
use in determining whether life-sustaining treatment should be
withheld under specific circumstances?
The final rules address the question of when, if ever, medical
treatment may be withheld from a defective newborn. 13 2 The final
rules offer three overlapping categories of cases in which extraordi-
nary life-sustaining treatment procedures may be withheld. 11 3 The
regulations, however, unequivocally require that certain ordinary
treatment procedures-including appropriate nutrition, hydration
and medication-be given to all infants regardless of their condi-
tion or prognosis. 3 14 One case in which life-sustaining treatment,
other than appropriate nutrition, hydration and medication, may
be withheld is when a physician, using reasonable medical judg-
ment, determines that the treatment would be virtually futile.13 15
1309. Final Rules, supra note 1266, at 14,887. One commentator remarked on the rela-
tively mild penalties that the Final Rules impose:
Given the enormous fuss, one might imagine that physicians and hospital administra-
tors would be summarily executed if they violated the rule. Hardly. The only direct
consequence of a proven violation of the new regulation would be that the State's
[child protection service] could be ruled ineligible for the relatively few federal dollars
available under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.
Murray, supra note 10, at 9.
1310. See Murray, supra note 1120, at 9.
1311. Id. Although the rule requires state child-protection services to establish certain
procedures and programs, the effectiveness of such state regulations will vary greatly. Po-
tentially, the legislation will not affect hospitals in the six jurisdictions that do not qualify
for the federal state grant program under the Child Abuse Act at all.
1312. Final Rules, supra note 1266, at 14, 887-91.
1313. See supra notes 1264-65 and accompanying text.
1314. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2); see also Bopp & Balch, supra note 1266, at 108.
1315. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2)(iii).
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The latest regulations define "virtually futile': 1316 as highly unlikely
to prevent "death in the near future"'1317 as opposed to "imminent
death.' 31 8 Physicians apparently have the option of withholding
treatment when an infant might live for weeks or months with no
prospect of relief or survival. 31 9
The final rules also address the question of who decides
whether treatment should be withheld. 320 Recognizing the consti-
tutionally protected right of parents to control their children's up-
bringing, 3 2' the final rules provide that, except in highly unusual
circumstances, the infant's parents or guardians should decide
whether to provide or to withhold medically indicated treat-
ment.13 22 The rules also provide that the parents' decision must be
followed unless inconsistent with the guidelines currently set out
in the final rules.'3 23 The rules provide that parents should base
their decision on the advice, recommendations, and reasonable
medical judgment of their physician.132 4
The final rules also address which criteria the parents should
use in making a treatment decision. 13 25 Commentators have pro-
posed a number of different criteria for treatment decisions, in-
1316. The definition of "virtually futile" in the final rules is contained in the appendix
under the interpretative guidelines. 45 C.F.R. § 1340 app.
1317. Because of strong opposition from the six principal sponsors, the final rules de-
fine "virtually futile" as treatment "highly unlikely to prevent death in the near future." Id.
(emphasis added). The rules explain the decision to adopt "in the near future" rather than
"imminent" for purposes of the interpretative guidelines.
1318. "Imminent" was not adopted in the interpretative guidelines to the final rules to
"assure no deviation from" the legislature's resolution "that 'imminent' would create undue
confusion both because it was ambiguous and because the expected time of death cannot be
predicted with precision." Final Rules, supra note 1266, at 14,880.
1319. Murray, supra note 1120, at 8.
1320. Final Rules, supra note 1266, at 14,880.
1321. The following cases have upheld as constitutional the rights of parents to make
certain decisions for their children. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right to deter-
mine children's upbringing); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (right to circum-
scribe child's religious literature, but no right to expose community or child to communica-
ble disease, ill health, or death); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to
direct children's education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to raise child); In
re Green (Child Div. Milwaukee County Ct., Wis. 1966) (right to choose to withhold novel or
especially risky treatment for child), reprinted in CaMM AND DELINQUENCY 377 (1966). Con-
tra Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979) (child given "customary" treatment for leu-
kemia over the objections of the parents); In re Pogue, No. M-18-74 (Super. Ct. D.C. Nov. 1,
1974) (blood transfusion ordered for child over religious objections of parents), cited in Spe-
cial Project, supra note 1121, at 608 n.10.
1322. Final Rules, supra note 1266, at 14,880.
1323. Id.
1324. Id.
1325. See Murray, supra note 1120, at 7.
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cluding the ordinary/extraordinary approach, 13 2 the medical feasi-
bility approach, 3 27  the quality-of-life approach,13 28  and the
jurisdictional approach. 1 29 The final rules adopt an approach that
narrows the discretion of parents and physicians to deny treat-
ment. 330 The final rules' "best interests of the infant" approach 33" '
forbids parents from basing their decision on subjective predictions
of the future "quality-of-life" of a retarded or disabled infant.3 3 2
D. CONCLUSION
HHS continues litigation to establish its authority to regulate
the treatment of defective newborns under section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973.1331 The Department may be continuing
litigation as a matter of principle, although the Department easily
could have abandoned its attempts to regulate under section 504
and promulgated all regulations under the Child Abuse Amend-
ments.13 34 Department officials, however, chose to continue pursuit
of a dual regulatory system and await final determination of the
1326. For a discussion of the "ordinary v. extraordinary means" approach to infant
care, see Robertson, supra note 1114, at 235-37. See also Longino, supra note 1121, at 397
("This approach is founded upon the notion that heroic treatment measures should not
have to be employed to preserve the life of a defective newborn.")
1327. For discussion of the medical feasiblilty approach, see Longino, supra note 1121,
at 398-99; Shaw, Dilemmas of "Informed Consent" in Children, 289 Naw ENG. J. MED. 885,
889 (1973) (The medical feasibility standard focuses on the current medical condition of the
infant and the feasibility of the treatment); Comment, Withholding Treatment from Defec-
tive Newborns: Substituted Judgment, Informed Consent, and the Quinlan Decision, 13
GONz. L. REV. 781 (1978).
1328. The quality-of-life approach often is proposed to justify termination of a defec-
tive newborn's treatment. This standard is based on predictions of the infant's future poten-
tial if treated. Longino, supra note 1121, at 395-97; Robertson, supra note 1114, at 252. The
final rules expressly reject the quality of life approach. 45 C.F.R. § 1340 app. (1985).
1329. The jurisdictional approach prefers the private choice by parents and physicians
as opposed to judgments by courts or legislatures. Public intervention should displace par-
ents' decisionmaking autonomy only if the parents cannot decide or if their decision does
not reflect a legitimate choice among alternatives. See Blumstein & Smith, supra note 1121,
at 19.
1330. Murray, supra note 1120, at 7.
1331. The "best interests of the child" approach is consistent with the standard ap-
plied in child custody and neglect cases. The approach simply requires "that the child's
welfare is given priority over every other interest involved." Comment, Baby Doe Decisions,
supra note 1115, at 924.
1332. 45 C.F.R. § 1340 app. (1985).
1333. "The Department's goal in pursuing, through litigation, reinstatement of the
section 504-based authority, is to clear the way for action to forge" an effective interrela-
tionship between the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and the section 504-based rule. Fi-
nal rules, supra note 156, at 14,885, (comparing the two regulatory frameworks).
1334. Id.
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scope of section 504 by the Supreme Court.13 35 The Supreme Court
should uphold HHS' authority to regulate under section 504 in or-
der to fill current gaps in the Department's authority under the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984.386 Commentators have elabo-
rated on several gaps in the regulatory framework of the Child
Abuse Amendments. 13 First, states that choose not to participate
in the federal grant program are not bound by the regulations. 133
Consequently, compliance with the amendments is an option for
states, rather than a requirement. Second, the Child Abuse
Amendments give state protection agencies the exclusive right to
file suit on behalf of a disabled infant. 3 9 Neither parents, physi-
cians, nor governmental officials are authorized to file such an ac-
tion.1340 Third, the amendments provide no remedy to an infant
who is killed or debilitated as the result of medical neglect.13 4 1 The
sole remedy under the Child Abuse Amendments is the withdrawal
of grants to state agencies. 1342 Finally, the Amendments exclusively
address medical neglect on a case-by-case basis and are ineffective
against institutionally adopted policies that discriminate against
defective newborns.1 343
The dual system of regulation under both section 504 and the
Child Abuse Amendments contemplated by HHS effectively would
fill these gaps and eliminate the deficiencies of regulating solely
under the Child Abuse Amendments.3 44 The Supreme Court
should, therefore, uphold the Department's authority to regulate
under section 504 in order to adequately protect disabled infants
in need of medical treatment. HHS' final regulations under section
5041345 and under the Child Abuse Amendments 346 could work to-
gether to "substantially enhance the protection afforded disabled
1335. See supra notes 1239-55 and accompanying text.
1336. See Bopp & Balch, supra note 1266, at 130.
1337. See id. The commentators also list several accomplishments of the regulations.
First, the commentators note that food and water must always be provided. Second, "qual-
ity of life" considerations may not be used in medical treatment decisions. Third, child pro-
tective services are now required to investigate cases of suspected medical neglect. Id. at
129.
1338. Id. at 130.
1339. Id.
1340. Id.
1341. Id.
1342. See supra notes 1306-10 and accompanying text.
1343. See Bopp & Belch, supra note 1266, at 130.
1344. Id.
1345. See supra notes 1214-35 and accompanying text.
1346. See supra notes 1292-1332 and accompanying text.
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A. INTRODUCTION
Philosophers, physicians, and legal scholars have examined the
potential conflict between the rights of the fetus and the rights of
its mother. These groups have disagreed over the proper resolution
of this conflict, and the disagreement has not been a function of
discipline. Some commentators who evaluate this issue resolve all
decisions in favor of the woman.134 8 Others, equally decidedly, in-
sist that the rights of the fetus should prevail. 1' 49 The scholarly
1347. See Bopp & Balch, supra note 1266, at 130.
1348. See, e.g., Ruddick & Wilcox, Operating on the Fetus, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
10, 14 (1982) (woman is primary obstetrical patient in maternal/fetal conflict); Annas,
Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut of All, 12 HASTNGS CENTER REP. 16, 45 (1982)
(woman's choice should be honored).
1349. See, e.g., Feinberg, Wrongful Conception and the Right Not to be Harmed, 8
HAlv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 57 (1985) (the abrogation of duty to care for fetus invokes liability
of pregnant woman); Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63
(1984) (fetal rights override maternal rights).
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debates explore the complexity of these issues, but the courts, in
the few cases decided, tend to employ simplistic analyses to favor
fetal over maternal rights. Little of the depth of scholarly discus-
sion appears in these opinions. Instead, courts rely on the worn
machinery of custody battles and other parent-child conflicts to
guide decisions concerning recent scientific advances 1350 that make
the issue of fetal rights so complex and puzzling.
Traditionally, Anglo-American law generally recognizes a dis-
tinction between duties imposed by law and responsibilities im-
posed by moral and ethical considerations. Consequently, one indi-
vidual typically is not required to take risks or bear burdens for
the sake of another.1351 For example, parents are not required by
law to donate organs to their children'35 2 or to rescue them if they
are in danger. Relying on this tradition, some commentators con-
clude that a woman may refuse fetal therapy. 35 3 Other commenta-
tors maintain that new medical technology, which potentially in-
creases the chance for healthy children, transforms the moral duty
of promoting the well-being of children into a legal duty with all
its rights and liabilities. 1354 This new focus on protecting the fetus
evokes restrictions on the autonomy of the pregnant woman for the
benefit of the fetus she carries. As medical technology continues to
advance and the possibility to improve the quality of life for the
fetus increases, the imposition of restrictions on pregnant women
becomes more likely and, in some instances, already has occurred.
Imposing restrictions raises more than the potential to produce
healthier children or to improve physical appearance; these imposi-
tions implicate the fundamental principle of maternal choice.
This Part of the Special Project addresses areas of the law in
which a right is pitted against a right: maternal rights of procrea-
tion and privacy versus fetal rights to be born physically and men-
tally healthy or to be born at all. The purpose of this Part is to
evaluate trends and offer solutions to these difficult problems. Sec-
tion B discusses maternal rights, and Section C examines fetal
1350. See generally supra section II of this Special Project.
1351. W. KEarON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 56 at 375 (5th ed. 1984).
1352. See Annas, supra note 1348 at 17; but see Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and
Preventing Harm: Limits of State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 8 HARv. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y
19, 44 (1985). Mathieu argues that legal precedent exists for compelling parents to undergo
invasive medical procedures for the sake of their children. Id.
1353. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 1348; Fletcher, The Fetus as Patient: Ethical Is-
sues, 246 J.A.MA 772 (1981).
1354. See generally Feinberg, supra note 1349; Mathieu, supra note 1352; Robertson,
The Right to Procreate and in Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 333 (1982).
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rights. Section D focuses on the three arenas in which conflict oc-
curs: the courtroom, the hospital and the workplace. Section E
concludes that a free society cannot tolerate unnecessary intru-
sions into a woman's rights to privacy and bodily integrity. Be-
cause legal mechanisms are currently poised to allow further and
more frequent intrusions into these rights, the legal system must
take care to prevent erosion of fundamental maternal rights.
B. MATERNAL RIGHTS
The term "maternal rights" encompasses several legal con-
cepts. These rights are not mutually exclusive. Instead, maternal
rights overlap and intertwine to form a backdrop against which
concepts of fetal rights must be viewed. One basis of the potential
conflict between maternal and fetal rights stems from the mother's
rights to privacy and bodily integrity. The right to privacy protects
a woman's decisions to have a child.13 55 Although the constitution
contains no explicit guarantees of privacy, the United States Su-
preme Court has recognized privacy interests in decisions regard-
ing contraception, 135 6 procreation,1 35 7 childrearing, and educa-
tion. 13 58 The Court also has established a woman's right to have an
abortion prior to the third trimester of pregnancy, at which point
the fetus has the "capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb."'" 59 Thus, a woman's right to privacy with respect
to her own body is broad enough to encompass her decision
whether to terminate her pregnancy'3 60 until the third trimester
when state regulations may protect potential life.1361
A pregnant woman's medical decisions may affect her own life
as well as the life of her fetus. The Supreme Court, however, has
not established guidelines to govern all potential situations of con-
flict between a woman's right to bodily integrity and the interest of
1355. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). For the Supreme Court's views of the federal aspects of the right of privacy, see
Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 871, §§ 4 & 5 (1976 & Supp. 1985).
1356. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977).
1357. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
1358. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-15, 232 (1972) ("primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring
American tradition"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925).
1359. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. For a thorough discussion of the Roe decision, see supra
notes 542-51 and accompanying text.
1360. 410 U.S. at 153.
1361. Id. at 154. The abortion decision is discussed supra at notes 542-51 and accom-
panying text.
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her fetus. The Roe Court issued guidelines for one potential area of
conflict and concluded that in light of present medical knowledge a
state's interest in regulating abortion becomes compelling only af-
ter the fetus is viable. 1362 The Court has yet to address other medi-
cal aspects of pregnancy that may be affected by the constantly
changing level of medical knowledge., For example, the Court has
not considered the constitutional status of a woman's decision of
whether to have a vaginal delivery or caesarean section. Arguably,
the interests inherent in this decision have been afforded constitu-
tional protection in that childbirth 363 lies between the fundamen-
tally protected rights of procreation and childrearing. Logic thus
suggests that childbirth is a fundamental decision protected by the
right to privacy. Recent decisions, however, suggest otherwise. 36 4
A second potential source of competing concerns arises from
the mother's right to informed consent and to refuse medical treat-
ment. Prior to medical treatment, a physician must obtain the in-
formed consent of the patient. 36 5 The patient has the legal right to
determine what is to be done to her body. 3 6 A mother's right to
refuse medical treatment pursuant to the informed consent doc-
trine is a logical extension of the right of privacy. At least one fed-
eral court'36 7 has held explicitly that the constitutional right of pri-
vacy protects the procurement or rejection of medical
treatment.13 68 State courts also have ruled that the right to die al-
lows refusal of medical treatment.1369 The right to refuse medical
1362. 410 U.S. at 163. With advancing technology, a state could show a compelling
interest in a fetus as viability becomes possible at an earlier stage in pregnancy. See supra
notes 157-63 and accompanying text. Thus, if science makes possible the maintenance of
fetal life in the first or second trimester of pregnancy, a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy might cease.
1363. For purposes of this section, childbirth refers to the actual delivery process of
the fetus whether vaginal or by caesarean section.
1364. See infra notes 1432-74, 1518-29 and accompanying text.
1365. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558 (D.C.
App. 1982); Meisel, The Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents: From Neligence to
Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REv. 51 (1977).
1366. See Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92
(1914), rev'd on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3
(1957). In Schloendorff, Cardozo stated, "Every human being of adult years has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body." 211 N.Y. at 129, 105 N.E. at 93.
1367. Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
1368. Id. at 1046-47.
1369. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (1977). See also, Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980)
(adult patient suffering from terminal illness had constitutional right to refuse or discon-
tinue extraordinary medical treatment). See generally Annot. 93 A.L.R.3d 67, §§ 3 & 4
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treatment becomes more complicated, however, when a pregnant
woman's decision affects the well-being of her fetus. Before the fe-
tus becomes viable, no state interest can override the potential
mother's right to privacy. 13 70 As medicine advances, however, the
previability time-frame becomes increasingly narrow.13 7' The issue
of fetal rights, therefore, will arise more frequently.
The third primary source of conflict is the mother's right to
parental autonomy. Traditionally, society respects parental discre-
tion regarding the treatment of children, and courts resolve any
conflicts by using a balancing test with a presumption in favor of
the parents. 3 72 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitu-
tion to give parents the right to raise their children as they
choose.1' 73 The right to parental autonomy, however, is not abso-
lute. Although courts give great deference to parents in their
choice concerning a seriously ill child, 3 7' courts have ordered in-
tervention when a child's life is at stake. 3 75 Courts also have or-
dered intervention when the parent is incompetent. 3 76 Parents
also may lose the right to parental autonomy when they have ne-
glected, abused, or posed danger to the child. 3 77 Thus, although a
(1979) (discussing patient's right to refuse treatment allegedly necessary to sustain life).
1370. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64. For a discussion of the Roe framework, see supra notes
542-51 and accompanying text.
1371. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
1372. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944). For a
discussion of parental rights, see generally, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Quil-
loin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Keiter, Privacy, Children, and Their Parents: Reflec-
tions on and Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REv. 459, 487-517 (1982).
1373. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944); see
also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (discussing parents' traditional right to make
decisions for child as constitutional restraint on states). See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d
1118 (1973) (discussing the power of the court or other public agency to order medical treat-
ment, despite parental religious objections, for child whose life is not immediately
endangered).
1374. See, e.g., In re Philip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979). See
generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 421 (1980) (discussing the power of the court or other public
agency to order medical treatment for a child over parental objections not based on religious
grounds).
1375. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (without
parental consent, court ordered chemotherapy treatment for child with leukemia).
1376. See, e.g., In re Daniel A.D., 106 Misc. 2d 370, 375-76, 431 N.Y.S.2d 936, 940
(Fam. Ct. 1980) (parents' rights terminated because of mental illness).
1377. See Custody of a Minor, see also People in the Interests of D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271,
276 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) ("[A] parent's election against medical treatment for a child is
not absolute in a life-endangering situation.").
In addition to losing parental autonomy rights, parents face legal sanctions for abusing
or abandoning children. See Katz, Howe, & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9
FAM. L.Q. 1, 63-70 (1975). No statutes, however, define parents' legal obligations toward chil-
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competent adult patient has the right to refuse personal medical
treatment in the absence of an overriding state interest, 3 "8 the
right to refuse medical treatment for a minor child may be overrid-
den more readily because the decision seriously implicates another
life.13 79
C. FETAL RIGHTS
The scope of fetal rights is unclear. By definition, the fetus is
incapable of speaking for itself, and, in many respects, a fetus is
not considered a person for legal purposes.138 0 Courts, however, are
beginning to afford the fetus greater protection than it previously
enjoyed. Many courts base that protection on the concept of viabil-
ity-the point at which a fetus can exist independent of its
mother. In Roe v. Wade, for example, the Supreme Court refused
to assign personhood to the fetus, holding only that the govern-
ment could assert a state interest in human life after the fetus be-
comes capable of survival independent of the mother. 381 A state,
accordingly, may regulate abortion after viability to promote its in-
terest in the potentiality of human life. 382
Viability also has been a relevant distinction for courts consid-
ering the issue of tort recovery for prenatal injury. A federal dis-
dren not yet conceived or born.
1378. See supra note 1369 and accompanying text.
1379. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
1380. For example, the United States Census Bureau does not count a fetus as a per-
son. Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 229 n.8 (D. Conn. 1972). The Census Bureau classifi-
cations are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983). In computing the total population and its
general characteristics, the Census Bureau determines age as that of the individual's last
birthday. This figure is based on replies to a question based on month and year of birth.
Thus, birth is a necessary prerequisite for being counted in the census. BuREAU OF THE CEN-
sus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CouNTY AND CrrY DATA BOOK xxvi (1983).
Similarly, a fetus is not entitled to welfare payments. Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575
(1975). Congress has not required states receiving financial aid under the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children Act (AFDC) to offer welfare benefits to pregnant women for their
unborn children. The Supreme Court in Burns construed the statutory term "dependent
child" to refer only to "an individual already born, with an existence separate from its
mother." Id. at 581.
1381. Roe, 410 U.S. 113. In declining to grant a fetus the legal status of a person, the
Court stated:
In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory
that life, as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the
unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent
upon live birth . . . . In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as
persons in the whole sense.
Id. at 161-62.
1382. Id. at 164-65.
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trict court in the District of Columbia, in the landmark case of
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 138 3 established viability as the crucial determi-
nant in allowing a fetus recovery for prenatal torts.13 84 State courts
vary in applying the viability standard for recovery in prenatal
torts. Although some courts still use viability as the standard,3 85
the general trend seems to be to ignore any distinction between
viability and pre-viability.13 6 The New Hampshire Supreme Court,
for example, adopted the view that a fetus becomes a separate or-
ganism from the time of conception. 138 7 Moreover, even if viability
remains the key distinction, technological advances will make via-
bility, and thus fetal rights, possible at increasingly earlier
points.13 8
Although no general rule of recovery currently imposes a ma-
ternal duty to protect the health of the fetus, courts increasingly
are recognizing fetal rights.138 9 The New Jersey Supreme Court, for
example, has asserted that a child has a legal right to begin life
with a sound mind and body.89 0 Courts have developed several le-
gal fictions that have facilitated this expansion of fetal rights. The
1383. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); see also supra notes 1025-27 (discussing Bon-
brest's impact on the development of wrongful death actions on behalf of the unborn).
Bonbrest signalled a departure from the early view established in Dietrich v. Inhabi-
tants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), overruled by, Torigian v. Waterton News Co.
352 Mass. 446, 225 N.E.2d 926 (1967). In Dietrich, Justice Holmes denied the wrongful
death claim brought on behalf of a child who, although born alive, was fatally injured in
utero because of the defendant's negligence. Justice Holmes proceeded on the theory that
the fetus was not a separate being apart from the mother at the time of injury. Birth, there-
fore, not viability, was the determinative issue.
1384. 65 F. Supp. at 140.
1385. See Beal, "Can I Sue Mommy?" An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for
Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 325, 331 n.42 (1984) for a
list of these jurisdictions.
1386. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971). One commentator predicts courts in the
future will assess cases and liability based on the rights of the child for all prenatal injuries
rather than on the stage of prenatal development. Collins, supra note 1005, at 686 (1984).
1387. Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 485, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958). See generally
Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1222 (1971) (discussing liability for prenatal injuries).
1388. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
1389. See cases cited infra notes 1439-86, 1500-05; see also Douglas v. Town of Hart-
ford, 542 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982) (recognizing a child's causes of action based on
injuries sustained in utero); Curlender v. Bio-Science Lab., 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477 (1980) (infant born with Tay-Sachs disease sued a medical testing laboratory for
incorrectly conducting genetic tests on parents when testing error led to conclusion of no
danger of transmitting the disease to the infant). See generally Beal, supra note 1385; Com-
ment, Legal Duty to the Unborn Plaintiff: Is There a Limit?, 6 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217
(1978). But see Guyton v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1979) (fetus not a person
within fourteenth amendment or Civil Rights Act), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916 (1980).
1390. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960) (infant plaintiff
entitled to recover for a prenatal injury received in an automobile accident).
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three primary methods are to grant a fetus the status of (1) a vic-
tim of a crime, (2) a neglected child, or (3) a patient.
The first means by which courts have expanded fetal rights is
to consider the fetus as the victim under a criminal statute. Tradi-
tionally, courts refused to construe criminal statutes containing the
word "person" to include a fetus."91 For example, a California
court considered charges brought against a heroin addict for en-
dangering her fetus because her use of heroin during the last two
months of pregnancy resulted in the birth of twin boys addicted to
heroin. 13 92 The court found that the California Penal Code, which
prohibited endangering a child,13 93 does not include an unborn
child. 3 94 Fetal protection, however, has been achieved through
statutory amendment3 5 and through courts' expansive reading of
criminal statutes. The court in Commonwealth v. Cass 39 6 ex-
tended protection to a viable fetus by defining as homicide the in-
fliction of prenatal injuries that result in the death of a viable fetus
before or after it is born.13 97 Cass relied on an earlier decision1 398 in
which the court ruled unanimously that a viable fetus was a person
for the purpose of the Massachusetts wrongful death statute.139 9
The dissent in Cass pointed out the dangerous implications of the
majority's reliance on a civil wrongful death case to interpret a
criminal statute. 40 0 Even more disturbing than courts drawing
analogies between civil and criminal law is the implication for the
liability of women. Courts may be willing to transform parental
duties to children into crimes punishable by imprisonment or fine.
For example, statutory provisions making the failure to provide
1391. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481
(1970). Keeler was superseded by statute as stated in Wilson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospi-
tals, 141 Cal. App. 3d 891, 190 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1983).
1392. Reyes v. State, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977).
1393. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(1) (West Supp. 1986).
1394. Reyes, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 219, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 915.
1395. After Keeler, the California legislature amended California Penal Code § 187 to
define murder as the killing of a human being or of a fetus. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West
Supp. 1984).
1396. 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984).
1397. Id. at 804, 467 N.E.2d at 1329. Cass considered a vehicular homicide statute.
1398. Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975). See also
Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978) (discussing the right to maintain an action or to recover
damages for the death of an unborn child).
1399. 368 Mass. at 355, 331 N.E.2d at 920. The Cass court made a semantic leap when
it proclaimed, "An offspring of human parents cannot reasonably be considered to be other
than a human being, and therefore a person, first within, and then in normal course outside,
the womb." 392 Mass. at 800, 467 N.E.2d at 1325.
1400. 392 Mass. at 810, 467 N.E.2d at 1330.
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proper medical care for one's child a crime140 1 create the possibility
that any violation of a physician's directive, including instructions
regarding care for a fetus, would expose a woman to criminal
sanctions.
Another trend is to give the fetus rights through the legal fic-
tion of "neglected child." State legislatures often draft child abuse
and neglect statutes by setting an upper age limit, usually eigh-
teen.140 2 These statutes generally do not expressly exclude the fe-
tus. 40 3 Some state courts have held that a fetus is a "child" for the
purposes of child neglect statutes.1 0 4 In Hoener v. Bertinato"0 5 a
New Jersey court held that the state statute did not preclude ap-
plication of its provisions to the unborn child.4 0 6 Under the court's
interpretation of the juvenile code, the parents neglected their un-
born child by refusing to consent to a blood transfusion. 40 7
Recent court decisions continue to extend abuse and neglect
statutes to the unborn. 40 8 For example, in In re Baby X, 140 9 the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that a newborn suffering narcotics
withdrawal as a consequence of prenatal maternal drug addiction
may be considered a neglected child.1410 The court found that a
pregnant woman's prenatal conduct-specifically, extensive narcot-
ics ingestion-can constitute neglect sufficient to give the probate
court jurisdiction. 4 "
1401. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West Supp. 1985); RL. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-
2(2)(d) (Supp. 1985).
1402. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103 (1973 & Supp. 1985) (expressly includes
unborn children); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3003 (1964) (includes children under eigh-
teen); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30-46-11 (West 1981) (expressly includes unborn children).
1403. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 1402.
1404. See Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961). See also An-
not., 12 A.L.R2d 1047 (1950) (discussing the failure to provide medical attention for a child
as criminal neglect). See generally Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State
Intervene?, 23 DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1984); Parness, The Duty to Prevent Handicaps: Laws Pro-
moting the Prevention of Handicaps to Newborns, 5 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 431, 460-61
(1983) (advocating state control to protect child's well being). But see In re Steven S., 126
Cal. App. 3d 23, 178 Cal.Rptr. 525 (1981) (finding no juvenile court jurisdiction to declare a
fetus the ward of the state because a fetus is not a person under the relevant jurisdictional
statute); Baby X v. Misiano, 373 Mass. 265, 366 N.E.2d 755 (1977) (holding that the father's
duty of support does not extend to the unborn fetus).
1405. 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
1406. Id. at 524, 171 A.2d at 144.
1407. Id. at 521, 171 A.2d at 142.
1408. See infra notes 1432-74.
1409. 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
1410. Id.
1411. Id. at 115, 293 N.W.2d at 739. See generally Parness, Crimes Against the Un-
born: Protecting and Respecting the Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARv. J. oN LEois. 97,
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The third principal avenue of expanding fetal rights is to con-
sider the fetus as a patient. New medical techniques have in-
creased fetal viability. The fetus can be tested and treated at vari-
ous stages of pregnancy. The fetus acquires a new status as
"patient" once it can be treated in the womb. 112 The answers to
the ethical and legal problems that these new developments raise
will define the degree of control pregnant women will retain over
their bodies in the future as courts increasingly recognize fetal
rights. Whether the fetus' "rights" as a patient can impose restric-
tions on pregnant women is an issue potentially limited only by
medical technology. If a fetus qualifies as a patient, courts confront
the need to balance the fetus' "right" to medical treatment and the
woman's "right" to bodily integrity. As fetal therapy moves from
the experimental to the accepted method of treatment, the balanc-
ing of these rights becomes even more difficult. To the extent that
courts delineate the duty of the woman to her fetus, their decisions
curtail and control her right to bodily integrity. Some courts al-
ready have defined a woman's duty to her fetus and, consequently,
have exposed her to increased liability and to decreased choice.
D. AREAS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN MATERNAL AND FETAL RIGHTS
1. Conflict in the Courtroom
(a) Erosion of Parental Tort Immunity
The earliest courts considering children's attempts to sue their
parents refused to allow children to maintain an action. For exam-
ple, in Hewellette v. George4 1 3 the Mississippi Supreme Court
held that children's suits against parents disrupt family harmony
and contravene public policy.141 4 In addition to the desire to pre-
serve family harmony, the concept of parental immunity is
designed to avoid fraud and collusion, to allow parents to disci-
pline their children, and to protect familial resources. 41 5 The justi-
155 (1985) (predicting that courts will remain cautious in extending protection to the
unborn).
1412. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. For historical background of the
development of fetal treatment see THE UNBORN PATIENT 1, 1-10 (M. Harrison, M. Golbus &
R. Filly eds. 1984).
1413. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (refusing to allow unemancipated child to main-
tain an action against parent for maliciously confining child to an insane asylum).
1414. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887. In addition, the Hewellette court held that a child must
comfort and aid his parent as long as the parent is obligated to support the child. Id.
1415. See Note, The Child's Right to "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness":
Suits by Children Against Parents for Abuse, Neglect, and Abandonment, 34 RUTGERS L.
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fications advanced to prevent judicial scrutiny of the family have
not prevented an increasing number of jurisdictions from permit-
ting children to maintain tort actions against their parents.1416
Based in part on the acceptance of children's legal rights and on
widespread automobile insurance coverage, the early cases that
recognized parental liability were suits alleging negligent parental
driving. 1417 Modern courts allow suits against parents for fetal in-
jury by reasoning that the immunity doctrine was created by the
courts and, therefore, courts are free to modify any doctrine they
create.
418
Courts that have modified the parental immunity doctrine dif-
fer on its remaining scope. Recent court decisions in California 41 9
and New Jersey1420 highlight contrasting approaches to parental
immunity, although both courts allow juries great discretion in de-
ciding community standards for parental care. The California Su-
preme Court, in Gibson v. Gibson, overruled a forty-year-old pre-
cedent that shielded parents from liability for injuries they
negligently cause their children.1421 Calling parental immunity a
"legal anachronism," 1422 the California court completely abolished
the doctrine. The court allowed a minor child to recover from his
father for negligently instructing the son to go out on a highway at
night to correct the position of a jeep's wheels. While following his
father's instructions, the child was struck by another vehicle."423
The California court justified its decision by pointing to the wide-
spread existence of liability insurance and its practical effect on
intrafamilial suits. 42 4 The California court adopted a liability stan-
dard of "an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent" in similar
REv. 154, 163 (1981).
1416. See Beal, supra note 1385, at 335-37.
1417. See, e.g., Cowgil v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950), overruled by, Winn
v. Gilroy, 296 Ore. 718, 681 P.2d 776 (1984). See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066, 1113
(1981).
1418. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 129 IM. App. 3d 859, 864, 473 N.E.2d 400, 404
(1984) (father brought suit against mother on behalf of three-year-old daughter injured in
an auto accident while in utero).
1419. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971). See
generally Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066 (1981) (discussing parental liability for negligently
caused injury to child).
1420. Foldi v. Jeffries, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2603, 2605 (N.J. July 13, 1983) (parent-
child immunity abrogated except in special cases involving exercise of parental authority
and customary child care).
1421. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
1422. Id. at 916, 479 P.2d at 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
1423. Id. at 916, 479 P.2d at 649, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
1424. Id. at 922, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
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circumstances. 142 5
In Foldi v. Jeffries4" ' the New Jersey court articulated a new
standard for parental conduct by holding that, while the doctrine
of parental immunity continues to bar suits alleging negligent su-
pervision, the doctrine does not protect a parent who willfully or
wantonly fails to supervise her child. 1'2" The Foldi court consid-
ered and rejected the "reasonable parent" guideline adopted by
the California Supreme Court in Gibson. The New Jersey court ob-
jected to the California test because of fear that the jurors would
substitute their own standards of childrearing for those of the de-
fendant-parent. ' 42' The New Jersey court maintained that parents
should have to defend their behavior only when it rises to the level
of wanton misconduct.1 42 9
The trend of abrogating parental immunity in situations of
failure to supervise children sets a precedent for parental liability
for prenatal injuries. As one commentator has pointed out, courts
may carve out exceptions to parental immunity for prenatal inju-
ries caused by gross negligence due to wanton and willful parental
behavior and for injuries caused by ordinary negligence. These ex-
ceptions would be similar to the exceptions to immunity for vehic-
ular driving negligence.143 ° Parental malpractice insurance is one
suggested solution 431 that may be a feasible way to insure compen-
sation. This solution, however, does nothing to alleviate the situa-
tion that gives rise to the claim-the mother's negligent behavior
or refusal of treatment.
(b) Court-Ordered Intervention
Courts have intervened to ensure medical treatment for chil-
dren when the treatment is deemed necessary.14" 2 Courts thus may
usurp parental control by removing the child from his parents'
care. When medical treatment of a fetus is at issue, however, pa-
1425. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
1426. 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2605. In Foldi, a two-and-a-half-year-old child wandered
into a neighbor's yard where a dog bit her on the face. The child's mother was gardening at
the time of the incident and defendants claimed the mother's negligent supervision contrib-
uted to the accident. Id. at 2603.
1427. Id. at 2605.
1428. Id.
1429. Id.
1430. Shaw, supra note 1349, at 113.
1431. Id.
1432. In re Adam L., 111 D.W.L.R. 25 (Super. Ct. D.C. 1982) (heart operation ordered
for child despite parents' objection). See also supra notes 1375-77 and accompanying text.
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rental autonomy issues take on an added dimension because the
mother's bodily integrity is directly affected. Given this dilemma,
some commentators posit that the mother's decision regarding the
child inside her should be respected at all times. According to this
position, the fetus can receive medical care only if the mother gives
informed consent. 1433 Others contend that maternal rights are not
absolute; rather, the mother's rights to bodily integrity and paren-
tal autonomy must be compromised in certain circumstances to ac-
commodate fetal rights.14 34 When ordering women to undergo med-
ical treatment, courts rely on traditional rationales without making
the obvious observation that mandating an invasive procedure is
fundamentally different from ordering pediatric care. Rationales
offered to justify court-ordered intervention include: the state's
power to prohibit the abortion of a viable fetus,14 3 5 the court's
power to order medical treatment for children despite parental ob-
jections,1 436 the waning doctrine of intrafamily tort immunity, 43 7
and the recognition of a cause of action for prenatal torts.
4 3 8
One form of abrogation of a pregnant woman's rights occurs
when courts order blood transfusions for pregnant women. The
leading case of Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v.
Anderson 43 ' held that "the unborn child is entitled to the law's
protection,' 14 0 and the court ordered a blood transfusion for an
eight months pregnant Jehovah Witness.144' The Raleigh court rec-
ognized two separate issues: (1) the issue of a fetus' right to treat-
1433. Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 1348, at 12; Annas, supra note 1348, at 45.
1434. See Note, The Fetal Patient and the Unwilling Mother: A Standard for Judi-
cial Intervention, 14 PAc. LJ. 1065, 1089 (1983). These commentators point out that the
notion of complete maternal autonomy is inconsistent with state laws that recognize a fetal
right to medical care and the state's duty to protect the health of the unborn. Id. Therefore,
implicit in the recognition of fetal rights is the acceptance of the idea that maternal rights
are not absolute. Id. One commentator, although recognizing that maternal rights are not
absolute, would limit court intervention to situations in which the fetus is a "provisional
patient." Id. at 1093.
1435. See supra notes 1359-61, 1381-82 and accompanying text.
1436. See supra notes 1375-77, 1432 and accompanying text.
1437. See supra notes 1413-29 and accompanying text.
1438. See supra note 1418 and infra note 1503 and accompanying text.
1439. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (per curiam), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
1440. Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538. Raleigh is a pre-Roe case. The Raleigh court relied
on two earlier decisions for its conclusion that an unborn child is entitled to legal protection.
In Smith v. Brennan, the New Jersey court allowed a child to sue for injuries negligently
inflicted prior to birth. 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960). In State v. Perricone, the New
Jersey court held that an infant was entitled to a blood transfusion despite the objection of
his Jehovah's Witness parents. 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
1441. Raleigh, 42 N.J. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
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ment in utero'442 and (2) the issue of compelling an adult to sub-
mit to procedures to save her own life.1443 Regarding the issue of
fetal right to treatment, the court simply stated without analysis
that the state had an interest in preserving fetal life, which af-
forded the unborn child the protection of the law.1444 The court did
not decide the second issue because "the welfare of the child and
the mother are so intertwined and inseparable that it would be im-
practicable to attempt to distinguish between them.1 445
Several limitations on the validity of the Raleigh decision ex-
ist.144 6 First, Raleigh illustrates that medical judgment can be in
error. The court relied on medical testimony that transfusions were
necessary to save the lives of both the mother and the fetus, but
the transfusion was never administered because the woman left the
hospital. Subsequently, she delivered a healthy child without the
transfusion. Second, implicit in the Raleigh court's decision to ap-
point a special guardian for the fetus is the judgment that a
mother is deemed unfit unless she acts in the best interests of her
child. The Raleigh case illustrates, however, that no one truly
knows a child's best interests. The court relied on the medical pro-
fession to determine the best interests of the fetus, but the medical
determination proved inaccurate. Third, the court refused to ac-
knowledge that fetal and maternal rights conflict in some situa-
tions, necessitating difficult policy decisions.
Another form of court-ordered intervention that abrogates a
pregnant woman's rights occurs when a court orders the woman to
undergo a caesarean section against her wishes. Two relatively re-
cent cases in Georgia144' and Colorado1448 illustrate the outer
reaches of the legal system's invasion of personal autonomy. The
Georgia Supreme Court, in Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County
Hospital,44 9 ordered a caesarean section over the woman's reli-
1442. Id. The Raleigh court characterized this issue as easier to resolve than the sec-
ond issue.
1443. Id.
1444. Id.
1445. Id.
1446. For an excellent discussion of the limitations of Raleigh, see Annas, supra note
1348, at 17.
1447. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981)
(per curiam).
1448. See Bowes & Selgestad, Fetal versus Maternal Rights: Medical and Legal Per-
spectives, 58 AM. J. OBSm'r. & GYNEc. 209, 209-11 (1981) (discussing an unreported Colorado
opinion).
1449. 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E. 2d 457 (1981) (per curiam). For a general discussion of
Jefferson, see Note, Court-Ordered Surgery for the Protection of a Viable Fetus, 5 W.N.
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gious objections.'1"5 The Georgia court based its decision on medi-
cal testimony that surgical intervention was necessary to save both
mother and fetus. 145' As in Raleigh, the Georgia court viewed the
life of the mother and the fetus as inseparable. 452 Relying on Roe
and Raleigh, the court extended legal protection to the fetus and
authorized the attending physician to administer all medical proce-
dures deemed necessary to preserve the life of the unborn child.
1453
The court engaged in a balancing test and held that the state's
interest in the life of the unborn fetus was sufficient to warrant
state interference "to protect a living, unborn human being from
meeting his or her death before being given the opportunity to
live.'" 145 Thus, the Georgia court removed the fetus from the wo-
man's custody through the juvenile court system.1455
The concurring opinion in Jefferson acknowledged the limited
power of any court to order a competent adult to submit to sur-
gery.14 56 The concurrence noted that, prior to this "unique" case,
such a court power would have seemed nonexistent. 14 7 However,
the recognition in Roe of the state interest in protecting the life of
a viable fetus, 455 coupled with the holding in Raleigh that an ex-
pectant mother in the later stages of her pregnancy no longer has
the right to refuse life-saving medical treatment for her unborn
child, 4 59 compels the conclusion that the fetus' right to live out-
weighed the mother's right to practice her religion by refusing
surgery. 460
A Colorado court exhibited similarly truncated reasoning
when the court ordered a pregnant woman to undergo a caesarean
section. 14" After a hearing conducted at the patient's bedside, the
ENG. L. REv. 125 (1982).
1450. Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
1451. Id. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459. Medical experts testified that if the woman chose to
have natural childbirth, she would have a 50% chance of dying and her unborn child would
have a 99% chance of dying. Id.
1452. Id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
1453. Id.
1454. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
1455. Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460. At least one judge questioned the juvenile court's
jurisdiction, commenting that the legislature, in drafting statutes giving the juvenile court
jurisdiction over children, meant children who had "seen the light of day." Id. at 92, 274
S.E.2d at 461-62.
1456. Id. at 89, 274 U.S. 460.
1457. Id.
1458. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
1459. 42 N.J. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
1460. 247 Ga. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
1461. Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 1448.
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juvenile court ordered the doctor to perform a caesarean section to
save the fetus' life despite the mother's objections. A psychiatrist
interviewed the patient and found her neither delusional nor in-
competent. 14 , 2 The court, nonetheless, took jurisdiction by finding
that the fetus was a dependent and neglected child within the
meaning of Colorado's Children's Code.1463 The medical staff
"viewed the patient's response as one of unreasonable insensitivity
to the welfare of her infant, ' 14 4 but the choice of caesarean section
was not without danger to the mother. The patient was obese and
the procedure posed a high risk for her.4 65 Nonetheless, the court's
directive was clear that doctors could administer medical treat-
ment necessary to save the life of the fetus against the will of the
pregnant woman.1 468
The Colorado decision provides the analytical framework
through which fetal rights can override maternal rights. The court
relied on the Raleigh decision in asserting jurisdiction to protect
the interests of the unborn child.1 46 7 The court also relied on rea-
soning in Roe that the state has a compelling interest to protect
the unborn. 468 The Colorado court found the fetus had protectable
rights.1469 Last, the court invoked the state's parens patria obliga-
tion to provide medical treatment to an unborn child to protect its
life over the unreasonable objections of its parents.470
In all three of these cases, the medical judgments that formed
the basis for court intervention proved to be in error-all three
women delivered healthy children without the recommended treat-
ment. 14 7 1 In the Colorado case, the fetal monitor overestimated the
amount of damage to the fetus that might result from delayed de-
livery.1472 An attending physician commented that the birth of a
1462. Id. at 209.
1463. COL. Rav. STAT. § 19-1-103 (1973 & Supp. 1985).
1464. Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 1448, at 211.
1465. Id.
1466. Id.
1467. Id. at 212.
1468. Id.
1469. Id. The court relied on Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140
(Juv. Ct. 1961). The Hoener court declared that the state had a duty to protect children in
its jurisdiction. "Children" included an unborn child. Id. at 524, 171 A.2d at 144.
1470. Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 1448, at 212. In a similar situation in Chicago, a
juvenile court judge gave a hospital attorney temporary custody of a fetus after the mother
refused to undergo a caesarean section because of religious reasons. The caesarean section
was performed and custody reverted to the parents. Am. Med. News, Feb. 19, 1982, at 13.
1471. Annas, supra note 1348, at 16.
1472. Id. at 17.
834 [Vol. 39:597
1986] CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND BIRTH 835
healthy child illustrated the limitations of continuous fetal heart
monitoring as a means for predicting neonatal outcome. 14 73 Indeed,
all of these cases illustrate that physicians cannot predict fetal
danger with a high degree of accuracy. Even if total accuracy were
assured, however, the seriousness of depriving women of control
over their own bodies makes forced caesarean sections unattrac-
tive.1474 Unfortunately, these courts failed to consider the potential
implications for society inherent in their decisions to order
intervention.
A third type of court-ordered intervention stems from medical
knowledge regarding the effects certain behavior during pregnancy
has on the health of the fetus. For example, smoking during preg-
nancy increases the risks of prematurity and spontaneous abor-
tion,14 75 and drinking has been linked to multiple congenital abnor-
malities.1 476 A court seeking to protect a fetus, therefore, may
decide to order a pregnant woman to adhere to a special diet or to
abstain from drinking, smoking, and other toxic substances. 1477 For
example, an Illinois circuit court ordered a pregnant woman who
had previously given birth to a heroin-addicted child to refrain
from using heroin. 478 Subsequently, the department of children
and family services moved to vacate an order appointing a guard-
ian for the fetus because of statutory limits to the juvenile court's
authority, practical problems, and difficult policy issues. Before the
court could resolve the issue, the mother gave birth to a nonad-
dicted child. The circuit court nevertheless expressed the view that
subject-matter jurisdiction was present. 479
In another unreported case, a Baltimore circuit court ordered
1473. Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 1448, at 211.
1474. Annas, supra note 1348, at 17, 45.
1475. H. TUCHMANN-DuPLESSIS, DRUG EFFECTS ON THE FETUS 183 (1975). For a discus-
sion of spontaneous abortion, or miscarriage, see supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
1476. See Wright, Barrison, Lewis, Macrae, Waterson, Toplis, Gordon, Morris & Mur-
ray-Lyon, Alcohol Consumption, Pregnancy, and Low Birthweight, 1 LANcET 663 (1983);
see also, Quellette, Rosett, Rosman & Weiner, Adverse Effects on Offspring of Maternal
Alcohol Abuse During Pregnancy, 297 N. ENG. J. MED. 528, 528-30 (1977). For a discussion
of the effects on the fetus when a mother uses drugs, alcohol or tobacco, see supra notes
115-23 and accompanying text.
1477. Shaw, supra note 1349, at 74, suggests legal controls on pregnant women's con-
sumption of alcohol similar to DUI statutes.
1478. Unreported 1982 case discussed in Parness, Protection of Potential Human Life
in Illinois: Policy & Law at Odds, 5 N. ILL. UL. REv. 1, 20-21 (1984). Some medical evidence
suggests that a comprehensive methodone maintenance program is preferable to detoxifica-
tion. Detoxification, as ordered in this case, may be more harmful than passive dependence.
Finnegan & Wapner, Drug Abuse in Pregnancy, 111 MED. TIMEs 4 (1983).
1479. Parness, supra note 1478, at 20-21.
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a pregnant woman to enroll in a drug rehabilitation program and
submit to weekly urinalysis until her baby was born.148 0 The court
ordered this monitoring intervention after evidence revealed the
mother was using large amounts of Quaalude, Valium, morphine
and cocaine.14sl As in the Illinois situation,482 the Baltimore wo-
man had previously given birth to an addicted child. 1483
Some limits on this type of court-ordered monitoring do exist.
A California court of appeals refused to prohibit a mother who fol-
lowed a macrobiotic diet 484 from conceiving children as a condi-
tion of her probation on a child endangerment conviction. 148 5 The
court did find, however, that if the woman became pregnant, she
could "be required to follow an intensive prenatal and neonatal
treatment program monitored by both the probation officer and by
a supervising physician.' ' 488 The court thus respected the rights of
the potential mother, but revealed a willingness to hold that fetal
rights override maternal rights in certain instances. This judicial
willingness to override maternal rights again was accompanied by a
complete failure to discuss any of the broad implications for
society.
(c) Woman's Right to Refuse Judicial Intervention
The state's power to interfere with a pregnant woman's right
to refuse medical treatment is not unlimited. Limitations on state
intervention currently exist at previability. Two recent cases clar-
ify this judicial position. In a 1983 decision, Taft v. Taft, s8 a
pregnant woman appealed a judgment ordering her to submit to an
operation that would preserve her pregnancy. The woman, who
had a prior history of requiring a surgical procedure 148 to carry her
1480. Shaw, supra note 1349, at 104-05.
1481. Id.
1482. See supra notes 1478-79 and accompanying text.
1483. Shaw, supra note 1349, at 104.
1484. A macrobiotic diet is a harmful fad diet which, if followed precisely, results in
severe malnutrition. This diet represents extreme adherence to a natural diet containing
only organic foods. Depending on the length of adherence to this diet, cases of scurvy, ane-
mia, hypoproteinemia, hypocalcemia, emaciation, loss of kidney function, and death have
been reported. Alfin-Slater & Aftergood, Food Fads, in NUTRITIONAL SUPPORT OF MEDICAL
PRACTICE 98, 106 (H. Schneider, C. Anderson & D. Coursin eds. 1983).
1485. State v. Pointer, 10 FA. L. REP. (BNA) 1270 (Cal. App. Feb. 17, 1984).
1486. Id.
1487. 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983).
1488. The court described the surgical procedure as a "purse string" operation. Id. at
332, 446 N.E.2d at 396.
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children to term, 1489 refused to allow a suturing procedure in this
instance to prevent the miscarriage of her not yet viable fetus. Al-
though the trial judge found the operation a "very minor one,' 149 0
the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the woman's refusal to
submit to the operation for religious reasons.149'1 The court recog-
nized the state interest in the well-being of "unborn children,' 1 492
but found that the state had failed to show an interest sufficiently
compelling in this case to overcome the woman's right to practice
her religion as she chose.' 93 The court did note, however, that
some situations might justify mandatory medical treatment to sus-
tain the completion of a pregnancy. 49
4
In a 1985 decision, Mercy Hospital v. Jackson, 95 a Maryland
court denied appointment of a guardian for a patient who refused
to consent to blood transfusions during a consensual caesarean sec-
tion because of her religious convictions. 1496 The court recognized
the right to refuse medical treatment as a corollary to the informed
consent doctrine. 1497 The court noted, however, that fetal survival
or support was not endangered by the woman's refusal to undergo
medical treatment. 498 The opinion thus implied that, if the wo-
man's refusal had threatened the life of the fetus, the court may
have decided to order intervention.1499
(d) The Future of Maternal Liability for Negligence During
Pregnancy
Civil liability for actions during pregnancy could impose enor-
mous burdens on women. Courts that have established liability for
negligent behavior during pregnancy have set precedent with po-
1489. In the one instance when the woman had not undergone the suturing procedure,
her pregnancy terminated in the seventh month and the child did not survive. Id.
1490. Id.
1491. Id.
1492. Id.
1493. Id. at 334, 446 N.E.2d at 397.
1494. Id. "Perhaps the State's interest, in some circumstances, might be sufficiently
compelling... to justify such a restriction on a person's constitutional right of privacy." Id.
1495. 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985). At the time of the suit the surgery was
concluded, the child born, and the patient discharged. The court, nevertheless, decided the
hear the case because of the likelihood that the issue would arise again. See id. at - 489
A.2d at 1132.
1496. The patient was a Jehovah's Witness. Id. at _ 489 A.2d at 1131.
1497. Id. at , 489 A.2d at 1133 n.7. See also supra notes 1365-66 and accompany-
ing text.
1498. 62 Md. App. at - , 489 A.2d at 1134.
1499. Id.
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tentially far reaching ramifications. A Michigan court, for example,
recognized a fetal right to be born healthy rather than merely to be
born alive by allowing a trial court to hold a mother responsible for
negligently impairing fetal health.1500 The suit, brought on behhlf
of an infant whose teeth were discolored because of the mother's
ingestion of tetracycline, alleged that the woman was negligent in
failing to seek medical care and in failing to inform the physician
that she was taking tetracycline. 150 1 In remanding the case for de-
termination of the reasonableness of the mother's action, the
Grodin court relied on prior decisions abrogating parent-child tort
immunity 502 and decisions holding that a child could bring an ac-
tion for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries. 50 3
The Grodin court concluded that the mother would bear the
same liability for negligently injuring her child as would a third
person. 50 4 The Grodin decision is an attempt to regulate the ac-
tions of a pregnant or fertile woman prior to the time of viability
or even conception of the fetus. The implications are far reaching.
Under the Grodin rationale, only the doctrine of intrafamilial tort
immunity, which is increasingly waning,150 5 and the impracticali-
ties of initiating the action prevent a child injured by the mother's
prenatal conduct from suing her.
If, as the court suggested in Grodin, a mother can be sued for
conduct during her pregnancy that results in harm to the child she
is carrying, the failure to avail oneself of prenatal diagnosis of de-
fects5 0 6 or the refusal to undergo recommended fetal surgery could
subject the mother to liability. Some see the advent of new tech-
niques in prenatal care as justifiable limitations on a woman's right
of bodily integrity once she has given up her right not to procre-
ate.150 7 These commentators argue that as soon as a woman be-
comes pregnant, she must give up some of her rights because she
1500. Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
1501. Id. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
1502. Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972).
1503. Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971) (recovery allowed
for brain damage suffered during the fourth month in utero based on reasoning that a child
has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body).
1504. 102 Mich. App. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
1505. See supra notes 1413-29 and accompanying text.
1506. See Kolata, First Trimester Prenatal Diagnosis, 221 SCIENCE 1030 (1983) (dis-
cussing advancing medical capabilities to diagnose chromosomal and biochemical defects
earlier in pregnancy); Shaw, supra note 1349, at 76 n.85 (explaining prenatal diagnosis
procedures).
1507. For a discussion of the constitutional right not to procreate, see generally supra
section V of this Special Project.
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has created a new being with a new set of rights. 5 0 8 Another com-
mentator views the parental right to reproduce as a privilege to
produce healthy infants.1509 Therefore, to the extent that the
health of the fetal patient is jeopardized by the mother's inten-
tional or negligent acts, courts should hold the woman liable. 51 0
This line of thinking and recent developments in the courts have
led one scholar to conclude that thirty jurisdictions would be re-
ceptive to the recognition of a mother's duty to her unborn child at
any stage of development.' 51' The illogical result of such a rule
would be that a woman would have the right to abort her fetus
early in pregnancy, but could be liable in tort for injuring that fe-
tus during the same period. 5 112
One method of limiting a woman's increased liability is by
statute. For example, a California statute provides that no cause of
action arises against a parent on the claim that the parent's child
should not have been conceived, or, if conceived, should not have
been born.' 53 California courts interpret this statute as prohibiting
suits brought on behalf of a fetus or infant. 514 The court in Turpin
v. Sortini found that this statute relieved parents of liability for
deciding to conceive or failing to abort a potentially defective
child. 51 5
Absent statutory protection, a woman's liability for prenatal
negligence is a definite possibility. The degree to which a parent
can jeopardize the health-and possibly the life-of her fetus is a
1508. See Robertson, Legal Considerations: The Duties of Mothers and Physicians in
Fetal Treatment, in THE UNBORN PATIENT 171, 179 (M. Harrison, M. Golbus & R. Filly eds.
1984).
1509. Shaw, The Potential Plaintiff, in 2 GENETIcs AND THE LAW 225, 227 (A. Milun-
sky & G. Annas eds. 1980).
1510. Id. at 228. See also Shaw, supra note 1349, at 116. Shaw describes the "moral
duty" to promote the health and well-being of children. She sees healthy children as an
ultimate societal goal to which parental wishes should be subordinated. Id.
1511. Beal, supra note 1385, at 357.
1512. See Note, A Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health? 58 IND. L.J. 531, 541-45
(1983) (discussing the complex remedy issues involved in a cause of action based on mater-
nal duty to the fetus). This problem could be avoided if legislation created a duty of care
only after the fetus was viable.
1513. See, CAL CiV. CODE § 43.6 (West 1982).
1514. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 229, 643 P.2d 954, 959, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337,
345 (1982).
1515. Id. The Turpin court analyzed the legislative history of § 43.6 and concluded
that the legislature had intended to eliminate "any liability or other similar economic pres-
sure which might induce potential parents to abort or decline to conceive a potentially de-
fective child." Id.
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decision that some feel the mother should make,151 6 while others
argue society should monitor that decision. 1 7 If opinion becomes
resolved, the legal system is poised to attach liability to certain
acts of a woman during her pregnancy.
2. Conflict in the Hospital
(a) Conflicts Resolved without Resort to the Court System
Not all conflicts between maternal and fetal rights are resolved
in the court system. Often those situations that are not litigated
present the conflicts in a most cogent way. Many of these situa-
tions occur in the hospital.
Some persons in the medical profession champion the well-be-
ing of the fetus 518 and would resolve conflicts between the rights
of a fetus and of a mother in favor of the fetus. 51 9 In one in-
stance, 520 after determining the life of the fetus was at risk, 521
physicians performed a caesarean section despite the objections of
an unmarried pregnant woman. In discussing the case, the physi-
cian-authors point out that no force was necessary to subdue the
patient, although she continued to protest verbally.1522 This fact
seemed to assuage any misgivings that the medical staff had in
choosing to bypass the "orderly decision-making process"' 5 23 of re-
questing juvenile court intervention.
In other situations medical personnel resolve the conflict in
favor of maternal rights. In two instances doctors decided to honor
the mother's refusal to deliver by caesarean section and both fe-
tuses died. 1524 In one of the cases, the woman who refused consent
explained that the fetus' death would resolve personal
problems. 52 5 In the second instance the patient refused because
1516. See Annas, supra note 1348; Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 1348.
1517. See Shaw, supra note 1349; Robertson, supra note 1354; Mathieu, supra note
1352.
1518. See Jurow & Paul, Cesarean Delivery for Fetal Distress Without Maternal
Consent, 63 AM. J. OBSTET. & GyNEc. 596, 598 (1984); Bowes & Selgestad, supra note 1448,
at 213.
1519. Jurow & Paul, supra note 1518, at 597.
1520. Id.
1521. Id.
1522. Id.
1523. Id.
1524. Lieberman, Mazor, Chaim & Cohen, The Fetal Right to Live, 53 Am. J. OBSTr.
& GYNEC. 515, 515-16 (1979).
1525. Id. at 516.
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she was afraid of dying.1526 The authors reporting these cases char-
acterize the conflict as one that requires the physician either to be
a passive accomplice to homocide or to act against the patient's
will and the law.1527 They conclude that the physician must warn
the patient she is commiting a felony'5 28 but that the physician
cannot proceed without her consent.
5 29
(b) Suggested Theories to Resolve Conflicts
Some medical journalists resolve maternal-fetal conflicts by
analyzing the status of the persons involved' 53q-the mother with
fully recognized rights at law and the fetus with potential rights.
After analyzing the status of the mother and fetus, one approach
to resolving conflicts is to employ a balancing test.
One attorney writing in the medical literature balances these
respective rights by biological reference to the dependent condition
of the fetus. 5 3 ' The mother can exercise her rights by not acting,
but a fetus can realize its rights only through a third person's af-
firmative act.
The third party capable of acting, the obstetrician, may refuse
to order surgery without the mother's consent because of potential
civil and criminal liability. Thus, the fetus is effectively prevented
from realizing any rights. 153 2 Absent any acceptable alternative to
requiring a patient's consent to surgery, the obstetrician's role in
situations of conflict between maternal and fetal rights remains
that of counselor. 153 3 Although legislatures could provide the obste-
trician with a cloak of immunity by drafting statutes making crimi-
nal a woman's wrongful refusal to consent to surgery, a woman's
good faith refusal based on fear for her own life or health would
seriously weaken the effectiveness of such a statute.15 4 A second
method of resolving the conflict focuses on the relative risks to the
1526. Id.
1527. Id.
1528. Id. at 517.
1529. Id. The authors recognized that the existence of risks to the patient might ne-
gate the felony charge. Id. See Feldman & Freiman, Prophylactic Caesarean Section at
Term?, 312 N. ENG. J. OF MED. 1264, 1267 (1985). The authors point out that caesarean
sections pose increased risk. Id. at 1265.
1530. Shriner, Maternal Versus Fetal Rights: A Clinical Dilemma, 53 AM. J. OnsTT.
& GYNEC. 518 (1979).
1531. Id. at 518.
1532. Id. at 519.
1533. Id.
1534. Id.
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mother and fetus rather than the parties' abilities to act. 5 35 Bal-
ancing the risks, however, might prove impractical because the bal-
ance might always favor the mother. The respected right not to
undergo surgery implicates principles of individual liberty widely
accepted by society.153
6
Some areas of conflict between maternal and fetal rights are
not susceptible to a balancing test. For example, medical commen-
tators have posited other methods of resolving conflicts when preg-
nant women use substances harmful to the fetus, including to-
bacco, alcohol, and certain drugs. Physicians discourage the use of
tobacco, hallucinogens, and alcohol during pregnancy. 537 The po-
tential for women of childbearing age to use or abuse these sub-
stances is great. Accordingly, the potential for exposing fetuses to
adverse effects is great. Some in the medical community feel that
the solution rests with educating the pregnant woman about the
dangers posed by these substances. 158 Others suggest that medical
personnel monitor the woman's actions and resort to legal sanction
when necessary to protect the health of her fetus. 589
(c) The Possibility of Compulsory Fetal Surgery
Medical advances have made possible the surgical correction
of certain fetal problems.'" 0 The pregnant woman's cooperation is
assumed. In rare cases, however, a woman may refuse to consent to
fetal surgery. These situations raise the possibility of compulsory
fetal surgery. Physicians already have forced women to undergo
caesarean sections for the sake of the fetus.1'' As fetal surgery
moves from experimental to accepted medical practice, the possi-
bility that a woman could be forced to undergo fetal surgery with-
out consent could become a reality. 542 Terming the woman's re-
fusal "fetal abuse," or "child abuse" at a later stage in pregnancy,
1535. Id.
1536. Id.
1537. See Finnegan & Wapner, Drug Abuse in Pregnancy, 111 Mm). TniEs 4 (1983)
(general discussion of harmful effects of drugs during pregnancy). See also supra notes 115-
23 and accompanying text.
1538. See Lieberman, supra note 1524, at 517.
1539. See Shaw, supra note 1349, at 84, 89 102-04.
1540. Elias & Annas, Perspectives on Fetal Surgery, 145 Ah. J. OBST-rn. & GYNEC. 807
(1983). The authors predict routine application of fetal surgery. Id. at 809. See supra notes
97-98 and accompanying text.
1541. For a discussion of one situation in which a woman was forced to undergo a
caesarean section, see supra notes 1520-23 and accompanying text.
1542. See Elias & Annas, supra note 1540, at 811.
842 [Vol. 39:597
1986] CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND BIRTH 843
might enable a court to order treatment against the mother's
wishes.
The possibility of compulsory fetal therapy raises several
problems. 15 43 First, a woman will be forced to undergo a procedure
for the benefit of another. Presently, parents are not required to
undergo surgery for the benefit of their children who have been
born alive.1 544 Second, compulsory fetal surgery deprives a woman
of autonomy because her body is invaded against her consent for
the potential benefit to the fetus. Last, compulsory fetal surgery
may abrogate the woman's constitutional rights.
Commentators have approached this dilemma from different
angles. One approach stems from the Supreme Court's indication
that a mother has a greater stake in an abortion decision than the
potential father.1 54 5 Some physicians argue that the logical exten-
sion of this premise leads to the conclusion that the mother should
prevail in any conflict between the father and the mother about
medical treatment of their fetus. 1546 These commentators view the
mother's consent as a necessary precondition for surgery even if
the father consents to the surgery.1547 Other physicians argue that
the establishment of safe and effective prenatal surgical techniques
alters the rights and duties of mothers and physicians. These new
duties would lead to criminal or civil penalties for not acting in a
reasonable fashion to avoid the birth of a defective child.1548 The
potential conflict between mother and child is further complicated
by the lack of consensus among physicians about what duty they
owe to the unborn child. A third approach, therefore, focuses on
the physician's duties. A physician is subject to two antithetical
principles: the need to protect and promote the best interests of
his fetal patient versus the need to respect the personal autonomy
of his maternal patient whose values and beliefs give her a perspec-
tive on her own best interests. Recognizing these polar influences,
1543. Ruddick & Wilcox, supra note 1348, at 10 (raising problematic situations in
which decisions will have to be made regarding fetal surgery); Robertson, supra note 1508,
at 174-77.
1544. See Annas, supra note 1348, at 17.
1545. See Danforth v. Planned Parenthood, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). ("The obvious fact
is that when the wife and the husband disagree on this decison [abortion] the view of only
one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physicially
bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as
between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.")
1546. Elias & Annas, supra note 1540, at 810-11.
1547. Id. at 811. The authors state that the mother must be informed of all the risks
to herself and to her fetus.
1548. See Robertson, supra note 1508, at 174-77.
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some have suggested a framework for identifying the physician's
moral obligations to the fetus and its mother and reaching deci-
sions by assessing the relative weights of those obligations.154 9
As a result of current uncertainty about fetal surgery, doctors
generally resolve conflicts between fetal and maternal interests in
favor of the woman.1550 Control of a woman is restricted to educat-
ing her about the harmful effects of cigarette, alcohol, and drug
abuse 55 ' to attempt vigorously to persuade her to consent to fetal
treatment. 1552 The rights and duties of mothers and physicians will
change drastically, however, when fetal surgery becomes routine.
As in the case of forced caesarean section intervention, if the medi-
cal profession and members of society reach a consensus that fetal
surgery should be compulsory, the legal machinery exists to negate
a woman's choice.
3. Conflict in the Workplace
Women account for increasingly large numbers of workers in
the marketplace, yet women's choices in the workplace increasingly
have been restricted. One focus of attention is the link between
toxins in the workplace and fetal harm.155 3 Although workplace
toxins affect the reproductive capabilities of both men and
women,15 54 policies normally restrict the employment of fertile
women but not of fertile men.15 5 These policies threaten equal op-
portunity for women by seriously reducing the job choices availa-
ble to females of childbearing age. Existing legislation protects
1549. See Chervenak & McCullough, Perinatal Ethics: A Practical Method of Analy-
sis of Obligations to Mother and Fetus, 66 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEc. 442 (1985) (This process
requires thorough documentation and objective assessment of fetal and maternal best inter-
ests, which sometimes may be an impossible task. Id. at 446. See also Robertson, supra note
1508, at 174-75 (suggesting a balancing approach to determine when the need for fetal inter-
vention outweighs maternal rights to bodily integrity).
1550. Chervenak & McCullough, supra note 1549, at 446.
1551. Id. at 444-45.
1552. Id. at 445.
1553. See, e.g., Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments:
The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 66 IowA L. Rav. 63, 119-29 (1980) (sumnmary of fetal vulnerability as affected by haz-
ardous environmental factors); Nothstein & Ayres, Sex-Based Considerations of Differenti-
ation in the Workplace: Exploring the Biomedical Interface between OSHA and Title VII,
26 ViLL. L. REv. 239 (1981) (exclusion of women only from agents that affect reproductive
capacity will not solve the problem of toxic effects); Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect
the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals
under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641 (1981) (employers adopt exclusionary policies for women).
1554. See Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 1553, at 243-56.
1555. See Williams, supra note 1553, at 647-51.
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women in the employment arena,"'56 but judicial interpretations
can limit the choices of women of childbearing age. In upholding
employers' policies that are designed to protect the unborn, courts
implicitly recognize that fetal rights not only exist but also over-
ride a woman's right to a higher paying, albeit more dangerous,
job. Two recent cases, Wright v. Olin Corp.1557 and Oil, Chemical
& Atomic Workers International Union v. American Cyanamid
Co., 558 illustrate judicial approval of the growing restrictions on a
woman's personal autonomy.
In Wright v. Olin Corp. 5 9 female employees challenged the
defendant-company's "female employment and fetal vulnerability"
program, which excluded or restricted pregnant and fertile women
from jobs exposing them to workplace toxins. 560 The defendant
stated that its program was designed to protect the unborn fetuses
of female workers from workplace dangers. 5 1 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit differentiated between a
woman's right to make her own choices regarding workplace
hazards and her right to make the same choices on behalf of her
unborn children.156 2 In addressing the justifications for the com-
pany's policy, the court analogized the fetus to invitees and licen-
sees who may be exposed to hazards when legitimately on business
1556. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination on the basis of
sex in the hiring, discharge, compensation, or other terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment. Title VII was amended in 1978 by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act which ex-
panded further the definition of sex discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of
"pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1983). The
legislative history indicates that the amendment extended protection to both fertile and
pregnant women. The House report indicated that the purpose of the amendment was to
expand protection to the "whole range of matters concerning the childbearing process." HR.
REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749,
4753. Neither the language of the amendment nor its legislative history uses a fetal protec-
tion rationale to resolve the issue of excluding women from workplace toxins.
1557. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). See generally Note, The Fetus as Business Cus-
tomer in the Toxic Workplace: Wright v. Olin Corp. Sets Standards for Fetal Protection
Programs, 1984 DaT. C.L. Rav. 973.
1558. 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
1559. 697 F.2d 1172.
1560. Id. at 1182. Defendant's program defined workplace toxins to include "known or
suspected abortifacient or teratogenic agents." Abortifacients are harmful agents that in-
duce abortion. See generally supra section I[ of this Special Project, for a discussion of a
challenge before the Supreme Court of a state law regulating abortifacients' use as contra-
ceptives. A teratogenic agent is a chemical that manifests an effect upon the fetus from
fertilization until birth.
1561. 697 F.2d at 1189.
1562. Id. at 1189 n.25. But see In Re National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. 249, 259 (S.D.
Fla. 1977) (commenting that the question of harm to the fetus is the mother's decision and
not that of the court).
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premises. 56 3 Based on this analogy, the court reasoned that the
safety of workers' unborn children should be no less a legitimate
business concern than the safety of the traditional business licen-
see or invitee. 156 4 The court, therefore, concluded that employers
may impose otherwise impermissible restrictions on women's em-
ployment opportunities if those restrictions are reasonably neces-
sary to protect the health of the unborn children of female employ-
ees against the hazards of the workplace. 565 The court then issued
guidelines for determining when a business necessity defense
would justify excluding pregnant women from hazardous areas of
the workplace. 566 The employer will prevail if objective evi-
dence 5 67 shows that (1) significant risks of harm to unborn chil-
dren exist, (2) the risks are confined to exposure of women, (3) the
restrictive policy effectively protects the unborn, and (4) no ac-
ceptable alternative policy exists. 568
In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union v.
American Cyanamid Co.' 569 the defendant announced it would ex-
clude women of childbearing capacity from certain high risk jobs to
protect unborn children. This category included women between
the ages of sixteen and fifty unless the women elected voluntary
sterilization. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) challenged this fetal protection policy. 57 0 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed an
administrative law judge's decision that held the sterilization op-
1563. 697 F.2d at 1189.
1564. Id.
1565. Id. at 1189-90.
1566. Id. at 1190-92. But see Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992-94
(5th Cir. 1982) (firing of a pregnant X-ray technician illegal for failing to utilize a less dis-
criminatory alternative).
1567. The court emphasized that the employer's subjective, good faith belief will not
suffice; independent, objective evidence must support these contentions. 697 F.2d at 1190.
1568. Id. at 1190-91. The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's judgment for de-
fendant, EEOC v. Olin Corp., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1646 (W.D.N.C. 1980), in all
respects except the lower court's holding that medical evidence justified the fetal vulnerabil-
ity policy and that the company instituted the policy with no intent to discriminate. 697
F.2d at 1176, 1192. The Fourth Circuit then remanded the case for further adjudication
according to the newly established guidelines. Id. at 1192. On remand, Wright v. Olin, 585 F.
Supp. 1447 (W.D.N.C. 1984), the lower court held that defendant had met the Fourth Cir-
cuit's standards and had successfully rebutted the prima facie case of discrimination by
showing that the risk was substantially confined to women and that no acceptable alterna-
tive policies existed. Id. at 1452. In issuing its opinion, the lower court praised defendant for
choosing a policy of fetal protection and called the choice "a social good that should be
encouraged and not penalized." Id. at 1453.
1569. 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
1570. American Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1596 (1981).
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tion of the fetus protection policy was not a "hazard" of "employ-
ment" under the language of OSHA157 1 and, therefore, did not vio-
late OSHA standards. The court asserted that the policy's
application to women was "imposed by unavoidable physiological
facts.' 15 7 2 The court conceded that women "were put to a most un-
happy choice.' 157 3 Arguably, however, women had no choice at all.
The company policy did not allow a female employee to choose
whether to risk the danger to a potentially developing fetus. In-
stead, the company made the choice for her under the euphemism
of a "fetus protection policy." Under this policy all women employ-
ees of childbearing age, not just pregnant women, are prohibited
from working at jobs that expose them to toxic substances at levels
scientists believe to be unsafe for a developing fetus.
Neither the Olin nor the American Cyanamid decision was ar-
ticulated in terms of fetal rights, yet the recognition that the fetus
is owed protection underlies not only the company's articulation of
the policy but also the judicial reasoning upholding the policy. His-
torically, employers have limited equal employment opportunities
for women by restricting their employment on the basis of a pro-
fessed concern for the health of women and their offspring. 5 74 Per-
haps the underlying reason for these emerging workplace toxin pol-
icies is a renewed effort to exclude women from high paying jobs
traditionally filled by males. Employers of typically female-domi-
nated jobs have not demonstrated as much concern with shielding
their workers from contact with hazardous substances. 5 75 The Olin
and American Cyanamid courts only superficially considered the
question of the effects of exposure on male workers. Because scien-
tific studies of hazards posed to the fetus by workplace toxins fo-
1571. 741 F.2d at 445. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 Pub. L. No. 91-596,
§ 5(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982)).
1572. 741 F.2d at 450.
1573. Id.
1574. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
1575. Address by Lucinda Finley, New York University National Conference on Labor
(June 7, 1985) reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 116, at A-13 (June 17, 1985).
Lucinda Finley, Yale University law professor, warned New York University's annual
National Conference on Labor that overbroad fetal plans that remove women workers of
child-bearing age from jobs involving exposure to workplace toxins may restrict women's
employment opportunities. Professor Finley suggested that employers who adopted fetal
protection policies focusing on female workers avoided measures that would make the work-
place safer for workers of both sexes. In addition, she stated that fetal protection plans
directed solely at women have a "potentially discriminatory motivation." She urged employ-
ers to stop thinking of the issue "as solely a women's [sic] problem." Id.
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* cus on the exposure of women rather than of men,1576 more scien-
tific data is available to support employer policies that exclude
women on a business necessity rationale.
The more appropriate solution to the issue of workplace toxins
is for the woman, rather than the employer, to weigh the risks.
Employers can avoid liability157" by informing female workers of
any risks and acting reasonably to clean up the workplace. The
potential for control and the obvious exercise of control over
women is readily apparent from these two recent decisions. Olin
and American Cyanamid illustrate, however, that the workplace
has joined the courtroom and the hospital as an arena in which
control may be exercised over women's choices with regard to the
fetus she carries or may carry in the future.
E. CONCLUSION
As moral codes, social customs, and ethical considerations
change, the law evolves. Scientific advances, which pose new ques-
tions for judicial scrutiny, create the momentum for legal innova-
tions. The definition of both maternal and fetal rights will evolve
depending on how the law responds to changes in medical
technology.
Although the law acknowledges fetal rights to certain material
things,157 18 a fetal right to life itself remains unsettled. Increasingly,
courts recognize fetal interests and often prefer them to the inter-
ests of the mother.1 57 9 Medical advances elevate the fetus to the
status of patient.15 80 Employers seek to protect the fetus from the
hazards of the workplace.1581 Advocates for maternal rights have
not been silent. These proponents have pressed their arguments in
the courtroom, hospital, and workplace. In spite of these efforts,
recent court decisions, medical advances, and workplace fetal pro-
tection policies evidence the erosion of maternal rights in major
arenas.
1576. Williams, supra note 1553, at 656-58. "Exposure of either parent prior to con-
ception to substances that damage the germ cells is an additional way in which fetuses may
be harmed." Id. at 656.
1577. See Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to Occupational Ill-
ness, 81 MICH. L. RE V. 1379, 1489-91 (1983) (discussing legal and factual issues surrounding
application of prenatal recovery theories to a toxic workplace setting).
1578. For example, a fetus possesses certain inheritance rights. See generally supra
section IV of this Special Project.
1579. See supra notes 1432-86 and accompanying text.
1580. See supra accompanying and following note 1412.
1581. See supra notes 1553-76 and accompanying text.
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Balancing the competing considerations of maternal and fetal
interests to determine reasonable solutions is a difficult process. A
woman's interest in deciding what is to be done to her own body
and society's interest in producing healthy offspring each deserve
serious attention. Neither interest automatically tips the balance
in either direction. Moreover, the resolution of this conflict has se-
rious implications for the kind of society in which we shall live.
A mother rarely will refuse medical treatment that is neces-
sary to protect the health of her fetus, and the instances of conflict
between fetal rights and maternal interests in bodily integrity will
be few. Deciding that fetal rights will prevail in those few in-
stances, however, inevitably will lead to a society that will require
monitoring of all pregnant and potentially fertile women to assure
effective enforcement of those fetal rights. As medical advances
turn the experimental into the routine, the pregnant woman con-
ceivably could be forced to undergo surgery for the sake of the fe-
tus she carries even though she would not be forced to undergo
surgery for a child who was already born. Monitoring and enforce-
ment problems could threaten to turn our society into a prototype
of an Orwellian novel if fetal interests override maternal choice.
Maternal choice can only extend so far. The law does not allow
a woman to abort a fetus after it is viable. A competent woman,
however, should have the right to make decisions about her own
body up until the time of birth. The difference between fetus and
child is a great one; the separateness of the latter from the mother
is contrasted with the oneness of the former. Until the moment of
birth, everything done to the fetus also affects the woman. In a
difficult decision, the woman's present right to bodily integrity
should prevail over the rights of a "potential" person. Further-
more, physicians' attempts to predict potential harm to a fetus are
not always accurate. Indeed, in the two reported instances of
court-ordered caesarean section, the orders were never carried out,
and both women delivered healthy children despite medical and
judicial judgment to the contrary.
Rather than subjecting women to control by courts and physi-
cians, the answer lies in educating women about the potential dan-
gers their behavior poses for the fetus. A woman who is aware of
the harm to the fetus she carries rarely rejects medical help. Al-
though some tragedies may occur as a result of respecting a wo-
man's right to refuse an operation that physicians believe to be
warranted, the instances will be few. Because of the fallibility of
medical science, preserving the rights of all competent adults to
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control their own bodies is preferable to living in a society that
would attempt to monitor every action of a pregnant woman. No
one can see into the future to ascertain the correctness of one's
decisions. To create a society in which the "right" decision will al-
ways be made is to undermine choice in its most basic sense. By
asking what kind of society we want, we may opt for an imperfect
world, but one that leaves room for personal autonomy.
XII. Conclusion
As medical technology continues to advance rapidly, new legal
issues arise and increase in complexity. This is particularly true of
the law surrounding conception, pregnancy, and birth. This Special
Project has examined the medical techiques themselves and their
implications on various legal issues. While recognizing that the law
inevitably lags behind technology, the Special Project has pointed
out the need for prompt judicial and legislative response to medi-
cal advances. These advances necessitate a thorough examination
and understanding of the legal issues surrounding conception,
pregnancy, and birth. It is hoped that this Special Project will
point out the need for, and contribute to, such an understanding.
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